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Abstract 
The purpose of this context statement is to investigate those factors which either 
contributed towards or impeded delivery of key recommendations from the Fraud Review, 
Attorney General (2006). These public works comprise three independent but intrinsically linked 
projects; the National Fraud Reporting Centre (NFRC), National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) 
and the Economic Crime Academy (ECA). 
Critical analysis shows how the success of each project influenced and contributed 
directly to the next project. 
Examination is made of how, without vision and the continuity of leadership, these 
public works would either not exist today or would have failed to be as successful as they are. 
Reflection upon this, together with analyses of individual and organisational leadership styles, 
stimulated two unavoidable and fundamental questions to be raised: 
• What does the Police Service now stand for? 
• Is the current model of police leadership fit for purpose? 
Critical analysis of the role of police leadership in the delivery of these public works led 
to a further, specific question: 
• Is the police response to fraud appropriate? 
 This is because police responses to fraud often appear to be in conflict with Peelian 
Principles, ACPO (2012) and are more biased towards serving the criminal justice system rather 
than delivering social justice through interventions that are morally and ethically grounded. 
On commencement of this context statement the intention was for it to be read by 
likeminded leaders and visionaries, those who do not fit the norm or stereotype of a typical 
police manager; as the context statement evolved so too has the intended readership. 
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Throughout reflective assessment and consideration of police leadership and today’s 
performance culture, it became increasingly apparent that this subject should be core reading 
for police leaders of the future. However, on completion of the context statement, it is apparent 
that readership audience should extend beyond the Police Service and the policy makers within 
government and the Ministry of Justice. The real audience should be the public we serve, those 
with whose consent we police. Therefore, it seems logical that public should be the ultimate 
critical assessors of this contribution, together with the effectiveness and appropriateness of 
the current and ongoing culture of police leadership and the response to fraud. 
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 The Public Works 
The Public Works submitted for the award of this Doctorate in Professional Studies is 
the establishment of a National Lead Force for Fraud (NLF). The NLF consists of several work 
streams that, collectively, were intended to bring standardisation and professionalism to the 
United Kingdom’s fight against Fraud. 
The Police Service is a complex and hierarchical organisation, in which leadership, 
responding to political and social change, is turbulent and in a state of constant flux. This, 
together with the rapid development of information technology, has resulted in the police and 
fraud investigation in particular, facing a challenge of unprecedented scale. The leadership’s and 
organisation’s approach to understanding this, as Lane and Down (2010, p. 514) state, ‘has failed 
to keep pace’. For this very reason, this context statement and the story it tells is descriptive 
and, at times, critical. 
My contribution to the creation of the NLF comprised three project work streams 
created in response to recommendations of the Fraud Review, Attorney General (2006). These 
work streams were developed and implemented between December 2008 and September 2014. 
To support my claim for this prestigious award by public works, documentary evidence 
provided includes design plans, user guides, business cases and publications. This claim is based 
upon: 
i. Design and delivery of the ‘National Fraud Reporting Centre’ (NFRC) 
ii. Creation of the ‘National Fraud Intelligence Bureau’ (NFIB) system ‘Know-Fraud’ 
iii. Creation, launch and establishment of the ‘Economic Crime & Fraud Training 
Academy’ (The Academy), which is now the national Centre of Excellence for 
fraud training and dissemination of best practice. 
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Central to this claim is that leading on all three projects provided an opportunity to be 
innovative by designing and creating an entrepreneurial, financially sustainable enterprise that 
is unique within the world of policing. Although this claim consists of three individual public 
works, I will demonstrate how the delivery and success of each informed and shaped the next. 
Without the innovation and leadership I provided, the outcome may still have been successful 
but, nevertheless, separate deliverables from each work stream.  
What started as a project concentrating on the threat of fraud to the UK has developed 
into a global business, developing an international capability focussed on combating all forms of 
economic crime; illustrated by: 
i. A critical review of each work streams. 
ii. Reflections on personal experiences of police leadership during development 
and delivery of project work streams and, an analysis of leadership paradigms 
that either enabled or inhibited progress and project success. 
iii. Evaluation of the potential impact of each work stream upon the policing 
response to fraud and its compliance with Peelian Principles. 
iv. Presentation of claim-supporting evidence, including the following: 
a. Design and content for the NFRC. 
b. Guide to the NFIB. 
c. Business Case for the Academy. 
d. First Academy Prospectus, 2012-13. 
e. ‘In-Focus’, first international newsletter from the Academy. 
f. Authorised Professional Practice for Fraud. 
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Similar to Schön (1983), throughout this context statement I have reflected upon my 
contributions to public works together with experiences, outcomes and interactions with senior 
leaders, both within the police and those of partner organisations. Then, through critical analysis 
and by drawing on prior understanding, I generated a new understanding with the potential to 
influence the direction of both my own future and the future of organisational leadership.  
Kolb (1984) defines reflective practice as a process whereby knowledge is created 
through transformation of experience. In authoring this Context Statement I applied the process 
of reflective practice through 4 distinct phases. 
These being: 
• Concrete experience – what was my involvement or participation? 
• Observation and reflection – what was my contribution or experience? 
• Formation of abstract concepts and generalization – options for integrating my 
observations in to logical theory and, if I were to repeat this, would I change 
anything? 
• Testing implications of the new concept – consider all potential outcomes and 
implement or hypothesize on impact.    
Reflecting upon a single experience from a given moment or period can be an 
enlightening and fulfilling process. However, having to reflect upon, examine and 
conceptualise multiple experiences, both positive and negative, from a period spanning 8 years 
was not always enjoyable and, instead, was often testing. Similar to Brookfield (1986), I found 
the process of experiential learning to be filled with uncomfortable tensions. 
Through the application of reflective practice and its translation into reflective writing I 
have been able to provide this Context Statement with a detailed description of my 
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experiences and, through critical analysis, I have questioned viewpoints, examined processes, 
products and my exposure to cultures of leadership within both the police and partner 
organisations. In the coming chapters I detail my contributions to the field of counter fraud, 
what I learnt on my journey and what I have now come to view as a paradox – a culture of 
police leadership lacking ethics, integrity and direction. 
Content in this document is presented in chronological sequence. In essence, telling the 
story of my career, the plot being the journey I have travelled, highlighting professional 
contributions made personally to the national and international field of policing. The main 
characters of this story are not always at the forefront of the plot, although they, myself 
included, played essential parts, the stars of this story are the public works.  
Because this is a journey of learning, reflecting upon my contributions to policing, the 
story is a personal one and the writing is detailed and descriptive so that the reader can 
experience the highs and lows, together with the challenges and successes, in essence, travelling 
with me on this journey of learning and reflection.  
The use of story-telling to enable critical thinking (including reflection), as Fear (2013) 
believes, is a useful vehicle for delivering individual and organisational development. This 
context statement has therefore been a personal journey, one of great significance and 
substance. Through it the emotional highs and lows of each project are shared, examining the 
personal learning and contributions made to professional practice.  
According to Gold et al (2002), in addition to critical thinking, story-telling is an effective 
tool for the development of managers and leaders by use of argument. As the public works at 
the centre of this context statement are a break from tradition (creating new methods of 
working and a new body of knowledge), story-telling provides an ideal medium for presenting 
contributions and the opportunity to reflect critically on my journey of discovery and delivery. 
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The story details a journey of leadership within a complex and hierarchical organisation 
where, at times, I was seen as an equal with a voice. While at other times, I was seen as a threat 
whose voice needed to be silenced, Lane and Down (2010, p. 516). The complexity of police 
leadership and my position within it is central to this context statement and a key theme 
throughout my learning and reflection. 
Chapter One is a personal introduction to who I am and what I believe has contributed 
to my success, and ultimately, helped shape me as person.  
Chapter Two continues with a focus on my professional career and my role within the 
police immediately prior to joining the Fraud Review Implementation Team.  
In Chapter Three I present the public works in the order that they were delivered 
demonstrating how each project was more of an extension and continuation of the previous, 
building a solid foundation for the ethical entrepreneurial enterprise that is recognised around 
the world as The Academy. 
Each chapter concludes with the learning and reflection I have taken from the delivery 
of these public works, the contributions they are making to international practice and my 
exposure to police leadership. At times, leadership was inspirational, empowering and 
motivating. At other times, it was intrusive and disempowering, inhibiting progress and success. 
In Chapter Four of the context statement I conclude with a final refection of the public 
works; drawing together the learning and reflection from proceeding chapters and looking to 
the future from personal, professional and organisational perspectives.  
 
Page | 5  
 
Quick guide to the content of this Context Statement 
 
Figure 1: Quick guide to the Content of this Context Statement 
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Chapter 1 –  Introduction 
Prior to leaving school, attending a careers event was hugely informative about options 
available, educational standards required, potential remuneration and the professional standing 
of individuals within certain occupations. What wasn’t covered was an explanation of a choice 
which would require an individual to commit their life unreservedly to their chosen career. This 
is the path I eventually chose. It is one that has governed and shaped both the professional and 
personal aspects of the life of a police officer. Prior to becoming a police officer I was employed 
by a major international shop-fitting company and promoted to project manager. At the age of 
20, one of the youngest in the business. Working a minimum 12 hours per day, at least 6 days a 
week, I quickly built a reputation as a person who could deliver the impossible; when other 
project managers either struggled or failed. I would be brought in to troubleshoot and ‘save the 
day’. Consequently, personal life was always second and suffered as a result. A change of career 
to restore balance to my life came in August 1996 when I joined the Police Service as a 
Probationary Officer. It all started with: 
I Stephen STRICKLAND of City of London Police do solemnly and sincerely declare and 
affirm that I will well and truly serve the Queen in the office of Constable, with fairness, integrity, 
diligence and impartiality, upholding fundamental human rights and according equal respect to 
all people; and I will to the best of my power cause the peace to be kept and preserved and 
prevent all offences against people and property; and that while I continue to hold the said office 
I will to the best of my skill and knowledge discharge all the duties thereof faithfully according to 
law.1 
The declaration, , said in the presence of a Justice of the Peace, transforms a regular 
citizen into a Crown Servant and bestows powers and privileges reserved for those holding the 
1 Subject to Section 29, Police Act 1996. This declaration was made in 2004 on transferring from 
Cambridgeshire Constabulary to the City of London Police. 
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office of Constable. From this point forward, any person who has made the declaration will 
thereafter only ever be known as either a police officer or a former police officer. A police officer, 
regardless of rank, role or position remains a Constable and holder of the office of Constable for 
the duration of their service. Contrary to popular belief, police officers are not employed, but 
are Crown Servants, working under warrant in the service of the Monarch. This unique position 
brings with it a number of expectations and restrictions to one’s private life.  
Officers must abstain from any activity considered likely to interfere with the impartial 
discharge of their duty or likely to give that impression. Police officers are restricted from taking 
an active part in politics. Officers must not reside at premises not approved by their chief officer 
and must not wilfully refuse, or neglect, to discharge any lawful debt. Restrictions extend further 
to include business interests incompatible with membership of a police force. These restrictions 
extend to the officer’s family and relatives who have, or propose to have, any business interest 
that could be perceived as interfering with the impartial discharge of duty. 
With such restrictions on an individual’s private and family life, combined with a 
stringent Code of Conduct, setting standards and expectations while both on or off duty, begs 
the question: What is it that appeals to anyone considering a career in the Police Service?  
Personally, the appeal was familial, having several family members either serving or 
retired police officers, I viewed the Police Service as a ‘family business’, a business dedicated to 
helping and protecting the public, a business I thought I understood. 
So what is the business of the Police Service and does this bear any resemblance to the 
original vision of Sir Robert Peel, Member of Parliament and founder of the Metropolitan Police? 
The modern Police Service is founded on Sir Robert Peel’s philosophy of what defined an ethical 
police force. The British model of policing by consent is unique and based upon the principle 
that police officers are ‘citizens in uniform’ who are only able to exercise their powers with the 
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implicit consent of the public they serve. The Home Office (2013) confirms, as with the Peelian 
Principles, that, policing by consent is only possible when the police are able to demonstrate 
integrity and transparency in the use of their powers. The question posed throughout this 
context statement is whether these principles and the model of policing by consent are still 
applied and operating in today’s modern Police Service? 
Parts of the United Kingdom, the City of London in particular, has had a form of policing 
dating back to the Roman occupation2. However, the concept of a disciplined professional Police 
Service wasn’t introduced until 1822, when Sir Robert Peel became Home Secretary. He 
introduced the Metropolitan Police Act 1829, which led to the establishment of the first full-
time police force known as the Metropolitan Police. On joining the Police Service, new officers 
were issued with ‘General Instructions’ containing the nine principles 3  of policing. These 
principles were framed within the context that the policing response would be by consent – 
citizens policing citizens. Even today, the Association of Chief Police Officers (2012) quote these 
principles as being not only responsible for the Police Service as we recognise it today, but for 
shaping the Police Service of tomorrow. Not surprisingly, the number one principal is the 
prevention of crime and disorder. However, surprisingly, it contains no mention of the principles 
of investigation of crime and disorder, nor the bringing to justice of those responsible. In fact, 
the principles actually specify only that “the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and 
disorder, not the evidence of police action in dealing with them”. 
This was at odds with the culture of policing that developed and was influenced by a 
Government viewpoint which measured success by using league tables to compare how well 
police forces performed, with a particular emphasis on criminal justice outcomes. 
2 Wade (2008) 
3 Commonly referred to as the Peelian Principles 
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In 2012, this operating philosophy changed as a direct result of the Police Reform and 
Social Responsibility Act 2011. This Act introduced locally-elected Policing and Crime 
Commissioners (PCCs), replacing the role of Police Authorities and transferred power away from 
government by eliminating league-table-related national targets. This provided PCCs with the 
freedom to consult with their communities to create local Crime and Disorder Plan, for which 
they could hold their Chief Constable to account. It is too soon to measure the success of this 
change, or whether it will amount to a mere substitution of performance metrics. 
On commencing my police career I did so with the belief that I was entering into a 
profession where I would serve the public – making the community safer, preventing crime and, 
where necessary, pursuing law-breakers and bringing them to justice. Over the years, I have 
come to question: 
• Whether the Police Service provided personal opportunities envisaged 
originally? 
• Has the opportunity been provided to make a difference? 
Looking back on my career as an officer in turn triggered reflection upon what the Police 
Service represents and raised a further, much deeper question: 
• Has the Police Service developed into the professional organisation that Sir 
Robert Peel originally envisaged or has it lost its way? 
On joining the Police, the learning curve was steep but enjoyable. I discovered that I had 
a natural ability to learn and retain information, particularly the law. Whilst on the initial training 
course I completed the Honey and Mumford (2000) ‘Learning Styles Questionnaire’. 
Interestingly, the results showed me to be an almost a perfect blend of Reflector and Theorist; 
Page | 10  
 
being almost 40 % in each area, but only 10 % each in the remaining Activist and Pragmatist 
areas. This supported my own objective assessment, that I was a thinker, creator and visionary. 
• My strengths, described herein, have driven me to be the professional I am. The 
reader is asked to please accept that this self-assessment is not one of conceit 
or arrogance, but comes from a place of humility and honesty.  
A major downside of these characteristics is that I can lose focus very quickly once 
something has been achieved or delivered; I struggle with routine when there is no real 
challenge. 
Before completing my probation, having developed a deep desire to learn, I commenced 
study for the police promotion exams. Rather than study independently, I organised a study 
group, produced a study schedule and hosted weekly workshops to consolidate and review the 
week’s learning. Not only did I pass the exam but everyone in the group passed; the best result 
the force had achieved for a number of years. By running the study group I developed a 
reputation as someone who would go the extra mile to help others to learn and it was suggested 
that I should consider a future in police training. 
Unlike identity in the professional environment I have found it necessary to examine 
and hypothesise who I am to set the context for this critical review. The process defined by 
Hollingsworth (1926) explains, that if I am to understand who I am I must examine what intellect 
and skills nature endowed me with together with what has been nurtured or learnt during my 
life. This is not an exact science, but my interpretation of what events in my life have made me 
who and what I am; identifying what I brought to the Police Service and what contributed to my 
success. 
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Reflecting upon my career I cannot recall a time when I would not consider myself to be 
a thinker, a creator and a visionary; at times a leader and an inspiration to others. I am not 
without fault, but on the whole, I believe my contributions in life provide for a good balance. So 
what is it that has given my life purpose, makes me get up in the morning, provides the 
motivation and desire to achieve and, ultimately, has defined who I am? In essence, it’s the 
challenge, the challenge of creating, developing or achieving something original, something no 
one has done before; on occasions, trying to achieve the impossible. 
 In one of my annual appraisals, my supervisor commented "Steve has a calming and 
inspirational influence over the shift, no matter how serious a situation he can be relied on to 
think through the situation rationally and consider all the options before acting”. However, he 
did then go on to say “Steve is so laid back, at times he is almost horizontal”. Considering this 
appraisal, I started to understand how others may view me. The heuristic exercise, Jahari’s 
Window, devised by Luft and Ingham (1950), when applied to my personal and public persona, 
has enabled me to understand and evaluate critically my different faces or facades. I have 
identified that what may have been perceived by some as a ‘thoughtful and considered’ 
communication style, could be perceived by others a reluctance to act. 
Prior to commencing this context statement, to test my objective self-assessment (that 
I am a visionary, a creator and an inspiration) I completed the Myers and Briggs (1980) Type 
Indicator and conducted a 360 degree feedback and evaluation process with my supervisors, 
peers and subordinates. My Type Indicator, INTJ, has the hallmark ‘Vision’, an individual who is 
independent and visionary, one that looks at global issues to meet the challenges of the future. 
This confirmed my reflective analysis, a lot of what I already believed to be so. However, of more 
importance personally is how I am viewed by others and, for this, I have drawn on the feedback 
from my 360 degree review. Themes common to all of the reviews are articulated best in the 
following statements: 
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‘You do not seek to elevate yourself above others and you are keen to share your 
learning and skills to enhance the experience and potential for all, a really admirable 
quality. Not only that, but you are always so enthusiastic and positive about where things 
could go / how they could evolve’. 4 
‘You have a unique ability to visualise the future of the work environment; 
identify current and future obstacles to effectiveness and can ‘engineer’ solutions to 
overcome the obstacles’. 5 
‘Steve has a capacity for work that often leaves others standing. Once he has 
an idea concept or vision he pursues it relentlessly! His ability to see the ‘potential’ is an 
overriding factor of his work ethic; he enjoys the challenge of setting up a new process, 
procedure or working environment. He has the energy and enthusiasm to motivate 
those around him'.6 
‘Steve has attention to detail and will utilise key experts to ensure his concept 
will achieve the results required, immersing himself in the research and collation of 
information. Steve will push the boundaries and is not afraid to challenge convention to 
achieve the outcome, but integrity is not compromised’. 7 
Although this corresponds with my own analysis and the results of the Myer-Briggs Type 
Indicator, there can be a downside to being seen as a visionary, one who pushes boundaries; 
this is best articulated in the following statement: 
‘The only weakness I can see is your strengths make you the perfect person to 
lead tricky, complex, and what for many in the police view as ‘dull’ projects of work – the 
4 Feedback from 360° Review Respondent SA 
5 Feedback from 360° Review Respondent DC 
6 Feedback from 360° Review Respondent JH 
7 Feedback from 360° Review Respondent JH2 
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sort of things that law enforcement are notorious for messing-up because they don’t get 
to grips with them or have the ‘engineers’ to deliver them! Whilst you can adjust to all 
environments you are not the stereotype senior cop and due to your intellect may be 
seen as a bit of a threat to some – leading them to stay at arm’s length’.8  
Analysis of the above confirms the premise that I am a visionary leader, a creator who 
challenges the norm. However, the personality traits which have contributed to my success, may 
have, at the same time, restricted my progression and contributed to my being pigeonholed and 
stereotyped as a ‘project’ person. 
In the following chapters, these personality traits, my relationship with senior officers, 
managers, peers and subordinates is examined in more detail and an assessment of today’s 
police management and leadership ethos is provided. 
8 Feedback from 360° Review Respondent DC2 
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Chapter 2 –  Prior to Fraud Review Implementation Team 
This Chapter considers and details my work prior joining the Fraud Review 
Implementation Team and shows how the lessons learnt prepared me for future challenges and 
contributed towards the ability to manage people and projects.  
At the heart of this Chapter is an attempt by the Police Service to be recognised as a 
profession and how it tried to move from militaristic and institutionalised training to a model of 
academically and vocationally accredited education; bringing the service, and its educational 
standards, in-line with other vocations and professional disciplines. This change was the result 
of over ten years of Best Value reviews conducted during the 1990s which concluded that the 
Police Service was not receiving value for money from its training provision. 
Reviews are: 
• 1989 Audit Commission: The Management of Police Training 
• 1997 HO Efficiency and Consultancy Unit – Review of National Police Training 
• 1998 Police Federation - Project Forward and South Wales Best Value Review 
• 1999 Local Government Act (Best Value) 
• 1999 HAC – Police Training and Recruitment 
• 1999 Stubbs Report 
• 1999 HMIC Managing Learning 
• 1999 Consultation document - The Way Forward 
• 1999 Police Federation – Police Training: What Next? 
• 2000 Raytheon Report 
• 2000 Government proposals - New arrangements 
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Resulting from all this activity, in 2001 the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
and the Association of Police Authorities (APA) set up the Best Value in Police Training Project 
to enable Police authorities and ACPO to regain control of the training agenda. One of the key 
outputs from this group was ‘Foundations for Change’ (2003), which led to the Home Office 
(2005) change agenda. Although the case for change was sound, my opinion was that decisions 
were financially motivated and proposed changes were secondary to any efficiency savings that 
would be generated by decentralisation of police learning and training. 
In October 2003, just as the Police Service appeared to have got a grip on the future 
direction of police training, the BBC TV Panorama broadcasted an undercover investigative 
expose into racism and sexism at a regional police training centre in Cheshire. The programme, 
‘The Secret Policeman’ provided evidence of how racist and sexist officers could infiltrate the 
service and complete their training undetected, adding to the public argument that the Police 
Service as a whole was institutionally racist and sexist. 
ACPO produced a plan to tackle the issue but, for the Home Secretary, the problem was 
with the regional training centres which were isolated and militaristic, detached from the 
communities that they serve. As a result, the decision was made for new recruits to be trained 
by their own forces under a new programme, to be called the Initial Police Learning and 
Development Programme (IPLDP). When the concept of IPLDP was introduced to police forces, 
I was the Inspector of Learning & Development (L&D) and was tasked to lead the project. This 
involved designing and implementing a solution aligned to the ethos of the City of London Police 
(CoLP). Although this is the smallest police force in the UK, it packs a punch far in excess of its 
size. 
IPLDP was delivered to forces as a framework of learning objectives and outcomes for 
which each force then had to design their own training materials, reflect local requirements and 
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align their programme to either National Vocational Qualifications (NVQ) at levels 3 and 4, or, 
to partner with an academic institution for the award of a Foundation Degree. The intention was 
for a single qualification but, at the time of implementation, no decision had been made by the 
centre as to whether this was to be an NVQ or a Foundation degree. Consequently, forces were 
left to decide for themselves, knowing that their programmes may have to be adapted or 
changed once a decision had been made on single national qualification. Regardless of the 
approach taken, the solution would be subject to Quality Assurance Review, conducted by the 
Central Authority, a function of Centrex, now known as the College of Policing. 
Although supportive of the concept of IPLDP, I believed that, with such little guidance 
from the centre, there was a significant risk that the Police Service could become fragmented 
and disjointed due to variations in training and learning achieved by the implementation of 
various programmes. As the programme manager it was my responsibility to take this forward 
and deliver a solution suitable for the needs of the City of London Police. The Commissioner at 
the time, a graduate himself of City University, London, was supportive of academic study and, 
although he did not exert influence on my approach, my impression was that he hoped that our 
solution would be academically founded. 
One of the greatest challenges faced in establishing the new, locally-owned and 
managed IPLDP programme, was to be in how to overcome the antiquated perception by the 
wider Police Service of academia. The common argument presented to me was that university-
based police education would result in officers becoming theorists, thinkers and not doers. This 
argument originated because of policing often being referred to by those on the streets as a 
trade-craft and therefore could only be learnt by the practice of doing. 
The Police Service wanted to be recognised as a profession but, the majority of its staff, 
senior management in particular, did not buy-in to the concept of professional education. 
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Instead, the preference was for a traditional model of vocational trade and skills-based training. 
For those who could see the benefit of professional education for the police, academia was the 
only option. 
Because of these challenges, I concluded that the solution must be designed to satisfy 
those from both camps of thinking and so must satisfy requirements for both the NVQ and the 
foundation degree, being both educational and practical. This led to an increased burden for not 
only the programme design and accreditation, but also in its delivery and assessment – an 
approach which, at the time, was unique within UK policing. 
 With an average of 40 new recruits per year, any standalone solution other than an 
internally delivered and assessed programme was not viable. To overcome this restriction and 
enable the option for dual accreditation (to best fit both camps of thinking) I entered into 
negotiations with British Transport Police (BTP) for a joint-developed and delivered programme. 
BTP had always relied on the Home Office and Regional Training Centres for their training 
provision. Consequently, having insufficient estates and personnel resources to undertake such 
a commitment, BTP was ill-prepared to accommodate necessary changes. To overcome this 
significant obstacle, I negotiated a training partnership between CoLP and BTP to provide them 
with a managed solution, project managed by myself, together with a small team from the two 
forces. The partnership brought the projected number of new recruits to be trained each year 
to 350. This number would increase to exceed 5009 within the first year of the programme. 
CoLP had a long-standing relationship with City University, London, which, together with 
the fact that the Lord Mayor of London was the Chancellor of City University, made the choice 
of academic partners a logically, forgone conclusion. In November 2005, together with a small 
9 Combined figure for Student Officers and Community Support Officers. 
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team of developers, I was seconded to City University working within the office of the Pro-Vice 
Chancellor for Learning and Teaching. 
Of all 43 police forces of England & Wales, less than 10 had decided to follow the 
academic route. The remainder either opting for the NVQ or taking a holding position of ‘no 
accreditation’ until Centrex confirmed what the single national qualification would be. 
As well as satisfying internal politics, my approach would ensure that whatever the 
decision for a single national qualification, the Student Officer Programme (as it would become 
known) would not only achieve this standard but surpass it with dual accreditation. 
As forces started developing their own programmes, it was clear that most were simply 
‘shoe-horning’ the old probationer training programme into a new accreditation framework 
without giving any thought as to how the new programme could be used as a vehicle to 
modernise and professionalise police education. Although universities had traditionally focussed 
on campus-based programmes, there was a move within academia to embrace innovative 
programmes incorporating work-based learning, as stated by Brennan (2005). My perspective 
was that work-based learning was essential but, equally, students needed to be able to immerse 
themselves into the ‘university experience’. Also, for the Student Officer Programme to be 
recognised as a quality undergraduate course of study, it must be on par with any other 
university prospectus offering. 
Towards the end of 2005, to support the business case for a dual-accredited policing 
programme, I commenced a new research project, looking into international models of police 
education and, specifically, looking for examples of best practice from police and university 
collaborations. 
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In the December of 2005, my counterpart from BTP, the Pro-Vice Chancellor for 
Teaching and Learning and myself undertook a five-day research visit to Charles Sturt University, 
New South Wales, Australia. In 1998, New South Wales Police (NSWP) entered into a 
collaborative partnership with Charles Sturt University for the delivery of a Diploma in Policing 
Practice; the equivalent of the UK Foundation Degree. The Diploma was introduced as a 
prerequisite to formal employment by NSWP. Students were required to fund their own study 
and did not receive an offer of employment until they had completed the first two modules (year 
one) of the Diploma successfully. This differed from the majority of international programmes, 
where the delivery was outsourced but the students were employed and funded throughout 
their study. 
The experiences of Charles Sturt University were examined by Chambers (2004), who 
concluded that, after six years and having enrolled over 7,000 students on the Diploma, the 
collaborative model provides a scalable and beneficial solution for police education. The solution 
implemented by Charles Sturt University was certainly considered widely to be one of the best 
and most innovative police programmes of the time. However, I would argue that it stopped 
short of achieving its true potential for transitioning from trade craft to professional education. 
This is something I would seek to address with the Student Officer Programme. 
Upon returning to the UK, I had developed a clear vision for how I wanted the Student 
Officer Programme to look, but I also had on eye on the future. At that time, Her Majesties 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (2004) were promoting a model of mixed-economy policing; 
increasing civilianised roles from the recently introduced Police Community Support Officers 
(PCSO) to include the new role of Police Staff Investigators (PSI). While the new, mixed-economy 
policing was establishing, the external face of the Public Police Service was changing with the 
rapidly growing role of private policing and security functions. As the police entered this period 
of internal change, Jones and Newburn (2005), suggested that UK policing was seeing a 
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transformation of a magnitude at least as great as occurred with the introduction of the New 
Police (Peelers) in the early nineteenth century. 
Bayley and Shearing (2005) went a stage further and suggested that the police were 
entering a period of momentous change. This, they believed, was being influenced by the 
outsourcing of policing functions, resulting in the search by the police for a new identity. As 
Bayley and Shearing point out, policing is no longer monopolised by Home Office-funded police 
forces; services previously unique to the police are now being performed by private companies 
and by communities and residential groups on a volunteer basis. This has resulted in an identity 
crisis, some officers feeling threatened, believing that the public may have lost or could as a 
result of this change, lose faith in the ability of the police to control crime. Whether the police 
were comfortable with these changes or not, I decided that they would need to be an integral 
element of the new policing curriculum. Potentially, this would open course access to non-
warranted officers and those performing policing functions within the private sector. 
A significant challenge was to design a curriculum that would address both academic 
and vocational requirements. Generally, a curriculum is thought of as the subject matter of the 
course. According to Kelly (2004) this is a restricted view, because the curriculum encapsulates 
all activities which assist delegates in achieving their specified training objectives. Which, in the 
case of the Student Officer Programme, are to becoming efficient and effective police officers 
and criminal investigators. In this respect, when planning the curriculum, it was important to 
understand the needs of the Police Service, Student Officers and where centrally-delivered 
training had failed previously. With this understanding, objectives were refined, devising 
appropriate content for classroom delivery and post-classroom, work-based, real-life evaluation 
to ensure that the learning experience achieved required objectives. 
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The Student Officer Programme went live in June 2006, Appendix 1. Designed as a 
modular programme, with each core module lasting 3 weeks and themed for delivery to a wider 
section of the Criminal Justice Sector, rather than just police recruits. 
When the programme was launched, it was the first in the UK to train police officers and 
PCSOs side-by-side on the same programme. The PCSOs would study the first 5 modules 
alongside their police counterparts before joining their Professional Development Unit (PDU) for 
the street skills training. If the PCSO later decided to join the police as a constable, they would 
re-join the programme automatically at the point they left, receiving full recognition of prior 
learning. Similar entry and exit points were established for PSIs, security and investigative 
partners from the wider criminal justice sector. Unfortunately, although the design allowed for 
inclusion of the rapidly expanding Criminal Justice Network, Centrex was resistant to the change 
and prohibited the Student Officer Programme, or modules of it, being offered to anyone other 
than a serving member of a Home Office-funded police force or certain ‘approved’ non-Home 
Office forces. There was nothing of a sensitive or restricted nature within the programme so, 
this move, in my opinion, was protectionism by the central authority and Centrex against the 
diversification of policing functions. 
• This is a good example of how the Police Service typically resists change rather 
than trying to understand and ultimately embrace change that could/would 
benefit service delivery through joint working. 
Regardless of this restriction, the Student Officer Programme was still unique and stood 
out from other university-based police programmes because of the approach taken in the design 
of the module assessment criteria. Again, reflecting upon negative perceptions of academia by 
a large proportion of the Police Service, I wanted to ensure that all assessment criteria were 
sound academically, but still focussed on the operational requirements of day-to-day policing. 
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To achieve this, I designed module assessments around operational requirements of 
‘Professionalising the Investigative Process’ (PIP10), a national initiative implemented to raise the 
standard of investigations at every level of the service. For Student Officers this would be PIP 
Level 1, focussing on volume crime. On completing their probation, if Student Officers decided 
to pursue a career in criminal investigation as a detective, they would then complete a further 
training programme at PIP Level 2, focussing on more serious and complex crime. 
Each of the classroom-delivered modules focussed on a specialist area of policing 
practice, starting with Neighbourhood Policing and progressing through Transportation and 
Crime Investigation to Terrorism and Major Incidents. By utilising the PIP as the vehicle for 
assessing each module, the aim was for students to be proficient at PIP Level 1 prior to 
independent patrol. Historically, this was something which had not been achieved before 
completing the 2-year probationary period. Each module would build in complexity and 
demand, testing the Student Officer’s knowledge and application of an investigative mind-set. 
This approach was a huge success because the final assessment, conducted prior to 
independent patrol (see Appendix 2, Counter Terrorism and Major Incidents), was perceived by 
some as taking officers to level of competence far in excess of PIP Level 1. 
However, although a great achievement, it did receive some criticism from officers in 
CoLP Central Detective Unit. The claim was that Student Officers were being ‘over-trained’. Once 
operational, Student Officers were considered to be operating at a level more akin to detectives 
at PIP Level 2 and thereby putting some our own specialist investigators to shame. I refused to 
accept this position and believed that the outcome was one of improved professional practice, 
10 PIP no longer exists as a standalone area of police practice or doctrine but is incorporated within 
Authorised Policing Practice (APP) available at www.app.college.police.uk  
Page | 23  
 
                                                          
not over-training as was being suggested. Pushing the boundaries of established practice and 
procedures was proving highly-effective and beneficial towards achieving policing objectives. 
The innovative approach taken in the design of the Student Officer Programme attracted 
a lot of attention from other police forces and the associated trade press, Appendix 3. However, 
the real potential of the Student Officer Programme was yet to be realised. Applying lessons 
learnt from the initial research visit to Charles Sturt University, I designed the programme so 
that it could be adapted to be a model of Pre-Employment Police Education (PEPE). Thereby, 
bringing the Police Service into line with those professions where individuals are expected to 
qualify before gaining employment. I could see the potential for PEPE but the Police Service was 
yet to be convinced about the benefits and have fears allayed that this would impact on the 
ability to recruit the best possible staff from a diverse community. 
In January 2008, I returned to New South Wales and, over a period of a week, conducted 
18 interviews and discussion groups with members of the Charles Sturt University and NSWP. 
Evidence was overwhelming that students were happy to pay for their own education, believing 
that it gave credibility to the police as a profession. More importantly, when viewed as a 
profession on par with other more established professions, Appendix 4, underrepresented 
groups considered the Police Service career pathway to be much more attractive than before.  
In February 2008, drawing on over 2 years of research, I produced a combined Project 
Initiation Document and Business Case for the implementation of PEPE, Appendix 5. 
Table 1, below, shows a summary of the financial case for this. Full financial analysis is 
shown in Appendix 6. 
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Table 1: Summary of Financial Case for PEPE   
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Suitable for FE Delivery Yes Yes Yes 
Suitable for HE Delivery Yes Yes Yes 
Suitable for P/T Study Yes Yes Yes 
Suitable for Distance Learning Yes Yes Yes 
IPR Ownership FE/HE FE/HE or Joint Joint 
Delivery Responsibilities  FE/HE FE/HE or Joint Joint 
Lead in time Sep 2009 Sep 2009 Apr 2009 
Curriculum Content (LPGs) 50 % 75 % 100 % 
Operational Practice (PACs) No No Yes (Specials) 
Option for direct recruitment  No No Yes 
Weeks saved  12 19 34 
Weeks to Independent Patrol 21 15 1 
Saving per officer (London) £19,000 £33,000 £41,000 
Revised Cost to Independent patrol Status 
(London) 
£40,000 £26,000 £18,000 
Saving per Officer (National) £17,000 £29,000 £36,000 
Revised Cost to Independent Patrol Status 
(National) 
£35,000 £23,000 £16,000 
Additional BTP Savings 
Tadworth 
London Accommodation  
Expenses 
 
Nil 
£760 
£310 
 
Nil 
£760 
£310 
 
£690 
£575 
£310 
Additional BTP Costs £1,380 £690 Nil 
Non-cashable savings (NCS) 
per officer 
Limited Limited 360 hrs policing 
as a SC = £7,200 
Return on investment FE 2010 
HE 2011/12 
FE 2010  
HE 2010/11 
FE 2009 
HE 2009 
Projected CoLP savings based on 
recruitment of 40 officers a year. 
£760,000 £1,320,000 £1,743,000 + 
NCS = £288,000 
Projected BTP savings based on recruitment 
of 150 officers a year. 
£2,743,000 £4,783,500 £6,264,000 +  
NCS = £1,080,000 
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Referring to Table 1, the financial case for PEPE was overwhelming, with a projected 
range of savings11 of between £19,000 and £41,000 per officer and a further non-cashable saving 
of £7,200 per officer from Option 3. Each Option demonstrates the programme’s potential to 
provide considerable savings to the Police Service and the public purse. 
Shortly after the case for PEPE was presented to senior management in CoLP and BTP, 
a copy was passed to the lead officer responsible for the police modernisation portfolio in the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). There, the case for PEPE grabbed the attention of 
senior members of the Police Service, Home Office and the National Policing Improvement 
Agency12 (NPIA). This coincided with another project being undertaken by ACPO and the Home 
Office, exploring options for delaying the attestation of new recruits. Although my proposal was 
based upon the introduction of a model of pre-employment education, it provided an ideal 
solution for delaying attestation of any officer until prerequisite skills and knowledge had been 
learnt.  
Linking the two project streams together, the NPIA established a National Working 
Group (NWG), of which I was a member and represented CoLP and City University. The NWG 
was given the remit to explore options for PEPE and develop a single model for national 
implementation. Although there was a degree of interest in what the NWG was doing, those in 
senior positions were not motivated to pursue or take seriously what they perceived to be such 
a radical change in police recruiting.  
Back in 2008, UK policing was still in healthy state of repair. Funding was stable and 
every force in the country was on a recruitment drive. Senior management feared that if CoLP, 
or a small number of forces, implemented PEPE, the result could be failure to attract the usual 
11 The projected range of savings was dependent upon the duration and type of programme already 
delivered. 
12 Centrex had been rebranded and became the National Policing Improvement Agency on 1st April 2007 
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high-calibre recruits, who might instead be attracted to alternative forces which still offered 
employed-and-funded educational programmes. I disagreed with this perceived fear because all 
of my research, Appendix 4, indicated the exact opposite. 
• Research shows that a professional education system attracts higher calibre 
recruits and is more attractive to under-represented groups where established 
professional occupations are more culturally acceptable.  
Unfortunately I was unable to gain support from senior management and, due to this 
lack of support, the project for PEPE was all but suspended to the point that most people thought 
it had been shelved, never to see the light of day again. 
During 2008, the developed world was just starting to feel the impact of the global 
financial crisis which led into the 4-year, global recession of 2008 to 2012. For UK policing, this 
resulted in a budget and pay freeze lasting 3 years, followed by an average 20 % reduction in 
funding across forces. Budget cuts meant that police recruitment was suspended. Additionally, 
some forces were actively reducing their numbers, with redundancies for support staff and 
compulsory retirement for officers at 30 years’ service. During this period, with no recruits and 
no budget for continuous professional development, programmes such as the Student Officer 
Programme came to an end and academic partnerships fell into disrepair. At the same time, 
forces were streamlining non-operational functions and Learning and Development 
departments were particularly hard hit, some losing up to half of their pre-2008 resources.  
In 2012, emerging from the worst of the recession with less staff and a greatly reduced 
Learning & Development capability, the time was ripe for PEPE. The NPIA formalised a 
curriculum for pre-employment education, which they termed the Certificate in Knowledge of 
Page | 27  
 
Policing (CKP). This was aligned to the new College of Policing13 (2013) Professional Entry to 
Policing Strategy. The Strategy was seen as the first step in establishing the police as a 
professional body with an educational model to match.  
Although PEPE was considered ahead of its time in 2008, the CKP represents the first 
stage of PEPE, mirroring Option 1 from the Financial Case (Table 1). Although I like to think that 
I made a significant contribution to influencing national thinking leading to the introduction of 
PEPE, what I learnt from the process was invaluable. 
13 The functions of the National Policing Improvement Agency moved to the College of Policing on 1st 
December 2012 
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Learning and Reflection 
During this phase of my career the greatest area of learning and reflection relates to 
management and leadership. Working within the management structure of the university I was 
able to compare and contrast police management and leadership styles with those in the 
university and the partner organisations I worked with. My exposure to, and experience of, 
senior police management was mixed and not always inspirational or motivational. This left me 
with the impression that the performance of senior management may, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, be inhibited by a developing culture of short-termism and risk aversion. 
Police managers and leaders observed during this period seemed to lack the desire to 
focus on the future and long-term deliverables. More importantly, the future, for them and that 
of the Police Service, did not appear to extend beyond their next promotion board or period of 
tenure. Therefore, any project extending beyond this, or presenting significant risk to their 
personal future progression, struggled to gain support.  
Reflecting upon my experiences of working with senior management, I have questioned 
whether the police may have been the architects of their own downfall. 
I realised that the police, like many organisations, has created a performance review 
culture, underpinned by an appraisal system that requires individuals to focus on short-term 
deliverables and developmental objectives. These are often limited to what can be achieved 
within the period before the next scheduled appraisal. 
Geal (2010) and McGregor (1960) have both questioned the validity of the performance 
appraisal system. Appraisals where originally intended as a means to drive organisational 
performance, but studies suggest that they are nothing more than a process for managers to 
use to control and direct staff. The logic behind this thinking is that to get people to perform, 
they must be told what to do, understand that their performance will be measured and that 
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they will be held to account. Therefore, performance appraisal becomes nothing more than a 
paper-based exercise for the command and control of staff, as I see it, being a ‘Theory X’ 
management tool, McGregor (ibid). 
The negative consequences of badly managed appraisal systems can, according to 
Argyris (1957), compel people and organisational culture into being dependant, subordinate and 
submissive. With advancement and opportunities being linked directly to performance 
appraisal, it appears to me that those hungry for promotion, to the exclusion of all else, would 
avoid, or at least distance themselves from, long-term or high-risk activities that could reflect 
badly upon them at their next appraisal if objectives or outcomes are not delivered or not 
achieved. 
My proposition is supported by the research into performance appraisal interviews by 
Asmuß (2008). Asmuß identified a link between supervisors believing negative assessments to 
be socially problematic and an employee’s subsequent difficulty with accepting negative 
assessments.  
Therefore, in my view, it is a logical and forgone conclusion that: 
• To avoid the risk of negative assessments, employees focus on objectives and 
outcomes that are achievable easily within the appraisal period.  
• Although risk management is a crucial aspect of many areas of business, the 
issue of appraisal-driven risk aversion is focussed on benefitting the individual 
(not always consciously), often to the detriment of the organisation.  
On reflection, my understanding of police management and leadership changed during 
my time at the university, I stopped accepting it for what it was and started to question whether 
the culture of police management and leadership was fit for purpose. Having identified a 
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worrying culture of short-termism, however simple it may seem, this was to be one of my 
greatest assets in future projects. It enabled me to package projects and visions as short-term 
deliverables, making them more palatable to those who may have been conditioned by an 
appraisal-driven, risk-averse culture. 
The IPLDP project was my first introduction to formal research, Bell (2005), utilising both 
quantitative (positivist) and qualitative (naturalist) methodologies. Research was essential to 
development of the Student Officer Programme and the business case for PEPE, but would also 
provide invaluable to my work on each of the National Lead Force (NLF) project streams. The 
IPLDP project also provided valuable learning and development for me in relation to partnership 
working, contract negotiation and project planning and management, again, transferable skills 
which have proved essential in the NLF project streams. 
I am immensely proud of my achievements at City University with the Student Officer 
Programme and the establishment of the Centre for Investigative, Security and Police Sciences. 
Without the learning and experiences from my time there I do not believe that the following 
public works would look like they do, nor that this context statement would even be possible. 
I am disappointed that the programme and partnership with City University no longer exists and 
consequently not included as a public work. However, the research into PEPE was a significant 
contribution towards the creation of the new CPK and professional entry into the Police Service. 
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Chapter 3 –  Public Works 
Early in 2008, whilst working on the PEPE project at City University I was approached by 
the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) who wanted to commission a counter fraud programme 
designed for the Romanian Ministry of Interior; required as a condition of their accession into 
the European Union. While working on this programme, I was introduced to the Director of 
Programmes for the Fraud Review Implementation Team who was leading a number of projects 
emanating from the recommendations from the Fraud Review, Attorney General (2006). The 
management style within the implementation team was inspirational. The management and the 
team worked as a collective, always upbeat and positive about the work, speaking with genuine 
passion and belief. This culture struck me immediately as being a unique and rare example of 
inspirational leadership in the police. 
This culture and leadership style triggered me to question and compare numerous 
management and leadership training programmes attended during my career. As far back as I 
can recall, the Police Service has promoted new models of leadership aimed at empowering staff 
with a trust-based ethos but, in my view, failed to tackle the traditional culture underlying police 
leadership. Neyroud (2014) supported his argument for change and the creation of policing 
professional body by pointing out that the current system of police leadership and training has 
its foundations rooted in the 1940s, when it was established to meet the demands of Post War 
Britain. Although it has evolved, the Police Service is still antiquated, militaristic and in desperate 
need of a radical overhaul. Any attempts to change or implement new, innovative models of 
operation are all too often undermined by mistrusting micro-managers unable to depart from 
the traditional model of intrusive management. This very much mirrors an organisation, as 
McGregor (1960) puts it, seeing itself as a ‘Theory Y’ trust-based organisation but is, in fact, 
‘Theory X’ controlling and untrusting in practice. 
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Those within the implementation team were, in my opinion, ‘Theory Y’ managers and 
leaders. Unfortunately, within the police, ‘Theory Y’ managers are often criticised for not 
managing staff properly and for not knowing what they are doing every minute of the day. 
I argue that intrusive management is not the most effective way to manage and lead a team, 
and that the most effective teams are those inspired by their leaders, seeing themselves as 
equals within the team or the organisation. 
This concept was considered by Secretan (2002), who questioned what caused followers 
to dedicate themselves to the work of some of greatest leaders in the world, what he found was 
that they were inspired, not motivated. They did not have strategic plans or business cases; their 
philosophy was built on passion and inspiration. The role of the leader is to inspire. A leader who 
does not inspire is like a river without water; using this analogy, I would argue the police is 
suffering a drought, although one can find the occasional oasis, in the main the riverbed is dry. 
To deliver successful projects, I strive to be an inspiration and a visionary – because they 
are essential leadership tools, selling the vision to others, getting them to buy into projects. 
Once they buy into the vision, they become responsible for it, co-owning it and, in essence, are 
inspired to lead and deliver in their own right. Although I would argue that this is an effective 
method of leading and managing a team, it has a major drawback. If the vision is lost and there 
is no vision to aspire towards, it becomes impossible to inspire others. This happened towards 
the end of 2008 when, after numerous iterations of the PEPE business case, the realisation came 
that the initiative was not going to gain project buy-in and sign-off by Chief Officers. It was clear 
to me that, although the Student Officer Programme was still operating successfully, I needed 
to find a new challenge and develop a new vision. 
Page | 33  
 
In December 2008, the opportunity came when I joined the Fraud Review 
Implementation Team, which was responsible for a number of work streams emanating from 
recommendation 43 of 2006 Fraud Review: 
A National Lead Force for fraud should be established with the following functions: 
a) To create, develop and manage the National Fraud Reporting Centre and its 
analytical unit; 
b) To disseminate intelligence and analysis to the network of Police Fraud Squads 
and, subject to appropriate protocols, other organizations investigating fraud 
(e.g. Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) to help them target fraud 
investigations and anti-fraud work generally; 
c) To act as a Centre of Excellence for fraud investigations, including organized 
training, disseminating best practice, general fraud prevention advice, advising 
on complex enquiries in other regions, and assisting with or even directing the 
most complex of such investigations. 
Recommendation 44 then went on say: 
The National Lead Force should be based around the existing City Of London Police 
Fraud Squad. (Attorney General, 2006: 310) 
It was a small team and, as with many police projects, it was under-resourced and 
overburdened with unrealistic expectations. Typically, most senior managers appeared to be 
keeping a ‘safe distance’ from the project in case it failed to deliver. The objectives-assessment-
risk scenario seemed to prevail as described in the previous chapter. 
I welcomed the challenge and during my time with the team was privileged to be given 
the opportunity to lead on the delivery of two key projects: 
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I. The implementation of a ‘National Fraud Reporting Centre’ (NFRC), and; 
II. The creation of ‘National Fraud Intelligence Bureau’ (NFIB) system ‘Know-Fraud’ 
At the conclusion of my time on the team, following go-live of the NFIB system, Know 
Fraud, I was given my third project, which was delivered as part of the wider Economic Crime 
Directorate (ECD): 
III. Establishing a Centre of Excellence for fraud training and dissemination of best 
practice through the creation and launch of the ‘Economic Crime & Fraud Training 
Academy’ (The Academy) 
These three projects, their outcomes and their contributions to the field of counter 
fraud, collectively constitute the Public Work submitted for the award of a Doctorate of 
Professional Studies. I do not claim to be responsible individually for every aspect of these 
projects. After all, I was part of much bigger team, whose members all contributed to delivery 
and success. My claim is that, without my unique vision and individual leadership style, these 
projects would not have reached fruition or have been the success that they are today. 
Although at the time of joining the team the NFRC and NFIB projects were running in 
tandem, I will show how delivery of the NFRC informed the design and build of the NFIB’s 
intelligence system, Know Fraud. I will then examine how the Know Fraud system was developed 
and how, without the knowledge and experience gained by delivering the NFRC, Know Fraud 
may not have been delivered or been the success it was and is today.  
The concluding text of these Public Works examines the development of the Academy 
as a unique entrepreneurial enterprise within policing. What started out as an internal training 
function, named ‘Centre of Excellence’, was built-up to become a world-class provider of 
specialist education and training solutions, with a remit to: 
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• Build international capability to combat economic crime, and;  
• Generate a much-needed revenue stream for CoLP. 
Evidence presented in support of this claim includes project documents, design plans, 
conference literature, web content, operational guides, business cases, and the first prospectus 
issued by the Academy. 
Supporting evidence is also included, such as newsletters, profiles, press cuttings and 
external reports. Where supporting documentary evidence from the public domain is available 
online only, web addresses are provided. Where evidence is online, but classified as Restricted 
and therefore not openly accessible, alternative evidence in support of this award is provided. 
Evidence consists of co-produced and co-authored works. However, in each of the 
projects and the evidence supplied I performed a leadership role, responsible for managing and 
delivering each project stream. 
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3.a Implementation of a ‘National Fraud Reporting Centre’ (NFRC) 
The scale and timeframes of the NFRC project were a little overwhelming. I was 
responsible for designing and producing the content for a new, online and telephone fraud 
reporting system, an area of policing which, at the time, I had limited knowledge of. 
Before I joined the team a number of key decisions had already been made, including 
hosting provision for the NFRC which, at the time, was to be the Office of Fair Trading (OFT14). 
The OFT had already delivered both Consumer Direct and Scambusters, which were major 
sources of potential fraud data, and would later become a significant contributor to the NFIB’s 
intelligence system, Know Fraud. 
The project was subject to Terms of Reference set out by the Office of the Attorney 
General and, by December 2008, when I joined the team, the project had already failed to meet 
its go-live date target. After an initial review of the business case and project plan for the NFRC, 
I produced a milestones document, Appendix 7. 
This document revealed and identified predefined milestone timescales, which required 
me to complete all of the following work within a mere 4 months: 
• Complete detailed research into web reporting tools. 
• Scope and identify all system design requirements. 
• Scope and design a detailed process for the reporting of fraud. 
• Write web content for all fraud typologies and prevention sections. 
• Work with programmers constructing the web portal.  
• Test the system; remediating and retesting as appropriate. 
14 The Office of Fair Trading ceased to exist from April 2014 when its functions passed to the 
Competition and Markets Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority. 
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• Publicise and launch the system. 
Although responsible for delivery of the NFRC, I was not responsible for the formal 
project management. The size and scope of this project required a project team consisting of a 
Project Director and Project Manager. This team would oversee each of the project streams and 
report back to CoLP Senior Management Team (SMT) and produce progress reports for the 
Attorney General’s Office and the Home Office, who were funding the projects. Although I 
embraced the principles of project management in the NFRC delivery, having this team to 
support me meant I was able to focus on deliverables without the additional burden of having 
to project manage the process formally. As with all my projects, I had to be able to visualise what 
the NFRC solution would look like, create a plan and then deliver the solution. Creating or solving 
the problem twice, as Covey (2004) puts it, first there’s the mental creation, the vision, then 
there’s the physical creation, the solution. The key to creativity is to begin with the end objective 
in mind, with a vision and a blueprint of the desired result. 
I would argue that this is why the Police Service and other areas of the public sector 
struggle or even fail to deliver so many projects15, or on time and/or within budget. More often 
than not, these organisations have the technical expertise but lack, or are afraid to embrace, the 
potential of dreamers and visionaries. Without a vision, such a project would be like a new 
journey, but without a map; there may be a destination, but there is no clear route of how to 
get there or what to expect when the destination is reached.  
For the NFRC, I formalised a research project with the following objectives: 
• Identify examples of best practices of UK online crime/fraud reporting systems. 
15 http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/sep/18/nhs-records-system-10bn  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-19413916  
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• Identify examples of best practices of international online crime/fraud reporting 
systems. 
• Conduct a consultation exercise with fraud investigators to identify weaknesses and 
gaps in traditional crime reports when used for fraud. 
• Create a framework of fraud offences and unique reporting requirements for each 
crime type. 
Although timeframe was short, the research project was completed quickly because, at 
the time, there were so few examples of online crime/fraud reporting systems and, no single 
solution to provide a representative example of best practice or suitability upon which to model 
the NFRC. A major issue that I discovered with the current offering of online crime reporting was 
the use of ‘free text’ fields, which allow users to enter words of their choosing. These caused 
issues with data consistency and, in almost every case, required each report to be scrutinised 
and assessed manually to understand the scale of what had happened, or even whether a crime 
had happened at all. 
I identified examples of online fraud reporting systems used by the United States 
Internet Crime Complaint Centre (IC3) and the Canadian Phonebusters Centre. Although both 
operations were well established, like the systems in the UK, they were heavily biased towards 
use of free text. Data collected by the NFRC was to feed directly into the NFIB, where it was 
envisaged that the new intelligence system would include a form of automated data extraction, 
mapping and assessment. Critically, this required consistent data and, therefore, minimal free 
text fields. Where used, any free text fields should contain supplemental information only, not 
data used for automated analysis. 
Consulting with fraud investigators confirmed that the existing form of recording fraud 
was not fit for purpose. In most criminal activities, the location of victim (for example) has direct 
correlation to the location of the offence. However, in fraud, the two can be completely 
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separate, even in different countries. In fraud, crime scenes may have no relevance to either the 
victim or the suspect and some crime scenes may be ‘virtual’ or in the ‘cloud’16. This, together 
with the fact that the majority of information available from victims of fraud would probably be 
false or misleading, raised the first issue of: 
• How to ensure data accuracy suitable for automated analysis, mapping and 
assessment?  
As research progressed, I started to understand better the scale of the project and 
produced a brief to the NFRC Design & Implementation, Appendix 8, clearly setting out 
requirements, objectives, audience, content and project delivery methodology. 
Key objectives that I had to deliver were defined as: 
• Contribute to increased volume and better targeted fraud investigations in 
the UK.  
• Encourage increased reporting of fraud.  
• Provide fraud prevention advice for consumers and industry stakeholders.  
• Create a fuller, more intelligent picture of fraud trends throughout the UK.  
• Prevent fraud.  
• Increase public satisfaction with law enforcement’s response to fraud.  
• Provide an online reporting centre for victims of fraudulent activity.  
• Collect comprehensive data on fraud.  
• Feed data to the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau.  
• Identify where investigations into fraudulent activity are appropriate.  
• Provide fraud prevention advice to the public.  
16 The term ‘the cloud’ refers to cloud computing infrastructures and is often used to refer to software, 
platforms and infrastructures sold as serviced solutions via the internet. 
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• Provide signposting for victims having specific issues and who may benefit 
from being assisted by another expert agency. 
By the time the brief had been agreed it was January 2009 and the first deliverables 
were due. Fortunately, I had been running several strands of the project in tandem and trying 
to stay one step ahead of all agreed milestones and deliverables. The most important 
deliverable, and critical to the design solution, was the identification and classification of the 
offences that would be recorded by the NFRC. 
This proved to be much more difficult than anticipated, because data collated by forces 
and supplied to the Home Office classified all fraud crimes under their legislative offences such 
as, fraud by false representation and thereby made no distinction in how each false 
representation had occurred. There was no way of knowing whether a victim had been targeted 
by a fraudulent investment scheme or subjected to an online sales scam. This reinforced findings 
from the Fraud Review, Attorney General (2006), that, fraud was misunderstood and not 
considered to be a policing priority. The Review identified a number of barriers preventing the 
public from reporting fraud to the police. 
These included: 
• A lack of understanding by the police of exactly what constitutes fraud and how 
to categorise it. 
• A lack of willingness by police forces to accept reports of fraud outright. 
• Where a fraud has occurred across force boundaries, forces have been known 
to not accept the report and try to send the victim to another force. 
 
Button et al (2009) believed the problem to be greater than this and expanded on the 
reasons for low reporting by including situations where a victim may not know they have been 
defrauded, or are too embarrassed, or do not believe their case justifies reporting because of 
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the low value of the loss. Similar to the Fraud Review, Attorney General (2006), Button et al 
(ibid) identified the most significant barrier to reporting as being the attitude of the police and 
the reluctance to record crimes that are resource-intensive to investigate. These crimes often 
remained unsolved and, ultimately, impacted badly on a force’s crime figures. 
To compound issues, no formal guidance existed, either to the public or, for that matter, 
to police who may be asked to investigate an offence that they had never heard of and probably 
didn’t understand. Additionally, because of lack of guidance, numerous offences were known by 
different names. Often this related to where individuals worked, the local culture and what 
knowledge of fraud existed. On conclusion of my research, I established the scope of ‘known’ 
fraudulent activity, both here in the UK and overseas with partner agencies in the United States, 
Canada and Australia. I standardised terminology and taxonomy and produced an outline of the 
fraud types and their suitability for recording by the NFRC. 
 A victim of fraud may think that the first point of contact should be the police or the 
NFRC but, for example, when a victim’s credit card is cloned by criminals, the most appropriate 
place to report this is to the issuer, who would be able to stop transactions and thereby protect 
both the card holder and the financial institution from financial loss. 
Issues such as this were further complicated by the fact that there was no requirement 
for a victim to report their crime to the police. In the case of fraudulent credit card use, if a victim 
is told by the issuer of the card to report fraudulent usage to the police, this generally indicated 
that the issuer believed the card holder was implicated in the fraud, possibly responsible for the 
usage and was trying to avoid liability by claiming that the usage was the result of card cloning 
or theft. 
My research revealed that victims often commenced a report without all of the 
necessary information being available, then leaving the report only part-completed and lacking 
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in the detail required by investigators. This caused frustration with investigators because, in 
almost every case, they would then first have to contact the victim to clarify what was being 
reported and then collate the correct information required to establish whether there were any 
possible investigative leads to support commencement of an investigation. Additionally, if 
correct information was not collated, then the automated intelligence system, that was to form 
the heart of the NFIB, would not function as intended and could fail to identify crime links, 
networks or potential lines of enquiry. 
Identifying best practice and lessons learnt from my research, in the first draft of the 
NFRC Functional Design I stated the following as essential to the design solution: 
• The triage page(s) to be entirely mouse-driven (i.e. specific choices, no free text) 
• System requires user registration / login to enable reports to completed over 
more than one session online. 
• The form to be updated by the victim (using original login) if further information 
comes to light. 
• A unique crime reference number to be issued for each report. 
• Email confirmation/verification of report submission. 
• Facility to register for the Fraud e-Newsletter. 
As the design progressed, so did the engagement with OFT, who wanted the solution or 
service to be designed to integrate with their existing business operating model. The NFRC 
potentially providing a lifeline to OFT call centres, which were under review with the potential 
threat of reduced services, closure and redundancies. Although we were open to their 
suggestions and welcomed any existing infrastructure that would help deliver the NFRC more 
effectively, the solution had to deliver best value, meet the quality of service specified by the 
Attorney General’s Office and provide the quality of data needed by the NFIB. 
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During this phase, a member of the National Fraud Authority (NFA17) was seconded into 
our team to assist with negotiations and delivery of the system. The NFRC was critical to the role 
of the NFA and, to some extent, their existence; without the NFRC, they would be unable to 
measure fraud losses accurately nor provide the core function it was created to deliver. 
During March 2009, I continued to work on the content for the reporting portal, 
producing draft content to make sense of fraud definitions, and develop fraud prevention advice 
to help the general public and victims, Appendix 9. Although the definitions and prevention 
advice had been informed by considerable research already conducted, it was envisaged that, 
following go-live of the NFRC, we would seek to continually update information on fraud 
typologies and the resulting prevention advice provided. Thereby informing and protecting the 
public from further risk and harm. In essence, fraud definitions and prevention advice would be 
a living element of the NFRC. 
The NFRC Functional Design had been tested at every stage of its development with the 
project team and, by March 2009, was ready for its first national consultation and testing with 
a representative sample of police forces from across the country. However, such consultation 
and testing would not enable feedback to be provided regarding ‘technical’ functionality. What 
was required was an assessment of how the report had been designed, whether it was easy 
enough for victims to follow and whether it would result in correct information being collected. 
It was not going to be possible to produce an electronic version of the report, so I designed a 
paper-based report that would, hopefully, achieve the same outcome and, without the smart 
navigation would still be simple enough to complete, Appendix 10.  
Testing was a success and feedback from the event proved that the design solution was 
fit for purpose. However, the event identified issues within forces where there was a lot of 
17 The NFA ceased to exist from April 2014 when its function where passed to the National Crime Agency 
and the City of London Police. 
Page | 44  
 
                                                          
speculation, misinformation and misunderstanding about the function that NFRC would provide 
and how this would relate to NFIB. In part, this was because the project team had decided to 
keep communication to a minimum, at least until there was firm indication that we could deliver 
to truly meet the Review’s recommendations and implement a suitable solution for both the 
NFRC and NFIB. 
I had identified that across the country there were pockets of forces banding together, 
either in support of, or against, the NFRC and NFIB projects. There was also resentment towards 
those areas of CoLP transitioning to the NLF. Some police forces could see the sense in CoLP 
being made NLF for fraud because of having essential expertise in the subject but, more 
importantly, in policing the City, the financial centre of the UK, and therefore having existing 
relationships with key stakeholders who could either make or break these projects. Those who 
were opposed saw the creation of the NLF with the NFRC and NFIB projects as a threat to their 
own business portfolios and status within the policing hierarchy. The Metropolitan Police, who, 
at the time, were the lead force for e-crime, was one such area of resistance. This country-wide 
division prompted a rethink of our communications strategy, to consolidate support across 
forces and eliminate any misinformation that could undermine the project. With the functional 
design virtually complete I then had time for additional responsibilities and so took on the 
responsibility of lead for project communications. This work started with the planning and co-
ordination of a national event to communicate the work of the project and the progress that 
had been made to date.  
Progressing with the final version of the functional design, I started to focus on solutions 
for addressing national buy-in and support from forces for each of the NLF functions. Having just 
left a role working within City University, I had become a regular on various conference circuits 
and suggested that we consider holding a national fraud reporting and intelligence conference. 
The three-day event was to be divided topically, with the first day focussing on strategic 
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implications for senior officers and the second and third day dedicated to tactical and managerial 
implications for those involved in operational implementation. 
Senior management viewed the event as a great opportunity to ‘showcase’ CoLP. 
However, considering feedback from the consultation event, I argued that the conference 
should be presented as a national project, not a CoLP project. It would therefore be beneficial if 
the conference was backed or promoted by an ACPO officer from outside the City. The Deputy 
Chief Constable of West Midlands Police was a great supporter and sponsor of the work being 
done by CoLP and committed both his support for the event and his time to act as conference 
chair. 
Considering project communications, Charvat (2012) makes an analogy between Star 
Trek and Communications, suggesting that the 1960’s television series Star Trek understood the 
concept of communications, constantly referring to ‘The Prime Directive’ as a master plan 
governing every aspect of the crew’s mission. My communications plan for the NFRC was no 
different, with my ‘Prime Directive’ being to communicate the mission, progress and 
deliverables of the various project streams, I developed a theme for the conference. Keeping 
with the Star Trek analogy, I named the event ‘Fraud: The Financial Frontier’, a play on words 
but, within policing, it was very apt. Fraud was very often the frontier that police officers would 
rather avoid than confront. 
As counterparts in United States and Canada had featured greatly in my research and 
the functional design of the NFRC, I secured speakers from IC3, Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) which, together with independent industry 
and academic speakers, I hoped would help to minimise perceptions that the conference was 
nothing more than a CoLP roadshow. To further reduce the perception of this being a CoLP 
roadshow I decided that the NPIA training centre in Warwickshire would be the ideal venue. 
Page | 46  
 
With services delivered at cost recovery, this venue provided both an ideal, geographically-
central location and best value for money. 
In designing and planning the conference and supporting literature, including the 
conference brochure, Appendix 11, I took every opportunity to maximise channels to 
communicate the ‘Prime Directive’. In the conference brochure, I incorporated a forward by 
ACPO, comprising a summary of the Fraud Review findings and recommendations followed by 
information on both NFRC and NFIB projects. Within policing, it is rare to come across a 
conference that has been planned and presented in such a manner. For me and for this event, 
my experience at City University had proved invaluable. 
The project team, myself included, considered the conference to be a success with 
nearly 100 delegates attending from around the country, including several attendees from the 
Scotland and Northern Ireland – even though the NFRC and NFIB projects were only applicable 
to England and Wales. 
• The objective of the conference had been achieved, with the message delivered 
and misinformation quelled. 
• Forces that we had been warned were joining together in a front against the 
NFRC and NFIB were sold on the projects and were keen for the messages 
delivered at the conference to be taken on the road and delivered to their chief 
officers, colleagues and business partners. 
While the communications work stream progressed, the relationship with OFT stalled 
due to a procurement issue. There was no option but to go out to tender for a service provider 
to build and host the online reporting portal and provide the telephone call centre, almost 
certainly delaying the delivery of the NFRC. The NFA stepped in, suggesting that use of the 
government’s approved supplier system would enable a streamlined procurement process to be 
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run in a fraction of the time that a full EU procurement process would take. It was at this point 
that responsibility for the NFRC was passed from CoLP to the NFA, with specific caveats that I 
would provide the final functional design, Appendix 12, and provide technical support and 
guidance to developers (upon their appointment).  
While the new service provider for the NFRC was being sourced, the Project Director 
decided that I would take the NFRC and NFIB communications work stream on the road, as 
requested at the conference. During the following months I visited the majority of police forces 
in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, providing briefings, advice and guidance regarding the 
implementation of the NFRC and NFIB. Where forces had disbanded their fraud teams, or had 
no capability or capacity to manage such changes, I worked with them to develop business cases 
for re-establishing their teams or for increasing capacity and capability. Hampshire 
Constabulary, an enthusiastic supporter of the project, was one such force. 
• As a result of the work we did together on developing a business case for a new 
fraud team, Hampshire established what is now one of the largest provincial 
fraud teams in the South of the country. 
Central to the business case, and one of the key questions that forces wanted to know, 
was what the potential workload was going to be once NFRC and NFIB were fully operational, 
receiving, analysing and disseminating crimes and work packages. The general consensus was 
that there was no way to predict this accurately because of historic issues associated with the 
underreporting of fraud. The most accurate data available was from CIFAS18 and their Identity 
fraud studies. I argued that, if there was a correlation between the level of identity crime and 
fraud, a theory supported by my research, which showed that false identity was a common 
theme in a large proportion of reported frauds, then, the CIFAS data detailing regional variations 
18 CIFAS is a not-for-profit UK fraud prevention service 
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and percentages of identity crime could be used to predict the potential level of fraud in each 
county realistically. To assist forces in establishing capacity and capability I produced three 
separate ranges so show minimum, average and maximum potential crimes and disseminations, 
Appendix 13. This data was used to produce presentations tailored specifically for each force. 
For a few forces there was a reduction in the volume of fraud they would receive but, for 
most, there was a significant increase, suggesting a need to increase resources and capability. 
Most importantly, presentations and projections I delivered got fraud and the NFRC and NFIB 
projects onto the agenda for Chief Constables and into the media. 
• In an article from the Yorkshire Evening Post on 2nd August 2009, Appendix 14, 
the Acting Chief Constable for Humberside went on the record stating that, “the 
NFRC would impact on Humberside, resulting in an increase of reported crime 
which the force did not have the capacity to deal with”. 
While I continued with the communication work stream, the NFA awarded the contract 
for the NFRC web portal and call centre to the BSS Group; a specialist call centre and 
communications provider. Work commenced on the design of an interim reporting system, to 
be tested by call centre staff prior to go-live of the public website and reporting portal. To meet 
the new delivery deadline, BSS were required to make compromises in the design solution. 
These compromises were in relation to the first iteration only, while the essential criteria would 
be implemented in future iterations of the website and web portal.  
I continued to work with the NFA and BSS, informing the build of the solution and testing 
several pilots until the final solution was approved. The NFRC was officially launched in April 
2010, when it was rebranded ‘Action Fraud’19. 
19 http://www.actionfraud.police.uk/  
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In a review of the fraud justice network, Button et al (2012) noted that, during its first 
year, Action Fraud received over 150,000 calls for advice or to report fraud crime totalling £75 
million. The finding predicted that such a positive take up in the service was promising for its 
future potential. 
Although this was a huge success, the volume of fraud reports received by Action Fraud 
continues to increase and for 2013/14 recorded losses from fraud to the value of £2.5 billion, 
with over 70 % of reports relating to cyber dependent/enabled crimes20. In March 2014, the 
management of Action Fraud passed back to CoLP and in the first quarter under new 
management by CoLP, Action Fraud received 265,694 reports of fraud, being recognised, within 
policing, as the most successful web-based crime reporting system to date. 
20 Cyber-dependent crimes include the spread of viruses and other malware; hacking and DDoS attacks. 
Cyber-enabled crimes related more to traditional crime types that are now committed with the use of 
technology and includes offences such as cyber-enabled fraud and theft. 
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Learning and Reflection 
In the previous chapter, delivering the IPLDP, I experienced risk-averse police leadership 
which resulted in a culture of short-termism. Whereas, on the NFRC project I was amazed at the 
level of trust and confidence placed in me in to deliver. There was no intrusive or micro-
management, very much the opposite. For me, this reconfirmed that when staff are trusted, 
empowered and given autonomy to deliver, yet know that they have the support of senior 
management, they will push themselves, not wanting to let those down that believe in them. 
Management and leadership styles I encountered assured my success and, in turn, success of 
the project. 
My research helped me develop a level of understanding of fraud that is often absent 
within policing and the criminal system. To understand fraud and provide an effective response, 
it was important for me to understand not only the criminal typology but also the methodology 
or ‘modus operandi’ used in the commission of the offence. It is commonly accepted that fraud 
is a deception or false representation practiced to secure unfair or unlawful gain.  
Within policing, most would refer to fraud as simply a theft committed through trickery 
or deceit. Although this may be correct when considering the application of the law and the 
classification or typology of the offence, it would be wholly inappropriate to consider this 
classification when devising an investigative or disruptive intervention. In this regard the police 
response is often misdirected, not taking time to understand the methodology used in the 
commission of the fraud. 
• From a modus operandi perspective, rather than comparing fraud to theft, a 
more appropriate comparison is, in my view, paedophilia. 
My proposition is based upon analysis and comparison of both criminal methodologies. 
Paedophiles generally create a false identity and then use this to create a false online profile. 
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Using this profile, they then identify potential targets, engaging with them, building trust and 
grooming targets until sufficient trust has been built to follow through with the criminal act. 
When the target is finally victimised, this is not the end of the criminal conduct, the paedophile 
will often have other targets at various stages of being groomed in preparation for victimisation.  
• Paedophilia is a ‘live crime’, where the threat of harm is ongoing; it does not 
end with the first victim.  
By understanding the criminal methodology used by paedophiles it is possible to draw 
parallels with many different fraud types, in particular, those committed via the internet, and, 
similarly, it is possible to understand how victims are selected, drawn in and eventually 
victimised. 
For me, the process of delivering the NFRC reinforced the importance of not only 
recording crime details but the necessity of understanding the crime itself. If information on 
fraud is not collected properly – that is, accurately, consistently and contextually – it becomes 
difficult to shape the correct level of response.  
As detailed above with the comparison to paedophilia, it is not just the crime itself that 
must be recorded, it is the complete lifecycle of communication and interaction between the 
victim and the suspect. Without this, the methodology used in committing the fraud cannot be 
analysed properly and it becomes virtually impossible to develop anything resembling an 
intelligence-led solution. 
For me, the project and, in particular, research into national crime recording systems, 
identified that the police are not always the first point of contact for victims of crime. Although 
there is a duty for the police to accept and record reports of crime, there are many situations 
where this may not happen and therefore not reported to the police.  
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Because of this anomaly, police intelligence and crime systems do not present a 
complete picture of fraudulent activity. Therefore, to enable a detailed picture of what is 
happening to be developed, it is essential that these systems are complemented by information 
held by other organisations across both public and private sectors. 
The collective learning gained from this project made me the ideal candidate to lead on 
the design and implementation of the NFIB’s intelligence system, Know-Fraud. 
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3.b The creation of NFIB’s ‘Know-Fraud’ system 
Towards the end of 2009, I found myself being lined-up to take over as the lead for 
delivering the NFIB’s intelligence system, Know Fraud. Initially, I was not happy with this decision 
because I knew that a lot of people within the police and government believed that what was 
being asked of the project team was unachievable and I felt as though I was being setup to be 
the ‘fall guy’. I was not selected – I was assigned because nobody else wanted the project. 
Despite my reservations, I accepted the project but realised fully that this was a high-risk venture 
and that most of my colleagues believed we would fail to deliver. A Proof of Concept (PoC) had 
already been completed, which focussed on three main deliverables: 
• Secure transfer of a data to a central hub of various other hubs. 
• Cleanse and structure multiple data sources in compliance with National Crime 
Recording Standards (NCRS). 
• Data to be compared and matched across various data sets. 
The product of these three deliverables combined to produce a central hub with maximum 
added value. 
The PoC was conducted using four data sets: OFT, SOCA, UK Payments and CIFAS, 
totalling 434,389 records. It was a success in each of the three deliverables. Most importantly 
for the project team, the PoC produced significant linkages across these data sets, as detailed in 
figure 2. Although the PoC was successful, it was clear that a simple data hub was insufficient to 
provide a suitable solution to help counter fraud. What was needed was a scalable, integrated 
search, analytics and investigation tool having the ability to predict emerging threats, assess and 
prioritise investigations automatically. This would minimise manual data processing and physical 
resources, something that would be new to the world of police intelligence. 
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Figure 2: Data matching from Proof of Concept 
With a very small team of analysts, I commenced the Technical Application 
Development (TAD) with developers from Detica 21, for a system based on the NetReveal® 
platform22. The platform was classed as a Custom Off-The-Shelf (CoTS) solution. In essence, the 
framework was there and the challenge was in defining how it was going look and perform. Most 
versions of NetReveal® are designed as document-centric white data systems, often ingesting 
only a single or small handful of data sources. An example of a document-centric white data 
system would be such as that used by a bank or insurance company, where daily application or 
transaction data is processed with a view to identifying anomalies or suspicious transactions. 
21 Detica was purchased by BAE Systems in 2008 and on 1st February 2014 was renamed BAE Systems 
Applied Intelligence. 
22 NetReveal® is an enterprise risk-management solution that uncovers networks of suspicious 
behaviour by identifying, scoring and visualising networks from multiple data sources. 
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With these systems, the data is consistent and the majority of what is processed is genuine and 
accurate. 
With the NFIB’s solution we would ingest ‘black data’ (crime data) from as many 
different sources as possible and having little or no data consistency. From what I learnt while 
designing the NFRC, I knew that the majority of information recorded about fraudsters would 
be false. Additionally, the NFIB solution was to be entity-centric rather than document-centric; 
focusing on unique entities, such as people, places, emails, websites, bank accounts, and so on, 
making the solution more complex than anything Detica had delivered previously. 
The NFIB’s solution also had the following additional restrictions and requirements 
which are not applied to standard, commercial solutions and so made the design solution even 
more complex: 
• Compliance with Home Office Crime Recording Standards. 
• Process of black data only and not used for fishing exercises. 
• Compliance with Management of Police Information (MOPI) requirements. 
• Export of networks, for evidential use. 
• Multiple rules sets, to allow switching between policing priorities. 
I felt overwhelmed, out of my depth and could not believe I had taken on such a project 
or that the Director had faith in me to deliver it. I started to think that the scaremongers were 
right and that this may be a Bridge Too Far for me and the team. I could see the very real 
possibility that we may very well fail to deliver. 
Hope and Frazer (2003) believe that once we establish a mind-set, we must achieve a 
certain outcome. We then limit our focus to that outcome to the exclusion of all else and become 
blinkered to alternatives and so increase further the potential for failure. 
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Listening to scaremongering troubled me greatly and I was then on a psychological 
roller-coaster, experiencing extreme highs and lows, going from motivated to demotivated and 
disillusioned in a heartbeat. If I didn’t regain my focus and vision, there was a real risk that I 
would be responsible for derailing the project. Reflecting upon my state of mind at the time, by 
understanding what motivates me it was possible to understand what could cause me to lose 
focus and become demotivated.  
McClelland (1988), when discussing his motivational needs theory contrasted 
achievement-motivated people with gamblers to help dispel the misconception that 
achievement-motivated people are risk takers. Achievement-motivated individuals are the high-
flyers who will often focus their skills and abilities towards goals which they are able to influence. 
Although challenging, the goal is considered achievable, being results-orientated such high-
flyers tend to focus on outcomes rather than individuals, pushing their staff too hard. From this 
theory it is clear that, once a project appears to be unachievable, there is loss of motivation. 
However, the theory itself does not provide a solution for overcoming the lows or for regaining 
the vision and motivation necessary for success. For a leader to be successful it is clear that 
vision and a positive persona is essential. If managers and leaders cannot convince their team 
that all is good with the world, how can they be expected to be motivated and positive about 
their work in hand? 
Although I can see a lot of myself in motivational-needs theory (ibid), it is not a perfect model. 
Personally, I would never ask more of my team than I was willing to give myself. In fact, I would 
do more myself to minimise impact upon the team. If anyone were pushed too far and suffer 
during delivery of a project, I would ensure that the only victim would be me. Considering the 
potential conflict of motivational needs, I believe that through the use of Action Centred 
Leadership, Adair (1988), one can achieve a more balanced approach to successful leadership. 
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 Figure 3: John Adair: Action Centre Leadership®. 
Although Action Centred Leadership (ibid), is a common component of police management and 
leadership training, I would argue that within senior management, a balanced, action-centred 
leadership style is relatively rare. In my experience, a number of senior managers would dismiss 
contributions of an individual or the team, to receive personal recognition for a successful task 
themselves. Or, as is often the case, the individual or team would be sacrificed when a task is 
not delivered or there is no recognition or consideration of the part that the managers and 
leaders played in the process. 
I began to analyse what was being asked and whether I had the correct skills engaged 
within the team to achieve project delivery. My priority was to look after the team and protect 
them from being used as scapegoats and, equally important, protect the management and wider 
team who entrusted me to deliver. 
The first thing I identified was that I had been looking at the project from the wrong 
direction. I was thinking of it as an IT or coding project – skills I did not possess. This was actually 
the responsibility of Detica; the organisation which was engaged to deliver the functionality 
required for the project. Therefore, what I needed to do was inform them how we wanted the 
system to function and perform. The system was not intended to be one of Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) but, as soon as I started to think of the solution as AI my mission became clear: 
Task
TeamIndividual
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• If I had access to all available data, what would I do with it?  
• How would I make sense of all that data? 
• How would I identify and prioritise one crime or network over another? 
And, most importantly; 
• How would I present this information so that others could make sense of it? 
As simple as it seems, thinking like a computer programme, instead of as a designer or 
programmer, was all it took to turn the situation around and realise a clear vision of what needed 
to be delivered and how to achieve it. 
From my work on the NFRC, I had a unique understanding of fraud, how fraudsters 
operate and what information was likely to be reported by victims of fraud.  
With this in mind, I tasked the team to start by mapping out reports of potential fraud, 
assessing information to identify which content was most likely to be either correct or false and 
identify which sources of information were available to clarify or verify the accuracy of what was 
known and compare this with what we needed to know. 
Armed with the in-depth understanding of fraud I had developed from the NFRC project, 
I created a virtual information map, overlaying crime reports with industry data. The team were 
then tasked to consider individually what information they had and what they would do with it, 
detailing every step of the process, no matter how small or insignificant it may seem. 
After each team member had completed their tasks, I brought together and overlapped 
individual process maps to first identify commonalities, options and alternatives and then create 
‘must’, ‘should’ and ‘could’ lists for how data should be processed. This was then used to define 
not only what the resulting information product should look like (presentation), but what 
information it should contain and which answers it should be expected to provide. 
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While mapping the data it was necessary to challenge the need for even having the 
system. Would it deliver the Holy Grail of fraud intelligence that had been promised? Similar to 
the process I went through with the NFRC, understanding the true nature of what was being 
reported, now I needed to understand the true value of multiple data sources and how 
aggregation and association would add further value. It was not going to be enough simply to 
map data. Data had to be represented and analysed in-line with three key factors essential to 
establish a successful counter fraud intelligence system, ensuring the correct data was ingested 
and that the data adds value to the central hub when combined with other data sources. 
The three factors which would define not only the success of the counter fraud 
response, but that of the IT solution itself, were identified as: 
• Time – I classify this as the ‘Divergence and Convergence’ factor.  
While observing entities within a fraud, when the police interact with those 
entities, there is ripple effect. If focus is on an incorrect entity, the correct entity 
may be alerted, causing a divergence and thereby distancing the true subject or 
entity from our focus. Conversely, while observing growth of a fraud network, 
additional entities or networks may become associated with the original 
network, causing a convergence. This may add value to intelligence or a 
resulting investigation, or it may confuse and distract the focus away from the 
primary objective. 
• Challenge – I classify this as the ‘Scale and Difficulty’ factor. 
It is common for a challenge to be misunderstood and incorrectly classified. 
Investigators may classify fraud as difficult to investigate when, in fact, it is not 
difficult. It is just the scale of the fraud that is difficult to comprehend. 
Investigative tactics are relatively basic. It is the cumulative effect that can cause 
confusion between scale and difficulty.  
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• Issue – I classify this as the ‘Define and Clarify’ factor. 
It is necessary to question: 
o Why is this fraud data needed? 
o What is the data telling us? 
o How is the data going to help combat fraud? 
o When considering the police response, is the data necessary and how 
will the data add value to the police response? 
These and many other factors and questions were being asked constantly to help clarify 
and shape system requirements – providing a blueprint for the solution. The three factors of 
time, challenge and issue are represented in the following figure: 
 
Figure 4: The ‘Three Factors’. 
What seems like a simple process was in fact an intensive and time-pressured piece of 
work. With the deadline for the final design solution set for Christmas week, the programmers 
were waiting for instruction. I passed my findings to the programmers who then soft-coded 
Time
Convergence & 
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Issue
Define & 
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Scale & 
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them into a development environment so that the team could then test the system and measure 
the impact of our instructions upon analysis of data. 
I found that what was a logical and natural process when completed by a police officer 
or analyst, adding value to an enquiry, often had the opposite effect when coded as an inflexible 
rule within an automated intelligence system. The intelligence system could not use common 
sense or instinct. Instead, the system applied those rules and/or questions precisely as I had 
asked of it. By understanding this, two challenging questions evolved: 
• Which of all potential questions must be asked to obtain contextually-relevant, 
meaningful, answers? 
• Which of all potential answers must be available to provide contextually-
relevant, meaningful responses to those questions? 
Superficially, these may appear to be the same question, but there are many ways a 
question can be posed to obtain the same answer. Therefore, it was necessary to first identify 
answer required and then work backwards from each answer until the correct question could 
be identified with certainty. By working one answer at a time, defining and refining, question-
by-question, the design solution appeared to be thinking and operating more like an 
investigator, producing intelligence products containing meaningful answers. This was a major 
improvement compared to simple data results, which posed more questions than answers. 
The approach was a success but no one was prepared for just how effective the system 
would be and the volume of criminal networks it would identify from what was previously 
unconnected and apparently disparate data. 
As a result, the next logical challenge was to design a set of rules for the assessment and 
prioritisation of individual crimes and criminal networks. In essence, this would automate the 
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work of crime reviewers or, at least perform the initial triage for the crime review process. 
Resources could then be used more effectively by the NFIB, focussing on those fraud crimes and 
fraudsters identified as causing most harm. 
Again, what initially seemed like a simple task became a complex problem to solve and 
raised difficult questions: 
• How to define harm? 
• What represents greater harm? 
o Loss of several million pounds by a bank that makes billions of pounds 
profit every year? Or; 
o An elderly investor defrauded out of their entire £2,000 savings? 
• Should harm severity be rated according to the impact of the crime upon a single 
person, or the harm it has on many? 
• A relatively low-level fraud, committed using an online auction site, for example, 
could defraud hundreds or thousands of people out of only a few pounds each. 
In such a case, the harm to any of those individuals may relatively negligible, so 
should this warrant police attention and resources? 
Analysing the problem, or rather the challenge presented by these questions, it was 
apparent to me that a single set of rules would not be enough and, therefore, a single form of 
data analysis and visualisation would not satisfy the needs of the NFIB nor fulfil the requirements 
of the Fraud Review.  
As I interrogated the system and started to understand the solution better, I concluded 
that results data should be run against various sets of rules to meet the needs of different 
policing priorities. Results must then be visualised in a variety of workspaces, complying with 
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particular policing priorities. I determined that this required individual rules and workspaces to 
be developed for each of the following: 
• Real-time crime having clear investigative leads. 
• Crimes targeting elderly and vulnerable victims. 
• Offences and networks involving Organised Crime Groups (OCGs). 
• Networks containing high volumes of crime and persistent offenders. 
• Networks which connect to live police operations. 
This solution would allow the NFIB to structure its operations and staff with resources 
dedicated to each specialist area, recognising the needs of victims unique to each area so that 
resources and responses would not be limited to one particular type of harm. 
A similar approach to how we defined the initial set of rules – how we wanted the system 
to think – was used to develop a scoring and prioritisation matrix for each work area. As before, 
each scoring and prioritisation matrix required extensive, iterative development. Each iteration 
required coding, evaluation and refinement until, after several weeks of intensive development 
and testing, the matrix was honed to perform to the same standards expected of an experienced 
crime reviewer. 
The vision was that, post go-live, the system would continue to grow, taking in new data 
sets and live operational data, until the system could receive, hold and analyse every conceivable 
data set of known fraud. 
However: 
• This presented a major drawback because, before each new data set could be 
ingested and processed, it must first be hard-coded, manually, according to pre-
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agreed schema (format) that, once coded, could not be changed without 
breaking the data ingest and nightly build of the system. 
This caused an issue in that any new data set could not be pre-tested or evaluated to 
assess the value it would add to the system. Additionally, there was no way of importing live 
data from police operations. A substantial fraud could have literally hundreds of addresses, 
telephone numbers, email addresses, bank accounts, people, and so on. Using a traditional 
approach of searching systems manually for entities in each operation could take days or even 
weeks to complete and, with the system taking in new data daily, any check would only be 
relevant to the day it was conducted. 
The challenge: 
• To enable me to ingest operational data into the system in real-time and test 
any new data sources, I wanted the system to be able to import data without 
first needing the source data to be coded. 
The solution: 
• By ingesting live operational data and not having to perform manual checks, I 
could save the valuable resource time of analysts and researchers. The system 
would then perform these checks automatically and repeat them every night 
checking for new data and matches. 
The answer came through the design of an ‘operational spreadsheet’. By identifying key 
data fields – those producing tangible links across the current range of data sets – the need to 
ingest the bulk of the data could be eliminated, allowing focus upon key fields only. By using a 
simple Excel spread sheet, a simple cut and paste command from almost any data source was 
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possible. Data could then be imported directly into the system and incorporated in that nights’ 
build. 
As the December deadline approached, we had built a development environment which 
proved that the system worked; not only delivering on the initial requirements, but exceeding 
those expectations with additional functionality not considered at the outset. 
Over Christmas, we reviewed final proposals and specifications and contracts with a 
view to commencing the development of the final solution in January 2010. There was a lot of 
pressure from both the Attorney General’s office and the Home Office for the system to be live 
by the summer, resulting in a seemingly unrealistic go-live date of June 2010. 
From the remote development site in Gloucestershire, my team and the team of 
programmers worked hand-in-hand. As soon as programmers hard-coded functionality, we 
would test and ultimately try to break the system. This was to ensure that no matter what the 
NFIB’s users did, the system would not fail.  
In spite of all the hard work and achievements, a real and significant risk remained. I 
knew that senior management would need to see the benefits of the system from an operational 
perspective. This system was unlike anything they had seen before and if they could not see the 
benefits and how it would relate to day-to-day operations and outputs, none of its sophisticated 
functionality would mean anything. To remedy this risk I decided to focus my time on testing 
the operational use and outputs of the system, establishing potential benefits to the public and 
UK law enforcement. 
The Fraud Review, Attorney General (2006), proposed that the combined functions of 
the NFRC and NFIB would be used to deliver an intelligence-led policing solution. Ratcliffe (2003) 
describes this as being the use of criminal intelligence to enable crime reduction and prevention 
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through effective policing interventions. Similar to the Peelian Principles, intelligence-led 
policing does not talk about operations or investigations. The focus is crime reduction and 
prevention. To validate the system and its use an intelligence-led policing solution, I invited a 
number of partner agencies to our development site to interrogate the system and assess its 
suitability as a single, national fraud data hub. 
The first test of the system was with an officer from a small fraud team in the south of 
the country: 
Table 2: NFIB Case Study 1 – reducing ‘blue on blue’. 
Situation - Core data from the live operation was provided which was fed into the Know Fraud 
system which, following the nightly build, produced links to two live operations, one being 
conducted by Operation Amberhill within the Metropolitan Police focusing on false identity 
factories and a second by the fraud squad of the Ministry of Defence Police who were 
investigating a case of public sector corruption. 
Contribution - The linkages between these investigations was previously unknown and by 
putting the investigators in touch with each other and providing them with evidence or 
investigative overlaps, duplication of effort was reduced (blue on blue 23 ) and the three 
investigations were aligned for efficiency and effectiveness. 
Benefits - It was possible to harmonise the three operations, reducing the impact of the blue 
on blue activities whilst ensuring that the individual cases, when presented at court were 
representative of the entirety of the criminal activity taking place. 
Operational benefits were easy to see. What I needed to do was to produce hard facts 
to demonstrate benefits and gain support from, not only our senior management, but from 
sceptics around the country. I focused on three operations and used them as case studies to 
evaluate and compare processes prior to, and post, NFIB implementation. 
23 ‘Blue-on-Blue’ is a term within policing, used when two or more investigations are being conducted into 
the same individual or criminal enterprise and the investigators are blind to each other’s investigation. 
This results in duplication of effort and unnecessary demands on time and resources and, eventually, 
when such cases are tried, the Court sees only a partial snapshot of the wider criminality. 
By reducing Blue-on-Blue, the investigative process is streamlined, money, time and resources are saved. 
Then, when cases are tried, the Court is more fully informed and so able to assess the true extent of 
criminal endeavours and therefore better placed to apply appropriate sanctions. 
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Table 3: Operational Benefits, Case Study 1 – Mandate Fraud 
Situation - The case was an investigation by a public sector body into a criminal network that 
had committed a £1.5 million mandate fraud (redirection of payments to suppliers) against 
the sector.  
A team which included an investigator, an analyst and a researcher spent 9 months building 
the case against the group, just prior to commencing a surveillance operation against the 
prime suspect he was arrested for a murder which had occurred whilst the team were building 
their case. 
Contribution - With a basic abstract of the original data, in less than a day, all of the data had 
been checked against that in the Know Fraud development environment, producing results 
and networks in excess of that which the initial investigation had taken 9 months to develop. 
Benefits – Calling on the expertise of the investigators in the case, using their estimates of 
time committed to the investigation, I calculated the following efficiency saving if the system 
had been available at the commencement of the investigation: 
• Working on a ratio of 10 % of the team’s time being dedicated to this investigation 
over a 39 week period, this equated to 58.5 days effort, the same was achieved in less 
than 1 day by 1 person on the Know Fraud System, a saving of 57.5 days. 
• Opportunities for prevention and disruption were available on day 1, having identified 
the fraud methodology, organisational weaknesses and enablers used by the 
fraudster. 
• Early enforcement opportunities could have been possible if the NFIB and the Know 
Fraud system had been available and the case had been passed to us at the beginning 
of the investigation. The same results (as a minimum) would have been available in 
24 hours in comparison to 39 weeks or 195 (working) days it took the investigation 
team to achieve. 
• In considering the potential reduction in harm and loss, a serious offence may have 
been prevented if Know Fraud had been presented with case at commencement of 
the investigation. Offences were still being committed for 9 months whilst the 
investigation team built their case. This activity would have been targeted and 
disrupted within the first few days of receiving the case. 
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Table 4: Operational Benefits, Case Study 2 – False Identity Fraud 
Situation – A northern police force had drawn a blank with an international investigation, the 
case involved the importation of fake identity & financial documents from West Africa to a 
person/address in the UK, neither of which were previously known to the police. 
Local police had 2 police officers and 2 financial investigators research the person and address 
for 4 days, they had been turned down for a warrant and had drawn a blank with no further 
reasonable lines of enquiry.  
Contribution - With only two pieces of data, the delivery address and name of the addressee, 
in less than 10 minutes Know Fraud had produced a network of criminality linking the person 
and address to multiple frauds. When this information was passed back to the officer a further 
request for a warrant was submitted which was now granted, on execution two persons were 
arrested and a wealth of fraudulent materials seized. 
Communications data obtained, as a result of the arrests, were passed back for checking 
against the Know Fraud system for any further criminal linkages; in less than 30 minutes the 
system had identified 6 additional criminal networks spanning the UK, identifying a serious 
and organised criminal network previously unknown to the police. 
Again, this information was passed back to the officer before the first interview with the 
suspects had even taken place. Within 24 hours, the suspects had been interviewed and the 
primary suspect was charged with multiple offences and presented to the court where he was 
remanded in custody pending trial. 
Benefits – The efficiencies for this case were easier to calculate because it was a live case: 
• The initial intelligence package produced was done 76.8 times quicker with a positive 
outcome, when compared to the time spent on the case by local investigators. 
• Early prevention & disruption of a national organised crime network was possible with 
opportunities to takedown telephone and email accounts associated with the 
fraudulent activity 
• Early enforcement opportunities were only possible because of the warrant which 
was obtained on the back of intelligence supplied (previously declined) which led to 
the two arrests. 
• There was a further reduction in harm and Loss following the communications checks 
which identified 6 linked criminal networks that were suitable for prevention and 
disruption interventions.  
• The primary suspect was remanded in Custody pending trial preventing any further 
fraudulent activities. 
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Table 5: Operational Benefits, Case Study 3 – Online Sales Fraud 
Situation – Live fraud reports were received through the trial of the Action Fraud reporting 
centre. The fraud reports alleged an online sales outlet was targeting Christmas shoppers, the 
retailer offering non-existent discount designer clothing.  
When compared to other fraud data sources the system identified an identical network of 
fraud from the previous year and a third network of charity clothing fraud linking the three 
together.  
The three networks were then linked to a ‘legitimate’ company possibly involved in laundering 
the criminal proceeds. 
Contribution - Traditional intelligence gathering would probably not have identified the scale 
and extent of the linked criminality, a team of experienced investigators and analysts 
estimated that traditional processes and intelligence systems would have meant a similar 
product would have taken in the region of 6 months to develop. 
The product produced by Know Fraud and the development team was prepared for action in 
four days by only one person. 
Benefits – The efficiency savings for this case were calculated using the same ratios and 
criteria as case study one:  
• The efficiency savings used the ratio of 10 % of an initial investigation team’s time 
being dedicated to this investigation over a 6 month or 26 week period which equated 
to 39 days effort, the same was achieved in 4 days by 1 person on the Know Fraud 
System, a saving of 35 days. 
• Early prevention & disruption opportunities would be available through a sound 
understanding of modus operandi enabling targeted awareness campaigns and alerts 
at areas and times to minimise the impact of future or linked threats.  
• Early enforcement opportunities would have been possible with identification of the 
earlier fraud, unfortunately this data which was held by a partner organization had 
not been analysed for enforcement action. If the NFIB and Know Fraud had have been 
live when this had occurred and the information had been passed to Know Fraud 
there was sufficient information to disrupt and take action at the point of the first 
offence 13 months prior to development of the resulting investigation package. 
• Considering the potential for the reduction in harm and loss, in this case 13 months 
of harm and loss could have been prevented from two linked frauds had the data 
been shared and Know Fraud had been operational. 
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The above case studies were compelling, clearly demonstrating the main benefits of a 
central fraud hub and the Know Fraud system. 
By aggregating results from the above case studies, I produced a simple guide to 
highlight the potential savings and operational benefits from the NFIB and Know Fraud, a 
summary of which are below: 
Table 6:  Summary of Operational Benefits 
Efficiency 
The average efficiency gain for identification and action was 48.4 times 
quicker than traditional intelligence methods. 
Disruption 
Real time opportunities for the identification and deployment of 
disruption interventions. 
Prevention 
Automated problem and subject profiling of fraud methodologies enable 
real time targeted awareness and educational campaigns. 
Enforcement 
Earlier and prioritised enforcement activities were possible on average 
212 days earlier. 
Harm & Loss 
There was a clear reduction in the duration of the harm and loss timeline 
though the identification and implementation of disruption, prevention 
and enforcement activities. 
 
To support findings from the above case studies, I produced two models to demonstrate 
differences between the Traditional Fraud Landscape (prior to the NFIB with information held 
in silos and the negative impact that this had on law enforcement action) and the Data Sharing 
Fraud Landscape, and so illustrate benefits of the Know Fraud system. 
The Traditional Fraud Landscape is illustrated on the next page. 
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Figure 5: NFIB Traditional Fraud landscape 
The Traditional Fraud Landscape illustrates that fraudsters are generally entrepreneurial 
and take every opportunity to maximise the profitability of a particular fraud, or diversify into 
further fraudulent enterprises before investigators fully understand the initial crime. Often, 
fraudsters’ business plans include the inevitable involvement of the fraud investigator and 
contingency plans for diversification to avoid identification and prosecution. For this reason, 
fraud is considered to be a ‘live’ crime – where the criminal is active and there is potential for 
further victims to be targeted before action is taken by an investigator. 
 The Traditional Fraud Landscape also demonstrates the effect of the investigator upon 
a fraud when a traditional investigative process is adopted. From the ‘Trigger Point’, 
investigative activity is focussed on identifying potential information sources (prior to the NFIB, 
there was no central hub of fraud data). While data gathering and investigative scoping is being 
conducted, there is potential that the fraud is still operational. Those involved are becoming 
more proficient and, potentially diversifying into new activities, either connected to the original 
crime, or as a new, standalone, criminal enterprise. 
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The risk with this approach is that investigators become so focussed on building their 
case that they lose sight of the fact that harm is still ongoing and the growth of the criminal 
activity could quickly outpace that of the investigation. This situation conflicts with the Peelian 
Principles, ACPO (2012), by allowing criminals to operate and target further victims while a 
criminal case is built. 
Having mapped the Traditional Fraud Landscape, I then set about mapping how this 
would look after go-live of the NFIB and Know Fraud and whether a model of policing fraud could 
be introduced that would be more compliant with the Peelian Principles, ACPO (ibid). The 
following model is my interpretation of what the Landscape looks like now: 
 
Figure 6: NFIB Data Sharing Fraud Landscape 
The new, Data Sharing Fraud Landscape is based around a central fraud data hub, the 
NFIB’s Know Fraud. This provides automation of ‘Trigger Points’, enabling law enforcement to 
prioritise prevention and disruption activities. Ultimately, these reduce the period of harm and 
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loss, returning to a model of policing more compatible with the Peelian Principles, ACPO (2012); 
and as demonstrated by my case studies. 
With the central repository of fraud data, the potential for enforcement activity occurs 
much earlier because the search for data (material/evidence) is greatly reduced. With the trigger 
point automation and early identification of potential criminal enterprises, law enforcement can 
disrupt and restrict fraudulent activities, thereby limiting the success and duration of a fraud 
and discouraging diversification and expansion into new fraud ventures. 
By this stage of the project, I confirmed to senior management that we were going to 
meet the deadline. We knew that we had developed something really special, something 
unique, which would make a difference to UK policing but, more importantly, something that 
would proactively help protect victims from harm and financial loss from fraud. 
Communicating the role of the NFIB and the Know Fraud system was going to be one 
the toughest challenges. This was not just another intelligence system, this is the future. This is 
what is possible if one dared to think differently. 
Once again, I worked with the team’s Technical Documentation Specialist and together 
we produced a guide to the NFIB, Appendix 15. This guide was distributed to all our force 
contacts, uploaded to our website and that of the National Fraud Authority. This guide 
demystified the function of the NFIB and the role it would play through the use of Know Fraud, 
supporting forces with fraud intelligence and investigative packages. 
In the days approaching go-live, senior management engaged with the project more 
actively, now reassured that we were going to deliver on time, under budget and with 
functionality exceeding what had originally been envisaged. 
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• What had once been high-risk was now certain of success and would reflect well 
upon those involved, potentially assisting careers and advancement through the 
ranks – especially if linked to individual performance objectives. 
As we prepared for go-live, I trained the new NFIB team on the system and various 
platforms so that, from day one, they would be ready to capitalise fully on all benefits it could 
deliver. 
Not everything was plain sailing though. There were a number of technical issues, not 
with the system, but with our internal infrastructure, including problems with firewalls and 
bandwidth limitations over the secure police network. However, all of these were resolved 
swiftly and the system quickly became the heart of NFIB operations. 
The success of the Know Fraud system was well publicised and, over the coming months, 
I hosted visits and demonstrations to senior representatives from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), Australian Crime Commission (ACC), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), 
Interpol and many others from UK and international governments and law enforcement 
agencies. 
For me, the highlight came in August 2010, when I was invited, with my Directorate 
Head, to give a live demonstration at the House of Commons to an Inter-Ministerial Group, 
chaired by the Attorney General at the time, Baroness Scotland. The demonstration and talk was 
a great success and the Attorney General concluded that if this was possible for fraud, why could 
the same not be achieved for other crime types? For me, this was all the recognition that was 
needed – I had delivered what was asked of me, and the project was successful on every level. 
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Detica, the solution provider, was also proud of the success of the system, which was a 
first for them on many levels. To celebrate success of the system, they produced an NFIB Case 
Study, Appendix 16, outlining some of the system’s key features. More importantly: 
• Detica concluded their case study with a short outline of a real-life case, where 
the solution had been used to process intelligence which led directly to the 
prosecution and conviction of a prolific fraudster – in less than 37 days – a 
significant first within the world of fraud investigations. 
What had initially been envisaged as a traditional police intelligence system quickly 
became the centre of a multitude of counter-fraud initiatives. Information now available from 
real-time fraud reporting enabled the NFIB to implement one of the most effective fraud 
disruption initiatives in the world:  
• By autumn 2011, disruption interventions were preventing an estimated 
£1 million of fraud crime per month, Appendix 17. 
• By the first quarter of 2013/14 this had increased to nearly £10 million per 
month, Appendix 18. 
The table below demonstrates how the scale and effectiveness of disruption 
interventions increased exponentially, with the value of disruption increasing to an average of 
£37 million per month for the first quarter of 2014/15: 
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Table 7: Summary of NFIB Disruption Interventions 
 Q1 2013/14 Q2 2013/14 Q3 2013/14 Q4 2013/14 YTD 2013/14 Q1 2014/15 
Bank A/C (Volume) 2,844 8,397 8,514 8,522 28,277 9,624 
Bank A/C (£m)  25.0 73.9 74.9 75.0 248.9 84.7 
Website (Volume) 311 321 253 255 1,140 235 
Website (£m) 3.1 3.2 2.5 2.6 11.4 2.4 
Telephone (Volume) 72 188 25,276 27,199 52,375 28,545 
Telephone (£m) 0.1 0.2 21.5 23.1 44.8 24.3 
Total (Volume) 3,227 8,906 34,043 35,976 82,152 38,404 
Total (£m) 28.2 77.3 99.0 100.7 305.1 111.3 
 
For the remainder of 2010, I continued to manage the ongoing development of the 
Know Fraud system, evaluating new data sources, ingesting a wide range of operational data 
from police forces and partner agencies, keeping Know Fraud and the work of the NFIB at the 
cutting edge of counter fraud operations. Once again, this project had been one of trust-based 
management and leadership, where I had been empowered and given autonomy to deliver what 
was probably one of the most significant projects that CoLP have ever been entrusted with. 
Although I had for a time lost my focus, the trust placed in me ensured that I would not give up. 
I succeeded, not for me, but for those who placed their trust in and believed in me. 
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Learning and Reflection 
As I reflect upon this period of my career and upon delivery of the Know Fraud system, 
this was possibly the most significant stage of my career, not for what I had contributed to the 
Police Service, but for my perception of fraud, what intelligence was capable of and how it could 
be used to protect the public and prevent crime. 
To help convey how the Know Fraud system changed me and how it empowers the 
Police Service to take a more positive stance to reduce the harm and loss committed against 
victims of fraud, I have drawn parallels with the London Riots of August 2011, or more 
importantly, with the failure to prevent those riots occurring. 
The Riots (Damages) Act 1886, specifies that, where damage is caused by people 
"riotously and tumultuously assembled", local police authorities are required to compensate 
victims. The Act rests upon the principle that the police are responsible for maintaining law and 
order and should be held to account if law and order breaks down and a resulting riot causes 
damage to property. In essence, failing to maintain the Peelian Principles. Police authorities 
(now the Police and Crime Commissioners) are then liable to pay compensation to owners of 
properties that have been damaged. The Act provides for claims against the police to be on a 
strict liability basis: 
• If a claim meets criteria specified in the Act, compensation must be paid and the 
claimant is not required to prove that the police were at fault.  
The law of England and Wales relating to police-negligent liability is highly restrictive 
and does not appear to be cognisant of the Peelian Principles. As Jamil (2013) explains, following 
the House of Lords decision in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire24, ‘de-facto’ immunity 
from prosecution continues to be the norm in actions against the police for negligence in the 
24 Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53. 
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investigation or prevention of crime. Sir Robert Peel, through the concept of policing by consent, 
established the fundamental role of the police to protect the public and their property from 
harm. However, this does not translate into a tort of negligence. For a tort of negligence to be 
successful, it must be established that there is a duty of care, or rather, a failure in relation to 
that duty of care. I would argue that as the modern Police Service was established to uphold the 
Peelian Principles, this duty of care not only exists but is at the very heart of every policing 
function. 
Caparo v Dickman25 is the test case for a duty of care and the House of Lords established 
a ‘three-fold-test’ to determine whether a duty of care arose in negligence: 
1. Harm must be reasonably foreseeable as a result of the defendant’s conduct. 
2. The parties must be in a relationship of proximity. 
3. It must be fair, just and reasonable to impose liability. 
There is no common law duty to rescue another or to protect another from harm 
inflicted by a third party, Jamil (2013). Unlike the Riots (Damages) Act 1886, which focuses on 
the failure of the police to maintain civil order resulting in damage to property, the majority of 
case law and research into police negligence focuses on the protection of life, not the prevention 
of crime per se. I argue that the police have not only a legal but a moral and ethical obligation 
to society to prevent crime, thereby: 
• Allowing crime to occur, to secure better evidence to support a criminal justice 
outcome, is unethical and in conflict with the Peelian Principles.  
Examining the principles of criminal liability and the social and ethical responsibilities of 
the police to prevent crime has never been more timely. The College of Policing (2014), in the 
new Code of Ethics for the policing profession reiterate the role of the Peelian Principles and the 
25 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. 
Page | 79  
 
                                                          
duty to protect the public and to prevent to crime. Unfortunately, the Code focuses on the 
minutia, the ethical conduct of the individuals, not the organisation which, in my view, fails to 
recognise the importance of the role of the organisation as a whole. 
I believe that: 
• For the Police Service to be viewed as a profession, the service in its entirety 
must act ethically, not just those individuals within it. In doing so, it must act in 
the best interests of society and the public it serves, not as a conduit feeding 
the criminal justice system. 
Within the context of the NFIB, an example of the conflict between serving the public 
and the criminal justice system can be shown by examining a City of London Police investigation 
into a ‘Boiler Room’ (fraudulent shares sales). When the investigation, Operation Sound-wave, 
commenced, it was estimated that total losses to victims exceeded £20 million over the two year 
period that the Boiler Room had been operating. The Boiler Room continued to operate for a 
further 3 months and 13 days while the police case was built to support the arrest and 
prosecution of suspects.  
• If the £20 million estimate was correct, then it could be argued that a further 
£3.5 million would have been lost by those new victims who were targeted 
while the case was being built by the police.  
Although this was heralded as successful investigation, with all arrested suspects 
receiving custodial sentences, it does raise the questions: 
• Who was the operation a success for – the police, the judicial system or victims?  
• If police could have intervened and shut down the Boiler Room within hours of 
identification and so prevented £3.5 million in losses, would those individuals 
who were targeted and suffered losses after the police investigation 
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commenced consider that justice was served, and that the police fulfilled their 
professional responsibilities to protect the public and prevent crime? 
Relating this back to my observations from delivering the NFRC and the comparison 
between fraud and paedophilia, I would argue that it would be wholly unacceptable, to both the 
police and the public, to not act to prevent an identified paedophile from targeting and abusing 
any further victims in order to secure best evidence. 
• If this is so, then, why would it be deemed acceptable to not intervene to 
prevent any further victims from being defrauded out of their life savings (for 
example) in order to secure evidence in pursuance of criminal investigation and 
prosecution? 
Many would argue that the harm from paedophilia is far greater than that of fraud but, 
according to research by Ganzini et al (1990), who compared victims of fraud with those of 
violent crime, many were afflicted with depression as a consequence. Deem (2000) found that, 
to some, the effects of fraud can be comparable to that of having been raped. In a study into 
the impact of Robert Maxwell’s pension fraud, Spalek (1999) identified anxiety, stress, fear and 
depression as being common emotional reactions. The study also found that a number of deaths 
were considered premature as a result of the fraud. 
To support this position: 
• Operation Archway26, a CoLP initiative, received a call from a distressed member 
of the public whose husband had taken his own life because he could not face 
the consequences of being a victim of a fraud; in this case, a Boiler Room.  
26 Operation Archway preceded the NFIB, NFRC and the Know Fraud project. 
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In my view, it is therefore wrong to classify harm from fraud as being any less severe 
than that caused by any other type of crime. Treating fraud crime or its victims as being less 
important would be an injustice and in conflict with the Code of Ethics for the Policing 
Profession, College of Policing (2014) and the Peelian Principles. 
Looking back on what I learnt from both the NFRC and NFIB projects, it is clear to me 
now that not only had my knowledge and understanding of fraud increased, but I had also 
changed as a person. I had started to focus less on the police and the criminal justice system and 
more on the needs of victims and the need for social justice. 
I had developed a depth of knowledge into fraud that needed to be shared with others. 
Although I didn’t know it at the time, I would be able to use the combined knowledge from these 
projects to help shape the future of the police response to fraud, minimising harm and loss and 
bringing the response to fraud back into line with the Peelian Principles. 
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3.c Establishing a Centre of Excellence for fraud training and dissemination of 
best practice 
In January of 2011, I took over CoLP’s fraud training capability, by then named the 
Centre of Excellence. The development of the Centre of Excellence came from the same 
recommendations within the Fraud Review as the NFRC and the NFIB. When I took over 
management of the Centre I inherited three staff. None were trainers, their role was to support 
administrative functions. When I reviewed the structure of the Centre, I discovered that there 
was no library or lesson bank, no lesson plans or curriculum documents, only a collection of 
PowerPoint presentations. I had to question what it was I was really taking on – was it a Centre 
of Excellence or a poisoned chalice? 
I attended the National Fraud Investigators’ Course run by the Centre while I was on the 
project team back in 2009. Unfortunately, my assessment of the course was not complimentary. 
The course was completely unstructured from a pedagogical perspective. There were no 
learning objectives or outcomes and the entire course was made up of a carousel of external 
speakers, lacking structured content and professionalism, most speakers were promoting and 
trying to sell the services of their own organisations. 
The previous incumbent had tried to establish the Centre with no experience of learning 
and development. Everything was outsourced and, in most cases, the external providers owned 
the intellectual property rights but delivered the courses under the banner of the Centre of 
Excellence. For me this did not sit right. If CoLP was promoting itself as a centre of excellence for 
best practice and training in fraud, I would have expected there to be at least a prerequisite level 
of expertise within the Centre and any courses offered to follow a structured format with clear, 
objective-led, learning outcomes. 
This was going to be an uphill battle with many challenges. Management perceived the 
Centre as one of CoLP’s success stories but, unfortunately, it was a story without substance. 
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Before I could do anything with the Centre, I would need to dismantle what had been created 
and rebuild it from new foundations. 
My first challenge was to redress the staffing balance and replace some of the 
administrative staff with experienced trainers and learning developers. As I was working to get 
the Centre into some sort of shape and capable of delivering its own training, worthy of being 
considered a Centre of Excellence, I was called to a meeting with the new Commissioner of the 
City of Police. The Commissioner was not taken in by the hype of the Centre of Excellence, but 
he did believe that there was the potential to create something real, provided the demand was 
there and we had the correct people engaged to deliver what was needed. 
I commenced research into all options for the Centre, with the aim of producing a 
business case for its development, to deliver what the Fraud Review had originally envisaged. 
First, I needed to understand what people expected from such a centre of excellence. 
Researching the subject, I found an appropriate definition by George (2010), who defined a 
centre of excellence as being an entity that provides leadership, best practices, research, 
support and training for a particular area. 
Around the country there was resistance to what was happening within CoLP, its lead 
force status and the extra money it was drawing down from the Government for these functions. 
With this in mind, and understanding what the expectation of a Centre of Excellence was, I felt 
uncomfortable with the name and believed that by calling ourselves a Centre of Excellence we 
were setting ourselves up for a fall. It was a real case of ‘Smoke and Mirrors’. I would have to 
live with the name while I developed the business case, but I had made the decision that the 
name would go, along with the old ways of working. 
In parallel to the business case and building on what I had learnt from delivering the 
NFRC and the NFIB Know Fraud system, I decided that I wanted to increase my understanding 
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of how fraud investigation differed from regular investigation. Was the current model of 
investigation effective and was the police response appropriate? I needed to understand what 
caused various issues and problems within fraud investigations and why they were so 
protracted. Fraud was a difficult area of policing to recruit into because of the lack of subject 
matter knowledge and the perception that investigations take not months but years to get 
before a court. Investigators struggled with such lengthy investigations and, harking back to the 
psychology of the ingrained ‘objectives/performance culture’, described earlier, naturally 
preferred performance-enhancing, career-advancing, swifter deliverables. 
Although a historical view of fraud investigations would help me understand what the 
issues were, I doubted that there many who understood how the NFIB and Know Fraud were 
changing the fraud landscape and how this could reshape the approach to fraud and 
investigation. Therefore, my research focussed on the following objectives: 
• Review a range of cases for factors contributing to either success or failure at 
court and identify barriers against effective investigation of fraud. 
• Map organisational learning against the traditional model of investigation and 
the new fraud landscape, to create a new model for investigation that would 
support NFIB operations and underpin the Centre’s products and training 
delivery. 
 While developing the concept for the new model of investigation, I also created the first 
draft of the business case for the Centre. Having researched national and international offerings 
around fraud training and having spoken to a great deal of contacts within local businesses and 
financial institutions, I was amazed at the level of support for both what I was doing and looking 
to offer going forward. 
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The business case had to be more than simply an estimate of the market and what we 
might be able to take of that business. We were in the middle of the global economic crisis (GEC) 
and the Government was in full swing with the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR). For CoLP 
and most forces in the country, this would mean a reduction in central funding by around 20 %, 
with some forces implementing compulsory retirement for officers at 30 years’ service and 
redundancies for support staff. 
In CoLP, every part of the force was under scrutiny. Recruitment had been cancelled for 
the foreseeable future, resources were being scrutinised for whether individuals and roles were 
necessary to achieve delivery of an effective policing service. This was done under the banner 
of City First, which was intended to deliver the efficiency savings required by CSR cuts and 
prepare the force for a leaner and more efficient future. Going against the grain of City First, I 
developed a business case, looking for upfront investment and recruitment of additional 
personnel, some of which would come from outside the force and so adding to our headcount 
and operating costs rather than reducing them. 
I needed to present a case where any upfront investment would be repaid through 
revenue generated from the sale of training. Ongoing delivery of the Centre’s functions would, 
at worst, need to be cost neutral, with the ultimate aim being to generate income that would go 
into the central pot to help offset the reduction in government funding. This was a unique 
proposition within the police, capitalising on a policing function as a commercial profit making 
enterprise. I knew there would be resistance and those that would predict its failure from the 
outset – I could deal with them. The biggest risk to the concept would be if management tried 
to manage it as they did policing operations, the bureaucracy and internal politics would kill it 
before it got off the ground.  
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In addition to internal politics and communications that would be required to broker 
support for the project, consideration had to be given to the public’s perception. They might 
question the use of police officers for generating a profit from a commercial enterprise. If this 
was to succeed and have the public support, it was essential to deliver a benefit cognisant of our 
policing priorities. 
The approach was structured around the following principles: 
• Services provided to public sector organisations would be delivered at-cost. 
• A profit margin would be added only to services provided to private sector 
organisations. 
• Any profit generated would be reinvested into core policing functions for CoLP. 
• All services provided must be focussed on counter-fraud capability being built-
up within both public and private sectors. 
• Ultimately, the work of the Centre should help protect the public and promote 
confidence in the City and the UK being a safe place to invest and conduct 
business. 
Considering how to sell this internally and externally, I started by pitching the concept as an 
ethical business model. Many studies have been done on the subject of business ethics, 
however, most studies tend to focus on the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR); 
Leonard and McAdam (2003: 27) believe that CSR is generally understood as being ‘a balanced 
approach for organisations to address economic, social and environmental issues in a way that 
aims to benefit people, communities and society.’ Although there are elements of this which 
resonated with the business case and principles for the Centre, it did not reflect the unique 
position of a police force seeking to deliver one of its functions as a commercial enterprise. 
I therefore coined the term ‘Ethical Entrepreneurial Enterprise’, which is defined as follows: 
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• Ethical – No profiteering off the public sector purse, profit being generated from 
private sector clients only. No shareholders or individuals in the Centre 
benefiting from revenues. All monies reinvested into core policing functions. 
• Entrepreneurial – Identified gap in the market, presenting the opportunity to 
start a new, police-owned and managed business, bringing in required 
resources, while accepting both the risks and rewards associated with the 
venture. 
• Enterprise – To be a bold and unique undertaking. The first of its kind within 
policing, capitalising on the brand and access to expertise, operational learning 
and real-time fraud diagnosis from Action Fraud, NLF, NFIB and Know Fraud, 
providing a unique business advantage to the centre. 
Understanding what was required for an effective operating model and an achievable 
share of the market, I delivered my business case to the Commissioner on 4 April 2012. Although 
the business case was well received, the Commissioner was under the impression that it was too 
conservative. If this was going to work, it had to be a lot more ambitious. I was given until May 
to refine the business case and present it back to him, ready for review by key members of the 
Police Committee. As requested, the business case was refined; projections were made more 
ambitious, as where the levels of staff and resources required. It was resubmitted on 23 May 
2011, Appendix 19. 
The business case was written using a public sector template, which the Commissioner 
had requested, to present the case to the Police Committee. Following an initial consultation 
with select members of the Police Committee, feedback was that the business case was 
compelling, except that, prior to formal submission to the Committee, consultants should be 
brought in to test the case and produce a more commercially recognised business case. Over 
the next 3 months, independent consultants pulled the initial business case apart, scrutinising 
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the estimates, financials and market projections. At the conclusion, they delivered a commercial 
case which backed up the original business case but with far more robust financial projections 
and alternative business models.  
While the case for the Academy was progressing, Neyroud (2013) was undertaking 
research into police leadership and training, believing that the Police Service needed to make 
the transition from a service that simply acts professionally, to one that is recognised as a 
professional service in its own right. This, he believes, is achieved through the setting up of a 
police professional body, eventually being supported by Royal Charter. This, it is envisaged, will 
replace the antiquated, militaristic structure that exists for overseeing police leadership and 
training. The aim is for ACPO to merge with functions of the professional body, providing 
executive direction and leadership. The success of this initiative, in my view, is heavily 
dependent upon ACPO having the necessary skills and expertise to deliver the vision of a 
professional body. As students, or rather, alumni of the current system, the suitability and 
capability of ACPO to undertake this role is questionable. 
There were many parallels between the Academy and what is being proposed. Neyroud 
(ibid) argues that, in the future, the majority of police training will be externally delivered, 
commissioned from external/commercial providers. The Academy, as a public sector 
commercial enterprise, was seeking to do just that, to sell police training to forces across the 
country. Unlike Neyroud, who believes that this would provide significant opportunities to 
reduce the substantial training estate and overheads for the Police Service, for CoLP, this was an 
opportunity to generate income and offset the effects of the CSR and cuts to the police budget. 
Based upon my experience with the IPLDP, I would argue that, if decentralisation of training is 
not done correctly, it will almost certainly place an additional financial and resource burden on 
local forces, with the potential for inconsistent approaches to training and ultimately policing 
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standards. This would result in the opposite to what is proposed through the creation of a 
professional body for policing. 
Capitalising on potential opportunities arising from decentralisation of police training 
and the new Professional Body for Policing, the Academy entered into a relationship with the 
NPIA to undertake joint research into volume low level fraud. Findings would be embedded into 
core learning programmes for call handlers, first responders and those investigating volume 
crime. By embedding fraud into these foundation programmes it was envisaged that the 
overarching police response to fraud would be improved and CoLP and the Academy would 
benefit from: 
1. Increased demand for training, with core learning programmes providing a 
feeder route into the Academy’s more specialist offerings. 
2. Improved understanding, helping to dispel myths about fraud investigation and 
overcoming some barriers to the recruitment of specialist investigators. 
With the support and backing of the NPIA, I continued with rebranding and delivery of 
the new Centre. Unfortunately, data within the commercial case was still thought to be 
questionable and, after several months of inactivity, the Commissioner decided that another 
group of independent consultants should be brought in, this time to review both the original 
business case and the new commercial case. On conclusion of this, the second round of 
independent consultancy and the submission of a further commercial case, CoLP employed a 
project manager to review all three cases and develop a definitive business case and operating 
model. After 18 months’ work and various iterations, the project manager delivered a business 
case and operating model but, once again, this was found to be lacking and so, towards the end 
of 2013, a new commercial director was employed to deliver another business case and 
operating model and to lead the team going forward. All my fears were being realised. The 
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Centre was suffering from paralysis by procrastination. A risk-averse senior management team 
was inhibiting progression, while bureaucracy was preventing the Centre from operating 
efficiently and competing with our more agile competitors. 
Most of this I had predicted back in 2011. Fortunately, this impacted upfront investment 
only. While the consultants were busy researching and writing their commercial cases, I was 
busy understanding the business, mapping course requirements from enquiries and previous 
offerings. In December 2011, I renamed the Centre the ‘Economic Crime and Fraud Training 
Academy’ and launched our first official prospectus, Appendix 20. 
The fraud training curriculum was designed adopting modular, blended learning 
techniques. Based upon latest operational analysis, including case studies from the NLF and 
NFIB, delegates progressed through their learning as members of simulated investigation teams. 
Toohey (2002) discusses some of the advantages and disadvantages of a curriculum structured 
to support the role of the learner. By immersing learners as active participants in the learning 
process, they are able to focus on the experience in its entirety, encouraging a culture of critical 
reflection. However, an obvious disadvantage is that it can be costly by being resource-intensive 
and time-consuming, to design, create and deliver.  
 In January 2012, I prepared an ‘options and progress’ paper for the Commissioner, 
because I needed to know in which direction I was expected to take the Academy’s 
development. Interest from the private sector had spiked and bookings for courses from police 
forces had increased three-fold, so my projections were proving accurate. The Police Committee 
required further development of the commercial case. However, the Commissioner was still 
supportive and wanted me to continue, but this time, growth and investment would be linked 
directly to income generation. There would be no upfront investment at this stage; this was to 
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come in April 2013, provided that the commercial case was developed and the business 
operating efficiently. 
On April 15 2012, before the business case and operating model had been finalised, the 
Commissioner gave an interview to the Financial Times, discussing the vision and potential for 
the Academy. The Commissioner was quoted as saying that CoLP was establishing a multi-million 
pound Academy to teach investigators from around the world. Income generated, which he 
stated would be £2 million, within 2 years of start-up, would fund 40 additional frontline 
officers.27 If nothing more, this reconfirmed the Commissioner’s support for the project and his 
belief in its potential to deliver real value back to CoLP as a new entrepreneurial enterprise. 
My research into the process of fraud investigation was to be central to the Academy’s 
course offerings. I learnt that the traditional model of investigation was contributing significantly 
to the excessive time consumption of investigations. This encouraged investigators to create 
unnecessarily large and complex cases, conditioned by an approach focussed on criminal 
prosecutions. This is not always necessary if appropriate investigative methodology is applied 
and consideration given to alternative sanctions and outcomes. The model used to investigate 
most crime has the ultimate goal of getting a defendant to court or, in certain cases, an 
alternative criminal disposal. The traditional model of investigation is effective when applied to 
the correct type of investigation, applicable to more than 99 % of all crime. Unfortunately, this 
model of investigation is not complimentary to that of a fraud investigation. 
The traditional model of investigation, known as the Process of Investigation is 
illustrated below: 
27 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/be2c3690-870c-11e1-ad68-00144feab49a.html#axzz36kiEYedM  
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Figure 7: Process of Investigation28 
Interviews with investigators and prosecutors identified a commonly held belief that the 
problem with this method, when applied to the investigation of fraud, was that it could add 
unnecessarily to the intricacy of the investigation and so result in an overly complex case to 
manage and present to court. The traditional model of investigation also does not consider the 
entrepreneurial ingenuity nature of fraudsters, who seize every opportunity to either maximise 
the profitability of a particular fraud, or diversify into further fraudulent enterprises, before 
investigators have full grasp of the original crime; as detailed in Figure 5: NFIB Traditional Fraud 
landscape, on page 72. 
For this reason, I classified fraud as a ‘live’ crime. As with the comparison to paedophilia, 
where the criminal is active and there is ongoing threat of further harm to the original, or new 
victims, before action is taken by the investigator. 
28 http://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/investigations/investigation-process/  
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An effective model of investigation needed to be aligned to the NFIB Data Sharing Fraud 
Landscape, Figure 4, otherwise, benefits of the Know Fraud system would not materialise. At 
the time of inception, the model was intended as a concept to underpin the need for specialist 
fraud investigation training, thereby supporting the business case for the new Academy and 
ultimately providing the basis for the new portfolio of courses. 
This raised the question: 
• If investigations for fraud crime and ‘regular crime' are no different, then why 
would an Academy dedicated to such training even be needed? 
As the Fraud Investigation Model took shape, I realised that its use might increase the 
efficiency of investigators and their ability to bring cases to successful conclusion. The Fraud 
Investigation Model is illustrated below: 
 
Figure 8: Fraud Investigation Model 
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The Fraud Investigation Model was not a radical new approach to investigation, it 
resulted from identification and collation of best practice and from innovative strategies and 
tactics that fraud investigators and intelligence operatives were already employing on an 
informal and unstructured basis. The model formalised these techniques into a more structured 
and consistent approach that could be applied by all. 
Most importantly: 
• The model placed prevention or reduction of harm at the very heart of policing 
operations. 
When I compare Academy training to the training of regular detectives, historically, a 
detective’s primary training would have focused on the ultimate aim of securing a criminal 
prosecution – learning their way around the criminal justice system, cutting their teeth on 
volume and priority crime. Having been taught to think and act as criminal investigators with a 
tight focus on arrest, charge and conviction, their mindset was acclimatised to adhere to a 
traditional investigative process. The key point here is that investigators, before undertaking 
Academy training, could be pre-conditioned by their role as a detective or police investigator. 
As they progress through the learning process, the aim being that, according to Knowles et al 
(2005), their point of reference and perspective changes as they are introduced to new methods 
of working, with alternative methodologies, that may be alien to police investigator mentality. 
Having introduced the Fraud Investigation Model into the Academy’s core curriculum, 
on conclusion of a National Fraud Course, a Detective Sergeant, in his reflective assignment, 
explained how he thought he had provided effective supervision and management to one of his 
team involved in a large mortgage fraud. But that, in fact, having been introduced to the Fraud 
Investigation Model, he now recognised how he had actually failed as a supervisor, in this 
instance, by allowing the investigation to grow unnecessarily large and complex when it could it 
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have been kept much simpler and completed much earlier – if the model had been utilised and 
more appropriate investigative parameters had been established. 
The following case study demonstrates the impact on efficiency savings and operational 
effectiveness of the Fraud Investigation Model when compared to traditional investigative 
practices. 
Table 8: Operational Benefits, Case Study – Extract from a post-course reflective assignment 
Case Study – Extract from a post course reflective assignment: ‘Using the models, theories 
and practice that have been covered in the National Fraud Course, identify a case and 
discuss how your approach would now change in light of this’  
Situation - The subject of the investigation was an East European OCG, who had committed 
a wide range of frauds and related offences. The OCG was involved in Gangmaster Offences 
and had links to Human Trafficking.  
The investigative approach used was a traditional one adopting a standard 
methodology. The enquiry expanded exponentially as the scale of the OCG and their 
offending behaviour came to light.  
The arrest phase required approximately 183 officers to trace and arrest 22 suspects 
at 15 locations. The subsequent enquiries took 18 months and resulted in a number of re-
bails and further interviews. Eventually a substantial evidence file was submitted and 12 
suspects were charged for a range of offences.  
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Table 8: Operational Benefits, Case Study – Extract from a post-course reflective assignment 
Contribution – An area which has challenged the standard policing mind-set has been that 
the police are only a small part of the national investigative response to fraud, and the need 
to demonstrate a true multi-agency approach. By changing the mind-set to consider 
disruption as a positive result, will in turn open a substantial range of tactics to tackle fraud.  
This model moves away from the standard linear approach to fraud investigation. 
One of the earliest considerations is what the final aim is and what success looks like. By 
adopting this approach the investigation can be tailor made to achieve this outcome and 
speed up the time taken to get a positive result. It will also ensure that policing resources are 
used more efficiently and that will ensure a greater number of offences per year are 
investigated. 
The enquiry team initially had five suspects with strong evidence against them. If 
they had dealt with those and ring fenced the enquiry then they would still have been able 
to disrupt the OCG. Once the OCG was mapped it was established that the leader of the OCG 
was amongst the original five suspects arrested. The eventual outcome has been only 12 
suspects charged although the evidence against some is stronger than others. Therefore, 
there is a firm case to show that the additional investment in time and resources is not 
proportionate to develop seven further suspects to the evidential threshold for charge. 
Findings - A more efficient method would have been to prosecute the original five 
suspects and then collapse the OCG by disrupting the criminal activities:  
• Just dealing with the original 5 suspects would have saved approximately £22,930.16 on 
the search and arrest day alone. 
• Although the police stand to obtain some remuneration through the incentivisation 
scheme, the value of this is unlikely to match the cost of the additional investigative 
work required to increase the prosecution of five suspects to twelve.  
• The standard investigation model was inefficient and failed to maximise the use of 
partner agencies, as such the Fraud Investigation Model is a far more efficient 
methodology to investigate fraud and would have greatly benefited this case had it been 
used. 
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The Fraud Investigation Model was adopted widely and, in 2014, provided the 
foundation for the development of the new Authorised Professional Practice (APP) for Fraud. 
Development of the majority of the APP was achieved through the collation of existing doctrine, 
standard operating procedures (SOPs), manuals of guidance, codes of practice, policies and 
professional manuals, each relevant to the area of policing concerned. The aim of APP is to 
deliver a consolidated product which links to core, specific and other reference knowledge 
materials, which collectively, would be required to maintain a professionalised operational 
delivery for policing. 
• Fraud was one of the few areas of policing where there was no existing 
knowledge base, no doctrine, nor guidance. 
I received a commission to develop the new APP for Fraud. By incorporating my 
knowledge of the NFRC, the NFIB and the Fraud Investigation Model, this consolidated 
knowledge provided the foundation for the development of a single national framework for 
combatting fraud. The effectiveness of this new investigation model, together with the 
combined functions of the NLF, is demonstrated by a multitude of case studies. An extract of the 
APP relating to use of the model is attached, as Appendix 21. The APP for Fraud was approved 
by ACPO Crime Business Area on 2 December 2014. 
Throughout 2012, I focussed on growth of the business through creation of a foundation 
client base. Following a targeted marketing campaign and distribution of the new prospectus, 
bookings were up 60 %. In February 2012, following a successful bid through the public 
procurement process, the Academy won the contract for delivering investigation training for the 
OFT. Although relatively small in commercial terms, the contract created a stir within policing, 
as no one knew whether, legally, the police could enter into a tender process to bid for work. 
Fortunately, the City Solicitors and Comptrollers Officer confirmed there was nothing within 
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legislation or regulations to prevent the police from entering into a competitive tendering 
process with the aim of winning work – it had just never been done before.  
Although great progress was being made, CoLP was unknowingly undermining the 
effective operation the Academy. By the middle of 2012 I was on my fourth line manager29, most 
taking responsibility reluctantly with limited understanding of learning and development 
functions, but each one wanting to make their stamp on the Academy. This was, after all, a 
headline project for the Commissioner and no one wanted to be at the helm and responsible for 
it failing. With constant changes in management came changes in direction, focus and strategy, 
life in the Academy had become two steps forward and one step backwards. The Police Service 
is a rigid hierarchical organisation requiring recognisable reporting lines. Unfortunately, there 
was little understanding of the importance of the role and the need for leadership, which is not 
constrained by public sector or policing mentality. From a personal perspective, I was constantly 
being undermined by ineffective and intrusive senior management and feeling disempowered 
and untrusted. By trying to shoehorn a commercial enterprise into a model of police 
management and leadership, the organisation was putting the whole concept of the Academy 
in jeopardy. 
Despite distractions caused by continual changes in senior management, I was making 
great progress with the Academy and the client base. Courses for the OFT were progressing well 
and I had won new contracts with NHS Protect and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). 
As the Academy expanded its operations, other police providers gradually disbanded their fraud 
investigations training services, leaving CoLP and the Academy as the sole provider of specialist 
fraud training to the Police Services of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Although some 
would consider this a commercial monopoly, as an Ethical Entrepreneurial Enterprise, there was 
29 By September 2014 the Academy was on its 8th Director 
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no profit to be made from the Police Service but, as the single national provider, there was a 
real opportunity for the Academy to influence and standardise operational and investigative 
practices for the better throughout the country. 
The reputation of the Academy was spreading and towards the end of 2012 I received a 
request from the Department for International Development (DfID) to deliver a 5-day 
international, anti-corruption course for North African countries, as part on an EU-funded 
project, Euromed Police III. The event, delivered in December 2012, to high-ranking officers from 
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Palestinian Authority, was a huge success 
and signified the start of the development of the international arm of the Academy. 
From the humble beginnings in 2011 with no training staff, by 2013 the Academy team 
had grown to a respectable size, employing 10 specialist fraud trainers and 2 training 
administrators. Business was increasing on the commercial front with the development of new 
industry-focussed programmes for the insurance, financial and aviation industries. Interest was 
also growing in our provision of Anti-Bribery training and, in the summer of 2013, the Academy 
entered into partnership with the British Standards Institute (BSI) to design and develop training 
that would underpin the BSI 10500 Anti-Bribery Management Systems30 standard. This was 
another first within policing, entering into a commercial partnership to develop training for 
commercial organisations seeking to achieve a standard, which would be a legally-recognised 
defence against criminal proceedings for failing to prevent bribery. 
This initiative started to reshape the Academy’s thinking. If the Academy was to protect 
potential victims, a more holistic view was required. The BSI 10500 training would help 
30 http://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/BS-10500-Anti-Bribery/Training-Courses-BS-10500/Requirements-
of-BS-10500/  
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businesses prevent themselves from falling foul of acts of bribery, making it safer for them to 
conduct business both at home and overseas. 
Applying this thinking to how we protect the City and UK businesses from fraud, I 
realised that to be effective, resources would need to be focussed on those areas of greatest 
weakness. Looking at data coming out of the NFIB, a substantial amount of reported fraud was 
now cyber-enabled, with a large proportion of it being committed from overseas locations. If our 
partners in international law enforcement did not have the knowledge or skills to tackle the 
threat of fraud and corruption within their own countries, how could we expect them to tackle 
offences directed towards the UK or against UK businesses operating within their countries? By 
up-skilling our international partners, increasing their capability to tackle economic crime, it 
would, by design, not only protect the UK, but reduce the threat of what has become a global 
pandemic. 
Analysing data within Action Fraud, it was clear that a large proportion of fraud was still 
being committed by individuals from West Africa, in particular Nigeria. So it was, in July 2013, 
that a small delegation from the Academy training team delivered a 5-day commercial fraud 
programme to specialist investigators from the Nigerian Special Fraud Unit, Appendix 22. 
Following the success of this programme, there has been regular demand for international 
programmes tailored for local agencies and commercial organisations from across Africa, Asia 
Pacific, Middle East and now Latin America, establishing the Academy as truly international 
provider, Appendix 23.  
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Learning and reflection 
As I reflect upon this period of my career, it could be argued that the Academy causes a 
conflict for those leaders responsible for the ‘identity’ of the City of London Police. Its position 
as a ‘public’ (not-for-profit) sector organisation is no longer clear, operating part of its business 
as a ‘private’ (for-profit) sector function. This adds to the complexity and turmoil of what the 
role of the ‘Public Police’ stands for and how it balances needs of public interest and economic 
growth through increased profitability. As complexity theorist Stacey (1996) has shown, we can 
only hope that within this unstable period of change, a new paradigm for private-public sector 
organisations that generate profit for the public interest will emerge. 
Despite the turbulence this has created, in the four years since I took over fraud training, 
I have created something which is deserving of the title, Centre of Excellence, and a first for a 
commercial and truly entrepreneurial enterprise within the police. Although the concept for the 
Academy was originally focussed on income generation, for me, it provided the opportunity to 
refocus policing response to fraud, as I have reflected upon in previous chapters, balancing the 
needs of the victim with those of the criminal justice system.  
Relating this back to the Code of Ethics for Policing, College of Policing (2014), this 
confirms for me that the Code has missed the point, by focusing only upon the conduct of 
individuals, not organisations themselves. This is reinforced by Gordon, et al (2009), who found 
that the effectiveness of ethical responsibility, when limited to individuals within organisations, 
was limited. 
As I consider the challenges I have faced, it is hard to comprehend how much was 
achieved in a relatively short period of time. In comparison to previous projects, where senior 
managers inspired, motivated and empowered, the management imposed on the Academy had 
the opposite effect.  
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In the beginning I was trusted, my managers empowered and supported me, giving me 
a voice and a place at the senior management table, recognising the importance of the skills and 
expertise I brought to the project.  As the Academy took shape and my managers changed, a 
sense of managerial paranoia set in. Pacifying the Chief Officer Group became the primary 
objective, again, encouraging the short-term, risk-averse culture.  
As management decisions became more at odds with the vision for the Academy, my 
voice was no longer welcome and my seat at the senior management table was withdrawn. I 
was not saying what management wanted to hear, I could not ‘tow the party line’. I could only 
be honest, something that managers did not always welcome. This is contrary to what Hackman 
et al (2007) suggest, in that, contrary viewpoints contribute to greater creativity. Unfortunately 
for the Academy, the management ethos became one of conformity, stifling creativity. Like 
Kahane (2007), I also believe that in complex and hierarchical organisations, such as the police, 
change occurs in unfamiliar and unpredictable ways. Managers and leaders see things from 
different perspectives, so problems become polarised and stuck, often leading to conflict and 
isolation. 
With the constant changes to senior management and their need to reinvent the 
business and its direction, progress was made despite their influence, not because of it. 
Surprisingly, it has been easier to reshape national thinking and practice in relation to the 
investigation of fraud than it has been to get management to think in new and creative ways. 
Leadership within such a turbulent organisation, one where, at times, I was 
disempowered and lacking a voice at the senior management table, was a challenge. To deliver 
the Academy I could not rely upon ‘rational decision making’, Stacey (1996), but instead had to 
maximise the use of ‘political decision making’, using negotiation and diplomacy to achieve 
results. An approach at odds with the organisational culture of control and dominance. 
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Thinking on my experiences with the Academy and the shortcomings of police 
leadership, I revisited the concept of short-termism once again. Examining the system of talent 
management, which, until 2014, for the police, was the High Potential Development Scheme 
(HPDS), I believe that the organisation may have inadvertently reinforced a culture of appraisal 
driven short term risk aversion.  
Officers on the HPDS are those destined for the most senior ranks in the organisation. 
Their careers are mapped-out from a very early stage, to ensure they are exposed to key areas 
of policing within the shortest period of time.  
Within policing, this is known as the ‘Butterfly Effect’. Those on the HPDS bypass normal 
promotion procedures and are fast tracked through to the rank of Chief Inspector on the back 
of an evidential portfolio of their performance and achievements in each role.  
Although talent management is an essential tool within most modern and progressive 
organisations, reflecting upon the time spent tutoring and mentoring those on HPDS, I now 
believe that its use has been, and continues to be, mismanaged by those who neither 
understand nor comprehend the limitations of short-term performance focus. 
I believe mismanaged talent management and a poor appraisal processes have 
compounded problems of police leadership, because many of those in the most senior positions 
are often those who have been conditioned similarly, from the beginning of their careers, to 
focus on low risk, short-term, achievable objectives.  
Most research into short-termism focuses on capitalism and the financial markets. 
However, Mullins (1991), defined short-termism as the actions of an individual, or an 
organisation, to secure short-term results to the detriment of long-term achievement. This 
definition is confirmed by Laverty (1996). 
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For me, evaluating the impact of the Academy, together with the development of the 
Fraud Investigation Model and APP for Fraud, reinforced the importance of looking at the 
complete lifecycle of information management.  
All three of these public works constitute a continuous cycle of learning, where fraud 
reporting informs the intelligence function. Intelligence informs prevention, disruption and 
investigative interventions. Ultimately, these functions, in turn, inform development of 
Academy products and shape the future of police response. Break the cycle at any point and the 
national response to fraud is weakened drastically. 
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3.d Conclusion 
In this Chapter I have presented my Public Works and my contributions through three 
individual, but intrinsically linked projects, demonstrating their significance and their impact, 
both nationally and internationally. Collectively, these Public Works have probably been 
responsible for making the single most significant contribution to the fight against economic 
crime this century. Through the story of my career, I have detailed and examined the original, 
ground-breaking work I contributed towards the professionalisation of the Police Service, 
through modernisation and education. From initial police training to national fraud reporting, 
intelligence and training of specialist fraud investigators – changing how fraud is viewed as a 
crime and the service provided to victims. 
Although I didn’t consider it at the time, these public works were the culmination of the 
knowledge and learning acquired from my time developing innovative educational programmes 
at City University, together with delivery of the NFRC and the NFIB intelligence system, Know 
Fraud. This, together with the creation of the Academy, has constituted a learning curve lasting 
nearly 8 years. 
City University provided me with the skills necessary to undertake international research 
projects, identifying best practice, leading to the design of new educational programmes that 
break with the norm – programmes both academic and vocational. International research into 
fraud and fraud reporting helped me develop an understanding of fraud extending beyond that 
normally associated with policing and questioning how fraud is classified and whether the police 
response is appropriate and compatible with the Peelian Principles. Developing the NFIB system, 
Know Fraud, enabled me to make optimal use of intelligence, providing the police with a unique 
opportunity to target fraudsters, with alternative interventions to minimise the harm and loss. 
With this combined knowledge, following research into the investigation of fraud, I designed a 
new model of investigation which, together with the APP, is delivering efficiencies and 
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operational improvements to investigations, aligned to both criminal and social justice. The 
success of each project can be linked directly to the previous. Any deviation from this journey of 
learning may very well have led to these NLF functions looking very different than they do today, 
some of which, including the model of investigation and the APP, may not even exist. 
Although I have not included my work at City University as part of these Public Works, 
my work there was critical to my personal and professional development, contributing 
significantly to my success in delivering the NFRC and the NFIB’s Know Fraud system and in 
establishing the Economic Crime & Fraud Training Academy. The business case I produced for 
Pre-Employment Police Education (PEPE), which estimated a potential national saving from 
probationer training of between £148,818,194 and £230,427,424, was considered to be ‘ahead 
of its time’, but is now an accepted model and been implemented by nearly all police forces in 
England and Wales. 
The projects I delivered at City University provided a great foundation for the research 
into the scope and impact of Fraud in the UK and around the world, enabling me to produce the 
first taxonomy of fraud this century. The taxonomy, which was subsequently used as the basis 
for the new Home Office Counting Rules for fraud, almost overnight changing what we 
understood about fraud, its impact and the scale of harm it causes. 
Through the study of online crime reporting systems in the UK, US, Canada and Australia, 
I identified examples of best practice and produced the blueprint for the National Fraud 
Reporting Centre. Working with the National Fraud Authority and using the blueprint, I informed 
and directed the construction of what is now Action Fraud, which is currently the only national 
crime recording system in operation in the UK. 
Heading up a Fraud Engagement Team, I provided advice, guidance and consultancy to 
UK police forces preparing for the roll-out of Action Fraud. As a result of this work, a number of 
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forces reversed the downsizing of their fraud teams by recruiting new staff. I supported one 
force (which had previously disbanded its fraud squad) in securing funding and support from its 
police authority to re-establish a fraud squad and, in doing so, created what is now one of the 
best staffed units in the region. 
 As lead for the Technical Application Development (TAD) and operational 
implementation of the NFIB’s technical solution, Know Fraud, I delivered a system which was 
instantly recognised as being the most powerful fraud intelligence system in the world. This 
system revolutionised how fraud intelligence was gathered, analysed and investigated. 
My evaluations31 of the system, using case studies from across the public and private 
sectors: 
• Established operational and organisational benefits from intelligence products 
actionable 48.4 times quicker than traditional systems. 
• Enabled possible enforcement action 212 days earlier, on average. 
The Economic Crime & Fraud Training Academy, which utilises the operational learning 
from the National Lead Force, together with the power of NFIB and the Know Fraud system, 
enabled me to create a dedicated counter fraud training enterprise that is unique and unrivalled.  
Drawing upon learning and experience acquired from delivering these work streams, I 
analysed existing investigative practices and developed the new ‘Fraud Investigation Model’ 
which, although not presented as a Public Work in its own right, represents the single most 
significant contribution to the community of practice and body of knowledge underpinning the 
combined response to fraud. 
31 These evaluations are conservative and based upon use of minimal resources.  
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• Use of the Fraud Investigation Model had such a positive impact that the College 
of Policing now prescribe this as ‘core’ learning and incorporate it into their 
mainstream uniform and detective development programmes. 
The Model is also central to the new Authorised Professional Practice for Fraud, the first 
authoritative guide on fraud investigation within UK policing, bringing consistency to 
investigative practice and, more importantly, improving the service provided to victims of fraud. 
Like the fraudster, who continually adapts to avoid detection and prosecution, so too 
has the Public Works adapted. Being dynamic, they have continued to evolve to meet the 
changing needs of the fight against fraud. Personally, there is no single contribution I can point 
to as being the most important for the creation of these Public Works. My contribution has been 
one of a leader, visionary and engineer. I have created foundations upon which today’s national 
counter fraud capability has been built. 
In the concluding chapter, following next, I intended to reflect upon personal and 
professional contributions, those of my colleagues, together with my experiences of police 
management and leadership. However, the process of completing this context statement 
caused me to reconsider and question the health of the Police Service and the effectiveness of 
its leaders. Looking back on my journey of discovery and learning and the current culture of 
police leadership, I have come to question what, if any, part I will play in its future. 
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Chapter 4 –  Concluding reflection on Public Works 
As detailed in the preceding chapters, all of the objective challenges presented by the 
Fraud Review 2006 were delivered, despite the culture, and the paradox of police leadership. 
Key learning points are summarised as: 
• The police assessment and review culture created an appraisal system that 
requires individuals to focus on short-term deliverables; 
• A flawed appraisal process of policing, combined with poor talent management, 
resulted in senior policing decision makers focussing on low-risk, short-term, 
achievable objectives; 
• The simplistic policing assumption that fraud is theft committed through 
trickery or deceit is erroneous. Recording and combating fraud must involve 
scrutiny of the complete lifecycle of communication between perpetrator(s) 
and the victim to understand fully the modus operandi of each case of fraud. 
All three are at variance with the requirements of a long-term, intelligence-led and 
proactive response to combating fraud. So, in this, the final chapter, I decided to focus my 
reflections on factors contributing towards the paradox of police leadership and what that 
meant for me and my colleagues. 
Similar to as for many other organisations, the paradox of leadership within the Police 
Service is that the culture experienced is not one of a forward-thinking agent of change working 
to improve service and effectiveness, but rather a collective of individuals obsessed by personal 
advancement. The result is an institutionalising and ossified leadership and command structure 
which hinders both creative thinking and the effectiveness of the combative response to fraud.  
Understanding this paradox, together with the process of completing this context 
statement and reflecting upon my personal and professional life and my contributions to the 
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world of policing, has been a life-changing experience. As a learning and development 
professional, I am no stranger to reflective practice, Rolfe, et al (2001), and an advocate of 
experiential and, more importantly, life-long learning. Like Kolb (1984), I define the process of 
experiential and reflective learning as a process whereby knowledge is created by doing. 
However, analysing parts of my life that I had long since forgotten caused me to question 
my motives and drive to succeed. I trawled through materials, papers and products, which have 
contributed to make me the person I am. When I consider the process of reflection and the 
creation of this context statement, like Hooker (2010), I believe that reflection has, for me, been 
an integral element of the story-telling process – looking back at achievements while providing 
a vehicle to analyse experiences. This enabled me to understand, not only what happened in the 
past, but what is happening now and what the future may hold. 
Through these collective Public Works, I have demonstrated how my vision to deliver 
real change and innovation has inspired others. The works have been transformational in how 
the police record, analyse and process fraud-related criminality, creating an international model 
of excellence. By focussing on the need for a sustainable future, I capitalised upon the benefits 
of the NLF and NFIB and created an Ethical Entrepreneurial Enterprise that is unique within 
policing, generating revenue for CoLP but, more importantly, educating and changing the way 
fraud is investigated, both in the UK and overseas. 
A key area of learning for me has been the recognition that technology alone is not the 
solution to our policing problems. 
• Any investment into technology must be matched by an equal investment in 
and by the people that will use or benefit from the technology. 
Page | 111  
 
Although delivery of Know Fraud had been a great success, organisationally, no one had 
considered the impact of the system once it was delivered and how it would be managed and 
used. The system delivered everything, and more, of what had been asked of it. The City of 
London Police and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau were then faced with the challenge of 
how to resource and maximise the potential of what this technology offered.  
In many ways they had become a victim of their own success, this was another example 
of negative impact of a culture of short-termism and focus on short-term deliverables. This was 
evidenced when, instead of embracing the new technology, those analysts and researchers who 
were expected to use the Know Fraud system were reluctant to change and adapt to new 
methods of working.  
System users expected and attempted to make the system work to match how they had 
always worked. They were unable to appreciate the advanced analytics that the intelligent 
technology offered. This was not a user problem, but one of re-education and training. System 
training was not delivered until after go-live and focused only upon technical processes, not on 
the conceptual changes users needed to understand to be able to embrace the system.  
Training was also delivered too late in the change process and failed to address the shift 
in mind-set and organisational culture necessary to facilitate change. Users felt as though a 
solution had been imposed upon them and so found it difficult to comprehend how the new 
technology could be used to enhance their role and productivity. 
Like the staff using the Know Fraud system, those responsible for the investigation of 
fraud failed, historically, to keep pace with changes in fraud Modus Operandi. To counter this, I 
provided investigators with access to information, intelligence and know-how, to be empowered 
to either prevent fraud from taking place, or to solve it after the event. Training is focussed on 
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development of an investigative mind-set, finely-tuned into the complexities of fraud, rather 
than purely on the process of investigation. 
Although great advances have been made through the application of the Fraud 
Investigation Model, concerns and pressures placed upon investigators has increased. In part, 
this is because public expectations of the police have grown substantially in recent times. With 
fraud, this can be attributed to increased awareness of the threat, through public campaigns 
such as those conducted by NFIB and the NFA. Therefore, it was essential that such concerns 
were, and continue to be, tackled as quickly and effectively as possible, to maintain effectiveness 
as a crime fighting body, whilst still maintaining the trust of the public that it serves. Goleman 
(2002), proposes the concept that successful leadership is not dependent upon the what but the 
how. 
Taking this concept in to account, it could be argued that, through creation of the 
Academy, I have provided a unique opportunity to not only produce excellent investigators, able 
to tackle complex and ever-changing frauds, but also provide organisations with future leaders, 
educated to the highest standards and being more adaptable, creative and open to new 
methods of working. In this respect, training of specialist fraud investigators becomes a vital 
aspect for the future of the policing response to fraud. 
Looking back at these Public Works and the interdependencies that were essential for 
their success, although there was great vision and direction within the Fraud Review 
Implementation Team, this has not always been the case within my career. There are many 
good, even exceptional managers and leaders within the Police Service. However, my 
experiences have not always been of motivational and inspirational leaders. At times I have 
worked with the risk-averse, those lacking in vision and those who focussed on only short-term 
deliverables. 
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When considering this very point, I think of individuals within the police who possess a 
real passion for their work. Those who inspire others and motivate us all, to follow and 
contribute towards their vision. Often they are not senior officers, they are the rank and file, the 
front line. Unfortunately, even their passion and motivation appears to wither the more senior 
they become within the service. Do they simply tire of their work, or is it ‘managed out of them’ 
by the organisation? 
In a recent study, Police (2014) confirmed the low morale of the Police Service, with nine 
out of ten police officers believing that criminals are being given the upper hand as a result of 
Government cutbacks. From my perspective, if the police response to fraud was lacking 
previously, this can only make it worse. On joining the service, I believed it was a job for life. 
Unfortunately, morale is so low that over 60 % of officers would consider leaving to seek 
alternative employment (ibid).  
Looking at what motivates individuals to join the police, there are few within the service 
who join because of the money. The majority join because they believe in what the Police Service 
stands for. They want to contribute, to make a difference. While managing the Student Officer 
Programme, it never ceased to amaze me what people had given up to join the Police Service 
and their unwavering commitment to protecting and serving the public. So, why is it that as the 
years pass, these same individuals seem to be counting-down the years of police service they 
have remaining? Perhaps tied in by a pension, no longer driven by passion or belief?  
I believe that this is due to the combined effect of the Governments Police Reform and 
the Comprehensive Spending Review – the impact upon officers’ terms and conditions of 
service, the pay freeze and changes to the police pension. However, this conflicts with my 
experience, as stated above, where I found that officers were rarely motivated by money, but a 
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desire to do good and to make a difference. If this is case, then why is it that the service in such 
unhealthy state of mind? 
When speaking to officers, a common gripe is the perceived lack of leadership from 
senior officers who focus more on performance measurement than team moral. Those on the 
front line feel that their voices are unheard and the future direction and shape of the Police 
Service is being dictated to them, engendering a feeling of being a dispensable asset, not integral 
or essential to its effective delivery. I cannot explain why senior police leadership has developed 
in this way and where things may have started to go wrong. However, what is important is to 
understand how officers feel, as these are the people who will become managers and leaders of 
the future. 
Looking back on the time that I spent training and mentoring officers preparing for 
promotion, there were few officers that were inspired and motivated to seek promotion 
because of great leadership, someone who was a role model, someone to look up to. 
Unfortunately, I often found that my colleagues were disillusioned and disappointed by the 
abilities of their managers and leaders, believing it was better to manage than be managed and, 
for many, the firm belief that they could do better. 
Regarding the health of the Police Service, its leadership and the positioning of the 
Police Service as a professional body, backed by charter, I have to question whether the Police 
Service, in its current structure, has not outlived its usefulness or, at very least, whether it has 
lost its way.  
• Are senior leaders, those responsible for the service we have today, the ones 
we want to shape the Police Service of tomorrow? 
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This question is compounded when the concept of a professional service is considered. 
Freidson (2001) states that there are two general concepts underpinning professionalism, which 
are: 
1. The belief that work is so specialised that it is out of reach for those lacking the 
required training and experience, and; 
2. The belief that it cannot be standardised. 
Few would argue that the training for the Police Service is intensive, blending academic 
and vocational learning over many months, or even years, until the requisite skill level has been 
achieved to warrant the title of Police Constable. From this base position, officers can spend 
many years honing their knowledge and skills in relation to a particular specialism, such as fraud. 
When this is related back to the question of talent management, even Neyroud (2013) accepts 
that the system is not working, although he did conclude that the time was not right for direct 
entry for senior managers and leaders. This is in direct conflict with the findings of Windsor 
(2012) who proposed a system of multiple entry points into the service, to help address 
limitations of senior leaders. 
The process of multiple entry points is now a reality. The first process for direct entry at 
Superintendent level was run in the Summer of 2014. However, for me, this raises the question 
of professionalism. 
If we accept Freidson’s (2001) principles of professionalism and that new, direct-entry 
superintendents are recruited for their leadership skills, not policing skills, it would be fair to 
argue that a large proportion of highly-specialised policing knowledge and expertise is then 
irrelevant to senior officers per se. I would then argue that only those ranks up to and including 
Chief Inspector can be considered policing professionals. At Superintendent rank or above, 
where knowledge and expertise of policing is secondary to managerial and leadership skills, this 
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does not negate their standing as management and leadership professionals – only their 
recognition as policing professionals. 
Following this rationale to a logical conclusion, it could be argued that, if this is the case, 
then, when considering the future for the new Professional Policing Body, the entire police 
structure could be rationalised, with Chief Inspector being the most senior rank. The more senior 
managers and leaders being external or support functions, bringing proven skills and expertise 
in the required management and leadership disciplines. 
I cannot say that these Public Works would not have been created without me and the 
leadership I provided but, I am certain that they would not look like they do today had it not 
been for my personal vision and inspiration. Like Dwivedi (2006), I believe visionary leadership, 
in particular for the police, is critical to its future. If the Police Service, as we recognise it, is to 
survive, it must harness those with the capacity to create vision and translate that vision into 
reality. 
What is very clear to me is that, not one of these public works would have been possible 
without the support and dedication of those I worked with, the individuals who believed in my 
vision and were motivated to accompany me on the journey. My strengths as a manager and 
leader, according to Johnson and Geal (2010), are due to my ability to ‘walk the floor’, engaging 
with colleagues in an informal and personable manner. By walking the floor, I observe 
colleagues, provide support, advice and guidance, making them feel valued and providing them 
with the opportunity to speak as equals and leaders in their own right. However, this is a direct 
contradiction with what several of my peers viewed as a weakness within my leadership style 
and was perceived to be in conflict with the norm of senior police leadership.  
Speaking with a Detective Chief Inspector (DCI) from a provincial police force about the 
current health of police leadership, he confirmed that he had been a better leader as a sergeant 
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and an inspector. But as a DCI, as with most senior management, he is now focussed on 
performance so much and the fear of failure that he is unable to lead. At best, all he can do is 
manage and try to prevent failure and a reduction in performance – a role of mitigation rather 
than true leadership. This confirms my assessment that the best leaders are those on the front 
line, the rank and file officers. Senior officers rarely lead, they manage and direct the leadership 
potential of those they are responsible for. Conversely, when senior managers get it wrong, they 
can, unfortunately, have the opposite effect, inhibiting and demotivating their leaders, as has 
been the case with the Academy. 
These Public Works and my reflections about them described in this context statement 
provide evidence of contributions and changes that I have made to the Police Service, through 
my management and leadership as a professional practitioner. Although I am not considered 
senior management, currently holding the rank of Detective Inspector, I have not been 
hampered by the lack of rank. On the contrary, it has been empowering. By harnessing the 
freedom and opportunities available to my rank, it has enabled me to facilitate change at a local 
level within the City of London Police, at an organisational level for UK policing, at an individual 
level for victims of fraud across the world and, ultimately, contribute to the field of professional 
practice. 
The process of reflection, examining these Public Works and the stories behind their 
creation has been a journey of learning. Learning about myself and the organisation I work for. 
Some of these Public Works have been challenging and firsts, not only for UK policing, but also 
for the world of policing. I have been pushed and stretched, or rather, pushed and stretched 
myself to the limits, working well outside of my comfort zone, But at every stage I have come 
back stronger, more knowledgeable and more capable. 
Page | 118  
 
I have learnt a lot from these Public Works, personally and professionally. Having 
developed as an individual I have chosen not to seek promotion, however, those around me 
could be said to have benefitted far more, with some advancing their careers considerably.  
As Broughton (2009) states: 
• The people that tend to rise to the top in organisations are the target-setters, 
not the implementers; setting goals and targets is easier than having to meet 
them. 
Looking back on my career I now appreciate that I have been and continue to be, an 
implementer, not a target setter. However, I have come to realise that simply working hard and 
delivering is not enough to get recognised or rewarded. At this time, I have no aspirations to go 
beyond my current rank and position in the Police Service, but to do so, I would need to become 
more politically motivated. Nurse (2005) explains that organisational politics is of equal if not 
more importance than working hard. Dubrin (1990) also argues that we have been misled into 
thinking that hard work is its own reward, believing that this will get us noticed is a fallacy. Again, 
for me, this brings into question the whole concept of performance appraisals. Nurse (ibid) also 
believes that hard work is situational. However, according to Kennedy (1980), what matters is 
not how well you perform but, who you know, so, ultimately, hard work will not lead to success. 
As an individual, I have learnt the importance of how the political game is used to 
progress ones career. However, more importantly for me, as a practitioner, I have changed, I 
have matured. I agree with Armitage et al (2003) and the proposition that we are part of the 
learning age and lifelong learning is our challenge. I am no longer the person I was when I joined 
the Fraud Review Implementation Team. 
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My reflections, and the journey as an adult learner, confirmed to me that as a police 
officer, a project manager and a learning and development professional, I like structure to my 
personal and professional life. Without structure, there is a risk that I can become disorientated 
and lose focus. In creating Know Fraud I had to learn, when there was no one to learn from, 
learn when what I had to do hadn’t been done before and, I had to do it in a way that guaranteed 
success. 
These Public Works represent significant contributions to the field of policing. In 
particular: crime reporting, intelligence, investigative practice and entrepreneurial enterprise. 
These works have been recognised internationally as models of excellence and, collectively, 
have not been equalled in relation to their contribution and resulting changes to professional 
practice. As I have stated previously, these works are not mine alone, they are the result of team 
work. Some teams I inherited, others I built, bringing together the very best, the most capable, 
the most knowledgeable and the most skilful. As Bradford and Cohen (1998) put it, I don’t have 
all the answers, I am dependent on the knowledge and skills of those around me. 
Over the years that these public works have spanned, I demonstrated how a relaxed but 
inspirational style of floor-walking management and leadership has delivered good results 
consistently, often in the face of resistance. As with the study by De Reyck and Degraeve (2010), 
I have shown that, as a good manager, I have delivered good results consistently by adhering to 
good business processes. While some lesser managers may have enjoyed positive results during 
the same period, their success was not sustainable. 
• Instead of assessing performance through purely short-term deliverables and 
annual performance appraisals, organisations should consider staff 
performance and potential over the span of their employment, recognising and 
rewarding long-term achievements as well. 
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Unfortunately, as discussed previously, annual appraisals or performance reviews have 
engendered a culture of short-termism, with staff and management focussed on low-risk 
deliverables limited to the term of the appraisal. In the police, as I am sure is the same in many 
organisations, there is limited use of the appraisal process to gauge long-term or career-average 
performance. This is further compounded with the process of staff rotation. Over the three and 
half years I spent with the Academy I worked under a total of 8 different line managers. 
• Not a single manager showed an interest in my previous performance, their 
focus being completely limited to how I would support them in achieving their 
own current objectives. 
During a meeting with the Commissioner, about the future direction of the Academy, in 
conversation, he commented how senior officers may find my knowledge and skill set 
intimidating and my capabilities alien to the organisation, potentially resulting in officers seeing 
me as threat and so distancing themselves from me; this alienation impacting upon my 
acceptance, limiting my progression and opportunities with the organisation. 
Analysing the Commissioner’s comments, together with the support and dedication I 
received from the many talented individuals I have worked with over the years, it is clear that 
these Public Works would not have been possible without them and the broad range of 
knowledge and skills they brought to each project – often knowledge and the skills that I lacked. 
So: 
• Why is it that I can embrace such individuals when others appear to fear them 
for having more knowledge or expertise than themselves? 
The research of Levitt (2003) into theories of discrimination based upon the television 
show, the Weakest Link, indicated that, in early rounds, incentives encourage the voting-off of 
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weakest competitors. Whereas, in later rounds, as incentives reverse, the strongest competitors 
become logical targets for voting-off because they pose the greater competition or threat to 
one’s authority. Referring to Levitt and my experiences of police leadership, I must consider 
whether this is a failing with the Police Service, a case of human nature, or the result of modern 
management and leadership training and the unrealistic expectations often placed on today’s 
leaders. 
While thinking about the culture of police leadership, I am reminded of the destructive 
potential of overachieving managers and leaders. Spreier et al (2006) identified that, instead of 
coaching and collaborating, overachievers have a tendency to command and coerce staff, with 
extreme focus on achievement which ultimately undermines morale, reduces workplace 
productivity and erodes confidence in management. This I argue, will eventually erode public 
confidence in the police as an institution. 
As this context statement concludes, I look back on how I viewed myself at the beginning 
of the process, a visionary leader, an agent of change and innovation. However, I am the one 
that has changed, I have grown and developed as an individual. 
I am left with two questions to answer: 
• Does the Police Service still have a role for me? And; 
• Do I still see my future in such a role? 
So it is that I now find myself at a crossroads. Each project has been delivered, so now, 
in some ways, I am redundant. Following the delivery of such significant public works, a further 
question arises: 
• Where will I find another project of such a scale of those delivered, contributing 
towards the establishment of the National Lead Force for Fraud? 
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While the knowledge and skills I have acquired have served me well – travelling the 
world, speaking on the subject of fraud intelligence and investigation – it is difficult to 
comprehend how and where I will be able to use my skills to best effect going forward. The 
lessons I learnt from the challenges and impact of delivering each Public Work, as detailed within 
this context statement, include the following beliefs: 
1. Success can take many different forms and what it looks like depends upon 
design, not outcome. 
2. Project success is less dependent upon subject matter expertise, but more 
dependent upon the ability to visualise and believe in the solution. 
3. No single person is more important than the team and, the stronger the team, 
the greater the opportunities are for success. 
4. A team performs at its best when each and every member of that team owns 
the task and objective; a shared vision is a united team. 
5. Just because it has never been done, doesn’t mean it can’t be done, but it does 
mean there is more free scope to define how it should and can be done. 
I have done all I can to contribute towards modernisation and professionalisation of the 
Police Service. Opportunities presented by the Fraud Review were unique in relation to the scale 
and reach that I was be able to achieve with my Public Works. The process of storytelling as a 
vehicle for reflective practice and learning has enabled me to understand the journey I have 
travelled and to contextualise the contributions I have made to the fields of fraud reporting, 
intelligence, investigation and opportunities for entrepreneurial enterprise within the Police 
Service. As a professional practitioner, I am proud of my contributions and that my career within 
the police has resulted in such change, both professionally and personally. 
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I cannot identify any single Public Work as my greatest personal achievement, they are 
all important and significant in their own right. Most important to me have been relationships, 
individuals and teams that I have had the pleasure to work with and who have travelled this long 
journey with me. That I delivered the impossible but, at the same time, never lost sight of what 
counts, the people, and without them, none of this would have been possible. Similar to Watkins 
(2008), I believe that those, like myself, who make the biggest impact upon team performance 
demonstrate visionary leadership. Seeing individuals who make up the team, embracing them 
as equals, recognising their knowledge, skills and contributions they can and do make. 
At this point I consider my role within academia. I do not for one moment pretend to be 
an academic, I may deliver academic lectures and design academic programmes, but I do this as 
a professional, a creative thinker, visionary and a reflective practitioner. As Casey (2012) puts it, 
through the use of practitioner research, I have been able to comprehend and make sense of 
my daily contributions to professional practice, recognising opportunities for learning and 
lifelong development. 
Public Works I created and my work as a police officer has not just been a job, it has 
been a calling, a part of my life I have been passionate about. But in the same way that I have 
changed and evolved as a person, so too has the Police Service. While travelling this journey of 
development, I wonder whether we have been going in different directions and how this bodes 
for my future and my career. 
To conclude, I see many parallels between what I have created with the Academy and 
the process of completing this Context statement. 
Similar to the principle defined by Tyler (1949): 
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• I have learnt by participating, it is what I have done that I have learnt, not 
what has been taught. 
This point is of great importance to me as an individual, but has also been the bedrock 
upon which the Academy was built. As with Biggs (2002), the connection between the theory 
(academic) and practice (vocational) should ideally come to the realisation that one supports 
the other and both will enhance learning potential. The choice, therefore, is not which, but how, 
to utilise both for greatest effect. 
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Student Officer Programme Launch 
Student Officer Programme 
Official Launch
The Partnership
The City of London Police and
British Transport Police have
formed a unique tripartite
collaborative partnership with The
City University to provide a learning
and development Programme. This
is both academically and
vocationally accredited, and
satisfies the requirements of the
Central Authority. In terms of
learning and development provision
for the Justice Sector, this form of
collaboration and associated
accreditation, is a distinctive and
pioneering approach. Within two
years of study, participants within
the Programme have the
opportunity to attain a Foundation
Degree in Policing Practice (or
Justice Studies), in tandem with the
award of a Level 4 National
Vocational Qualification (NVQ). 
The Programme
In response to the APA document
‘Involving Communities in Police
Learning and Development’, a
guiding principle in the design of
the Programme has been the
integration of learning and
development for the Justice Sector
into the context of a wider society.
This has been achieved by the
move to academic collaboration, in
conjunction with the involvement of
the community in the design and
delivery of the Student Officer and
Justice Sector programmes. This
approach was seen as crucial to
enable learners to experience wider
perspectives in respect of the
society which they serve. 
The original concept, which was
more limited in its outlook, was for
a programme to train Student
Officers joining the Police Service.
However, during the design phase,
a vision emerged of producing a
programme that would be more
inclusive, flexible and accessible in
addressing the learning and
development needs of numerous
bodies within the wider Justice
Sector, both public and private.
This philosophy spawned a
modular structure, which permits
participants to enter and exit the
Programme, depending on their
individual circumstances. 
On the premise that ‘one size does
not fit all’, the design team have
built into the Programme even
greater flexibility. As previously
implied, partners from the Justice
Sector have the potential to choose
individual modules, or
combinations of modules, to
address their own individual needs.
This principle has now been taken
to its logical conclusion, whereby
adaptation may be made to the
Programme to produce a truly
‘bespoke’ option in relation to:
module content, duration,
accreditation, or delivery method.
Furthermore, the modular structure
facilitates the ability to accredit
prior learning/experience/
achievement in line with the City
University policy for APL and APEL.
Student Officer Programme
Background
The development of the Student Officer Programme has been as a consequence of Home Office
directives following the publication of Training Matters (HMIC 2002) and Building Communities,
Beating Crime - a better police service (Home Office 2005). Its aim is to widen the experiences of
new recruits to the police service by professionalising their learning and development which is
locally designed, delivered and owned. To achieve this aim, an innovative approach has been
adopted, whereby learning and development has the potential to be delivered, not only to
Student Officers, but across the entire Justice Sector. The fundamental thrust of the Programme
is the principle that all learning is not dealt with in isolation, but is ‘grounded in practice’.
Following approval of the
Programme at the University Stage
II process, the design team is now
commencing Phase II with the
development of distance learning
materials, further increasing the
flexibility and accessibility of the
Programme. Again, ‘bespoke’
distance learning modules can be
tailored to meet the needs of any
partners from the Justice Sector. 
The Student Officer Programme at
City University is a ground breaking
venture for both the Higher Education
and the Justice Sector, particularly in
the recognition and accreditation of
practice-based learning. After 23
weeks of University and work-based
study and learning, full-time students
complete all HE1 credit modules,
moving straight on to the
predominantly work-based HE2
credit modules, thus achieving the
Foundation Degree after two years of
study and professional practice.
In addition to the emphasis placed
on practical based learning and
assessment, the Programme has
innovatively embraced
‘Professionalising Investigative
Process’ (PIP) as a vehicle for
learning and assessment. PIP has
been threaded through each of the
six University delivered modules,
providing Student Officers with the
opportunity to achieve PIP Tier 1
prior to independent status.
Coming online later in 2006, will be
a full PIP Programme tailored for
the differing needs of both public
and private investigative bodies,
providing progression from Tier 1
through to Tier 3.
The Student Officer Programme
has been designed to
comprehensively prepare new
recruits, serving officers and
members of the wider policing
family to undertake a role within the
Justice Sector. The Programmes
represent the first step on an
academic pathway that leads to the
award of a Foundation degree in
Policing Practice or Justice
Studies, and possibly, the first step
on a pathway to life-long learning
and academic achievement. There
will be a choice of work streams
providing learning and development
opportunities in Patrol, Community,
Investigation and Management &
Leadership at Honours year, and
thereafter at Master’s Level. These,
together with a proposed doctorate
programme for senior managers
and investigators, will likewise be
grounded in practice, naturally
building on the initial Student
Officer Programme.
Student Officer Programme
The City University,
London
The City University, London, plays
a distinctive role at the heart of
business and the professions and
in our relationships with employers
and government. Our courses for
both undergraduates and
postgraduates are designed to help
students succeed in the workplace.
Over the past one hundred years
we have gained a worldwide
reputation for teaching and
research – and we are committed
to continuous innovation and
improvement of our activities. 
Each year around 1,300 new
undergraduate students join City. In
total there are almost 13,000
students, which makes City a mid-
sized university. City students come
from diverse backgrounds:
approximately one third are from
elsewhere in Europe or further
afield; and around 42 per cent are
aged 21 or older when they start
their programme.
City Police
The City of London Police is
responsible for the safety of
everyone in London’s ‘Square Mile’.
There are about 6,000 residents in
the City of London although this
number is swelled daily by an influx
of some 350,000 commuters, as
well as people travelling through
and tourists.
The Force is organised into six
command areas. The two territorial
divisions, based at Snow Hill and
Bishopsgate, are responsible for
the day-to-day policing of the City.
Fifty per cent of Force staff work
from these police stations and their
functions include giving crime
prevention advice, investigating
crime, patrolling, staffing the traffic
and environmental zone, and
dealing with public enquiries.
About 1,200 people work for the
City of London Police. Around one
third of these are civilian support
staff performing a wide range of
professional, administrative and
some operational support roles.
British Transport Police
British Transport Police (BTP) is the
national police force for the
railways providing a policing
service throughout England, Wales
and Scotland. BTP is also
responsible for policing the London
Underground system, the
Docklands Light Railway, the
Midland Metro Tram System and
Croydon Tramlink. Between them,
these rail businesses move more
than six million people every day. 
The railway environment presents
its own particular policing needs
and British Transport Police – which
now numbers 2,600 police officers
and 1,000 support staff – exists to
provide a specialist policing service
to meet those needs.
Policing the railways is an integral
part of policing the community
and BTP forms an important,
specialist element in the national
policing structure which
safeguards the citizen.
Programme Partners
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Travelling to The City University
The nearest Underground stations are
Angel, Moorgate and Old Street on the
Northern Line (City branch), Barbican,
Farringdon and Moorgate on the Metropolitan
and Circle lines, and Whitechapel on the
District Line. All the University buildings are
about 10 minutes’ walk from the nearest
Underground station.
By bus: 4, 19, 30, 38, 43, 55, 56, 63, 73,
153, 205, 214, 243, 274, 341.
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Module 12 Terrorism & Major Incidents Assessment 
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ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES FOR STUDENTS AND TEACHERS 
PRE REGISTRATION THEORETICAL ASSESSMENTS 
 
Programme Foundation Degree in Policing Practice 
Foundation Degree in Justice Studies 
Module 12  Terrorism and Major Incidents 
Level 2 (Diploma) 
Assessment Investigation of Crime Identified in one of two 
Prescribed Videos, Liaise with Witnesses, Plan and 
Prepare both a  Suspect and a Witness Interview. 
Type Summative 
 
Introduction 
 
This assessment gives students the opportunity to demonstrate the application of their skills in investigating a 
crime liaising with witnesses, planning and preparing both a suspect and a witness interview, by relating their 
learning from issues and situations examined in the classroom and self directed learning to a prescribed 
scenario.  
  
Format 
 
Students will be given one of two prescribed video scenarios about which they will plan the investigation of the 
crime, liaise with witnesses, plan and prepare both a suspect and a witness interview in line with the current 
ACPO Guidelines for Tier 1 Investigative Interviewing. They will be required to carry out and evaluate the 
interview and propose actions to take forward the investigation. 
 
They will also be required to review a pre-formatted witness statement, analyse this statement against set 
criteria. They will also be required to observe and evaluate a video of the suspect interview against set criteria 
and propose actions to take forward the investigation.   
 
This process will include the completion of the relevant documentation as prescribed by the current Manual 
of Guidance to meet the criteria set by Tier 2 Professionalizing Investigative Process (Centrex 2006) 
(Advanced Model). 
 
The evaluation of the assignment and proposals for future action should be 1000 words. 
 
Please use the marking criteria as a guide to the weighting of the discussion. 
 
The assessment must be legible and is to be submitted with the attached marking record in an A4 plastic wallet or 
folder with a transparent front (not a ring binder), with the page headed assignment submission at the front.  The 
student is advised not to use a slide binder as papers can easily become detached. 
 
Submission 
The assessment should be handed in to the Nominated Officer at the respective Force Training Centre by the date 
specified by the Module/Programme Leader. 
 
The results will be published shortly after the Interim Assessment Board, but will be subject to ratification 
at the Assessment Board. 
 
Late submission 
Non-negotiated late submission will be treated as non-submission and will automatically be awarded a fail (see 
extension policy). 
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Strategies to enable coursework development 
• Group tutorials 
• Group discussions in class  
• Workshops 
• Lectures/Seminars related to education and any relevant skills 
• Reflection 
 
Expectations and results of assessment 
The purpose of this summative assessment is to build on what the student has learned from classroom and self-
directed study  in relation to basic crime investigation.  A mark of 40% is required for a pass. 
 
Failure to achieve a pass mark for this assessment 
The student will be offered a tutorial support programme to enable resubmission of the assessment on an agreed 
date. 
 
Only two attempts are allowed.  A pass at second attempt will be awarded only 40%.  Failure to achieve a pass at 
second attempt will lead to failure of the module, unless there are extenuating circumstances.   
 
When resubmitting this assessment please include at the back of the folder the first attempt submission and 
marking record. Failure to submit this will lead to 0% being awarded and a fail grade will be recorded at the 
Assessment Board. 
 
Final instructions 
It is essential for the student to take these guidelines to every tutorial 
 
The student is strongly advised to retain a photocopy of the assessment.  Returned assessments and the marking 
record must be retained by the student for the duration of the programme. 
 
 
Amended by Chair’s Action July 2006
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 Assignment submission 
 
Name of Personal Tutor  Code  
Name of Student  Word count  
Programme Foundation Degree in Policing Practice 
Foundation Degree in Justice Studies 
Module 11 
 
Advanced Crime Investigation 
Assignment 
 
Intake  
Submission date  
I certify that the coursework that I have submitted is my own unaided work, and that I have read and 
complied with the guidelines on plagiarism as set out in the student handbook. I understand that the 
University may make use of plagiarism detection software and that my work may therefore be stored 
on a database, which is accessible to other users of the same software.  
  
Students should be aware that, where plagiarism is suspected, a formal investigation will be 
carried out, and action may be taken under the University’s rules on Academic Misconduct. 
This might result in penalties ranging from mark deduction to withdrawal from the University. 
 
Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
I verify that no extenuating circumstances have affected my performance during the development of this 
assessment. 
 
 
Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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Marking record 
 
Student's name  Code  
Programme Foundation Degree in Policing Practice 
Foundation Degree in Justice Studies 
Level 2 (Diploma) 
Module 11 Advanced Crime Investigation Marker  
Intake  Final mark  
Assessment Investigation of Crime Identified in one of 
two Prescribed Videos, Liaise with Witness, 
Plan, Prepare and Conduct a Witness 
Interview. 
Pass/fail  
 
Structure and presentation     10% 
 
• Logical, coherent development.  Clearly presented.  (5%) 
• References accurate and recognized referencing system used.  (5%) 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mark awarded . . . . . . . . . . 
 
Content       90% 
 
• Analysis of the offence and relevant legislation (10%) 
• Liaising with witnesses to obtain accurate and relevant information.(10%) 
• Plan, conduct and evaluate both a suspect and a witness interview in line with ACPO Guidelines for Tier 1 
Professionalising the Investigative Process (Advanced Model).(35%) 
• Evaluation of the suspect interview, completion of relevant documents (Tier 2) and propose actions to take 
forward the investigation with rationale (30%) 
• Use of the literature to support the management of the investigation (5%) 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                           Mark awarded . . . . . . . . . . 
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Marker’s comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marker's signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
 
 Foundation Degree in Policing Practice/Justice Studies/module 1/assessment /mod-4 Induction 2/Two Action Plans  Page 6 
Moderator's comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moderator's signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
External Examiner’s Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
External Examiner’s signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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The Future of Police Training 
27 - The Billboard - Issue 2
The Billboard was privileged to get 
the opportunity to do an article on a 
revolutionary new method of police 
training. City of London police and the 
British transport police have formed a 
tri-partite partnership with City University 
with the sole aim of producing an all 
encompassing curriculum that will provide 
students with the tools they 
need to police our ever 
changing, modern day 
society.
The Student Officer 
Programme will see the 
three organisations join 
forces to provide a new 
course for recruits in which 
probationers will spend time 
in lectures and seminars as 
well as out in the community and at police 
stations.
Commander Frank Armstrong from 
the City of London Police says: “Our 
prospective police officers will be exposed 
to a greater range of people, ideas and 
influences. They will be much more 
involved in the community and the 
community will have more input into their 
training.”
Students will also benefit from extended 
and localised specialist input on subjects 
such as counter terrorism, 
major incident handling, 
public order and fraud 
investigation.
Probationer training is 
delivered in five phases. 
After a two week induction 
by each Force, student 
officers enter a two week 
community stage of training.
Then comes 18 weeks at The City 
University learning theory, law and 
procedures, followed by a nine week 
professional development phase at a 
special police development unit in London. 
After a year, new officers spend supervised 
time at local police stations until they are 
ready to be signed off for independent 
patrol.
Existing police officers will also have 
access to the new type of training in a 
programme of lifelong learning. They 
will get credit for previous courses and 
experience through a system of Accredited 
Prior Learning and have the opportunity 
to build on this, earning further credit 
towards graduate and postgraduate 
qualifications.
The Billboard spoke to Inspector Steve 
Strickland, the project manager of the 
course, to find out what benefits the 
course will bring to its students and in turn 
to the UK Police force.
Billboard: So can I just first of 
all ask when this course was first 
conceptualised? 
The future of
We investigate a Tri-partite scheme between two UK police forces and a leading UK 
university as they strive to offer the most comprehensive police training course available.
Our prospective 
police officers will 
be exposed to a 
greater range of 
people, ideas and 
influences.
police training
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within the field within the UK had all been 
case studies around individual crimes 
from investigations, which though highly 
effective can be a little bit limiting. What 
we found with New South Wales is they 
had produced a case study which was 
called, ‘In God we Trust’ (taken from their 
oath), and that was based around the 
experiences and learning of a single New 
South Wales recruit. We looked at this 
idea and took it a stage further for our 
programme. The Journey focuses around 
the whole process of police training from 
day one to confirmation and details the 
key learning and problems along the 
way. The person that wrote the Journey 
is Detective Bob Pointer from City of 
London Police and he did a lot of research 
with current probationary officers; 
questionnaires, interviews and research. 
He involved officers from City of London 
Police and British Transport Police at quite 
a national level looking at what were their 
thoughts, what were their concerns, what 
were they well prepared for, what would 
they liked to have known more about? 
And all of that has been fed into what the 
Journey has turned into. 
Bb: With all your research completed and 
your goals and curriculum in place what 
is your role in the program now?
S: I’m currently seconded to the university 
as the project manager. With this project 
being a tripartite collaboration with three 
partners, the City of London Police, British 
Transport Police and City University, it was 
thought to be appropriate that instead 
important not to make it too prescriptive; 
that it would only suit police officers. 
Because it’s a lot harder to change 
something that is already in place and 
accredited than it is to design it with 
that flexible from the very beginning. 
So from the very outset we looked at as 
many of the external partners from the 
justice sector as possible and looked at 
what their needs were and how we could 
potentially deliver that with a modularised 
programme.
Bb: I suppose by doing that it becomes 
attractive to a wider scope of people?
S: Yes, we talk about working in 
collaboration with our partners. However, 
collaboration, if it only takes place at the 
final stages, isn’t going to be effective 
whereas if that collaboration starts in 
the classroom with all partners learning 
together from a single standardised 
approach, they learn together, they 
investigate together and prosecute then 
we’re bringing uniformity and collaboration 
into the frame at every single stage. 
Bb: During you’re 18 months research 
you compiled a document called “the 
Journey”, can you give us a bit of 
background information on this?
S: The idea of the Journey, again, comes 
from the visit to Australia and looking 
at what New South Wales had done. 
We identified that case studies are an 
excellent tool for contextualising learning 
but the majority of the work currently 
Steve: Well I’ve been involved in the 
project now for about 18 months, the first 
year of that was pretty much research, 
looking at what we were going to do, the 
route we were going to take, whether 
collaboration was an option. At the early 
stages of that 18 months we started to 
identify the potential for collaboration 
between the City of London Police 
and British Transport Police. We then 
conducted a lot of in-depth research 
which took in numerous forces from 
across Europe looking at what they 
were doing to provide police training. 
We then widened our research as far a 
field as Australia and New South Wales 
police. I actually visited New South Wales 
in December last year to look at their 
programme and brought back a lot of 
very, very good information and ideas from 
there, which has also helped to focus the 
direction of what the programme looks 
like. So there has been a lot of work really 
over the 18 months. We can’t say that it’s 
all original; a lot of what we have done 
has been as a result of building on the 
best practice and innovative ideas from 
everyone we visited and hopefully come 
up with a single programme that stands 
out from the crowd.
Bb: What objectives did you have for the 
foundations of the course?
S: It’s probably worth mentioning, one of 
the biggest motivators for the program was 
that there is nothing worse than designing 
something which is redundant before it 
actually hits the market. So during the 
design stage we looked at what was on the 
current police reform agenda – i.e. police 
reform, workforce modernisation, mixed 
economy policing – this ensured that we 
always had an eye on where things were 
likely to go in the future. These topics 
have acted as the drivers that have made 
the program look the way it does. We 
have had to make the programme flexible, 
make it available for part time students 
and make it available for the wider police 
family. From there we took the whole 
concept of police reform to the next stage 
by integrating with the wider justice sector.
Bb: You mention the wider justice sector, 
was the course initially intended solely 
for the police our always for the justice 
sector?
S: Well from the very earliest stages, when 
we looked at it, we thought it was very »
tjj
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of each force or each partner having 
their own project manager that one be 
appointed to represent all three parties. 
So I was selected and seconded to the 
university to take up that role.
Bb: What was the reason for coming up 
with the course - were the older methods 
of training falling short and in need of 
modernisation to deal with more complex 
criminals?
S: The fundamental motivator for us was 
the Home Office, which goes back to 
a HM report, ‘Training Matters’ which 
deemed that the old training system wasn’t 
fit for purpose. It didn’t deliver the training 
that was required by police officers in the 
21st century. But the last thing that we 
wanted to do was to come up with a new 
programme and basically dismiss what 
had gone before because I worked in 
the old training system at both National 
Police Training and Centrex and thought 
it was an excellent product that was being 
delivered. So what we’ve done is we’ve 
been very careful not to undermine or 
dismiss all the good work that has gone 
before and we’ve taken the best of what 
went before and built on it to come up 
with the programme we’ve got.
Bb: So it’s more evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary?
S: It is, yes. 
Bb: Is the qualification academic or 
vocational? Are lectures complemented 
with on-the-job training?
S: Yes. When you start talking of academia 
a lot of people think that we’re going to 
produce academics that can write essays 
or dissertations but are not necessarily 
going to be able to do the job. However 
the City University is a university for 
businesses and professions and a lot 
of their work is what would be termed 
grounded in practice. So when it came to 
designing the programme we started with 
a view of the end product; what did we 
want that end product to look like? And 
the end product has to be a 
police officer fit for purpose; 
somebody that can do 
the job. So the whole 
programme was designed 
around ensuring that that’s 
what we achieved. And the 
whole programme has been 
designed so that at every 
stage of it we are looking at 
theory and practice hand-
in-hand, that everything 
is underpinned with a 
practical application.
Bb: All in the direction of producing a 
very good officer?
S: And to that end what also makes 
our programme unique is how we have 
brought together both vocational training 
and academic education into a single 
programme. Whereas previously people 
had seen you either do vocational training, 
which is like the NVQ, or academic in 
higher education. And what we said is 
well why can’t we do the two at the same 
time? So we have a single programme 
that delivers the underpinning knowledge 
within the university and then applies that 
knowledge in the workplace gathering 
evidence towards the award of an NVQ. 
But both the education counts towards the 
NVQ and the practical application counts 
towards the foundation degree. They both 
work seamlessly together to achieve a dual 
award.
Bb: So the result of you working closely 
with the university is synergetic? 
S: Yes, there are so many 
benefits to be had from 
an institution which is 
established within this field. 
The police, though a very 
specialised organisation, 
can’t be experts in 
everything and there are 
huge opportunities here 
for, for example, our police 
trainers to develop and to 
learn more about education; 
how to make education 
work for people. There are 
greater opportunities for the 
student officers with access 
to resources, on-line resources, e-learning, 
and the library, all of these facilities. 
And then the experts also that we have 
within the university, within the fields of 
Forensics, Law, Criminology, they all go to 
make this a superb product. 
Bb: Do you hope the course will attract 
wider spectrum of people to the justice 
sector?
S: A key driver in the design of the 
programme has been a need to make 
TAbove left: he Guest speakers with the student officers of cohort one, comprising of 7 City of London Police Officers and 19 British Transport Police Officers. Above rmiddle: The guest 
speakers for the official launch: Chief Constable Ian Johnston (British Transport Police), Pro-Vice Chancellor Mary Watts (City University), Commissioner James Hart (City of London 
Police), Ed Gibson (Chief Security Advisor - )Microsoft.
...our programme 
unique is how 
we have brought 
together both 
vocational training 
and academic 
education into a 
single programme.
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Police training more flexible and 
accessible, attracting students from areas 
that may previously have been deterred 
from joining due to the residential and 
militaristic style of police training. The 
Student Officer Programme which is 
currently delivered at the City University 
will evolve over time to a level where it 
can be offered as a traditional taught 
course, a distance learning programme 
or a blend of both which will be available 
to both full time and part time students. 
To complement this, a framework has 
been developed which could see students 
complete their initial learning and 
development though this flexible approach 
to a standard where they could potentially 
achieve independent patrol status with the 
award of a level 3 NVQ and a certificate 
of Higher Education, all pre employment. 
I find this development very exciting as it 
will enable people to experience what it 
means to be a police officer so they can 
make a more informed decision before 
taking that final step to join the service. 
Bb: The Foundation Degree and NVQ 
awards must be very attractive to 
new recruits who have not had the 
opportunity to experience Higher 
Education? How attractive do you think 
this will be to potential recruits that 
already have a degree?
S: I believe the opportunity to achieve 
a foundation degree and NVQ will be 
very attractive and will assist our forces 
in maintaining the highest standards of 
recruit. In a bid to attract recruits of the 
highest calibre, in addition to offering the 
dual accredited foundation degree and 
NVQ levels 3 & 4 qualifications we are now 
finalising the details of a graduate / HPDS 
entry route. This option will have officers 
undergoing the same Student Officer 
Programme with a higher more critical 
level of assessment. The students under 
this scheme will still be working alongside 
regular students gaining evidence against 
the NOS for independent patrol and 
confirmation in the rank achieving the 
same NVQ’s but with a Masters Degree 
after two years in stead of the Foundation 
Degree. 
Bb: It’s the first time it’s been done 
in the UK. Do you see this becoming 
the future of police training? Will every 
university offer the course or a similar 
course?
S: There are a number of universities 
around the country delivering this type of 
training but none following the structure 
and the model that we’ve designed. It’s 
important to recognise that each institution 
or area has to deliver the training that 
is suitable for the community it serves 
and its particular policing needs. So I 
wouldn’t go as far to say that we have 
something that could answer everybody’s 
needs. But in the very nature of how 
it’s been designed I think there is a lot 
of what could be seen as best practice 
and answers to a lot of the problems that 
certain areas or forces are encountering 
with either delivering IPLDP, Initial Police 
Learning and Development Programme, 
whether it be internally with NVQ or with 
HE. We’ve come up with a model that 
says it’s not that difficult. It’s easy to 
achieve the integration of vocational and 
academic education into a programme 
that embraces change. 
Embracing the police reform agenda, with 
a focus on the future of the service we are 
working with HE to compliment this with 
a programme of lifelong learning. We’re 
providing career pathways, valuing officers 
that have gone before, accrediting prior 
learning and prior experiential learning 
(APL & APEL), integrating them into the 
programme at, say, year three straight on 
to a Honours or even Masters Programme. 
Officers will be able to tailor there own 
development plans, with a focus on 
their career aspirations around the fields 
of community, patrol, investigation or 
management and leadership. There will 
be opportunities to study more specialist 
fields of criminology, sociology, forensics, 
fraud and economic crime, high tech 
crime and computer forensics, all of 
which will fit into the programme of life 
long learning, starting with short courses 
and finishing with Professional Doctorate 
programmes.
Bb: How do you think the course will 
benefit the student?
S: This programme is about education; 
it’s not about training. And the way that 
I would explain that is that under the 
previous national training programme 
it was all about training where students 
attended classes and they were provided 
with the information they needed to 
know. They were trained in every aspect 
that they needed and the responsibility 
for the learning was pretty much taken 
away from them, which then when they 
left that training it didn’t really promote 
them to take responsibility for their own 
learning. Whereas here what we are 
doing is within the context of academia or 
higher education we’re promoting learning 
with a great deal of the emphasis being 
placed on the students. So we’re starting 
them down that pathway of personal 
responsibility for lifelong learning, which 
I do see as one of the greatest shifts in 
what we’re doing.
The billboard would like to thank Steve 
Strickland for taking the time out of his 
busy schedule to talk to us. We wish the 
team at London University all the best with 
their revolutionary course as we feel it can 
only be beneficial to all UK Police forces.
Above right: Steve Strickland, Student Officer Programme Manager at City University.
 Delivering the Recommendations of the 
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Delayed Attestation.  Pre-employment Police Education 
 
Interviews of NSW Police and Charles Sturt University representatives 
 
Summary of Research Findings. 
 
 
 
A. MOTIVATION FOR CHANGE 
 
1. Do you recall any significant social, economic or political events at the time 
which may have influenced this transition? Originally the 1981 Lusher 
Report followed by the 1998 Royal Commission into New South Wales 
Police which recommended changes to recruitment and training 
including: Community involvement, transparency reflective practice and 
professionalisation. See Royal Commission Report (cross reference to The 
Review of Policing, HMIC 2008), Collaborative Police Education and 
interview D1 01 2008 01 21.  
 
2. If yes: What were they, why did this influence the change & how important 
was this to the change happening? As above 
 
3. How was the recommendation for change communicated within the service? 
There was a communication strategy, the details of which are unclear. See 
interviews D1 01 2008 01 21 & D3 02 2008 01 23 
 
4. How was this received by the serving members of the NSWP? Generally 
received well, there were some reservations which were fuelled by the 
problems encountered by Queensland Police and Griffith University. See 
interviews D1 01 2008 01 21, D3 02 2008 01 23 and D6 01 2008 01 26 and 
the paper - Wimshurst, and Ransley, (2007). Police Education and the 
University Sector: Contrasting Models from the Australian Experience. 
 
5. Was there any negative press, internal or external? None that can be recalled 
 
6. How was the negative press / resistance managed? N/A 
 
B. BENEFIT AND PERFORMANCE REALISATION. 
 
1. How does the associate degree entry route make NSWP a more attractive 
employer of choice, or does it simply limit the potential pool of recruits? No 
direct research has been done around the attractiveness of NSWP as an 
employer of choice, however, NSWP is the only state that meets or 
exceeds it recruitment targets (Average 17 applications requested for 
every position). NSWP is the also the only state that does not actively 
recruit inter-state or internationally, conversely, NSW police officers are 
actively targeted by other states for transfer. See interviews D1 01 2008 01 
21, D3 02 2008 01 23, D4 01 2008 01 24 and D6 01 2008 01 26 and the 
paper - Jones, D, Jones, L, and Prenzler, T (2005). Tertiary Education, 
Commitment, and Turnover in Police Work  
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2. What evidence do you have to support this view? As above 
 
3. What research has been done to compare the performance of officers trained 
under the previous system against those trained on the associate degree? None, 
unfortunately no benchmarking was done of the officers under the 
previous system which prevents any comparison being made with recruits 
on the ADPP. However, it is worth referring to the interview D1 01 2008 
01 21 and interview D6 01 2008 01 26 for a perspective from professional 
standards and field training. 
 
4. From your findings what was the most significant improvement in 
performance for the officers and the service? N/A 
 
5. Again, what evidence do you have to support these findings? N/A 
 
6. Have you consulted local communities to compare public satisfaction or to 
gage the quality of service received from officers trained under the associate 
degree? No 
 
7. How does this compare with previous figures on public satisfaction and 
quality of service prior to the associate degree being implemented?  N/A 
 
8. The change to an academic teaching model for police is often compared to that 
of the medical and nursing profession. However, the skills and qualifications 
linked to the medical and nursing professions are transferable across 
professions, organisations and countries, have you considered the 
‘transferability’ of your police recruits, or, are their skills and qualifications 
only suitable for employment with NSWP? Currently there is none or 
limited transferability between forces / states, however, this is being 
reviewed by the federal government and is likely to change in the near 
future. See interviews D1 01 2008 01 21 & D6 01 2008 01 26 and papers - 
Chambers, R, (2004). Collaborative Police Education. A Report. And 
Harris, R, Simmons, M and Edwards, G. (1998). From Institution-Based 
to Work-Based Learning. 
 
9. Do you have any examples of where and how this ‘transferability’ has 
worked? As above 
 
10. If the skills and qualifications are not directly transferable across organisations 
or borders, and this leads to the need for conversion programmes, how does 
this impact on the validity of the programme? See evidence as above. 
 
C SELECTION AND RECRUITMENT 
 
1. In the UK we have an aging workforce and the pool of potential recruits 
reduces year on year. How does this compare to the NSW / Australian 
workforce? This is the same as the Australian workforce, see papers - 
Lynch, J, (2006) ACPR Scope, Australian Police Workforce Planning 
Priority Research Directions, Lynch, J, (2005) ACPR Issues, Looking to 
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the Future: Implications of emerging trends for police workforce 
planning, Lynch, J & Tuckey, M, (2004) ACPR, Understanding 
Voluntary Turnover: An examination of resignations in Australian police 
organisations and Jones, D, Jones, L, and Prenzler, T (2005). Tertiary 
Education, Commitment, and Turnover in Police Work. 
 
2. How has the associate degree affected the ability of NSWP to recruit and 
retain officers? It has had a positive effect, recruitment levels exceeding all 
other states and policing sectors (transport / federal). See interviews D1 
01 2008 01 21 and D5 01 2008 01 25. 
 
3. What is current attrition rate within the probationary period in comparison to 
that of the previous system? Difficult to make a direct comparison as the 
two systems are so different. Attrition on the ADPP averages at about 
20% prior to employed status, post employment the attrition rate is 
comparable with that of the previous system. See interview D1 01 2008 01 
21 and supporting document - Attrition Analysis Cause (Excel spread 
sheet) 
 
4. How rigorous is the joint selection process run by NSWP and CSU? On the 
surface the recruitment process appears to be almost absent. However, in 
comparison to the previous system all areas of the force (strategic, 
personnel, training, recruitment, union and professional standards) 
believe that the current system is more fit for purpose and leads to the 
selection of the most suitable recruits. See interviews D1 01 2008 01 21, D5 
01 2008 01 25 & D6 01 2008 01 26.  
 
5. Is there any conflict between the processes or the organisations? The only 
area of conflict has come from professional standards who believe that the 
board established to consider professional suitability can sometimes be 
too harsh and professional standards have had to reinstate professional 
suitability on a number of occasions through appeal. See Interview D1 01 
2008 01 21 for an explanation of the process and interview D6 01 2008 01 
26 for a perspective from professional standards. 
 
6. Who manages the recruitment and selection process? Joint between the 
University and force recruitment department. See above with the addition 
of interview D5 01 2008 01 25 with one of the recruitment sergeants. 
 
7. What are the resource implications for this? The process is streamlined for 
the police – initial paper selection is conducted by the university, police 
conduct ‘professional suitability’ but without interviews or selection 
centres the recruitment department is more of a proactive centre 
(advertising, promotions and public interface) See interviews D1 01 2008 
01 21, D5 01 2008 01 25 and D6 01 2008 01 26. 
 
8. How does this compare with the resources required under the pervious 
system? No comparison has been made. 
 
Summary of results paper NSWP/CSU  Page 4 of 29 
Steve Strickland,   Version 1 
City of London Police  SS/01/08 
9. In the UK we have a blended approach to policing, relying heavily on 
volunteer Special Constables and the new Police Community Support 
Officers. Do you have similar volunteer or support roles within NSWP? There 
is no equivalent of Special Constables or PCSO’s in Australia but they do 
have VIPS. There is a move to potentially implement the equivalent of the 
Special Constable position but it is being resisted by the police union. 
Professional standard believe a system of incorporating ‘live practice’ 
with special constables pre-employment would be an improvement on 
their system. See interview D6 01 2008 01 26. 
 
10. Are the recruits for these roles enrolled on your associate degree? N/A 
 
11. If not: Does this lead to any issues or complaints of discrimination or lack of 
opportunity? N/A 
 
D DIVERSITY AND PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 
 
1. In 2004 under the associate degree programme the average age of recruits had 
risen from 21 to 25. What is the average age of new recruits now? 26 years. 
See papers - Rooker, J, and Woolston, R. (2007). First generation 
university students: Opportunities for Women, Indigenous Australians 
and trades people to obtain an associate degree and Chambers, R, (2004). 
Collaborative Police Education. A Report.  
 
2. It could be argued that the student officer route may discriminate against men; 
in particular, those with families who are seeking to change careers later in life 
who can not afford to finance the initial unpaid / unemployed student phase. 
Has this been the case? The programme did initially ‘marginalise’ certain 
groups for which positive action initiatives were put in place including 
scholarships, bridging programme and the distance learning option. See 
paper - Rooker, J, and Woolston, R. (2007). First generation university 
students: Opportunities for Women, Indigenous Australians and trades 
people to obtain an associate degree and supporting documents - Bridging 
programme analysis, Scholarship analysis and the Demographic reports 
(Word documents). 
 
3. If yes: Have any positive action or initiatives been implemented to counter this 
trend? If no: What was the reason for this? Yes, see above. 
 
4. Alternatively, the programme could be seen to favour female applicants, 
possibly those returning to work after starting a family. Has NSWP seen any 
significant change in the workforce make up, in particular individuals from 
previously underrepresented groups? No, see above. 
 
5. Does NSWP or CSU run any positive action initiatives, financial or otherwise 
to encourage recruitment from underrepresented groups? Yes, see above. 
 
6. For an occupation that has been historically ‘skills’ based the associate degree 
could be discriminating against a considerable proportion of the community 
who are not academically minded or capable. Do NSWP / CSU provide any 
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support or initiatives to encourage applications from individuals who do not 
meet the academic standard for acceptance on to the programme? Yes, see 
above, especially the paper - Rooker, J, and Woolston, R. (2007). First 
generation university students: Opportunities for Women, Indigenous 
Australians and trades people to obtain an associate degree 
 
7. How successful is this / are these initiatives? Extremely successful, see 
supporting documents - Attrition Analysis Cause (Excel spread sheet), 
Analysis of Literacy and failure rates, CALD – Culturally and 
Linguistically  Diverse Student Performance, Scholarship analysis, 
Bridging programme analysis and Demographic reports (Word 
documents) 
 
E FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
 
1. I understand there is means tested scholarship available for students on the 
associate degree. Who funds the scholarship? The Police fund the 
Scholarship. See supporting document - Scholarship analysis.  
 
2. Who is responsible for the means testing and the management of the 
scholarship fund? The university process all Scholarship applications and 
administer payments etc. The costs of the scholarship are then reclaimed 
from the Police at the end of each financial year. See interview D3 01 2008 
01 23 and D3 02 2008 01 23  
 
3. How does the cost of funding and managing the scholarships compare with the 
costs associated with employed / salaried recruits, which I believe they were 
under the previous system? There are significant savings. When the course 
was originally designed a formula was agreed utilising a percentage of the 
savings to fund the scholarships. The amount of scholarship has remained 
static for 12 years so the level of savings have increased year on year. This 
system is however under review and a 0% student loan scheme is being 
scoped as an alternative and fairer alternative to the scholarship scheme. 
See interview D3 02 2008 01 23 and supporting document - scholarship 
analysis. 
 
4. Has NSWP conducted any financial analysis to compare the cost of the 
associate degree with that of the previous attested police training route? 
Financial analysis was done as part of the original scoping project. However, 
efficiency savings were not the main driver for the change; police reform and 
professionalisation were considered the main drivers. See interviews D1 01 
2008 01 21, D3 02 2008 01 23 & D6 01 2008 01 26 and supporting 
documents - Royal Commission Report (cross reference to The Review of 
Policing, HMIC 2008 and Training Matters, HMIC 2002), Collaborative 
Police Education and interview D1 01 2008 01 21. 
 
5. Do you have any evidence detailing the efficiency savings / additional costs? 
As above 
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6. In addition to any efficiency savings realised by NSWP through the student 
officer route and the delay in employment, have are there any other significant 
areas where the associate degree has added value or provided efficiency 
savings? There have been numerous areas where value has been added, 
namely: recruitment, retention, streamlining of HR and Personnel 
structures, professionalisation and public image of the police. See 
interviews D1 01 2008 01 21, D2 01 2008 01 22, D2 02 2008 01 22, D3 02 
2008 01 23, D4 01 2008 01 24, D5 01 2008 01 25 & D6 01 2008 01 26. See 
supporting documents - Hummer, D, (2006). An Argument for 
Incorporating police Internships into Liberal Arts-Based Criminal Justice 
Curricula: An Example of Mutually Beneficial Cooperative Education 
and Harris, R, Simmons, M and Edwards, G. (1998). From Institution-
Based to Work-Based Learning. 
 
7. If savings are made: Have the saving been retained for the use of NSWP or 
has the service seen its budget reduced by the government to reflect this? 
Savings were, and still are retained by NSWP and have been used to fund 
additional officers which have seen the force strength grow considerably 
over the last 12 years. No specific evidence or data to support this but it is 
backed up by NSWP annual reports. 
 
8. If the saving was retained by NSWP: For a service funded from the ‘public 
pocket’ how has this saving been utilised? As above 
 
9. Was there any community consultation over this decision and the proposed 
use for the money? No 
 
10. What evidence do you have of this consultation? N/A 
 
11. There is a great risk for those changing occupations later in life when, during 
the initial ‘student’ phase, they have no benefits or privileges awarded to 
employees? How are ‘students’ protected during this Phase, for example, if 
they become injured and cannot continue with their training and gain 
employment? The students are covered by an insurance policy 
administered by the university which has been specially tailored for the 
prospective police recruits. 
 
12. If support systems / insurances are in place: Who administers this and what 
is the cost to the force? During sessions 1 & 2, prior to employed status, 
student support systems are all administered by the university and the 
full cost of the police specific insurance is covered by the University. See 
interview D3 01 2008 01 23.  
 
F ISSUES OF HONESTY AND INTEGRITY 
 
1. Has there been any notable change in the professional standards of Student 
Officers compared to attested recruits? Yes, as there is a risk of having 
professional suitability removed and not gaining employment there a 
fewer incidents of misconduct during sessions 1 & 2. See interviews D3 02 
2008 01 23 and D6 01 2008 01 26. 
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2. What is the percentage or number of officers within their probation subject 
formal discipline, or were refused employment due to disciplinary action 
under the associate degree programme? As above, see in particular 
interview D6 01 2008 01 26. 
 
3. How does compare with the percentage or numbers under the previous 
system? No direct comparison, see above interview. 
 
4. What evidence do you have to support this? N/A 
 
5. How do NSWP exert control and discipline – in relation to professional 
standards – on student officers prior to employed status? Students are subject 
to a behaviour contract as part of their professional suitability and 
conditional offer of employment. See interview D3 02 2008 01 23 
 
6. Do you have any examples of where this has worked or more importantly 
where it has failed? As above see interview D3 02 2008 01 23 
 
7. To minimise the risk and temptation of officers become corrupt there are 
restrictions placed on officers private lives, including the management of debt. 
Do the NSWP have similar restrictions? Yes, exactly the same. 
 
8. If yes: Have there been any cases of bad debt linked to student loans or a 
change of career in order to undertake the associate degree? None 
 
9. If yes: Have any of these cases resulted in investigations where the officer was 
suspected of corruption or a breach of police regulations? N/A 
 
10. Are the student officers responsible for managing their own debt or does the 
service assist, for example, deductions direct from salary for loan / debt 
repayment? Loan / student fee deductions are taken at source. See 
interview D3 02 2008 01 23 
 
G. EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS AND HUMAN RESOURCES 
  
1. Are NSW Police officers Employees or Crown Agents? NSWP police officers 
(post confirmation) are sworn officers whilst probationary officers are 
termed ministerial employees. See interview D6 01 2008 01 26 
 
2. Would ‘Employed’ v ‘Crown’ status have affected the decision to move 
towards a non-attested recruit training programme? In Australia sworn 
officers are employed and protected by employment legislation (like all 
Australians). This was a motive for change as it was and still is very 
difficult to get rid of an officer, even probationary officers who are either 
inefficient or corrupt. Student officers are not covered or considered 
employees until they session 3 when they are formally employed. See 
interview D6 01 2008 01 26 
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3. For successful applicants, when an offer of acceptance is made does this 
contain an offer or conditional offer of employment? When an applicant is 
offered a position on the programme the conditional offer of employment 
is only legally binding if the student successfully completes the first two 
sessions and maintains professional suitability. See interview D3 01 2008 
01 23. 
 
4. Is this offer legally binding? As above. 
 
5. Have there been any cases where a student has not been employed and has 
challenged the decision or legality of the decision? No, there was a case by 
the police union who claimed that a student officer is simply an unpaid 
police officer by another name. The case failed and the court held that 
students are students and are not protected by employment law. See 
interviews D3 02 2008 01 23 and D6 01 2008 01 26. 
 
6. If yes: What was the outcome of this / these cases? As above 
 
7. Do you have a copy of the initial offer? Pending 
 
8. What measures are in place to ensure that the checks are still valid at the time 
of employment? Detailed in the interview D1 01 2008 01 21, D4 01 2008 01 
24 and D6 01 2008 01 26. 
 
9. If further checks are necessary: What further checks are conducted and how 
does this affect the offer of employment? N/A 
 
10. Is a further offer of employment made at this stage? Yes, the formal offer 
after successful completion of stage 2. 
 
11. If yes: Is this offer fixed and legally binding or are there certain conditional 
elements attached to the offer? Yes, it results in employment and protection 
from employment law. See interview D3 01 2008 01 23 
 
12. Do you have a copy of the formal offer? Pending 
 
H RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 
 
1. Was there any community consultation prior to the move to the associate 
degree? No, other than that which formed part of the Wood Royal 
Commission into New South Wales Police.   
 
2. If yes: What were the general feelings of the community about this change? 
3. What was the most notable cause for concern? N/A 
 
4. If concerned: How did NSWP / CSU overcome these concerns? N/A 
 
5. Was the change being driven by the government or by NSWP? Initiated as a 
result of the Royal Commission and then driven jointly by the Police and 
the Government. See interviews D3 02 2008 01 23 and D6 01 2008 01 26. 
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6. If NSWP: What was the position of the government when presented with the 
proposal or feasibility paper? Supportive because it had commissioned the 
Wood Report and recruited Commissioner Peter Ryan from England 
(former Chief Executive of NPT) to implement the change. See interviews 
D2 02 2008 01 22, D3 02 2008 01 23 and D6 01 2008 01 26.  
 
7. Was this position consistent with both the state and federal governments? Yes 
 
8. Was there any negative press or publicity linked to the change in recruitment 
and in particular the saving which the NSWP would realise or the costs that 
would be incurred by new recruits? No 
 
9. If yes: How did NSWP deal with this negative press? N/A 
 
10. We are living in a world constantly at risk of terrorist attack and there is fear 
that a system where police recruits are ‘regular’ students could lead to an 
increased risk of infiltration by groups seeking to undermine the security of 
the country. Have you identified any applications or individuals whose motive 
for joining NSWP could have been to undermine the security of the service or 
the country? No more of a risk than through infiltration that could occur 
on an employed entry route. Over the 12 years that the programme has 
been running no individuals have been identified. There has been one 
individual that came to the attention of professional standards but this 
could not be attributed to the ADPP. See interview D6 01 2008 01 26 with 
professional standards. 
 
11. If yes: What systems have you put in place to prevent or reduce the risk of this 
happening again? N/A, however, in a bid to continually improve 
performance and standards, recruitment are re-introducing home checks 
for prospective students / officers. See interview D5 01 2008 01 25. 
 
12. In the UK academic institutions have historically been viewed as left wing 
whilst the police service was considered very right wing. Is this the same in 
NSW? Yes, for a view on this see interview D6 01 2008 01 26 and an 
insight from Detective Inspector Nabbs. 
 
13. If yes: Has this lead to any notable change in the attitude and behaviour of 
staff or students at the university? As above. 
 
Key extracts from CSU and UK supporting documents 
 
Travis (1995) 
 
Travis, J. (1995). Education in Law Enforcement: Beyond the College Degree. In, 
Centre for Research in law and Justice, University of Illinois, Forum on the Police and 
Higher Education, Chicago, Illinois, America 10th February 1995. US Department of 
Justice: Washington. 
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Our commitment to higher education is a given. But I think we need to look at it not 
as a goal, but the means toward a goal, the goal being better policing. When viewed 
this way, education has to be ongoing, and better policing has to be a constant pursuit. 
 
The profession should address the question: What level of judgement, maturity, 
knowledge, and intellectual curiosity should we expect of our employees? Any 
profession that is trying to keep ahead of the curve in making changes, to modify its 
methods of service delivery, to encourage innovation, will also have enough trust in 
its employees to make a significant investment in their intellectual development. 
 
Harris, Simmons, Edwards (1998) 
 
Harris, R, Simmons, M and Edwards, G. (1998). From Institution-Based to Work-
Based Learning. In Australian Association for Research in Education Conference, 
Adelaide,  Conference, Adelaide, South Australia 29th November – 3rd December 
1998. The Association for Active Educational Researchers: Victoria, Australia. 
 
In Queensland, the new model of recruit training introduced in 1991 combined study 
at university and the police academy (Byrett 1992). Evaluation of this innovation led 
to further developments and the adoption of the Police Recruit Operational and 
Vocational Education (PROVE) programme which is underpinned by problem-based 
learning methodologies (Melville and Carter 1994). 
 
Work-based learning presupposes that structural and social change will occur in the 
workplace. This shift in workplace culture and organisation will not only be a by-
product, but also a pre-requisite, if the full potential of these changes to police training 
is to be a reality. 
 
Edmond, N., Hillier, Y., and Price, M. (2007). 
 
Edmond, N., Hillier, Y., and Price, M. (2007). Between a rock and a hard place: the 
role of HE and foundation degrees in workforce development. Education and 
Training, 49(3), 170 - 181. 
 
The development of such degrees (Foundation), which are located in the higher 
education sector, combine vocational and academic knowledge and skills to produce 
skilled employees and it has been argued that such programmes are ‘a key in 
supporting the raising of standards and professionalisation’ of vocations (Edmond, 
Hillier, and Price, 2007 p.179) 
 
Rooker, Woolston (2007) 
 
Rooker, J, and Woolston, R. (2007). First generation university students: 
Opportunities for Women, Indigenous Australians and trades people to obtain an 
associate degree. (Paper) Goulburn, New south Wales: Charles Sturt University. 
 
The NSWPF is constantly striving for the demographic composition of its members to 
be representative of the population that it serves (Police, 2006 p.19).  Consequently 
diversity in age, gender, ethnicity, and socio economic status of the students entering 
the ADPP is sought.  To cater for this diversity, which also includes varying 
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educational levels, the academic entry requirements for the ADPP must be sufficiently 
broad to allow entry to the greatest range of applicants, whilst at the same time being 
robust enough to ensure that those who are accepted into the program have the 
academic ability to complete tertiary level studies. This has resulted in the 
demographic composition of cohorts in the ADPP being quite different from 
traditional university courses such as law, science, and accountancy studies with more 
than 65% of ADPP students entering via non-traditional pathways.  
 
It is within this context that the concept of first generation university students is 
explored. In 2007, a survey of ADPP students studying in their first trimester both on 
campus and distance education was undertaken by the authors.  The survey was 
completed by 221 students which equated to a response rate of 81%.  The survey 
results indicated 64% of students were identified as first generation with 66% of 
women, 55% of Indigenous Australians and 52% of trade’s people being first 
generation.  These results show that over half of the students in these three groups, 
which are the focus of this paper, undertaking the ADPP are first generation 
university students. 
 
In September 2001, distance education was introduced and provided students an 
alternative pathway into the ADPP which has resulted in a significant reduction in the 
period of time students are required to spend at the police college.  The distance 
education provision is offered for session one of the ADPP and provides students with 
the opportunity to undertake their studies at home whilst continuing to work.  The 
composition of the 2007 distance education cohort surveyed by the authors consisted 
of 126 students, of whom 18% were women, 8% Indigenous Australians and 54% 
trades people.  Of those students who completed the survey, 70% of the first 
generation students indicated the provision of distance education influenced their 
decision to undertake the ADPP.  Within the three focus groups of first generation 
students, 43% of women, 25% of Indigenous Australians and 86% of trade’s people 
indicated the provision of distance education influenced their decision to undertake 
the ADPP. 
 
The results of the survey strongly support the offering of distance education and 
indicate it is a contributing factor influencing the decision to undertake the ADPP for 
first generation marginalised students  
 
Jones, S, and Lonsway, K. (2002) 
 
Jones, S, and Lonsway, K. (2002). Up-close recruiting: Recruiting and selecting 
women officers. Law and Order, 50, 94-99. 
 
Jones and Lonsway (2002), when researching police recruit training in the United 
States of America found that; 
Too often women are more likely than men to have such primary care 
responsibilities.  The live-in requirement can be a significant factor that 
limits the recruitment or retention of women during academy training. 
 
 
Foster, J. (1998) 
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Foster, J (1998). Memorandum. December 1998. Cambridge: Institute of 
Criminology, University of Cambridge.  
  2.5  "College educated officers were more open minded than non-college colleagues 
(Roberg 1978) ... more likely to be tolerant of people of different lifestyles, race and 
ethnicity (Goldstein 1977), less likely to resort to force in conflict situations, work 
within legal frameworks (Sterling 1974), exercise their discretion appropriately 
(Worden 1985), communicate more effectively (Bell 1979), are more professional 
(Carter and Sapp 1988) and have fewer complaints and disciplinary action taken 
against them (Carter and Sapp 1989:158, Cohen & Chaiken 1972, Dalley 1975, 
Cascio 1977, Roberg 1978). 
  2.9 There are also likely to be considerable savings to the service if, at the point of 
entry, recruits are more qualified. As Guyot (1991:298) points out most "organisations 
staffed by professionals" do not often "bear the cost of the professional training but 
place that burden on the individual". Clearly all recruits will require some specialist 
police training at the outset of their career but the nature of their training may be very 
different if the calibre of officers was higher at the point of entry to the service. 
  2.10 There has been recent concern about corruption in the Metropolitan Police and 
in the constabularies. Research by the New York Police Department following serious 
corruption scandals suggested low educational attainment was a significant factor in 
the histories of seriously corrupt officers. The better educated police officers were at 
the point of recruitment the less likelihood there was for corruption. The Department 
changed its policy, raising the age of recruitment and the educational requirements. 
The level of educational attainment increases with rank and is a condition of 
promotion. 
  2.11 Police officers' propensity to lie is also linked with educational attainment 
(Barker et al 1994). Research on Los Angeles police officers for example after the 
1991 riots demonstrated that 58 per cent of officers surveyed felt it "moderately 
acceptable" to lie to "get the bad guy off the streets". Length of service was not linked 
with response, neither was gender but educational attainment was. "Deviant lying for 
illegitimate purposes" (breaking "substantive or procedural laws/department 
regulations") decreased with education (Barker et al 1994:161-2). 
  3.6 Furthermore, there are many well qualified young people of black and Asian 
origin. Many of them however do not apply to join the police service. A recent study 
for example revealed that ethnic minority students were more likely to move into 
higher education and "in inner city areas gain better exam results than their white 
counterparts" (Policy Studies Institute, in Albury and Snee 1996:359). "It is not 
enough" therefore "to just encourage more ethnic minority applicants ... the police 
should be aiming to recruit people from the higher end of the ability scale in this 
group" because those who currently apply "are of a generally lower ability level than 
White applicants" which leads to a "seemingly lower performance of ethnic minorities 
on the Police Initial Recruitment Test" (Ashley undated: 24). 
  8.2 Training should be the realm of experts and some of it is best delivered (for 
example management and criminology) by those outside the organisation. All police 
officers involved in training should hold a first degree and preferably a Masters 
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degree, one wherever possible which covers the substantive knowledge in the 
field/areas for which they are responsible. For example criminal law should be taught 
by someone with both practical and theoretical legal knowledge. 
  8.4 It is crucial that trainers are carefully selected. As Southgate (1988:234) remarks 
"good police officers do not automatically make good trainers, but it is unlikely that a 
person will be a good trainer unless he or she is a good operational officer as well". 
10.1 The police organisation has often regarded itself as omni-competent (indeed this 
term is used in the research report conducted on behalf of the Federation, see Davies 
undated: 75). It is not possible to be omni-competent. Policing an increasingly 
complex world means that no one agency or individual has all the requisite 
knowledge required. 
  10.2 The proposals by the Police Federation for a virtual police university have 
many appealing and positive aspects (for example, accessibility to information, 
support for all officers, "the need for the entire workforce to update and up-grade their 
skills, knowledge and understanding on a regular basis throughout their career 
irrespective of rank" [Davies et al undated: 75]). This is very important as the service 
has failed to provide front-line officers with adequate support and training for the vital 
role that they perform in the organisation.  
Fitzgerald, G. (1989). 
 
Fitzgerald, G. (1989). Report of a commission of inquiry pursuant to orders in 
council. Brisbane: Goprint. 
 
The most significant event in the history of the Queensland Police was the Fitzgerald 
Commission of Inquiry. The Fitzgerald (1989) Report found extensive corruption, and 
a culture of mismanagement and incompetence. The Report linked ineffectiveness in 
policing operations with inadequate education. 
 
Jones, D, Jones, L, and Prenzler, T (2005) 
Jones, D, Jones, L, and Prenzler, T (2005). Tertiary Education, Commitment, and 
Turnover in Police Work (online), Police Practice and Research, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 
2005, pp. 49–63. Available at: 
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/gppr;jsessionid=9hdp7pv6927q.alex
andra (accessed 11th February 2008) 
 
This study investigated the effects of tertiary education on police turnover 
(separations) and job attitudes. It is sometimes argued that tertiary education will 
reduce the commitment of police to staying in the job because they will experience 
frustrated promotional aspirations and they possess greater employment mobility. In a 
case study of Queensland police officers with between five and nine years of service, 
human resource data showed no significant differences in turnover rates for degree 
holders and non-degree holders. A survey of serving police compared job attitudes, 
withdrawal cognitions, and intention to leave for degree holders and non-degree 
holders. Results revealed few differences of significance between the two groups. In 
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combination, these results suggest that fears that higher education will reduce police 
commitment to the job are not well founded—at least in large police departments with 
numerous career development opportunities and a system of promotion based on 
merit. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study has shown that the possession of a tertiary degree by police officers had 
little effect on turnover or job attitudes, including intention to leave. However, tertiary 
educated police recognised that their education increased their job opportunities. As 
far as these findings can be generalised to other police departments, they suggest that 
there is no cause for alarm over police tertiary education and job commitment. At the 
same time, human resource managers will need to monitor the factors that attract 
police to remain in the job as the number of police with both tertiary qualifications 
and previous work experience increases. This presents a vital challenge for future 
research. 
 
Chambers, R, (2004) 
 
Chambers, R, (2004). Collaborative Police Education. A Report. February 2004. 
Australia Charles Sturt University, New South Wales.  
 
During the Royal Commission consideration was given to a model of police education 
in which police recruits would undertake more formal academic studies at a university 
campus followed by training at a police academy to acquire skills in use of police 
equipment, self-defence, tactics, etc. 
 
This solution was rejected.  It was argued that education should model the integration 
of knowledge and skills and that not to do so would enshrine in the minds of recruits a 
distinction at odds with good practice between academic study and "real policing".  
Such a solution would also exclude the University from engagement with important 
aspects of police education which included elements which had a particularly 
important role in the formation of police culture. 
 
The University's costs with regard to insurance cover for student activities have 
increased dramatically as a result of the introduction of the program.  While students 
in Stage 2 of the program, as employees of the Police, are covered by the latter's 
workers compensation and insurance arrangements, students in Stage 1 are the 
university's responsibility. 
 
Rates of injury in the practical aspects of the course are high compared with other 
university programs, largely as a result of practicing physical contact in self defence 
or public order tactics.  Students have been injured, and one, as a result of a police 
vehicle accident, killed, during the police station placement at the end of session 1.  (2 
students have also been killed during stage 2.) 
 
A concerted and well resourced environmental health and safety effort is essential to 
the success of the program. 
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One of the main reasons why the only other attempt at systematic engagement of a 
university with police education failed – in another state, not NSW – was 
unpredictability of numbers and consequent difficulties in planning and in sustaining 
a staffing base. 
 
The collaborative model, whilst it creates these problems, also helps manage them.  
This is because police teaching staff can be redeployed to field duties when numbers 
are low, a process which even has some benefits in terms of liaison with the field and 
maintaining currency. 
 
The field based and distance education components of the course have proved most 
robust in terms of scalability.  They do not rely on infrastructure and lend themselves 
to the use of short term staffing arrangements. 
 
Opponents of the reforms to police recruit education in 1998 argued that the 
introduction of University based recruit education would lead to a decline in demand 
for police careers and a failure to meet recruitment needs. 
 
In fact the opposite has proved to be the case.  The program has supported 
unprecedentedly high recruitment requirements.  It has generated interested in police 
careers from groups with previously low levels of interest, such as graduates and 
women.  It has done this whilst significantly increasing the average age of recruits 
from around 21 to 25. 
 
Demand from traditional sources of police recruits, especially males with trade 
qualifications, has not decreased.  Students from these sources have proved as 
successful in the course as those with better educational backgrounds. 
 
Motivation is certainly reinforced by the fact that in Stage 2 of the program students 
are employed at a salary of A$45,000.  This is above average weekly earnings in 
Australia and above nearly all graduate starting salaries. 
 
The Collaborative Model 
 
The principles on which the collaborative model for the police recruit program was 
developed were: 
 
(1) there would be collaboration in the design, delivery and monitoring of the 
program; 
 
(2) the program would be an award of the University and as such subject to the 
University's accreditation and quality assurance processes; 
 
(3) employment decisions would be solely the prerogative of the Police Service; 
 
(4) collaboration would extend to all areas of the program so that as far as 
possible the marketing, management, administration, teaching, assessment, 
coordination, and evaluation of the program would be undertaken by teams 
drawn from police and university as would policing research; 
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(5) Police Service staff teaching on the program were required to be accredited by 
the University against University appointment criteria.  Accredited staff would 
have the same status within the University as University staff; 
 
(6) the model would involve co-location of skills based and other teaching and 
learning; 
 
(7) the model would involve a significant component of workplace based 
education. 
 
To support the model the following structures were created: 
 
(1) A Board of Management with members drawn equally from senior staff of the 
University and Police with an independent chair agreed by the Vice-
Chancellor and the Police Commissioner. 
 
The Board is responsible for the overall management of the partnership, 
including monitoring the implementation of the Agreement; planning, 
including resource matters and intake numbers; and evaluations of the 
effectiveness of the program in meeting its objectives.  
 
(2) A Course Committee consisting of senior University academic staff in 
policing, senior police education staff, two field commanders and student 
representatives.  The Course Committee develops and monitors the 
curriculum, teaching and assessment.  Its determinations are subject to 
approval by University committees.  The latter are especially responsible for 
determining that University requirements with regard to awards and quality 
assurance are observed. 
 
(3) An Assessment Committee responsible for monitoring assessment and 
determining grades. 
 
(4) Co-location of the University's School of Policing Studies and various 
University support services with the NSW Police Academy. 
 
(5) Joint planning with regard to staffing, facilities and resources. 
 
(6) A joint marketing task force which combined the University's course 
promotion processes and the Police Service's marketing of careers. 
 
(7) An integrated admissions process which assesses both academic and 
professional suitability.  Applicants must meet the University's minimum 
academic entry standards as well as a range of Police Service requirements 
including fitness, health, integrity and probity and drivers licence checks. 
 
(8) Teaching teams drawn from the University and Police Service. 
 
(9) Field based education involving University and Police Service staff. 
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(10) Collaborative research based on an agreed focus on identification and 
validation of best practice. 
 
(11) Collaborative student management, including sharing student information 
(students sign a disclaimer allowing disclosure of their student record to the 
Police Service); joint student advising; collaborative provision of student 
services; shared insurance arrangements. 
 
Areas in which there has been a division of labour within the collaborative approach 
include: 
 
(1) Teaching of operational skills:  driving; pistol; self defence; use of equipment 
(radio, baton, pepper spray, handcuffs); public order tactics.  These are taught 
by police instructors although the curriculum, learning materials, teaching 
techniques and occupational health and safety arrangements require approval 
and are monitored by the University. 
 
(2) Professional suitability assessment is undertaken by Police staff against 
criteria determined by the Police Service. 
 
(3) Integrity matters.  The University is responsible for investigation and 
determination of academic misconduct matters, eg cheating, plagiarism. 
 
The Police consider findings of academic misconduct from the point of view 
of the professional suitability requirement of integrity. 
 
(4) General conduct and order on the Police Academy campus, which is a 
residential campus, is the responsibility of the Principal of the Police 
Academy. 
 
The Course developed under this model is a five session course (each session of 14 
weeks duration) in which the first two sessions are taken on campus at the Police 
Academy, the remaining three sessions in the field following attestation as 
Probationary Constables.  Field based sessions involve practicums and subjects taken 
by distance education. 
 
The curriculum supports the acquisition of the skills and knowledge required of a 
police constable.  It is organised around both specific content areas (eg Traffic, Drugs 
and Alcohol) and around key developmental areas within policing such as 
investigations, communication, ethics and law which inform the whole curriculum. 
 
The Diploma articulates with a Bachelor of Policing, also collaboratively developed 
and taught.  It is an expectation of the Police Service, although not yet a requirement, 
that this degree, or an equivalent, will be completed prior to first promotion. 
The objectives of the course are that on completion of the program a student will be 
able to: 
• understand the social context of policing; 
• understand the place of policing within the broader context of the criminal 
justice system; 
• evaluate critically their own professional practice in policing; 
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• contribute to the enhancement of police practice; 
• undertake autonomously and through further study professional 
development; 
• understand the values which guide policing in Australian society; 
• understand the ethical standards and accountability expected of police 
officers; 
• carry out the duties of a General Duties Police Officer. 
 
 
Wimshurst, and Ransley, (2007) 
 
Wimshurst, and Ransley, (2007). Police Education and the University Sector: 
Contrasting Models from the Australian Experience. (Online). Journal Of Criminal 
Justice Education Volume 18 Number 1. March 2007.  
Available at: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713721714 
(accessed 15th February 2008) 
 
University education for police officers continues to be heralded as a major 
component in the reform of police organizations and police culture. Interestingly, the 
extensive research literature from the United States over the past 30 years remains 
ambivalent about the extent to which education achieves these objectives. Individual 
officers doubtless gain personal and professional benefits, but the relationship 
between higher education and police effectiveness, professionalism and accountability 
remains unclear. Nevertheless, the Australian experience since the late 1980s is that 
concerted efforts to provide university programs for police almost invariably arise 
from periods of crisis in police organizations and the recommendations of official 
inquiries into those organizations. Two educational “reform” models have resulted, 
one based on liberal education and the other on a paradigm labelled “professional 
policing.” These now constitute the main (contrasting) paradigms for police education 
and training across different states. The case study concludes that the relationship 
between university education and preparation for policing is likely to remain 
problematic. 
 
Tertiary-educated officers, it is claimed, are more likely to monitor and modify their 
own styles of policing within diverse communities, and to utilize problem-oriented 
and community policing strategies. 
 
Fitzgerald’s prescription for police higher education became the stuff of legend and 
has since often been invoked to justify related developments in other states. He 
believed that police were not adequately educated to meet the demands of an 
increasingly complex society, and that recruits were too young (many entered the 
police academy direct from school). The absence of women compromised the 
profession. Until well into the 1980s, senior management remained suspicious of 
women and the police force maintained a 10% quota on female recruitment, although 
women often comprised up to 25% of applicants (Prenzler and Wimshurst 1997). 
Fitzgerald was critical of the “military model” of academy training with its emphasis 
on imposed discipline, narrow curriculum, drill and rote learning:  
Police need a deeper appreciation of social, psychological and legal 
issues which are intrinsic to their work—an understanding which can only 
be acquired by higher education. United States research confirms that 
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authoritarian tendencies are lower and tolerance higher among better 
educated police. Better educated police also perform more effectively. 
Education programs in tertiary institutions which provide basic knowledge 
of criminal justice processes and foundations of social science are needed. 
The courses would be ideally attended by police along with people from 
other disciplines, to ensure the breadth of experience essential to the study 
and understanding of human behaviour. (Fitzgerald 1989:250) 
 
More recently, Courtright and Mackey (2004:312) concluded that the “jury was still 
out” in terms of mandating university studies for police officers: 
There has been an abundance of research investigating the utility and 
benefits of a college degree for law enforcement practitioners although … 
little evidence exists demonstrating that educated police officers are more 
effective crime fighters or that education has a significant influence on 
police officer behaviour. 
None of this is to deny that individual officers might derive considerable personal and 
professional benefits. Qualitative research from the United Kingdom (Lee and Punch 
2004; Smithers, Hill, and Silvester 1990) found that graduate officers readily 
acknowledged the personal benefits from their degree studies, such as enhanced 
confidence and self-esteem, broadened outlooks and greater tolerance for divergent 
points of view. 
 
The resulting baccalaureate degree in criminology and criminal justice established by 
Griffith University incorporated a first year which could be oriented to police recruits, 
thus producing a new one-year program shared with the police academy called the 
Advanced Certificate in Policing.1 For the first time anywhere in Australia, all police 
recruits were expected to complete some university courses. The state’s political 
upheaval saw a Labor government come to power (the first non-conservative 
government in Queensland for over 30 years). This government promised to boost 
operational police numbers substantially, and placed considerable pressure on the 
university and police service to mount the Advanced Certificate quickly (PSMC 
1993:183). The university was obviously happy to participate in the recruit program 
since the partnership established a link with a new industry group along with 
considerable funding. The Advanced Certificate featured content in social and 
behavioural sciences, communications, accountability and ethics, criminology and 
law, and police competencies (Bryett 1992; CJC 1993; Lewis and Prenzler 1993). 
Recruits spent the first semester at the university and a longer second semester at the 
police academy. On graduating from the university/academy year, recruits were sworn 
in. The QPS then required first-year constables to undertake a further probationary 
year 
of intensive field training under the supervision of experienced officers. The 
Advanced Certificate in Policing, as noted below, was to be short lived (1991–1993), 
but it remains an important case study in the history of police higher education in 
Australia because it represented the earliest attempts to: 
 
a. introduce significant civilian input into curriculum design and delivery; 
b. provide a broader liberal studies/“policing and society” education and training 
package for the 1,040 recruits who passed through the program over the 
three years; and 
c. make some university study mandatory for all police recruits. 
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An “operational imperative” came to dominate police views of the new program. The 
CJC (1993) noted that the program had emerged in a hurry, as a response to the crisis 
of confidence in policing, and found that there was little integration between the 
university and academy components. 
 
Educators from within policing remained suspicious of university influences and 
intentions. Police educators acknowledged that the university sector had “revitalised” 
education and training at a time of crisis, but claimed the university was intent on 
moving to control police education: 
[Academics had] failed to identify the hidden issues of what universities 
are all about—the takeover bids constantly interfere with fostering mutual 
ideas and developing excellence and integration of education and training 
content for police. The constant ideal of professionalism, accreditation, 
credentialism and credibility do [sic] not blend well with police who 
subjectively view academics with suspicion, sometimes justifiably, as many 
academics involved in police education at universities lack an 
understanding of what policing is all about. (Barrow and Pitman 1995:18) 
In fact, their comments on “developing excellence and integration of education and 
training content for police” reflected aspects of the “professional policing” model of 
police education emerging in some other states during the 1990s. 
 
Flanagan (2000:3) notes that while there is “no uniform conceptualisation of liberal 
education,” the idea generally describes an education which focuses on encouraging 
informed analysis of current social issues, constructive critical thinking, flexible 
approaches to problem solving, and a capacity to understand values and beliefs 
beyond one’s immediate life experiences. These are presumably desirable attributes 
for those entering careers in what are said to be rapidly changing and complex work 
environments such as the criminal justice system (Flanagan 2000). This model can be 
contrasted with a second approach to police education which sees policing as an 
emerging “full” profession with specific higher education needs, one where the 
discipline of policing should be taught to recruits by those with practical/professional 
expertise in specialized tertiary programs. This second approach we have termed the 
“professional policing” model, which we outline further in the next section. 
In fact, an enduring theme in Australia over the past two decades is that while the 
liberal ideal for police education has been endorsed by two further commissions of 
inquiry (Kennedy 2004; Wood 1997), reforms subsequent to those inquiries have 
tended to subvert this ideal by implementing the “professional policing” model. For 
example, the Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police (1994–1997) 
investigated corruption in that police service, and in the areas of recruitment, 
education and training made recommendations very similar in spirit to Fitzgerald’s 
prescriptions for Queensland reform from almost a decade earlier (for the 
convolutions of police reform in New South Wales, see Chan 2003; Dixon 1999; 
Longbottom and van Kernbeek 1999). Royal Commissioner Wood championed the 
apparently restorative powers of a liberal education when he insisted that “recruits 
[must] have an exposure to the external influence of an open campus in which they 
can interact with students studying in other disciplines, thereby limiting potential for 
entrenchment of the negative culture which might be encouraged if their entire 
training was conducted in a closed and isolated residential college” such as the police 
academy (Wood 1997:276). Wood clearly had the liberalizing potential of higher 
education in mind when he recommended that recruits complete an “external tertiary 
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qualification provided through a civilian education in all but the core policing skills 
which were better delivered by experienced police trainers” (Wood 1997:276). 
 
During the early 1990s, some prominent police educators within Australian police 
agencies were also developing a model which they called the “full professional” 
paradigm of police education (Bradley 1992, 1996; Bradley and Cioccarelli 1994). 
These educators were adamant that police organizations could never be reformed 
“merely through some form of gentrification” by way of recruiting generalist 
graduates (Bradley 1996:93). They too advocated a partnership between universities 
and the police in order to develop a “discipline of policing” (Bradley and Cioccarelli 
1994), but they argued that police themselves must take prime responsibility for 
initiating and carrying through these developments. Policing must utilize university 
expertise, particularly research expertise; however, the police would remain firmly in 
control of their own professional destinies, setting the agendas for such partnerships. 
This vision for the future of Australian policing presumed “the existence of highly 
educated and skilled officers operating on a foundation of rigorous applied research” 
(Bradley 1996:86). The “full professional” model was hailed not only as a new 
paradigm for police/university research collaborations, but it was to inform education 
and training partnerships with universities, including pre-service education. However, 
this was to be a tertiary education, according to the model, where police operational 
and management needs stayed at the forefront. In an earlier statement on the model, 
Bradley (1992:149) describes how: 
Academy courses were to be articulated to tertiary education degree 
programs. It was envisaged that all major forms of police training would 
be integrated with tertiary education programs. In this way the value and 
worth of police vocational training was to be given proper public 
recognition and police training would not be as vulnerable as it had been 
in the past to slippages and regressions, stitched in as it would be to larger 
programs of education in colleges and universities. Educational expertise 
and educational management, married to operational police knowledge, 
were to be devoted to the production of courses which were rigorously and 
expertly designed to reproduce good policing practices of a general, 
specialist and managerial kind. 
 
While the professional policing model was portrayed as the way of the future, 
replacing the outdated and ineffective practices of “traditionalist” police regimes, in 
fact the “full professional” paradigm has also benefited from the reports of official 
inquiries into crises in police organizations. There remains an overwhelming faith in 
the reformative powers of university-linked education to fix problems of corruption, 
misconduct and maladministration. It was thus not surprising when, most recently, the 
Royal Commission into the Western Australia Police (2002–2004) also endorsed the 
reformative powers of higher education in its attempt to heal a police service 
confronted by allegations of “corrupt or criminal conduct” (Kennedy 2004). 
The Royal Commission recommends that the qualifications of recruits be 
upgraded to ensure that appropriate persons are being employed. It is to 
be borne in mind that it is from the current recruits that the leaders of the 
future will emerge. Improving the calibre of recruits is a certain measure 
in providing long-term improvement in the quality of delivery of police 
services. (Kennedy, Vol. 1, 2004:8) 
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Western Australian students who are not accepted into the police service at the end 
of their first year are required to transfer from Police Studies into the broader Justice 
Studies degree. 
 
In both programs, policing students might be effectively quarantined from their 
mainstream peers, thus minimizing the potential “liberalizing” effect of attendance at 
university. In short, the liberal education model has been displaced by a model 
developed and owned by police organizations themselves. 
 
 
Hummer, D, (2006) 
 
Hummer, D, (2006). An Argument for Incorporating police Internships into Liberal 
Arts-Based Criminal Justice Curricula: An Example of Mutually Beneficial 
Cooperative Education. (Online). 15 (3) Police Forum, Academy of Criminal Justice 
Sciences, Police Section. Available at: 
http://www.sulross.edu/policeforum/docs/archives/Volume_15_Number_3.pdf 
(accessed 17th February 2008) 
 
As criminal justice becomes an ever more popular academic major in the United 
States, the discipline is attracting some of the best and brightest students who 
formerly would not have considered the study of deviance a worthwhile collegiate 
pursuit. As Frank R. Scarpitti (2002) commented: 
“From only a handful of programs specializing in criminology or criminal 
justice in the late 1960s to more than 1,500 such programs by the end of 
the next decade, the speed of criminal justice’s growth has to be 
considered unparalleled in the history of higher education. All across the 
United States, young men and women began declaring their interest in the 
study of crime and the justice process, often pursuing post-graduate 
studies in related fields.” 
 
With many students and parents alike looking for a definitive “end product” on which 
to focus after completing four years of higher education, the lack of probable 
employment in a student’s chosen field could become an unattractive problem for 
criminal justice programs, especially in regions of the country where jobs are not as 
easy to come by. In particular, many students enter university criminal justice 
programs with ambitions of ultimately becoming law enforcement officers. The 
upside of this trend is, of course, that policing agencies have a broader and deeper 
talent pool from which to draw, and by extension, the agency is improved as the 
quality of personnel increases (Hughes, 2003). 
 
It could be argued that the discipline of criminal justice has done a very good job of 
preparing graduates academically for entry into the job market, but has failed students 
by not emphasizing experiential learning within curriculum’s (e.g. Breci & Martin, 
2000; Flanagan, 2000; Parilla & Smith-Cullen, 1997). In the not so distant past, 
criminal justice was seen as a “trade” profession, and higher education contained a 
healthy dose of practical work experience required prior to graduation. The remnants 
of this cooperative focus remain, as most undergraduate criminal justice majors either 
require or offer internships and/or practicum experiences in order to complete 
coursework for the major (Ross & Elechi, 2002; Reed and Carawan, 1999) but in an 
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effort to develop academic rigor within criminal justice curricula (a noble undertaking 
in and of itself), the vocational element of studying criminal justice has been, 
unintentionally or not, downplayed in the name of academic respectability (Flanagan, 
2000). 
 
Higher education can do more for these graduating students. By developing a program 
which serves as a ’school-to-work’ extension of the practicum, select students who 
have completed all other curriculum requirements can attend a municipal peace 
officer academy (for Act 120 certification in the State of Pennsylvania ) and then gain 
experience after the academy by serving time as a sworn law enforcement officer on 
a college or university campus under direct supervision from a senior officer, much 
like a traditional field training experience. Top criminal justice students would 
emerge from the program highly trained academically and practically, and would be 
candidates for most any law enforcement job, while campus police departments will 
benefit from having a ready supply of inexpensive personnel to supplement ranks 
that are in some cases stretched thin for budgetary reasons. 
 
Municipal law enforcement agencies, when given a choice, will prefer the candidate 
with experience and certification as opposed to candidate without these traits. Simply 
put, the department is getting a known commodity when it hires an individual who 
has previously worked in the field (Matthews & Kilpatrick, 2002). 
 
A student entering the job market in law enforcement fresh from the university setting 
without such practical experience is hired based on potential, and is therefore a work 
in progress at best, and a gamble at worst. 
 
In tight economic times, a police department can save itself the time and expense 
involved in putting a recruit through the academy if that candidate has already worked 
in the field. Hiring a nonsworn candidate means that the department must necessarily 
wait for that recruit to complete academy training, and worst case scenario, would 
have to go back to the drawing board if the candidate fails to complete the academy 
experience. This program would allow candidates who might otherwise be passed 
over for budgetary reasons to remain in the hiring pool because they would already be 
certified as a peace officer. 
 
 
HMIC, (2002a) 
 
HMIC, (Her Majesties Inspectorate of Constabulary) (2002a), Training Matters, 
Executive Summary. Home Office 
 
The history of probationer training is inextricably linked to the origins of policing 
itself. From the days of Sir Robert Peel and the first police organisations, the need to 
train new recruits in the procedures and regulations of policing led to attempts to 
define the training required to allow individuals to patrol as constables. The end of the 
Second World War heralded the first ‘probationer’ courses which often made use of 
surplus armed service facilities. In fact, many new officers employed at that time had 
recently been demobilised from active service themselves. Accordingly, the training, 
which is not totally dissimilar from today’s programme, was delivered in a somewhat 
military style with an emphasis on the learning of police powers. Despite a number of 
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events and incidents over the next 60 years, including, in the 1980s a radical attempt 
to enhance the attitudes and behaviour displayed by police officers, the current 
training is still heavily biased towards the gaining of law knowledge. Fundamentally, 
for the most part, the PTP is delivered in isolation from, and excludes the active 
involvement of the community. 
 
In relation to the PTP, the Service has been let down by a lack of strategic level 
management, direction, vision, and resources. The strategic structures which exist, in 
particular, to manage the PTP have not been effective. 
 
Successful training delivery will only be guaranteed if a Service-wide approach is 
adopted to assuring the consistency of delivery. Inconsistency can lead to a 
fragmented provision of learning and undermine its credibility. 
 
In an attempt to ascertain the investment involved in providing the PTP on a national 
basis, all forces, NPT and Hendon were asked to indicate how much of their total 
annual budget was expended on programme delivery. Using the Service’s own 
figures, the delivery of the PTP, including the salaries of those involved, on an annual 
basis, attracts an investment of over £200 million. 
 
If the Service is to be viewed as a profession, the initial training and development 
provided must be comparable with other professions and, in particular, those within 
the criminal justice system. 
 
Achieving a level of competence in line with National Occupational Standards should 
result in the award of an external qualification, something that has been sadly lacking 
in police training. 
 
The majority of trainers involved in delivering the PTP are police officers of 
constable or sergeant rank. However, increasingly, non-police trainers, such as 
support, Home Office and externally contracted staff are employed in delivering 
training. It is important that trainers should be credible or the message that they 
deliver can be diluted or disregarded. 
 
The Service must adapt to become more attractive as a career to all parts of the 
community. Only then can policing aspire to be truly reflective of society. 
 
 
HMIC, (2002b) 
 
HMIC, (Her Majesties Inspectorate of Constabulary) (2002b), Training Matters. 
Home Office 
 
This Inspection examined all of the component parts relating to the PTP, and must 
conclude that the current programme is not wholly fit for purpose now, nor to support 
the police service of the twenty-first century. 
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Probationers are currently attested within their first week of service. This means they 
have all the powers, but certainly not the knowledge, understanding, skills, attitude 
and behaviour required to be a competent police officer. Attesting an officer at this 
stage of their career can also be a disincentive to displaying maximum effort and 
commitment. If attestation occurred at a later point in their training, for example 
immediately prior to workplace experience, it could be seen to be a goal at which to 
aim and should be linked to a formal assessment of competency at that point. The 
PSNI has already tackled this issue by implementing new regulations2 to cover 
‘trainee’ officers. Adopting this approach in England and Wales would require 
changes to the Police Regulations. Nonetheless, benefits in attesting at a later point of 
service can be seen. For example, it could be more appropriate to deliver training on 
and in the community, to potential rather than actual police officers, where they could 
immerse themselves in learning without having to concern themselves with policing. 
 
Recommendation 7.1  
HM Inspector recommends that the attestation of recruits into the police service takes 
place after completion of core training and prior to supervised patrol. The Service, led 
by the Home Office, should address this at the earliest 
 
Qualifications certify the knowledge and skills that a person has achieved through 
training, work and life experience. A qualifications framework identifies all of the 
awards available to the employees of an organisation and links them together to form 
a system of identification and recognition. This in turn can promote the concept of 
lifelong learning and the provision of a seamless and diverse education and training 
process. 
 
Recommendation 4.5  
 
HM Inspector recommends that the Service, in collaboration with the Police Skills 
and Standards Organisation (PSSO), creates a qualification framework which will 
accredit completion of parts of, as well as the whole Probationer Training Programme. 
 
Whilst there may be a place for more than one provider of training, there should be 
only one design of programme to a national requirement. Those forces that identify 
unique or specific training needs in relation to their particular operational sphere are 
free to deliver additional inputs. But a move by any force to deliver the common, 
nationally congruent element of probationer training to their own design is not 
supported. 
 
Recommendation 5.13  
 
HM Inspector recommends that the Probationer Training Programme as a whole for 
every new officer be to a single national design and delivered, as far as possible, 
under centralised management arrangements but with regional or local facilities 
 
During this Inspection many people voiced anxieties in relation to this phase 
(Residential) of the PTP, and especially the duration of 15 weeks (the MPS 18 
weeks). Examples of their concerns include: 
• It raises difficulties for those with families. 
• There is no part-time option. 
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• It may not fully recognise diverse cultural requirements. 
• It is perceived to be too intensive. 
Delivering training within the community in a college or university would address 
many of these issues. For example, attending training on a daily basis at a site close to 
an individual’s home and providing childcare facilities, as many colleges or 
universities do, would be attractive to those with families. Furthermore, many 
educational establishments deliver courses on a part-time basis. 
 
A course based in a college or university should follow national educational 
guidelines. Even if delivery involved a mixture of police and non-police staff, courses 
would be monitored and evaluated for effectiveness with account taken of 
individual’s different learning styles. Such an approach could ensure that future 
training for probationers would be delivered in a balanced way but no less effectively. 
 
Recommendation 7.8 
 
HM Inspector recommends that the Service, led by National Police Training (NPT), 
designs a new training programme in line with National Occupational Standards, 
which will cater for individual learning styles and abilities as well as taking into 
account previous experience, qualifications and inherent attitudes and behaviour. 
 
 
 
HMIC, (2008) 
 
HMIC, (Her Majesties Inspectorate of Constabulary) (2008), The Review of Policing. 
Home Office 
 
Different interpretations have been made of ‘workforce reform’ for the police. This 
review has used the following definitions, and we suggest that partners continue to 
use this in taking forward the recommendations in this report. 
 
“Workforce reform involves joining officers and police staff in a strategic 
framework providing clear career pathways through accreditation of skills 
and competencies, whilst improving demand management and workforce 
planning, particularly in relation to recruitment and deployment, in order 
to mitigate risks and ensure operational resilience.” 
 
In my interim report I highlighted the integral role that PCSO’s are playing in the 
implementation of Neighbourhood Policing and the range of problem-solving and life 
skills, together with the very rich diversity, which has enhanced service delivery and 
reputation within communities. I am encouraged that following my report the NPIA 
has been commissioned to lead a tripartite review of PCSO’s which includes looking 
at their roles and responsibilities, recruitment and training, and career development. 
This 
review is expected in February 2008 and will also comment on the interim 
recommendation that the NPIA should research the feasibility of a volunteer PCSO 
scheme. The Review welcomes this piece of work and will return to revisit the 
potential for a volunteer scheme in six months time. 
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Training and development 
The current model requires officers and staff to be provided with adequate training to 
carry out their role, but this tends to be on a ‘one size fits all’ approach, rather than 
tailored training according to an individual’s development needs and the nature of a 
specific role. Further work should be carried out to allow for accreditation of prior 
learning to avoid duplication (this is especially so for PCSO’s who become officers 
and currently have to repeat some of the same training). A more streamlined ICF that 
forms the basis of recruitment and development for officers could facilitate this, 
enabling individuals to take greater ownership of their professional development. We 
could look to other sectors for comparisons, for example in education and social care 
the individual takes responsibility for their pre-employment training completing 
relevant degree programmes at their own expense before being eligible for 
employment. 
 
We must focus on building a more confident police service – one which emphasises 
individual professionalism and which is founded upon strong standards and team 
values. This means we need to move away from training towards education.  
 
Within this enhanced approach to professional development, the police service must 
also ensure that proper attention is given to the importance of professional ethics as a 
crucial contributory factor to the fair and effective use of an officer’s discretion. 
Police officers and police staff will have to use greater professional judgement, take 
greater risks in their decision making, and to use their discretion in order to achieve 
the highest levels of trust and confidence in policing. 
 
Partnership Learning and Development 
Developing the right skills in the right people is clearly a key part of developing 
effective partnerships. There is now a need to consider how to build the capacity to 
work in effective partnerships, not just in the police service but across local agencies. 
It is vital that this training mirrors the sorts of working which it is preparing people 
for. It cannot be solely carried out within individual organisations but instead should 
be delivered jointly across them so those who will build effective partnerships have 
the opportunity from the outset to develop their knowledge and understanding with 
their future colleagues from the outset. This joint training should be augmented by 
the sharing of analysis and research capacity across the sector and the service should 
demonstrate its commitment to supporting the development of its colleagues in other 
agencies by sharing training facilities in order to provide, for the first time, sites 
where joint community safety training, learning and development can take place. 
 
In the area of training, development and recruitment, proper recognition must be 
given to the fundamental importance problem solving skills play in Neighbourhood 
Policing and the significance of ensuring the right people with the potential to acquire 
the appropriate skills are recruited. Developing these skills needs to be made a core 
part of the training and development opportunities offered to officers and PCSO’s. 
 
The importance of continuity was also supported by a recommendation that PCSO’s 
who choose to become police officers should be given recognition for the skills they 
have already acquired in the form of a reduced training commitment that allows them 
to return more quickly to Neighbourhood Policing roles. 
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4.32 A study by a metropolitan force has identified that on average supervisors: 
1. Spent 11.5 hours per probationer under the PTP system completing PDP 
paperwork 
2. Now spend at least 35.2 hours per student officer under the SOLAP system 
This triples the amount of supervisor time required (an additional 10,000 hours per 
annum completing assessment paperwork in one force) 
 
4.33 Similarly, on average Student Officers: 
1. Spend 1.9 hours per working week in duty time completing NOS paperwork 
2. Spend 5.4 hours per working week off duty time completing NOS paperwork 
3. Spend 3.4 hours in total in duty time completing self assessment 
4. Spend 7.9 hours in total off duty time completing self assessment 
Total student officer time spent completing assessment paperwork in this 
(reasonably large) force is 129,000 hours per annum. 
 
Recommendation 18 
The NPIA should work with forces on a post implementation review of the SOLAP 
workplace assessment and accreditation process. 
 
 
Morris, W, (2004) 
 
Morris, W, (2004). Independent Inquiry into Professional Standards and Employment 
Matters in the Metropolitan Police Service. (Online). Metropolitan Police Authority, 
December 2004. 
Available at: http://www.mpa.gov.uk/morrisinquiry/report/default.htm 
(Accessed 11th February 2008) 
 
We recommend that attestation is delayed until the officer has satisfactorily 
completed his or her initial training. Attestation would then act as an incentive to 
probationers to complete their training successfully. 
 
 
CRE, (2005) 
 
CRE, (The Commission for Racial Equality), (2005).  Formal Investigation of The 
Police Service in England and Wales. (Online). Metropolitan Police Authority, March 
2005. Available at: http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/committees/mpa/050331-09-
appendix01.pdf 
(Accessed 11th February 2008) 
 
Recommendation 38 
The Home Office and Association of Chief Officers should produce proposals for 
raising the professional status of police training so that it attracts the ‘brightest and 
best’ applicants. 
 
 
EOC, (Equal Opportunities Commission), (2005) 
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EOC, (Equal Opportunities Commission). Action Plan for Government, Unlocking 
Potential. (Online). Bristol Primary Care Trust, July 2005. Available at: 
http://www.bristolpct.nhs.uk/theTrust/Equality/Gender/publications/unlocking_gap_e
oc.pdf 
(Accessed 19th November 2007) 
 
Our vision is for workplaces which are flexible and variable, not organised around a 
fixed working day from which part-timers deviate; where people are valued for their 
contribution, not length of their hours; where flexibility is seen as an opportunity to 
improve productivity and deliver the workplace of the future, not as a threat, and 
where flexible working is therefore available in all sectors and at all levels. Our vision 
is for a society where caring is seen as a skill and experience of great value in many 
different jobs and where women and men are paid the same for work of equal value. 
 
 
 
 Delivering the Recommendations of the 
Fraud Review 2006 
and the  
Paradox of Police Leadership 
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Glossary of Terms
APL Accredited Prior Learning
APEL Accredited Prior Experiential Learning
BTP British Transport Police
CA Central Authority
Cert HE Certificate of Higher Education
CISPS Centre for Investigative, Security & Police Sciences
CoLP City of London Police
CPD Continuous Professional Development
CSU Charles Sturt University
CU City University
CRB Criminal Records Bureau
DDO Designated Detention Officer
FD Foundation Degree
FE Further Education
HE Higher Education
HMIC Her Majesties Inspectorate of Constabulary
HO Home Office
IPLDP Initial Police Learning & Development Programme
LPGs legislation, Policy & Guidance
NCALT National Centre for Applied Learning Technologies
NOS National Occupational Standards
NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency
NRS National Recruiting Selection 
NSWP New South Wales Police
NVQ National Vocational Qualification
OCR Oxford, Cambridge, & Royal Society of Arts
PACs Police Action Checklists
PEPE Pre-Employment Police Education
PCSO’s Police Community Support Officers
PDO Professional Development Officer
PDU Professional Development Unit
PTP Probationer Training Programme
SC Special Constable
SO Student Officer
SOP Student Office Programme
WBL Work Based Learning
WFM Workforce Modernisation
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1: INTRODUCTION
Currently, a national selection process is used to sift and assess the suitability of 
prospective new recruits. Successful applicants undergo a training programme unique 
to their chosen force; generally, recruits are ‘sworn’ in and given full powers of the 
office of constable in their first week.  
Recruits undertake a two year training programme, for City and BTP; this is the 
Student Officer Programme which is delivered in partnership with City University.  
The Programme leads towards the award of a Foundation Degree and NVQ Levels 3 
& 4.
Student Officers receive a full salary (including additional London allowances where 
applicable), whilst their training is funded by the officers force and a Home Office 
grant which currently stands at £3,000 per officer (Home Office forces only).  The 
first three phases of the Student Officers Programme lasts 34 weeks with the majority 
of student officers achieving independent patrol by this stage.
This document explores the options for the implementation of a Pre-Employment
Student Officer Programme. The Pre-Employment route aims to provide students with 
an opportunity to gain the skills and knowledge required of a police officer prior to 
employment, bringing police education in line with other professions.  
The paper draws on the following recommendations:
The Commission for Racial Equality (Recommendation 38, Formal Investigation of 
The Police Service in England and Wales, March 2005) ‘The Home Office and 
Association of Chief Officers should produce proposals for raising the professional 
status of police training so that it attracts the ‘brightest and best’ applicants. 
(Paragraph 5.48)’
Robin Field-Smith, Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary Personnel & Training 
(Recommendation 7.1 - ‘Training Matters’ - Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary, 
January 2002) ‘HM Inspector recommends that the attestation of recruits into the 
police service takes place after completion of core training and prior to supervised 
patrol.’
Sir William Morris (Recommendation 2g – Independent Inquiry into Professional 
Standards and Employment Matters in the Metropolitan Police Service) ‘We 
recommend that attestation is delayed until the officer has satisfactorily completed 
his or her initial training. Attestation would then act as an incentive to probationers 
to complete their training successfully.’
The Home office consultation paper ‘The Timing of Attestation’ which looks at 
options for delaying attestation and includes relevant extracts from Training Maters, 
the Morris Enquiry and Police Regulations: 
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The options presented in this paper are flexible and would provide great scope for 
accrediting prior learning, full or part time study, traditional face to face, distance or 
fully blended options. The modular structures would allow exit and progression routes 
for all members of the wider police family,  with qualifications aimed at students both 
currently working in the service as well as students wishing to begin a career in the 
policing sector.
Diversity & Community Impact:
The police service has traditionally found it difficult to attract recruits from minority 
ethnic communities particularly Asian and Caribbean. Anecdotally one of the reasons 
given was that the police were not seen as a ‘profession’ in the way that pharmacists, 
lawyers, doctors and accountants were perceived. 
Aspirational parents were not keen for their children to choose the police service as a 
profession when compared to the more ‘desirable’ professions previously mentioned. 
Where this was once seen as the explanation mainly given by potential recruits from 
the Asian community this is now given as an explanation by people from the Black 
British and Caribbean communities. 
The proposal would, at last, mean that the entrants would first have to gain a degree 
(or agreed level of credits) before joining the service. More importantly this would be 
gained at an academic institution so gaining a legitimacy that some communities have 
never attached to police training.
In the preparation of this part of the proposal several face-to-face interviews were 
carried out with people who identified themselves as being members of Asian and 
African Caribbean communities. 
They confirmed that a degree gained before recruitment would confer legitimacy and 
confer on the police the status of a ‘profession’. 
They also stated that it would make the police more attractive to women as they 
would not have to cope with the perceived macho culture of regional police training; 
the effect of ‘The Secret Policemen’ cannot be underestimated in this respect.
The Certificate / Foundation Degree in Policing Practice is designed to meet the needs 
of the employer, Skills for Justice, Central Authority, the QAA benchmarks and the 
students.
2: PRELIMINARY BUSINESS CASE
The time taken from the point where the need for recruit resources is identified to the 
point where appointees are ready for operational deployment is too long. The time 
delay inhibits effective service delivery and efficient workforce planning.  In addition 
the existing initial L&D delivery is an expensive process offering little if any return to 
the force in the early stages of an officer’s career. 
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Considerable resources in terms of staff, facilities and materials are given over to 
initial training which could be drastically reduced producing both cashable and non-
cashable efficiency savings.
Currently, resource planning, recruitment and initial training processes can take up to 
one year. By the time recruits have been trained, operational and organisational needs 
may have changed. The Pre-Employment Police Education proposals would allow the 
recruiting and initial training processes for a police officer to be reduced from thirty-
four weeks to anything from twenty-four weeks to as little as one week.
This is done by transferring some or all of the IPLDP learning requirement (pre 
independent patrol elements only) into a learning programme that is then delivered by 
Further and Higher Education (FE/HE) establishments to potential employees, prior to 
application or recruitment.  This process reduces the “in Force” training needed by 
applicants and ensures that newly qualified staff reach the front line with minimum 
delay.
To aid motivation, retention and commitment of staff to the Force, there is a need to 
invest in the individual and include this as part of an overarching Workforce 
Development Strategy, which will in turn feed into an effective Workforce Planning 
Model.
In addition there is opportunity to take full advantage of advances in technology 
within the training process.  Development of e-learning systems as part of a fully open 
blended approach within Pre-Employment Police Education could further widen 
access to initial recruits.
The development of a Pre-Employment Police Education Programme has the potential 
to completely change the way in which police officers and other operational staff 
undertake their initial training. PEPE offers a range of options that can modernise the 
way in which future officers and members of the wider police family are recruited. 
Each of the options provide the opportunity for applicants to commence their training 
prior to joining the service.
To take a recruit through to independent patrol, the current system of delivering 
Student Officer Education costs the police service between £46,000 and £59,000 per 
officer (depending on delivery method and receipt of allowances: London Weighting 
etc).
The opportunities for developmental, refresher, specialist and promotion related 
programmes could fit within the same framework, generating further savings through 
the establishment and professionalisation of an academic career development 
framework. 
Savings would be generated through: 
x Reduced salary / oncosts for student officers – savings of between twelve and 
thirty four weeks salary per recruit.
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x Possible franchising of the learning process.
x Improved workforce planning.
x Potential to bypass the National Recruiting Selection (NRS) process and 
recruit directly from the PEPE Programme.
x The potential to reduce the number of training staff and potentially redeploy to 
the front line.
3: TERMS OF REFERENCE
Aims & Objectives:
To develop a Pre-Employment Police Education Programme for 
Student Officers which serves the needs of City of London Police and 
British Transport Police with City University; complying with the 
requirements of Home Office Initial Police Learning and Development 
Programme Curriculum and the Workforce Modernisation Agenda.
x This will include the facility of delivery at multiple sites across England and 
Wales thereby maximising benefits to the student and the organisation whilst 
reducing the costs and inconvenience of single site delivery.
x This will include the establishment of processes to accredit the training and 
trainers and the provision of an ongoing process to monitor/evaluate training 
delivery and quality.
x The completed programme will be consistent with the individual Force styles 
to enable it to meet local needs and deliver optimum officer performance.
Terms of Reference
x To identify the most suitable methodology, including the most suitable 
campus, for delivery of probationer training. Taking into account the potential 
for co-operative and collaborative ventures in each phase.
x To identify a suitable curriculum and mode of delivery meeting all necessary 
criteria laid down by the Home Office / Central Authority.
x To identify, and establish a project management structure in accordance with 
PRINCE2£methodology
x To introduce, pilot and establish a Pre-Employment Police Education 
Programme based upon the agreed curriculum above.
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x To identify the qualification and accreditation requirements for lecturers/tutors
to undertake delivery of the above educational programme.
x To identify the appropriate qualification/accreditation for students completing 
the programme.
x Establish and deliver a process capable of audit by the Police Committee and 
Police Authority for the ongoing evaluation and monitoring of the educational
process and its quality.
x To incorporate the new probationer training process within the overall 
umbrella of continuous professional development within City of London 
Police and British Transport Police.
x Establish within the educational process a mechanism for identification of 
training needs, confirmation and measurement within the annual PDR process.
Scope
x To institute an educational process suitable for City of London Police and 
British Transport Police use. It may be necessary to consider the potential for 
further collaborative actions with other forces / Universities.
Constraints
x Project funding will be limited as NPIA / Home Office, although supportive of 
the initiative, are not providing any funds.
x It is acknowledged that BTP are funded in a unique manner.
x A Deed of Variation has been entered into extending the existing MOA by 6 
months which runs till November 15th 2008.
x The programme design will need to be equal to or exceed nationally agreed 
standards for all options e.g. FE and HE courses must provide the same 
minimum requirements for an equal certificate to be obtained.
x The NPIA guidance, Models for Leaning must be considered throughout the 
project
x Project Planning will follow Models for learning guidelines, which will 
include the use of a project plan, and risk register, and the establishment of 
key roles and responsibilities of the project team.
x Quality Assurance (QA) protocols will be applied.
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x Document control procedures will be applied.
x A full evaluation will be carried out.
x Key documents must be retained.
x Programme will be designed to meet  NPIA and Skills for Justice guidelines 
and recommendations
x Ownership of intellectual property rights must be identified.
Assumptions
x City of London Police and British Transport Police are supportive of the 
police Learning and Development process and the Workforce Modernisation 
Agenda and will assist with the establishment of the necessary facilities to 
implement the change.
x The will exists both within senior management and the Police Committee and 
Police Authority to support the development, piloting and establishment of a 
Pre-Employment Police Education Programme.
x All necessary resources will be made available in order to develop, pilot and 
establish the agreed Pre-Employment Police Education Programme.
x A Workforce Development Strategy is required.
x A robust Workforce Planning Model will be in place to facilitate the new 
recruitment programme.
x Higher and Further Education students will choose to study this course.
x Accredited Prior Learning (APL) process is valid and capable of allowing 
police staff to evidence accredited learning.
Project Approach
x The project will be managed under the PRINCE2® methodology. 
4: BENEFITS REALISATION
Benefits accruing from the project will be managed in accordance with the City of 
London Police and British Transport Police Policy on Producing a Benefits 
Realisation Plan.
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An example of project benefit analysis is to be found in Appendix A attached
5: RISKS
An initial list of identified risks is to be found in Appendix B attached
A sample of the Risk Register is to be found at Appendix C attached.
6: QUALITY MANAGEMENT
The management of quality will be as described in City of London Police and British 
Transport Police– ‘QUALITY MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO’.
Briefly all products will be the subject of Product description Forms (PDF) and 
subject to individual review.
7: COMMUNICATIONS PLAN
This project will affect many elements of City of London Police and British Transport 
Police so good communications will be vital. A joint Communications team will need 
to be established to look at both internal and external communications strategies. 
The Communications Team will need to liaise with each stakeholder, as the project 
requires using emails and meetings, we will use workshops and group emails to 
communicate with groups of stakeholders more efficiently. 
As the aspects of the proposed training are so far reaching it is intended to fully 
consult stakeholders to provide input to both the Project Team and Project Board. 
Although these individuals will have no official status within the PRINCE2© 
methodology it is intended that they will be utilised to advise and inform the project 
team.
The stakeholders will include representatives from:
x NPIA
x Her Majesties Inspectorate of Constabulary
x Community Representatives (IAGs)
x Divisional  Commanders
x Human Resources
x Learning and Development
x Recruitment
x Finance
x Police Committee/Authority
x Estates
x Staff Associations 
x Professional Development Officers & ‘Mentors'
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8: ORGANISATION & CONTROLS
No work will commence without authorisation from the Project Board. The Board 
will allow the project manager a margin of tolerance of 10 days on any product and no 
more than 20 days for any stage. 
Immediately the project manager has cause to suspect that any allowed tolerance is 
likely to be exceeded and that the situation cannot be rectified, this will be brought to 
the Project Board’s attention by way of an Exception Report and Plan.
The project manager will keep the Board informed of progress against the Plan by 
means of a Highlight Report that will be submitted at four weekly intervals to the 
board. All changes to the project, whether additional requirements or changes in 
direction will be treated as project issues and will need to be approved by the Board 
once their impact has been assessed.
9: ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES
The key roles are listed below. TO BE CONFIRMED
Strategic Group
Executive Chair
Executive BTP
Executive CoLP
Project Management Team
Project Chair
Deputy Chair 
Project Manager
Project Second
Senior User - CoLP
Senior User – BTP
Senior Supplier – CU
Supplier Assurance – CU
User Assurance – CoLP
User Assurance – BTP
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10: PROJECT PLANS
To be developed.
11: SUMMARY OF BENEFITS FO THE ORGANISATION
x Significant cashable/non cashable efficiency savings from 2009/10.
x Reduces the establishment requirement for in house law trainers in the longer 
term.
x Improved framework to underpin career pathways.
x Reduces classroom requirement.
x Comparatively low cost of development in comparison to the projected 
efficiency savings (ROI in Year 1).
x Provides the link between recruiting and WFM practices/procedures.
x Delivers probationers to the front line between week 22 for option 1 to as 
quick as week 1 for option 3 as opposed to the current 34 weeks – making 
workforce planning easier for Divisional Commanders.
x Enhances and compliments other service training.
x Potential to open up other collaborative initiatives with Academic institutions.
x Puts a substantial part of police training in the community and being delivered 
by non police staff or jointly in collaboration.
x Strengthens community understanding of the role and powers of the Police and 
opens further opportunities for community links with City of London Police
and British Transport Police.
x Makes police training “transparent” and open to public scrutiny.
x Opportunities to promote the Home Office High Potential Scheme.
x Fits in with and underpins the principles of Workforce Modernisation.
12: SUMMARY OF BENEFITS FOR THE RECRUIT
x No longer have to wait until the last minute to prepare for a police career.
x Can select an option to fit their personal circumstances.
x Can prepare whilst in full time education, full time employment or whilst 
committed at home or elsewhere.
x Allows a better work - life balance
x Can make good use of the ‘dead time’ between deciding upon a police career 
and joining.
x Can move at own pace, opting in and out as their personal circumstances 
dictate. 
13: NATIONAL OVERVIEW
Surrey Police: 
Developing a model similar to option 1with Portsmouth University and Guilford 
College which is being implemented from Jan 2009 in a phased approach. Surrey are
seeking to establish the programme as the single route of entry by 2010.
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Lancashire Police:
Have been delivering a pre-employment Foundation Degree Programme with 
University of Central Lancashire since 2007. Set recruitment levels through route at 
25% resulting in yearly cohorts of 40 – 45 for which there are approximately 4.8 
applicants for each position. The Lancashire model is very similar to the third option 
and utilises the role of Special Constable but does not directly recruit from the 
programme and students are still subject to the National Recruiting Selection Process.
Cumbria Police:
From September 2008 Cumbria will delivering a programme with the University of 
Cumbria which follows the principles of the Lancashire / UCLAN model utilising the 
role of special Constable. This has been developed with the assistance of Lancashire 
and UCLAN.
Northamptonshire Police:
Although still in the approvals process it is anticipated that from September 2008 
Northamptonshire will delivering a programme with the University of Northampton 
which follows the principles of the Lancashire / UCLAN model utilising the role of 
Special Constable. This has been developed with the assistance of Lancashire and 
UCLAN.
West Midlands Police:
Delivering a programme in partnership with Wolverhampton University which is 
similar to option two but provides the facility for students to apply and become 
Special Constables whilst studying leading to a ‘fast track’ application and 
recruitment process if the students decided to join the service.
Dyfed Powys Police:
Delivering a programme with the University of West Glamorgan which, like the West 
Midlands model is similar to option two but provides the facility for students to apply 
and become Special Constables whilst studying leading to a ‘fast track’ application 
and recruitment process if the students decided to join the service.
Thames Valley Police:
Have entered into talks with Surrey Police with a view to implementing the 
Portsmouth University model. Future intention not confirmed.
In addition to the above forces that are actively progressing Pre-Employment Police 
Education Programmes a great deal of interest has been shown nationally and many 
more forces are conducting research and feasibility studies into the potential of 
implementing Pre-Employment Police Education Programmes. 
14: WAY FORWARD  
City of London Police and British Transport Police have already undertaken a lot of 
work in scoping the options for Pre-Employment Police Education at a local, national 
and international level.
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The City University, City of London Police and British Transport Police have 
developed an effective working relationship in the delivery of the Student Officer 
Programme. This project seeks to build on that relationship with the potential to 
expand to include other police and FE / HE partners on a regional / national level.
This project will redesign the recruiting and L&D processes to reduce the initial L&D 
period in terms of cost and time. The delivery structure for recruiting and the Learning 
and Development function will be reviewed and amended to accommodate the 
proposed changes. 
The Programme would see the Policing Certificate / Cert HE / FD issued after the 
successful completion of the accredited course. 
The options range from outsourcing the knowledge requirement to a full collaborative 
model achieving independent patrol and potentially removing the need for students or 
the service to be subjected to the National Recruiting Selection.
The extensive research carried out since 2005, scoping the Student Officer 
Programme against existing pre-employment programmes and the preparatory work 
which encompassed emerging trends within police reform both future proofs and 
enables the easy transition to offering pre-employment police education. 
If the proposal is approved and formal project management is established by Aug
2008 initial efficiency savings will be achievable from Jan 2010 (depending of option 
progressed). A realistic and achievable timeline for implementation is:
Aug
2008
Apr
2009
Jun – Aug
2009
Sep
2009
Feb - Sep
2010
Project initiation Course offered 
through UCAS 
and advertised 
jointly through 
force and 
university web 
sites
Admission and 
selection process 
administered –
pilot cohort 
approved
Pilot cohort 
commences 
studies 
First successful 
recruits eligible to 
claim APL 
through NRS or 
for direct 
recruitment / 
employment
Start up costs                               Break even                                Efficiency saving
15: RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The City of London Police and British Transport Police support the 
proposal, agree on one or more options for development and initiate 
‘project start up’. 
2. In line with PRINCE2 methodology (project management), strategic and 
project management boards are established and a project team appointed. 
3. Both strategic and project management boards will need to include 
representation from each of the formal partners and could potentially be 
extended to include prospective partners i.e. The MET.
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A dedicated Project Team would require the following personnel:
x Project Manager: dedicated Chief Insp or equivalent
x Project Second: dedicated Insp or equivalent
x Project Team: 2 dedicated Sgts or equivalent
x Project Administrator: dedicated administrative support
x Finance: advisor to the project team
x Legal: advisor to the project team
x Diversity: advisor to the project team
The Project Team would also require the following resources:
x Dedicated accommodation for the Project Team
x IT with facility to interface with both force and university systems
x Facilities for remote working
4. To support the development of the business case and project initiation, a 
steering group should also be considered; I suggest the group consists of 
the following members as a minimum:
x Chair – ACPO lead
x Critical Advisor – Independent L&D / HR representative
x Operational Advisor – Area Commander / Superintendent
x Community Impact Advisor – Diversity Unit
x Workforce Advisor – HR / Recruitment
x Best Value – Finance
x Communications – Corporate Communications
x Staff Associations – Police Federation / Union / TSSA
x Service Provider – City University
The steering group could initially consider the following areas:
x Phased Implementation
x Phased delivery options
x Positive action initiatives
x Financial incentives
x Communications
x Evaluation
16: OPTIONS CONSIDERED
Three different models have been considered, costed and scoped for benefit and risk. 
Each option has the facility to offer multiple exit or progression points and the 
flexibility to be delivered through an impressively blended open approach. Each 
option could also be offered full time, part time utilising day release and evening 
classes, and for those seeking rapid employment by a compressed ‘fast tracked’ 
option.
03/07/08 15
Combined Options & 
Project Initiation 
Document
City of London Police, 
British Transport Police
Version 1.2
SS/GS 14/07/08
It is recommended that the delivery options are implemented through a phased 
approach:
x Short term – year 1 – traditional face to face delivery on fast track and 
standard programmes.
x Medium term – year 2 – as above with the option of part time study.
x Long term – year 3 – as above with the addition of distance / blended learning.
Option 1: The Elective Model
Elective model: in this option the underpinning knowledge elements of IPLDP are
separated out from policy, guidance and procedure and delivered as elective modules
within existing Criminal Justice / Public Services programmes. 
Students who successfully complete the elective modules could then apply to the 
service via the NRS process and claim APEL for the knowledge requirements of 
IPLDP.
This would reduce an officer’s probation by 12 weeks and see a new recruit achieving
independent patrol within 21 weeks of employment.
This route requires the attendance at and completion of the designated unit electives 
(2 of them) provided by a University for its students as part of a full or part time 
degree course. 
At this stage, it is envisaged that the unit electives would be delivered as options in 
year 2 and 3 of an undergraduate’s degree course. The successful completion of each 
unit elective would qualify the student for between 10 and 15 credits towards their 
degree award (Maximum of 30 credits in total). 
The unit electives offered will cover; the role of the police in society; criminal law; 
traffic law and general police duties and powers. 
The scope and depth of the subject matter will be designed to comply with current 
National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) and IPLDP learning requirements.  
In offering these subjects in this way it is anticipated that twelve weeks could be 
saved from the current Student Officer Programme.
Universities may elect to undertake additional assessment in order to ensure the 
elective contributes towards the award of a degree.
This option also has the potential to enable Further Education Colleges to deliver the 
core material as set out for Higher Education.
In addition to a full time course there could be options that would allow accredited 
learning to take place on a part time basis via evening classes held over the academic 
year. 
03/07/08 16
Combined Options & 
Project Initiation 
Document
City of London Police, 
British Transport Police
Version 1.2
SS/GS 14/07/08
This provides for those who are not in full time study and who have other day time 
commitments to study at a more convenient time.
The learning leading to the award of a certificate will be assessed at NVQ level 3 /4 in 
keeping with national requirements.
There is also the potential for applicants who do not have easy access to HE or FE 
establishments to access the necessary underpinning IPLDP knowledge requirement 
through distance learning packages delivered via the Internet. 
This form of learning together with other blended learning options could be 
investigated as part of the overall project. 
The same electives could be available to benefit those existing members of Police 
staff, including volunteers, who wish to become police officers e.g. PCSO’s, DDO's,
SC's etc. It could also target posts that require knowledge of criminal law and possess 
investigative skills e.g. staff working as Case Support and Investigative Officers. 
Outsourcing the ‘knowledge’ elements of IPLDP whilst achieving a qualification that 
meets the National Minimum Qualification would remove the need for the current 
tripartite relationship and potentially end the collaboration between CoLP and BTP.
It is acknowledged that some of the existing PCSO and SC courses etc would have to 
be changed to align them to the proposed process. 
Option 1 Overview:
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Projected costs / savings:
Time saved Pre-Employment: 12 weeks
Time Employed to Independent Patrol: 22 weeks
London based officers
Cost to independent Patrol: £40,000
Savings per officer: £19,000
Officers outside of London
Cost to independent patrol: £35,000
Savings per officer: £17,000
This option is similar to the model that is under development by Surrey Police and 
Portsmouth University. It is not compatible with the current Student Officer 
Programme which would result in a longer lead in time and increased development 
costs for both the Pre-Employment and Post-Employment elements.
Benefits
1 A standardised programme delivered by multiple universities would increase 
the scope for delivery / study sites.
2 Optional electives would remove the need for a dedicated ‘policing student’ 
University admissions / assessment process.
3 This concept gives a greater degree of integration with the diverse nature of 
University life.
4 Delivery through FE Institutes would increase accessibility to the programme, 
in particular16 – 18 year olds. 
5 The learning support of a major educational establishment would be available 
to Police students.
6 Place responsibility for delivery with the FE / HE establishment and reduce 
the need for police teaching staff.
7 Provide a suitable platform from which more flexible options, including part 
time, day release, evening classes, distance and e-learning routes could be 
developed and implemented.
8 At the conclusion of the FE / HE study programme the student Officer would 
have a qualification which satisfies the national minimum qualification 
requirement for police.
Risks
1 This is a new programme and there would be a longer lead-in time (allowing 
for design, development and approval) with projected implementation being 
September 2009 to coincide with the academic year for existing Criminal 
Justice Programmes.
2 A new programme would also have to be designed to cover the remaining 
learning requirements of IPLDP which would not fit within the existing 
Student Officer Programme framework.
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3 Operational practice through the Professional Development Unit would revert 
to a single phase which, without overlapping cohorts would restrict potential 
recruitment to 5 intakes a year.
4 Recruitment could be constrained by the FE and HE academic / graduation 
calendar – resulting in once / twice yearly surges of applicants. 
5 There is no guarantee that the student body will go on to apply for the police 
service or that they would satisfy the requirements of the NRS process.
6 An academically owned and delivered programme would limit the influence 
the forces could exert on students who, without any sense of belonging may be 
attracted / poached by other forces.
7 Ownership of the course and its content would sit with academic body who 
may not respond to changes in legislation or policing priorities appropriately.
8 An academic programme delivered independent of the police may lack 
credibility within police circles which could undermine the validity of the 
programme and integration of Pre-Educated recruits.
9 QA of the course would still be subject to scrutiny by the Central Authority 
which could be difficult to administer on a non-collaborative programme.
10 Remove the need to partner with City University as students would join after 
achieving a suitable qualification and potentially end / reduce the collaboration 
between CoLP and BTP.
11 Increase the demand on existing force training facilities by 200%, for BTP this
would exceed current capacity  by up to 50%.
Option 2: The Pre-patrol model
Pre-patrol model: This option provides students with the opportunity of completing 
the majority of legislation, policy and guidance required by the Home Office / Central 
Authority.
Students who successfully complete this programme could then apply to the service 
through the regular NRS process and claim APEL for all of the knowledge (LPGs) 
requirements of IPLDP. 
This option would only require a recruit to undergo a maximum of 6 weeks teaching
(Force induction & local procedure) before commencing the tutorship phase with the 
PDU. 
This would reduce an officer’s probation by 19 weeks and see a new recruit achieving 
independent patrol within 15 weeks of employment.
This route requires the attendance at and completion of the dedicated Policing 
Programme provided by a University as a full or part time Cert HE course. 
The successful completion of the programme would lead to the award of a Cert HE –
120 credits, and provide the opportunity to continue studies and work towards a FD or 
BSc in Policing Practice post employment.
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With the exception to the induction elements, first aid, officer safety, diversity and 
community engagement, the programme offered would cover all mandatory
legislation, policy and guidance at level one and two.
The scope and depth of the subject matter will be designed to comply with current 
National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) and IPLDP learning requirements.  
Universities may elect to undertake additional assessment in order to ensure the 
programme satisfies the academic requirement for the award of a Cert HE.
This option also has the potential to enable Further Education Colleges to deliver the 
core material as set out for Higher Education.
In addition to a full time course there could be options that would allow accredited 
learning to take place on a part time basis via evening classes held over two academic 
years.
This provides for those who are not in full time study and who have other day time 
commitments to study at a more convenient time.
There is also the potential for applicants who do not have easy access to HE or FE 
establishments to access the necessary underpinning IPLDP knowledge requirement 
through distance learning packages delivered via the Internet. 
This form of learning together with other blended learning options could be 
investigated as part of the overall project. 
Modules from this programme could be made available to benefit those existing 
members of Police staff, including volunteers, who wish to become police officers 
e.g. PCSO’s, DDO’s, SC’s etc. 
It could also target posts that require knowledge of criminal law and possess 
investigative skills e.g. staff working as Case Support and Investigative Officers. 
For those police staff that are in front-line and operational positions it is foreseen that 
they would be able to access elements of the course in order to update, refresh and 
develop their knowledge. 
It is acknowledged that some of the existing PCSO and SC courses etc may have to be 
changed to align them to the proposed process. 
Option 2 Overview:
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Projected costs / savings:
Time saved Pre-Employment: 19 weeks
Time Employed to Independent Patrol: 15 weeks
London based officers
Cost to independent Patrol: £26,000
Savings per officer: £33,000
Officers outside of London
Cost to independent patrol: £23,000
Savings per officer: £29,000
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This option is similar in structure to the Student Officer Programme and would utilise 
the core modular structure and content. The transition to a Cert HE from a FD would 
require the Programme to be re-written and submitted for university approval. The 
lead in time would be less than in option one and development costs for both the Pre-
Employment and Post-Employment elements would be reduced.
Benefits
1. A Cert HE would be cheaper making the programme more accessible.
2. A Policing Theory / Knowledge programme (non–operational) would remove 
the need for a dedicated ‘policing student’ University admissions / assessment 
process.
3. This concept gives a greater degree of integration with the diverse nature of 
University life.
4. Delivery through Further Education Institutes would increase accessibility to 
the programme, in particular16 – 18 year olds. 
5. The learning support of a major educational establishment would be available 
to Police students.
6. Provides the option to deliver the programme in collaboration or pass the 
responsibility for delivery to the FE / HE establishment and reduce the need 
for police teaching staff.
7. Provide a suitable platform from which more flexible options, including part 
time, day release, evening classes, distance and e-learning routes could be 
developed and implemented.
8. At the conclusion of the FE / HE study programme the student Officer would 
have a qualification which satisfies the national minimum qualification 
requirement for police.
Risks
1. This is a revised / adapted version of the Student Officer Programme which 
would still require a realistic lead-in time (allowing for design, development 
and approval) with projected implementation being September 2009 to 
coincide with the academic year.
2. A new programme would also have to be designed to cover the remaining 
learning requirements of IPLDP which would not fit within the existing 
Student Officer Programme framework.
3. Operational practice through the Professional Development Unit would revert 
to a single phase which, without having overlapping cohorts would restrict the 
recruitment to 5 intakes a year.
4. Recruitment could be constrained by the FE and HE academic / graduation 
calendar – resulting in once / twice yearly surges of applicants.   
5. There is no guarantee that the student body will go on to apply for the police 
service or that they would satisfy the requirements of the national selection 
process.
6. Ownership of the course and its content would sit with academic body who 
may not respond to changes in legislation or policing priorities appropriately.
03/07/08 22
Combined Options & 
Project Initiation 
Document
City of London Police, 
British Transport Police
Version 1.2
SS/GS 14/07/08
7. An academic programme delivered independent of the police may lack 
credibility within police circles which could undermine the validity of the 
programme and integration of Pre-Educated recruits.
8. QA of the course would still be subject to scrutiny by the Central Authority 
which could be difficult to administer on a non-collaborative programme.
Option 3: Post-independent model:
This option mirrors the Student Officer Programme in structure and timescale and 
takes the student through to independent patrol prior to being offered employed status. 
This model is 90% compatible with the existing Student Officer Programme only 
requiring a redesign of the on the application, assessment and induction elements. 
By running a collaborative dual application process, applicants are security and 
suitability checked prior to commencing the programme, at which point they are 
sworn in as Special Constables. 
Students could potentially be offered a conditional offer of employment at the 
commencement of the programme with the conditions that they successfully complete 
and pass the first 13 modules and maintain professional suitability.
Having been sworn in as special constable, students complete the work based 
assessments with the PDU or BCU under the same criteria as regular sworn 
constables.
This programme would cover all mandatory legislation, policy and guidance at levels 
one and two whilst allowing students to demonstrate competence against the Police 
Action Checklist prior to employment.
A collaborative approach to delivery will allow accurate and continuous assessment of
both academic and professional suitability providing the opportunity to bypass the 
National Recruiting Selection process, recruiting directly from the student body.
Having passed the programme and providing professional suitability was maintained, 
students who are offered regular employed status (bypassing the National Recruiting
Selection process) would only need to complete a short local procedure course before 
being deployable as an independent resource.
This would reduce an officer’s probation by 34 weeks and see a new recruit achieving 
independent patrol within their first week of employment.
Initially this option would require the attendance at and completion of the dedicated 
Policing Programme provided by a University as a full time course. This programme 
is highly adaptable and could easily accommodate part time, distance and blended 
learning options.
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For those seeking rapid employment a fast track ‘intensive’ programme could see 
students suitable for employment in only 21 weeks or less if they able to claim 
Accredited Prior Learning, e.g.: PCSO’s.
As these options become available there would be the potential for applicants who do 
not have easy access to HE or FE establishments to access the necessary underpinning 
IPLDP knowledge requirement through distance learning packages delivered via the 
Internet. 
This provides for those who are not in full time study and who have other day time 
commitments to study at a more convenient time. This form of learning together with 
other blended learning options could be investigated as part of the overall project. 
The successful completion of the programme could lead to either the award of a Cert 
HE – 120 credits or a FD – 240 credits, and provide the opportunity to continue 
studies and work towards a BSc in Policing Practice post employment.
The flexibility of this programme would allow for year round recruitment not 
restrained by cohorts, academic calendars or National Recruitment Selection 
processes.
Students who achieve employed status would only need to evidence competence 
against the National Occupational Standards which would be achieved on area as a 
deployable independent resource.
Based around the content and structure of the current Student Officer Programme the 
depth and breadth of the subject matter has been assessed by the Central Authority
and is fully compliant with current National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) 
and IPLDP learning requirements.  
Modules from this programme could be made available to benefit those existing 
members of Police staff, including volunteers, who wish to become police officers 
e.g. PCSO’s, DDO’s, SC’s etc. It could also target posts that require knowledge of 
criminal law and possess investigative skills e.g. staff working as Case Support and 
Investigative Officers. 
For those police staff that are in front-line and operational positions it is foreseen that 
they would be able to access elements of the course in order to update, refresh and 
develop their knowledge. 
It is acknowledged that some of the existing PCSO and SC courses etc may have to be 
changed to align them to the proposed process. 
Option 3 Overview:
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Projected costs / savings:
Time saved Pre-Employment: 34 weeks
Time Employed to Independent Patrol: First week
London based officers
Cost to independent Patrol: £18,000
Savings per officer: £41,000
Officers outside of London
Cost to independent patrol: £16,000
Savings per officer: £36,000
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This option almost mirrors the current Student Officer Programme and was designed 
with a long term view of eventually making the transition to pre-attestation / pre-
employment delivery. The compatibility with the current Student Officer Programme 
would significantly reduce lead in time and development costs for both the Pre-
Employment and Post-Employment elements. This option is also designed to reflect 
was has been established as best practice internationally for pre-employment policing 
programmes.
Benefits
1. Options to offer the programme as a Cert HE, FD or Bsc increasing the appeal 
of the programme to wider spectrum of potential students.
2. A collaborative approach to programme delivery would provide ‘credibility’ in 
both programme delivery and organisational acceptance.
3. A collaborative approach to delivery will assist students with identifying with 
their potential future employer, reducing the risk of poaching by other forces. 
4. This concept gives the greatest scope for integration with the diverse nature of 
University life.
5. Delivery through Further Education Institutes would increase accessibility to 
the programme, in particular16 – 18 year olds. 
6. The learning support of a major educational establishment would be available 
to Police students.
7. A collaborative approach to delivery would reduce the need for police 
employed teaching staff.
8. Provide a suitable platform from which more flexible options, including part 
time, day release, evening classes, distance and e-learning routes could be 
developed and implemented.
9. At the conclusion of the FE / HE study programme the student Officer would 
have a qualification which satisfies the national minimum qualification 
requirement for police.
10. Provides the maximum potential cashable savings whilst providing a second 
stream of non-cashable savings through the use and deployment of Special 
Constables.
11. Provide a platform for continuous academic, professional and occupational 
competence prior to employment providing an opportunity of direct 
recruitment, bypassing the National Recruiting Selection process.
12. Direct recruitment bypassing NRS would keep the student body focused on the 
collaborative policing partners further reducing the risk of poaching by forces 
who would require the students to apply through the NRS.
Risks
1. This option would require a completely new policy and procedure for the 
recruitment and employment of student officers.
2. The streamlined collaborative recruitment process could reduce internal 
procedures and practices by up 50% resulting in personnel redeployment or 
potential redundancies.
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3. A new structure would have to be designed to cover the operational 
deployment of Volunteer Student Officers as Special Constables whilst 
working towards the achievement of the Police Action Checklist prior to 
independent patrol.
4. Potential for poor take up whilst there are still options for paid post-
employment training.
5. Potential for excessive take up which exceeds work force planning 
requirements.
6. The provision of IPLDP through a Pre-Employment Police Educational 
Programme may result in a reduction of Home Office grant for Student Office 
Training (currently £3,000 per officer).
17 OVERVIEW OF OPTIONS
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Suitable for FE Delivery Yes Yes Yes
Suitable for HE Delivery Yes Yes Yes
Suitable for P/T Study Yes Yes Yes
Suitable for Distance Learning Yes Yes Yes
IPR Ownership FE/HE FE/HE or Joint Joint
Delivery Responsibilities FE/HE FE/HE or Joint Joint
Lead in time Sep 2009 Sep 2009 Apr 2009
Curriculum Content (LPGs) 50% 75% 100%
Operational Practice (PACs) No No Yes (Specials)
Option for direct recruitment No No Yes
Weeks saved 12 19 34
Weeks to Independent Patrol 21 15 1
Saving per officer (London) £19,000 £33,000 £41,000
Revised Cost to Independent patrol 
Status (London)
£40,000 £26,000 £18,000
Saving per Officer (National) £17,000 £29,000 £36,000
Revised Cost to Independent Patrol 
Status (National)
£35,000 £23,000 £16,000
Additional BTP Savings
Tadworth
London Accommodation 
Expenses1
Nil
£760
£310
Nil
£760
£310
£690
£575
£310
Additional BTP Costs2 £1,380 £690 Nil
Non-cashable savings (NCS)
per officer
Limited Limited 360 hrs policing as 
a SC = £7,200
Return on investment FE 2010
HE 2011/12
FE 2010 
HE 2010/11
FE 2009
HE 2009
Projected CoLP savings based on 
recruitment of 40 officers a year.
£760,000 £1,320,000 £1,743,000 +
NCS = £288,000
Projected BTP savings based on 
recruitment of 150 officers a year.3
£2,743,000 £4,783,500 £6,264,000 + 
NCS = £1,080,000
1 Expenses have been calculated at £225 for officers commuting into London daily and £647 for 
officers resident during the University modules which have been combined to give a per unit cost.
2 The additional cost is the result of increased internal delivery. These costs only reflect the figures 
produced by BTP for Student Officer delivery and do not reflect the additional costs of having to 
outsource accommodation / facilities for other areas of police L&D business.
3 BTP recruitment based on 120 London North, South & Underground and 30 national.
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All of the above options allow for the integration of PCSO’s as with the existing 
Student Officer Programme. As such each of the options would provide the same 
level of efficiency savings which has been calculated at:
London PCSO: £11,000
Non-London PCSO: £9,500
The efficiency savings have been calculated using the 2008/09 figures for both City of 
London Police and British Transport Police with a tolerance of + or – 10%. The 
savings shown are the minimum efficiency saving (excluding static costs) achievable 
per officer recruited.
Areas where costs will remain static
The following areas are static and would remain constant:
x Security / vetting checks
x Fitness testing
x Medical
x Issue of uniform and personal protective equipment
In the initial / pilot stages of the programme certain costs will remain static or could 
even increase to support both employed and pre-employment recruitment routes but 
would potentially offer efficiency savings if pre-employment was adopted as the sole 
route for recruitment.
Area where additional costs may be incurred
x It is acknowledged that FE / HE funding through Higher Education Funding 
Council for England (HEFCE) and government grants would potentially have 
to be increased to accommodate the additional student numbers this project 
would generate. It is also acknowledged that this additional cost could 
potentially be passed on to the police by way of reduced police grants.
x The provision of ‘work placements’ as special constables for university 
students will undoubtedly result in above average insurance / public liability 
insurance premiums for the university. This is a cost that could potentially be 
shared by the collaborative partners.
x The Home Office / Police ‘Could You’ campaign would not address the 
recruitment needs of the pre-employment programme and whilst there was still 
an ‘employed’ recruitment option available a separate recruitment strategy 
would need to be developed and funded. Again, this is an area that could 
potentially be joint funded by the collaborative partners.
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18 HUMAN RESOURCES POLICY & PROGRAMME APPROVAL
The Project Initiation Document has now been agreed and the Project should 
commence on Stage One.
Approved option / Options:
……………………………………………………………………….
……………………………………………………………………….
Executive
………………………………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………………………..
Date……………………………………………..……………………
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Financial Analysis 
 
Before looking at the cost to the organisation of delivering the Initial Police Learning 
and Development Programme (IPLDP) and considering any potential alternatives that 
could potentially offer efficiency saving at a local or national level; it would be useful 
to know what the cost of new recruit training was when it was delivered in partnership 
with National Police Training (NPT)1.  
 
The last thematic inspection of police training; ‘Training Matters’ looked at these costs 
on a national level: 
 
HMIC (2002) stated ‘In an attempt to ascertain the investment involved in providing 
the PTP on a national basis, all forces, NPT and Hendon were asked to indicate how 
much of their total annual budget was expended on programme delivery. Using the 
Service’s own figures, the delivery of the PTP, including the salaries of those involved, 
on an annual basis, attracts an investment of over £200 million’.2 
 
The figure of £200 million was of course the cost back in 2001 / 2002 so to give a 
realistic comparison I will allow for a yearly inflation increase of 3%, based on the 
average salary increase for police officers which make up the majority of these costs. 
Allowing for 7 years inflationary increases the figure rises to £246 million. 
 
To provide a comparison of what IPLDP costs are, I have separated out the figures and 
shown them as ‘London’ and ‘Other’ to allow for the additional costs incurred with 
London weighting and other allowances.  
 
Table C1 sets out the salary / employment oncosts, reflecting those used in the 
National Costing Model: 
 
Salary / Employment oncosts 
Table:  
C1 
London Other 
 Per Year Per Week Per year Per Week 
Inspector £70,875 N/A £62,380 N/A 
Sergeant £56,475 £1,086 £49,980 £961 
constable £48,803 £938 £42,308 £813 
Initial Recruit3 £44,997 £865 £38,498 £740 
 
 
The cost calculations are based on an officer strength for England and Wales of 
141,000 including British Transport Police, who, although they are not a Home Office 
force, used NPT for probationer training and now work in collaboration with the City 
of London Police on the Student Officer Programme.  
                                                 
1 National Police Training became CENTREX in 2001 and the National Policing Improvement Agency 
in 2007. 
2 HMIC, (Her Majesties Inspectorate of Constabulary) (2002), Training Matters, Executive Summary. 
Home Office 
3 The pre and post independent patrol salaries have been averaged out to cover the probationary period 
and the salary / employment oncosts added which include the hidden costs associated with recruitment 
and induction to the organisation. After the two year probation, once the initial costs have been absorbed 
the salary / employment oncosts will level out to approximately: salary + 22%. 
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The national distribution of officers equates to 34,000 ‘London’; this includes the 
Metropolitan, City of London and British Transport Police; and 107,000 ‘Other’.  
This paper will assume a standard of 5% yearly recruitment which would, for the 
majority of forces, maintain officer numbers, giving a total yearly recruitment of 7,050 
officers, 1,702 in London and 5,348 Other. 
 
With such a variation of programmes nationally and with course duration ranging from 
28 to 48 weeks to independent patrol this analysis has used the original model as 
prescribed by Centrex and the Central Authority of 34 weeks to independent patrol.  
 
These 34 weeks includes a 5 week induction (including community placement), 17 
weeks Legislation, Policy & Guidance (LPG), 10 weeks tutoring / work Based 
Learning (WBL) and 2 weeks annual leave in year 1.  
 
In year 2 there is a further 6 weeks (30 days) protected learning /  Continuous 
Professional Development (CPD).  
 
This paper will assume a week as being 5 days, Monday – Friday and a day as being 8 
hours, each week totalling 40 hours. 
 
For year 1 LPG, a ratio of 18 students per class with 2 trainers, delivering 2 x 24 week 
courses a year has been used. This is then supplemented by 1 Sergeant for every 6 
trainers and 1 Inspector for every 4 Sergeants.  
 
An assumption has been made that within the WBL phase a ratio of one Professional 
Development Officer to each Student Officer will be used. 
 
For the year 2 CPD , a ratio of 18 students per class is still used and training staff have 
been scoped as being able to deliver 44 weeks (220 days)4 a year still using a ratio of 2 
trainers per class with 1 Sergeant for every 6 trainers and 1 Inspector for every 4 
Sergeants.  
 
Classrooms have been costed at a flat rate of £575 per week to include the additional 
costs of specialist facilities, such as IT suites, gymnasium, DOJO etc. 
 
With all of the additional responsibilities associated with local delivery, evaluation, 
quality assurance, administration, curriculum maintenance, environmental scanning, 
assessment, timetabling to name but a few, a further allowance of 4 support roles per 
100 recruits has been allowed and costed at Constable level. 
 
The costing has been broken down into the following areas: 
 
• LPG - 24 weeks legislation, Policy & Guidance (including Induction) 
 
• WBL - 10 weeks Professional Development  
 
• CPD - 6 weeks Protected Learning  
                                                 
4 The 44 weeks / 220 days per person represents the maximum availability having allowed for annual 
leave, miscellaneous abstraction and average sickness. 
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Table C2 sets out the costing for the first of these areas, LPG, which breaks down as: 
 
Costing for 24 week LPG phase (including induction) 
Table: 
C2 
Courses Classrooms Trainers Sergeants Inspectors Support 
London 95 2470 weeks 95 16 4 68 
Cost N/A £1,420,250 £4,636,285 £903,600 £283,500 £3,313,604 
Other 298 7748 weeks 298 50 13 149 
Cost N/A £4,455,100 £12,607,784 £2,499,000 £810,940 £8,969,296 
Total  £5,875,350 £17,244,069 £3,402,600 £1,094,440 £12,282,900 
 
 
This gives a total of £39,899,359 
 
Table C3 sets out the next area which is WBL and has been calculated on a preferred 
model of ‘one on one’ tutorship, this breaks down as: 
 
Costing for 10 week WBL phase 
Table: 
C3 
Students Weeks Cost per week Actual cost 
London 1,702 17,020 £938 £15,964,760 
Other 5,348 53,480 £813 £43,479,240 
Total 7,050 70,500 N/A £59,444,000 
 
 
This gives a total cost of £59,444,000   
 
Table C4 sets out the final area which is CPD and has been broken down as: 
 
Costing for 6 week CPD phase 
Table: 
C4 
Courses Classrooms Trainers Sergeants Inspectors Support 
London 95 570 weeks 26 4.5 1  
Costs 
covered 
under 
LPG 
Cost N/A £327,750 £1,268,878 £254,137 £70,875 
Other 298 1,782 weeks 81 13.5 3.5 
Cost N/A £1,024,650 £3,426,948 £674,730 £218,330 
Total  £1,352,400 £4,695,826 £928,867 £289,205 
 
 
This gives a total cost of £7,266,298 
 
Table C5 sets out the cost to forces for delivering the core elements of Initial Police 
Learning and Development Programme in house: 
 
Cost of in house delivery of IPLDP 
Table: 
C5 
Cost – London Cost – Other  
 Total Per Officer Total Per Officer Total Cost 
LPG £10,557,239 £6,202 £29,342,120 £5,486 £39,899,359 
WBL £15,964,760 £9,380 £43,479,240 £8,130 £59,444,000 
CPD £1,921,640 £1,129 £5,344,658 £999 £7,266,298 
Total £28,443,639 £16,711 £78,166,018 £14,615 £106,609,657 
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From this we have a national figure of £106,609,657 and figures per officer of £16,711 
for London and £14,615 for Other.  
 
Initially, this looks very respectable in comparison to the figure of £246 million which 
it would have cost under the previous system, however, no account has been taken of 
force specific costs: accommodation, meal and travel allowances, course materials, 
NVQ registration / award or University fees for those undertaking programmes in 
partnership with Further or Higher Educational Institutes. 
 
Another area of disparity is in the provision of Professional Development Units 
(PDU’s), some forces have dedicated PDU resources and classrooms whilst others 
integrate their Professional Development Officers (PDO’s) and the PDU function with 
operational units, similar to the traditional model used for tutoring prior to the 
implementation of IPLDP.  
 
If dedicated resources and classrooms were provided nationally for PDU’s, this would 
equate to 89 dedicated units at a cost of £29,900 per unit giving an additional cost of 
£2,661,100 or £377 per officer. This takes the total cost to £109,270,757 
 
Table C6 is an updated version of Table C5 which shows the cost of in house delivery 
with the additional costs dedicated PDU support.  
 
Updated: Cost of in house delivery of IPLDP 
Table: 
C6 
Cost – London Cost – Other  
 Total Per Officer Total Per Officer Total Cost 
LPG £10,557,239 £6,202 £29,342,120 £5,486 £39,899,359 
WBL £15,964,760 £9,380 £43,479,240 £8,130 £59,444,000 
CPD £1,921,640 £1,129 £5,344,658 £999 £7,266,298 
PDU £638,664 £377 £2,022,436 £377 £2,661,100 
Total £29,082,303 £17,088 £80,188,454 £14,992 £109,270,757 
 
 
From this we have a national figure of £109,270,757 and figures per officer of £17,088 
for London and £14,992 for Other.  
 
A new recruit offers very little in the way of return on investment prior to achieving 
independent patrol, post independent patrol a full return on investment is achieved at 
approximately 5 years service.  
 
To reflect this period were the organisation receives no return on investment the salary 
/ employment cost for the recruit needs to be added to the delivery costs. 
 
Table C7 details the salary / employment oncosts5 which have been broken down to 
reflect the lower pay scale of a probationary constable over their initial two year 
probation together with an allocation of the hidden costs of to the organisation 
associated with recruitment and employment. 
                                                 
5 The pre and post independent patrol salaries have been averaged out to cover the probationary period 
and the salary / employment oncosts added which include the hidden costs associated with recruitment 
and induction to the organisation. After the two year probation, once the initial costs have been absorbed 
the salary / employment oncosts will level out to approximately: salary + 22%. 
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Salary / employment oncosts for student officers 
Table: 
C7 
Yearly 
rate 
weekly 
salary 
34 weeks yr1 
6 weeks yr2 
Recruit 
Numbers 
Total 
cost 
London £44,997 £865 £34,600 1702 £58,889,200 
Other £38,494 £740 £29,600 5348 £158,300,800 
 £217,190,000 
  
 
Table: C8 is an updated version of C6 which shows the cost of in house delivery with 
the additional costs of salary / employment.  
 
Updated: Cost of in house delivery of IPLDP 
Table: 
C8 
Cost – London Cost – Other  
 Total Per Officer Total Per Officer Total Cost 
LPG £10,557,239 £6,202 £29,342,120 £5,486 £39,899,359 
WBL £15,964,760 £9,380 £43,479,240 £8,130 £59,444,000 
CPD £1,921,640 £1,129 £5,344,658 £999 £7,266,298 
PDU £638,664 £377 £2,022,436 £377 £2,661,100 
Employment £58,889,200 £34,600 £158,300,800 £29,600 £217,190,000 
Total £87,971,503 £51,688 £238,489,254 £44,592 £326,460,757 
 
 
Regardless of delivery option, the above figures indicate that the greatest cost incurred 
in the training of new recruits is associated with salary / employment. Added to the 
previous total we now have an overall cost of £326,460,757 
 
The Review of Policing, Sir Ronnie Flanagan, HMIC, (2008)6 identified the following 
areas as adding to the bureaucracy of probationer training: 
 
‘A study by a metropolitan force has identified that on average supervisors: 
1. Spent 11.5 hours per probationer under the PTP system completing PDP 
paperwork 
2. Now spend at least 35.2 hours per student officer under the SOLAP system 
 
Similarly, on average Student Officers: 
1. Spend 1.9 hours per working week in duty time completing NOS paperwork 
2. Spend 5.4 hours per working week off duty time completing NOS paperwork 
3. Spend 3.4 hours in total in duty time completing self assessment 
4. Spend 7.9 hours in total off duty time completing self assessment’ 
 
The additional time spent by supervisors completing NOS paperwork is 23.7 hours per 
officer. Working on a ratio of 44 working weeks a year each Student Officers spent an 
average of 45 work hours a year completing NOS paperwork which added to the self 
assessment in duty time of 3.4 hours gives a total of 48.4 hours. 
 
Table C 9 sets out the additional cost involved in completing the NOS paperwork; 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 HMIC, (Her Majesties Inspectorate of Constabulary) (2008), The Review of Policing. Home Office 
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Cost associated with the completion of NOS paperwork 
Table: 
C 9 
Yearly 
Salary Cost 
Weekly 
Salary Cost 
Total 
Hours 
Weekly 
Equivalent 
Additional 
Cost 
London Student £44,997 £865 82,376 2,059 £1,781,035 
London Supervisor £56,475 £1,086 40,374 1,009 £1,095,774 
Cost Per Student  £1,690 
Other Student £38,498 £740 258,843 6,471 £4,788,540 
Other Supervisor £49,980 £961 126,747 3,168 £3,044,448 
Cost Per Student  £1,464 
Total Cost  £10,709,797 
  
 
Table: C10 is an updated version of C8 which shows the cost of in house delivery with 
the additional costs of work place assessment against the NOS.  
 
Updated: Cost of in house delivery of IPLDP 
Table: 
C10 
Cost – London Cost – Other  
 Total Per Officer Total Per Officer Total Cost 
LPG £10,557,239 £6,202 £29,342,120 £5,486 £39,899,359 
WBL £15,964,760 £9,380 £43,479,240 £8,130 £59,444,000 
CPD £1,921,640 £1,129 £5,344,658 £999 £7,266,298 
PDU £638,664 £377 £2,022,436 £377 £2,661,100 
Employment £58,889,200 £34,600 £158,300,800 £29,600 £217,190,000 
Assessment £2,876,809 £1,690 £7,832,988 £1,464 £10,709,797 
Total £90,848,312 £53,378 £246,322,242 £46,059 £337,170,554 
 
 
This gives a total of £337,170,554 which is based on in house delivery assessed against 
the NOS.  
 
This does not include any additional allowance for completion of NVQ portfolios, or 
the costs associated with the NVQ award or programmes delivered in partnership with 
Further Education (FE) and Higher Education Institutes (HE). 
 
 In 2007, British Transport, City of London, Cleveland, Kent, Leicestershire, 
Nottinghamshire, South Wales, Sussex, West Mercia and West Yorkshire were 
working in partnership with Further or Higher Education partners.  
 
From these forces alone an estimated 1,420 officers a year have been enrolled on either 
a Certificate of Higher Education (Cert HE) or a Foundation Degree (FD). 
  
The fees for these programmes are approximately £3000 per year, and the force 
breakdown for 2007 works out at 35% on the Cert HE programmes and 65% on FD 
programmes. 
 
Table C9 sets out the costs per officer if IPLDP is delivered in partnership with an 
Institute of Further or Higher Education  
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Cost per officer of IPLDP with FE / HE partner 
Table: 
C9 
Cost of 
In-House Delivery 
Cost with  
Cert HE 
Cost with  
FD 
London £53,378 £56,378 £59,378 
Other £46,059 £49,059 £52,059 
 
 
A number of forces have managed to negotiate favourable rates for their programmes, 
the institutions relying either on HEFCE funding or a return on investment from those 
that self enrol on ‘top up’ programmes. For this analysis the standard figure of £3000 
per year has been used and adds a further £7,114,000 taking the overall cost to 
£344,284,554. 
 
The cost of the Cert HE and FD programmes add a considerable burden to the cost of 
student officer training but this can be offset if the programme is delivered at the 
FE/HE Institution and furthermore if the teaching is shared between the force and the 
Institutions academic staff. 
 
Financial Case Study - Cost (City of London Police) 
 
The Student Officer programme delivered by City of London (CoLP) and British 
Transport Police (BTP) in collaboration with City University is used as a case study to 
compare programme costing: 
 
University fees for each Student Officer (SO) enrolled on the two year Foundation 
Degree are £6,000 (£4,500 year 1 & £1,500 year 2).  
 
The Student Officer Programme incorporates an accredited Police Community Support 
Officer (PCSO) route which costs £1,200 per PCSO enrolled on the programme 
 
Table CS1 sets out the costs for staff seconded to the University: 
 
Cost of Seconded Staff 
Table: 
CS1 
Constables Sergeants Inspectors Total 
Total Staff 8 2 1 11 
BTP Staff 5 2 0 7 
CoLP Staff 3 0 1 4 
Individual Cost £48,803 £56,475 £70,875 N/A 
Total £390,424 £112,950 £70,875 £572,249 
 
 
The total cost of seconded staff is £572,249 which divided by the average number of 
modules (31) gives a per module cost of £18,460.  
 
The individual module cost of £18,460 divided by a yearly average of 180 Student 
Officers and 100 Student PCSO’s. PC’s attend the University for 6 Three week 
Modules and PCSO’s 1 Three week Module which equates to an average of 37.5 
students per module. The per person module costs are: £18,460 ÷ 37.5 = £492 per three 
week module. 
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Table CS2 sets out the costs of the modules for SO’s and PCSO’s. 
 
Module costs for SO’s and PCSO’s 
Table: 
CS2 
Student 
Officers 
Police Community Support 
Officers 
Number of Modules 6 1 
Cost per Module £492 £492 
Total Cost £2,952 £492 
 
 
The Professional Development Unit (PDU) is more difficult to cost due to various 
forms it takes within CoLP & BTP.  
 
For the analysis I have used the CoLP PDU as a model to project costs on a ‘per 
officer’ trained rate. The CoLP PDU has a dedicated classroom which has been costed 
at £575 per week.  
 
In CoLP the PDU staffing and facilities include the delivery of the four induction 
modules, management of Community Placements, year 2 protected learning and 
dedicated assessors for the NOS / NVQ element.  
 
In BTP the Induction, with the exception of the Community Placements are delivered 
at Tadworth training centre which is residential. No account has been given to these 
additional costs. 
 
Table CS3 sets out the cost of the PDU and its staff: 
 
Cost of PDU and its staff 
Table: 
CS3 
Constables Sergeants Inspectors Classrooms Total 
Numbers 3 2 .25 1.5 N/A 
Cost Each £48,803 £56,475 £70,875 £575 N/A 
Total Cost £146,409 £112,950 £17,718 £44,850 £321,927 
 
 
Total cost of: £321,927 per year 
 
Table CS4 sets out the usage of the PDU by SO’s and PCSO’s: 
 
PDU usage by SO’s and PCSO’s 
Table: 
CS4 
Induction PDU 
Tutoring 
Protected 
Learning 
Total 
SO’s 5 weeks 3 x 3 weeks 6 weeks 20 weeks 
PCSO’s 5 weeks 1 x 3 weeks N/A 8 weeks 
Total based on yearly recruitment of 40 Officer and 30 PCSO’s 1040 weeks 
 
 
Dividing the PDU cost of ££321,927 by 1040 gives a weekly cost of £309 per person. 
 
Table CS5 sets out the costs PDU support for SO’s and PCSO’s: 
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Cost of PDU support for SO’s and PCSO’s 
Table: 
CS5 
Induction PDU Tutoring 
Support 
Protected 
Learning 
Total 
Student Officers £1,545 £2,781 £1,854 £6,180 
PCSO’s £1,545 £927 N/A £2,472 
 
 
Professional Development Officers who are attached to the PDU on a rotational, 
cohort by cohort basis cost £48,803 per year - £1,085 per week 
 
Table CS6 sets out the costs of the costs of providing PDO support: 
 
Cost of PDO Support 
Table: 
CS6 
Officer 
One on One 
Officer 
One on Two 
Total 
Cost 
Yearly cost £48,803 £24,402 £374,430 
Weekly cost £1,085 £543 N/A 
SO weeks 6 3 N/A 
SO cost £6,510 £1,629 £8,139 
PCSO weeks 0 3 N/A 
PCSO cost Nil £1,629 £1,629 
 
Based on the Review of Policing by Sir Ronnie Flanagan, HMIC (2008)7 there is the 
additional time spent by supervisors completing NOS paperwork which is 23.7 hours 
per officer.  
 
Working on a ratio of 44 working weeks a year each Student Officers spent an average 
of 45 work hours a year completing NOS paperwork which added to the self 
assessment in duty time of 3.4 hours gives a total of 48.4 hours.  
 
This is costed as being only applicable to Student Officers with a yearly recruitment of 
40.  
 
Table CS 9 sets out the additional cost involved in completing the NOS paperwork; 
 
Cost associated with the completion of NOS paperwork 
Table: 
CS 9 
Yearly 
Salary Cost 
Weekly 
Salary Cost 
Total 
Hours 
Weekly 
Equivalent 
Additional 
Cost 
Student £44,997 £865 1,936 48.4 £41,866 
Supervisor £56,475 £1,086 948 23.7 £25,738 
Cost Per SO  £1,690 
Total Cost  £67,604 
  
 
Table CS10 sets out employment / salary oncosts for SO and PCSO:  
  
 
 
                                                 
7 HMIC, (Her Majesties Inspectorate of Constabulary) (2008), The Review of Policing. Home Office 
 
Pre-Employment Education Draft SS/05 
28/03/2008 
 10 
Salary / employment oncosts for SO’s and PCSO’s 
Table: 
CS10 
Yearly 
rate 
weekly 
salary 
34 week 
SO 
6 week 
PL-yr2 
11 week 
PCSO 
Recruit 
Numbers 
Total 
cost 
SO £44,997 £865 £29,410 £5,190 N/A 40 £1,384,000 
PCSO £33,160 £637 N/A N/A £7,007 30 £210,210 
Total  £1,594,210 
 
 
Table CS 11 sets out the total cost of delivery, support, assessment and employment 
for each SO and PCSO:  
 
Total cost of delivery, support, assessment and employment 
Table: 
CS11 
Student Officer Police Community 
Support Officer 
Course Fees £6,000 £1,200 
Induction Modules £1,545 £1,545 
University Modules £2,952 £492 
PDU yr 1 Support £2,781 £927 
PDO Tutoring £8,139 £1,629 
PDU yr2 PL support £1,854 N/A 
Assessment £1,690 N/A 
Employment £34,600 £7,007 
Total £59,561 £12,800 
 
Between May 2006 and November 2007 238 PC’s and 153 PCSO’s have been 
recruited and enrolled on the Student Officer Programme / accredited PCSO 
programme. Based on the above figures the cost to date to BTP and CoLP is: 
 
PC’s: (238 x £59,561) = £14,175,518 
 
PCSO’s: (153 x £12,800) = £1,958,400 
 
Total: (£14,175,518 + £1,958,400) = £16,133,918 
 
Again, it should be noted that this total does not include the additional cost of BTP 
student’s residential accommodation at Tadworth and London or any allowances / 
expenses paid by either force. In addition, no account has been given to the cost of 
residential accommodation for BTP training staff at either location. 
 
For the City of London, based on an average yearly recruitment of 40 PC’s and 30 
PCSO’s a year a projected annual cost to the organisation can be reached: 
 
PC’s: (40 x £59,561) = £2,382,440 
 
PCSO’s: (12 x £12,800) = £153,600 
 
Total: (£2,382,440 + £153,600) = £2,536,040 
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The study of CoLP and BTP is a comparison based on delivery and assessment costs 
only, the salary / employment oncosts are still weighted to include recruitment and 
induction costs which are spread over the initial two year probation.  
 
Central Funding and Costs 
 
Each force (with the exception of BTP) receives £3,000 per Student Officer from the 
Home Office towards the cost of delivering Initial Police Learning and Development 
Programme. For an average recruitment of 7050 officers this equates to £21,150,000 
per year. The savings realised centrally, through devolved training, have not been 
passed on to forces. 
  
It is acknowledged that there was a capitol start up grant for forces, the amount being 
pro-rata to the size of the force and yearly recruitment projections. For a number of 
forces the grant fell short of the real cost of setting up IPLDP delivery, the short fall 
being financed by the forces. 
 
The £3,000 per student falls well short of the cost for delivering the programme and is 
not representative of the costs associated with delivering the previous Probationer 
Training Programme. In part, this is down to the continued support and services 
provided by the Home Office through the National Policing Improvements Agency 
(NPIA) and its partners.  
 
The NPIA budget was set at £612.3 million for 2007/08 which was adjusted at the mid 
year point in light of projected under spends to £597.8 million. 
 
Some of the services provided by the NPIA which would impact significantly on the 
cost or recruitment and student officer training are: 
 
• Proportion of estate costs attributable to IPLDP 
• Management and administration of the Police SEARCH Recruit Assessment 
Centres 
• Curriculum design and maintenance 
• Design, production and maintenance of learning materials, including legal, 
proof and diversity checking 
• Environmental Scanning 
• Quality Assurance and Evaluation services 
• Student registration and tracking (NCALT) 
• Design, production and maintenance of blended learning materials (NCALT) 
• Management and maintenance of the IT platform to support student 
registration, blended learning materials and programme forums.  
 
To obtain a true cost of recruiting and training of student officer further analysis would 
be required to determine what proportion of central funding received by the NPIA is 
used to support the Initial Police Learning and Development Programme. 
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Projected Savings 
 
The ‘City’ Student Officer Programme was developed on the principals of pre-
employment education utilised by New South Wales Police and Charles Sturt 
University. The structure of the programme permits any number of variables to be 
considered, for both the organisation and the potential students.  
 
The two options that have been scoped are both based on the collaborative 
‘Professional Policing’ approach in preference to the ‘Liberal’ educational model. 
These have been costed for both national and local savings.  
 
Option 1: Partial – Pre Patrol Programme 
 
This option provides students with the opportunity of completing 10 modules leaving 
only 9 weeks (based on the 3 x three week modules of the SOP) ‘work based learning’ 
or ‘tutoring’ to be completed post employment before achieving independent patrol.  
 
All compulsory teaching covering legislation, policy and guidance, as required by the 
Home Office / Central Authority would be covered. This would reduce an officer’s 
probation by 25 weeks, subject to regulations. 
 
National Costing 
 
The ratio of 18 students per class is still used but under the collaborative model 
teaching commitments are shared with university staff. This equates to 1 trainer, 
delivering 2 x 24 week courses a year. This is then supplemented by 1 Sergeant for 
every 12 trainers and 1 Inspector for every 8 Sergeants.  
 
For the year 2, CPD - Protected Learning, a ratio of 18 students per class is still used 
and training staff have been scoped as being able to deliver 44 weeks a year still using 
a ratio of 2 trainers per class with 1 Sergeant for every 6 trainers and 1 Inspector for 
every 4 Sergeants. Here there is the option to have this element delivered by distance 
learning, as is common with employer led academic programmes which would remove 
the majority of these costs, options for both have been included.  
 
All classroom costs have been removed for the initial phase and two options have been 
included for year 2, traditional 6 weeks protected and the distance learning option. 
 
With the reduced responsibilities associated with delivery of the programme in 
partnership with a HE institution, administration, quality assurance, evaluation, 
curriculum maintenance, environmental scanning, assessment, timetabling etc, a 
reduced rate of 2 support roles per 100 recruits is used. 
 
The costing is still broken down into the following areas: 
 
• LPG - 25 weeks legislation, Policy & Guidance (including Induction and leave) 
• WBL - 9 weeks Professional Development  
• CPD - 6 weeks Protected Learning  
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Table OP1 sets out the projected costing for the first of these areas, LPG, which breaks 
down as: 
 
Costing for 24 week LPG phase (including induction) 
Table: 
OP1 
Course
s 
Classroom
s 
Trainers Sergeants Inspector
s 
Support Total 
Londo
n 
95 0 47.5 8 2 34 N/A 
Cost N/A NIL £2,318,14
2 
£451,800 £141,750 £1,656,80
2 
£4,568,494 
Other 298 0 149 25 6.5 74.5 N/A 
Cost N/A NIL £6,303,89
2 
£1,249,50
0 
£405,470 £4,484,64
8 
£12,443,51
0 
Total  NIL £8,622,03
4 
£1,701,30
0 
£547,220 £6,141,45
0 
£17,012,00
4 
 
 
This gives a total of £17,012,004 
 
The original cost was £39,899,359  
 
This gives a projected saving of £22,887,355 
 
Table OP2 sets out the next area which is WBL: 
 
Costing for 9 week WBL phase 
Table: 
OP2 
Original  
cost 
Students Weeks Cost 
 per week 
Revised  
Cost 
Projected 
Saving 
London £15,964,760 1,702 15,318 £938 £14,368,284 £1,596,476 
Other £43,479,240 5,348 48,132 £813 £39,131,316 £4,347,924 
Total £59,444,000 7,050 70,500 N/A £53,499,600 £5,944,400 
 
 
This gives a total of £53,499,600 
 
The original cost was £59,444,000 
 
This gives a projected saving of £5,944,400   
 
Table OP3 sets out the final area, CPD which is unchanged, whilst OP3a sets out the 
potential savings from adopting a distance learning approach. 
 
Costing for 6 week CPD phase (traditional delivery) 
Table: 
OP3 
Courses Classrooms Trainers Sergeants Inspectors Total 
London 95 570 w 26 4.5 1 N/A 
Cost N/A £327,750 £1,268,878 £254,137 £70,875 £1,921,640 
Other 298 1,782 w 81 13.5 3.5 N/A 
Cost N/A £1,024,650 £3,426,948 £674,730 £218,330 £5,344,658 
Total  £1,352,400 £4,695,826 £928,867 £289,205 £7,266,298 
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Costing for 6 week CPD phase (distance learning) 
Table: 
OP3a 
Courses Classrooms Trainers Sergeants Inspectors Total 
London 95 Nil 13 2.25 .5 N/A 
Cost N/A Nil £634,439 £127,068 £35,437 £796,944 
Other 298 Nil 40.5 6.75 1.75 N/A 
Cost N/A Nil £1,713,474 £337,365 £109,165 £2,160,004 
Total  Nil £2,347,913 £464,433 £144,602 £2,956,948 
 
 
The cost of traditional delivery is unchanged at £7,266,298 
 
The revised cost of distance learning is reduced to £2,956,948 
 
This gives a projected saving of £4,309,350 
 
Table OP4 sets out the cost of delivering Initial Police Learning and Development 
Programme under the collaborative pre employment route and OP4a goes one step 
further with the distance learning option included for year 2:  
 
Cost of Collaborative delivery of IPLDP (traditional delivery) 
Table: 
OP4 
Cost – London Cost – Other  
 Total Per Officer Total Per Officer Total Cost 
LPG £4,568,494 £2,684 £12,443,510 £2,326 £17,012,004 
WBL £14,368,284 £8,442 £39,131,316 £7,317 £53,499,600 
CPD £1,921,640 £1,129 £5,344,658 £999 £7,266,298 
Total £20,858,418 £12,255 £56,919,484 £10,642 £77,777,902 
 
Cost of Collaborative delivery of IPLDP (distance learning) 
Table: 
OP4a 
Cost – London Cost – Other  
 Total Per Officer Total Per Officer Total Cost 
LPG £4,568,494 £2,684 £12,443,510 £2,326 £17,012,004 
WBL £14,368,284 £8,442 £39,131,316 £7,317 £53,499,600 
CPD a £796,944 £468 £2,160,004 £403 £2,956,948 
Total a £19,733,722 £11,594 £53,734,830 £10,859 £73,468,552 
 
 
There is no change in the cost of providing PDU (tutoring) support so this remains at 
the original cost of £8,442 / £7,317.  
 
This would equate to 898 dedicated units at a cost of £29,900 per unit giving an 
additional cost of £2,661,100 or £377 per officer.  
 
                                                 
8 89 is a notional figure based on the ‘ideal’ required to provide PDU support on a national basis and 
would be subject to change based on individual force requirements.  
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The greatest potential for saving comes from reduced employment costs by delivering 
25 weeks pre-employment which, coupled to the option of delivering year 2 protected 
learning (CPD) by distance education, could save 31 weeks employment costs. 
 
Table OP5 sets out the salary / employment oncosts for the existing 34 week 
programme and the potential savings of pre-employment and year 2 distance CPD. 
 
Salary / employment oncosts and potential savings 
Table: 
OP5 
Yearly 
rate 
weekly 
salary 
34 week 
rate 
25 week  
saving 
6 week  
saving 
London £44,997 £865 £29,410 £21,625 £5,190 
Other £38,494 £740 £25,160 £18,500 £4,440 
  
 
Table: OP6 sets out the costs with a traditional employed 34 week programme. OP6a 
sets out the costs by implementing the 25 weeks pre-employment education. OP6b sets 
out the costs of pre-employment education with distance CPD option in year 2. 
 
Total cost of delivery, support, assessment and employment  
(traditional route) 
 Table: 
OP6 
Cost – London Cost – Other  
 Total Per Officer Total Per Officer Total Cost 
LPG £10,557,239 £6,202 £29,342,120 £5,486 £39,899,359 
WBL £15,964,760 £9,380 £43,479,240 £8,130 £59,444,000 
CPD £1,921,640 £1,129 £5,344,658 £999 £7,266,298 
PDU £638,664 £377 £2,022,436 £377 £2,661,100 
Employment £58,889,200 £34,600 £158,300,800 £29,600 £217,190,000 
Assessment £2,876,809 £1,690 £7,832,988 £1,464 £10,709,797 
Total £90,848,312 £53,378 £246,322,242 £46,059 £337,170,554 
 
Total cost of delivery, support, assessment and employment  
(Pre-Employment) 
Table: 
OP6a 
Cost – London Cost – Other  
 Total Per Officer Total Per Officer Total Cost 
LPG £4,568,494 £2,684 £12,443,510 £2,326 £17,012,004 
WBL £14,368,284 £8,442 £39,131,316 £7,317 £53,499,600 
CPD £1,921,640 £1,129 £5,344,658 £999 £7,266,298 
PDU £638,664 £377 £2,022,436 £377 £2,661,100 
Employment £22,083,450 £12,975 £59,362,800 £11,100 £81,446,250 
Assessment £2,876,809 £1,690 £7,832,988 £1,464 £10,709,797 
Total £52,446,086 £30,815 £143,036,318 £26,743 £195,482,404 
 
Total cost of delivery, support, assessment and employment  
(Pre-Employment & Distance CPD) 
Table: 
OP6b 
Cost – London Cost – Other  
 Total Per Officer Total Per Officer Total Cost 
LPG £4,568,494 £2,684 £12,443,510 £2,326 £17,012,004 
WBL £14,368,284 £8,442 £39,131,316 £7,317 £53,499,600 
CPD a £796,944 £468 £2,160,004 £403 £2,956,948 
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PDU £638,664 £377 £2,022,436 £377 £2,661,100 
Employment £13,250,070 £7,785 £35,617,680 £6,600 £48,867,750 
Assessment £2,876,809 £1,690 £7,832,988 £1,464 £10,709,797 
Total £43,612,706 £25,635 £119,291,198 £22,243 £162,898,904 
 
Table OP7 summarises the costs and projected savings for option 1: 
 
Summary of projected savings 
Table 
OP7 
Existing Cost Pre Employment + Distance CPD 
London total cost £90,848,312 £52,446,086 £43,612,706 
Per officer cost £53,378 £30,815 £25,635 
Other total cost £246,322,242 £143,036,318 £119,291,198 
Per officer cost £46,059 £26,743 £22,243 
Total cost £337,170,554 £195,482,404 £162,898,904 
Projected Saving NIL £141,688,150 £174,271,650 
 
 
Add to this £7,114,000 which is currently being paid to HE institutes by the forces and 
the figures rise to: £148,802,150 and £181,385,650 respectively. 
 
Table OP8 sets out the saving on a per officer basis comparing both ‘pre employment 
education’ and the ‘distance CPD’ options 
 
Summary of projected savings on a per officer basis 
Table 
OP8 
London 
(Pre-Emp) 
London 
(Dist-CPD) 
Other 
(Pre-Emp) 
Other 
(Dist-CPD) 
Savings if 
currently 
In - House 
 
£22,563 
 
£27,753 
 
£19,316 
 
£23,816 
Savings if 
currently 
Cert HE 
 
£25,563 
 
£30,753 
 
£22,316 
 
£26,816 
Savings if 
currently 
FD 
 
£28,563 
 
£33,753 
 
£25,316 
 
£29,816 
 
 
Option 2: Full – Post Independent Patrol Programme 
 
This option mirrors the Student Officer Programme in structure and timescale but 
seeks to take the student through to independent patrol prior to being offered employed 
status.  
 
To achieve this, in addition to the compulsory teaching covering legislation, policy and 
guidance, as required by the Home Office / Central Authority, the student officer must 
be exposed to and demonstrate a level of competence against the criteria set out in the 
Police Action Checklist (PACs).  
 
Because the student officers are not ‘employed’, applicants would need to be security 
and suitability checked prior to commencing the programme, at which point they 
would be sworn in as Special Constables.  
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As special constables the student officers will be able to demonstrate competence 
under the same criteria as employed officers. This option builds on the Charles Sturt 
model taking students one stage further before offering employed status. 
Once a special constable has demonstrated competence against the PACs they would 
be eligible for employment as a regular officer having completed 34 weeks (there are 
options to ‘fast track’ this time scale or extend it with part time study) pre-employment 
study and would be immediately deployable as an independent resource.  
 
With this option it is proposed that the Student Officers could be ‘fast tracked’ without 
the need to complete the national recruit selection process (SEARCH) because they 
would have undergone rigorous academic and workplace assessment to assess their 
suitability for employment.  
 
In essence the only change to costing will be the reduction in employment costs by a 
further 9 weeks.  
 
Table OF1 sets out the costs for the ‘pre-employment education’ route and OF1a sets 
out the costs under the ‘distance CPD’ route  
 
Total cost of delivery, support, assessment and employment  
(year 2 traditional delivery) 
Table: 
OF1 
Cost – London Cost – Other  
 Total Per Officer Total Per Officer Total Cost 
LPG £4,568,494 £2,684 £12,443,510 £2,326 £17,012,004 
WBL £14,368,284 £8,442 £39,131,316 £7,317 £53,499,600 
CPD £1,921,640 £1,129 £5,344,658 £999 £7,266,298 
PDU £638,664 £377 £2,022,436 £377 £2,661,100 
Employment £8,833,380 £5,190 £23,745,120 £4,440 £32,578,500 
Assessment £2,876,809 £1,690 £7,832,988 £1,464 £10,709,797 
Total £33,207,271 £19,512 £90,520,028 £16,923 £123,727,299 
 
 
Total cost of delivery, support, assessment and employment  
(year 2 distance learning) 
Table: 
OF1b 
Cost – London Cost – Other  
 Total Per Officer Total Per Officer Total Cost 
LPG £4,568,494 £2,684 £12,443,510 £2,326 £17,012,004 
WBL £14,368,284 £8,442 £39,131,316 £7,317 £53,499,600 
CPD a £796,944 £468 £2,160,004 £403 £2,956,948 
PDU £638,664 £377 £2,022,436 £377 £2,661,100 
Employment NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL 
Assessment £2,876,809 £1,690 £7,832,988 £1,464 £10,709,797 
Total £30,362,636 £17,850 £83,673,518 £15,643 £114,036,154 
 
  
Table OF2 sets out the saving on a per officer basis comparing both ‘pre employment 
education’ and the ‘distance CPD’ options on the full – post independent patrol model: 
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Summary of projected savings on a per officer basis 
Table 
OF2 
London 
(Pre-Emp) 
London 
(Dist-CPD) 
Other 
(Pre-Emp) 
Other 
(Dist-CPD) 
Savings if 
currently 
In - House 
 
£33,866 
 
£35,528 
 
£29,136 
 
£30,416 
Savings if 
currently 
Cert HE 
 
£36,866 
 
£38,528 
 
£32,136 
 
£33,416 
Savings if 
currently 
FD 
 
£39,866 
 
£41,528 
 
£35,316 
 
£36,416 
 
 
Separating out the fees currently being paid to HE institutes the projected savings are: 
 
London Option 1: £38,402,226 to £47,235,606 
 
London Option 2: £57,639,932 to £60,648,656 
 
Other Option 1: £103,301,968 to £127,367,968 
 
Other Option 2: £155,819,328 to £162,664,768 
 
Including the fees being paid to HE institutes the projected national savings now range 
from: £148,818,194 to £230,427,424. 
 
Areas where costs will remain static 
 
The following areas are static and would remain constant: 
 
• Security / vetting checks 
• Fitness testing 
• Medical 
• Issue of uniform and personal protective equipment 
  
In the initial / pilot stages of the programme certain costs will remain static to support 
both employed and pre-employment recruitment routes but would potentially offer 
efficiency savings if pre-employment was adopted as the sole route for recruitment: 
 
• Streamlining of learning and development (initial training) 
• Streamlining of HR functions (recruitment and selection) 
 
Area where additional costs may be incurred 
 
1. It is acknowledged that FE / HE funding through Higher Education Funding 
Council for England (HEFCE) and government grants would potentially have 
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to be increased to accommodate the additional student numbers this project 
would generate. It is also acknowledged that this additional cost could 
potentially be passed on to the police by way of reduced police grants. 
 
2. The provision of ‘work placements’ as special constables for university 
students will undoubtedly result in above average insurance / public liability 
insurance premiums for the university. This is a cost that could potentially be 
shared by the collaborative partners. 
 
3. The Home Office / Police ‘Could You’ campaign would not address the 
recruitment needs of the pre-employment programme and whilst there was still 
an ‘employed’ recruitment option available a separate recruitment strategy 
would need to be developed and funded. Again, this is an area that could 
potentially be joint funded by the collaborative partners. 
 
Associated areas where efficiency savings could be made 
 
1. A collaborative recruitment model, based on the system implemented by New 
South Wales Police and Charles Sturt University would significantly reduce the 
burden on forces in the management and administration of police recruitment.  
 
For forces, the efficiencies in personnel alone have been estimated at 1 junior 
clerical / administrative and 1 administrative manager per 100 recruits. With 
employment oncosts of £32,915 and £37,210 respectively, for recruitment of 
7050 officers this could potentially provide efficiency savings of £4,943,812. 
 
2. The cost of supporting and submitting potential recruits to ‘SEARCH’, the 
national recruit selection centres has been calculated at £155 per candidate.  
 
Assuming a success rate of 60%, to achieve recruitment of 7,050 officers, 
11,750 applicants would need to be assessed.  
 
Under option 2, where the ‘SEARCH’ assessment is not required, this would 
equate to a potential saving of (11,750 x £155) £1,821,250. However, this does 
not include the potential saving that could be realised by the NPIA who 
currently run the selection centres. 
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1. Context 
 
The Government announced a review of fraud to Parliament in October 2005, 
with the aim: ‘to review the arrangements for dealing with fraud with the intent 
to reduce the amount of fraud and the damage it causes to the economy and 
society.’ The Fraud review was completed in July 2006, and made 62 
recommendations encompassing the prevention, reporting, measurement, 
investigation, and prosecution of fraud. 
 
Following a period of public consultation the Government published it’s 
response in March 2007. The government selected four key 
recommendations to progress as part of an integrated strategy to combat 
fraud. 
 
• To improve fraud recording 
• To improve service to victims 
• To improve fraud investigation and pursuit of the perpetrator 
• To improve the volume and quality of intelligence and analysis 
 
In total there are seven work streams emanating from the recommendations 
the NFRC/NFIB and NLF are two of those streams. The other streams are:  
 
• National Fraud Strategic Authority 
• Measurement Unit 
• Extending Powers 
• Financial Court Study and Working Group 
• Framework Plea and Negotiations 
 
It is widely held that fraud is the second highest source of harm to the 
economy and society. Fraud is conservatively estimated to cost the economy 
at least £20billion1 in direct costs (based on 2005 statistics), not taking into 
account the cost of trying to do something about these losses, however, the 
reality is probably far higher. 
 
Action to tackle fraud is undermined by the highly fragmented way that fraud 
is reported and then analysed.  
 
Criminals exploit a routine failure of information sharing between 
organisations that hold fraud intelligence, which helps disguise the nature and 
extent of the criminal networks involved - increasing harm and driving up 
demand on police and the courts.  Individuals and small businesses are often 
confused about where to report fraud.   
 
To be effective, action against fraud by industry, law makers and law 
enforcers must be based on robust intelligence.  But this in itself requires 
clear lines of reporting of fraud; and an ability to join-up pools of intelligence 
                                                 
1 Levi et al “The Nature, Extent, and Economic Impact of Fraud in the UK” published by ACPO 2006 (foreword) 
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currently split between organisational silos; and strong links to law 
enforcements’ wider criminal intelligence systems.  
  
As set out in the government’s Fraud Review, the National Fraud Reporting 
Center (NFRC) and the associated National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) 
will provide the vehicle through which relevant organisations can work 
together to tackle the fraud problem.  The NFRC and NFIB aim to close the 
gap between data gathering from multiple sources and analysis - much as 
JTAC2 does for terrorism.  
 
1.1 Overview 
 
The NFRC will have two main access channels – a website and a call centre. 
 
The first channel to be launched will be the website which will be hosted by 
Consumer Direct (CD) – the public enquiries branch of the Office of Fair 
Trading.  The website will be piloted in a specific region (to be determined) of 
the country and supported by a targeted marketing campaign within that area.  
The pilot will last for approximately 3 months. 
 
The NFRC website will effectively be a micro site of the Consumer Direct 
main website.  It will retain the navigation of the main site, however it will have 
its own branding style, content and URL.  It will also have a link from the 
home page of the CD site.  The main elements of the site will be an 
‘intelligent’ reporting form supported by fraud prevention advice. 
 
The website will be communicated to the general public as a portal for all 
fraud reporting, apart from where pre-existing reporting arrangements are in 
place, for benefits, credit card, copyright fraud etc.  In these cases the website 
will signpost individuals to the appropriate organisation. 
 
Individual reports of frauds in progress will be redirected to the appropriate 
local force as the website will not be designed to receive reports of active 
crimes in progress. 
 
The Fraud Review 2006 made the following recommendations: 
 
• The NFRC should be housed within the National Lead (police) force 
(rec39) and staffed by police officers and civilians. It should work 
closely with the NFSA3. 
                                                 
2 Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, a multi-agency unit staffed by members of the security agencies and 
other government departments.  
3 The National Fraud Strategic Authority (NFSA) was established on 1 October 2008. An Executive 
Agency of the Attorney General’s Office will coordinate fraud activity across the whole economy, 
private and public sectors, to make the UK a hostile environment for fraudsters. It is aiming to initiate, 
co-ordinate and communicate on counter-fraud activity across the private and public sectors.  
The National Fraud Strategic Authority will have no operational responsibilities but will concentrate 
on measuring fraud, developing a national fraud strategy, assessing performance in the response to 
fraud and disseminating advice and assistance in response to fraud crime. 
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• The NFRC should have the capacity to accept crime reports from 
victims (including businesses and Government departments, 
Regulators, etc) according to the Home Office Counting Rules (HOCR) 
and the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS). 
• The NFRC should work with police forces to agree criteria for 
screening and allocation of cases to forces. Theses criteria should be 
reviewed on a regular basis (e.g. annual or bi-annual). 
• The NFRC should be compatible with the IMPACT programme and 
searchable by police forces. The NFRC analytical unit should run 
reports on the system upon request from forces. 
• A pilot should be undertaken to match known frauds against other 
police data sets using IMPACT. 
• The NFRC should identify trusted partners in different sectors and 
establish working relationships with them to identify how information on 
known fraudsters can be shared efficiently to prevent and detect fraud. 
• The NFRC should analyse reports to provide strategic, tactical and 
other assessments to the police and partner organisations. Strategic 
assessment would pass to the NFSA and inform the United Kingdom 
Threat Assessment (UKTA). Tactical assessments would inform an 
operational response. 
• Devising and implementing public anti fraud campaigns and warnings, 
drawing on generic and case specific information provided by NFRC. 
 
 
2. Aims and Objectives of the NFRC 
 
 
o To contribute to increased volume and better targeted fraud 
investigations in the UK. 
o To encourage increased reporting of fraud. 
o Provide fraud prevention advice for both consumers and industry 
stakeholders. 
o To create a fuller and more intelligent picture of fraud trends throughout 
the UK. 
o To prevent fraud. 
o To increase public satisfaction to law enforcement’s response to fraud. 
o To provide an online reporting centre for victims of fraudulent activity. 
o To collect comprehensive data on fraud.  
o To feed data to the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau. 
o To identify where investigations into fraudulent activity are appropriate. 
o To provide fraud prevention advice to the public. 
o To act as a signpost for victims with specific issues that may benefit 
from being handled by another expert agency. 
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3. Target audiences for website 
 
Audience Information and service 
requirement 
Victims Reporting facilities, advice, 
information on new fraud trends 
Small and medium businesses 
(small business as defined by Companies 
Act – turnover less than £5.6m) 
Reporting facilities, advice, new 
information on fraud trends 
General public Advice, information on new fraud 
trends 
Media Information on new fraud trends, 
advice (as reference tool) 
         
 
4. Website outline 
 
A visitor to the website will initially land on a home page where they will find a 
set of navigation choices.  The home page will either be reached directly via 
its unique URL or through the home page of the CD main site. 
 
The main sections of the website will be: 
o Definitions of fraud 
o Advice on fraud prevention with links to other expert sources of advice 
and assistance 
o Link to counter fraud specialists (Police Fraud and Economic Crime 
specialist departments) within the UK 
o A fraud news centre – to be able to post new trends in fraud as a 
prevention tool (including fraud alert subscription service) 
o An interactive reporting form 
o Victims of Fraud support 
 
4.1 Definitions of fraud 
 
A comprehensive list of the different types of fraud a person may be a victim 
of.  This information will help individuals identify whether they are a victim of 
fraud and raise their awareness of other prevalent types of fraud. 
 
4.2 Advice and links 
 
A section covering advice on how to avoid becoming a victim, and  
organisations that can provide assistance .  
 
4.3 Counter Fraud Specialists in the UK 
 
An area of the website which identifies local and regional centres of expertise 
within the police service who have established/dedicated fraud or economic 
crime departments.  The site will provide local contact details or links to 
dedicated fraud web pages if available. 
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4.4 News centre 
 
An area of the website where visitors can monitor fraud trends.  This section 
will act as a prevention tool as well as potential catalyst for further publicity.  It 
will also keep the site ‘fresh’ as content will regularly change. 
 
4.5 Interactive reporting form 
 
The form will act as a filter, directing people to the most appropriate outcome 
in relation to the type of reported fraud. 
 
4.5.1 Possible outcomes of reporting: 
o A full report is taken and the information is passed to the NFIB for 
further analysis – the victim will be informed that they will be 
contacted further by police 
o Urgent referrals to local forces? 
o The victim is redirected to another agency better equipped to help 
with this type of fraud (i.e., e-crime) 
o The victim is informed that their information has been collected and 
will be used in intelligence analysis but that no further action will be 
taken on that individual fraud.  They will be redirected to fraud 
prevention advice (low level fraud) 
 
4.6 Support for Victims of Fraud 
 
Initially, the web site will provide links to support organisations such as Victim 
Support and Citizen Advice. A separate project is underway to identify the 
requirements for a National Victim support network for fraud. Information on 
this will be included as soon it is available. 
 
5. Scope of the Work Package 
 
The design of the NFRC web-reporting site is broken down into 6 key stages: 
 
5.1 Initial scope:  
 
Develop an initial model taking consideration of the requirements and 
recommendations of the Fraud Review 2006 and relevant legislation and 
guidance/policy documents which includes: - 
 
• Compliance with ‘Crime Recording Standards’ 
• Compliance with ‘Minimum Investigation Standards’ 
• Compliance with ‘Citizen Charter’ 
 
The initial model will be developed to a ‘gold standard’ incorporating the 
maximum data that could be recorded which will be rationalised to a standard 
(through consultation) that is acceptable for data matching, intelligence and 
where appropriate, allocation and investigation. 
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5.2  Stage one consultation:  
 
Stage one consultation will focus on data field compatibility with the National 
Fraud Intelligence Bureau; this will be based on the cleansed data extracted 
from the data submitted by stakeholder organisations engaged with the NFIB 
proof of concept.   
 
The City of London Fraud Desk will review the data fields and consider 
content as a direct comparison to crimes that are referred to the desk for 
consideration (mapped against acceptance criteria and crime recording 
standards). The Fraud Desk will be expected to make recommendations for 
additional fields and the streamlining of existing fields. 
 
Additional subject matter experts may be consulted as appropriate. 
 
5.3  National Consultation: 
 
As the NFRC is a national project it is vital that forces are consulted and 
contribute to the design solution. The national consultation will bring together 
a small number of key stakeholders4 from across the UK police services, the 
stakeholders will be selected from the forces with well established Fraud or 
Economic Crime departments and have the requisite knowledge and 
expertise to constructively influence the design solution of the NFRC.   
 
The national consultation will focus on data quality & capture in relation to 
initial reports of fraud submitted to the NFRC. The group will also consider the 
minimum standards (including processes) for transfer to forces for both 
intelligence and investigation.  
 
Note – this consultation is only in relation to the design solution for the web-
reporting portal, consultation on the wider NFRC/NFIB project will include all 
forces and stakeholder groups.   
 
5.4  Product sign off & construction:  
 
The refined design solution will be presented to the Project Board for approval 
and product sign off. The approved design solution will form the basis of the 
product specification for the web design contract that will be delivered by the 
contracted supplier of web solutions to the OFT. 
 
The design solution will be used to scope the requirements of the call centre 
reporting process to ensure data compatibility between the two channels. 
Having scoped the call centre reporting process a full training needs analysis 
will be conducted mapping the existing Consumer Direct training programme 
                                                 
4 The first national consultation will focus on the specific requirements of the Police service but 
additional consultation events will bring together key stakeholders from industry e.g. APACS, CIFAS, 
OFT and representatives from support networks/charities including Victim Support, Citizens Advice 
etc. 
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and job description against the requirements to incorporate the NFRC. A train 
the trainer’s package will be developed and cascaded across all Consumer 
Direct staff during the 3-month pilot in preparation for national roll out.    
 
5.5  Pilot & evaluation:  
 
The NFRC pilot will consist of a website including an on-line reporting facility 
(phase one) backed up by a call centre (phase two) which will be signposted 
on the website (perhaps). The target audience will be the general public and 
small businesses.  
 
The NFRC Pilot is intended to establish whether the public would use a fraud 
reporting service, what the levels of uptake will be for call/web reporting and 
to understand the levels of expected data traffic and calls for a national rollout. 
 
The pilot will provide feedback, which will indicate how useful/appropriate 
members of the public, found the web pages/content. The pilot will include 
web analytics to assess the level of use, number of individuals who 
commence a report in relation to the number who submit a report. Data quality 
comparison between web reports and call centre reports will inform any 
amendments or refinements required prior to national roll out. 
 
 
5.6  National roll out: - 
 
The findings of the NFRC pilot will form the basis of a business case that will 
be presented to the Project Board for approval prior to national roll out.  
 
The business case will also inform the structure of the ‘back room’ 
requirements for managing both the NFRC and the NFIB. This will include 
both the technical solutions (data bank, intelligence analytics, data transfer 
etc) and people requirement (Fraud Desk v National Fraud Desk) to review 
allocate and transfer crimes for intelligence and investigation.  
 
The national roll out of the NFRC will include promotion of the web site and 
the call center reporting facility.  
 
 
 Delivering the Recommendations of the 
Fraud Review 2006 
and the  
Paradox of Police Leadership 
 
 
 
    Appendix Nine 
 
NFRC Fraud Prevention Advice 
NFRC Fraud Definitions & Prevention Advice 
Account takeover fraud 
This type of fraud occurs when a fraudster manages to steal sufficient details about 
you and your account to get mail redirected or cards reissued. The fraudster can then 
get access to your money. 
Also known as: 
Identity theft 
Protect yourself 
• Don’t throw out anything with your name, address or financial details on.
Shred it using a cross-cut shredder first.
• If you receive an unsolicited email or phone call from what appears to be your
bank or building society asking for your security details, never reveal your full
password, login details or account numbers. Most banks will not approach
their customers in this manner.
• If you’re concerned about the source of a call, ask the caller to give you a
main switchboard number so you can call it yourself and be routed back to
them
• Check your statements carefully and report anything suspicious to the
financial institution concerned
• If you’re expecting a bank or credit card statement and it doesn’t arrive, tell
your bank or credit card company
• Don’t leave things like bills lying around for others to look at, such as at work
Application fraud 
This type of fraud occurs when a fraudster steals enough personal details about you 
to open an account in your name. These could include real or fake utility bills, bank 
account or credit card statements, or documents like a passport or driving licence. 
 
Also known as: 
False application fraud, identity theft 
 
Protect yourself  
• Don’t throw out anything with your name, address or financial details on 
without shredding it first. 
• If you receive an unsolicited email or phone call from what appears to be your 
bank or building society asking for your security details, never reveal your full 
password, login details or account numbers. Most banks will not approach 
their customers in this manner.   
• If you are concerned about the source of a call, ask the caller to give you a 
main switchboard number for you to be routed back to them 
• Check your statements carefully and report anything suspicious to the 
financial institution concerned 
• If you’re expecting a bank or credit card statement and it doesn’t arrive, tell 
your bank or credit card company 
• Don’t leave things like bills lying around for others to look at, such as at work 
• Get regular copies of your credit report from a credit reference agency  
• If you move house, always get Royal Mail to redirect your post 
Asset misappropriation 
This is a crime in which third parties or employees of an organisation abuse their 
position to steal a business asset. This can be anything from intellectual property to 
customer details. Here’s an example: A bank employee accesses customer security 
details in order to use them to commit a crime or pass them on to other criminals. 
This enables the fraudster to contact the bank, and pretend to be the customer. 
Typically he’ll then transfer money to another account or ask for new cards etc. to be 
sent to a bogus address.   
Asset misappropriation can also apply to all sorts of other things such as making 
false expense claims, payroll fraud or creating fictitious employees. 
Also known as 
Stealing company assets, intellectual property theft, false expenses claims, payroll 
fraud 
 
Protect yourself 
Your organisation can take the following steps to help to protect itself from asset 
misappropriation fraud: 
• vet employees thoroughly checking employee CVs and references 
• implement a whistleblowing policy 
• control access to buildings and systems using unique identification and 
passwords 
• restrict and closely monitor access to sensitive information 
• impose clear segregation of duties 
• consider job rotation 
• use tiered authority and signature levels for payments 
• regularly reconcile bank statements and other accounts 
• periodically audit processes and procedures  
• promote a culture of fraud awareness among staff 
• adopt, and rigorously implement, a zero tolerance policy towards employee 
fraud 
• have a clear response plan in place in case fraud is discovered. 
ATM – Cash machine fraud 
Cash machine fraud isn’t a type of fraud but describes where it takes place.  
 
Card reading devices 
In this case, fraudsters capture your card details by attaching an electronic device to 
the card entry slot and a miniature pinhole camera above the PIN pad. These are 
highly sophisticated gadgets and are very difficult to spot as they’re designed to look 
like part of the machine. The devices may only be placed on a particular machine for 
a very short period of time before they’re moved to another one. 
The fraudsters use the card details they’ve stolen to produce fake cards which can 
then be used with the appropriate PIN to withdraw money at cash machines 
overseas which have not yet been upgraded to chip and PIN.  
 
Shoulder surfing  
Sometimes criminals watch over your shoulder while you enter your PIN, and then 
pick your pocket or distract you to steal your card. They have been known to do this 
by dropping money on the floor, then asking you if it’s yours.  
 
Card trapping devices  
In this case, a device is inserted into a cash machine's card slot which retains the 
card. The criminal tricks you into re-entering your PIN and watches carefully while 
you do it. When your card doesn’t reappear, they just wait until you give up and 
leave. The criminal is then free to remove the device, with your card, and withdraw 
your cash.  
 
Also known as: 
Skimming, counterfeit card fraud 
 
Protect yourself  
• If you suspect a device has been placed on an ATM don’t try to remove it. 
These are expensive gadgets and the fraudsters, who’ll be watching nearby, 
may use violence if they think you’re taking their property 
• Instead, call the police or contact the bank immediately  
• Never keep your card and PIN number together  
• Beware of people behind you at cash machines. Don’t let anyone see you 
entering your PIN number. (Try to cover your hand while keying in your PIN) 
Benefit Fraud 
Benefit theft not only applies to those who are working for 'cash in hand' whilst 
claiming Job Seeker’s Allowance, it can be committed in any number of ways. 
For instance, it includes deliberately not telling the benefits agency about certain 
changes in your situation which may result in a reduction in your benefits: 
• that you are now living with a partner 
• about any savings or not telling the Benefits Office the right amount  
• that your children have left home  
• that you’ve started work, or about any earnings  
• that you have inherited money  
• that you’re going abroad, are living abroad, or have changed address. 
You may also be a victim whereby a criminal has fraudulently used your details to 
make a claim for state benefits. 
Also known as 
Benefit theft, job seekers allowance fraud 
Are you a victim of benefit fraud? 
• Being told that you are claiming benefits when you are not could mean that you 
have been a victim of identity theft and fraudsters are claiming benefits in your 
name. 
• If you have applied for state housing and been told you do not qualify in your 
area, but have had housing before, you may have been a victim of benefit 
fraud. 
What should you do if you're a victim of benefit fraud? 
• Notify your local council and benefits office. 
• Report benefit fraud to the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) via their 
secure, online report a benefit thief form. 
• Call the National Benefit Fraud Hotline (NFBH) on 0800 854 440. Lines are 
open between Monday to Friday, 8am to 6pm. It is free and confidential. There 
is a text phone service available on 0800 328 0512. 
• The Welsh National Benefit Fraud Hotline on 0800 678 3722 is open from 8am 
to 6pm, Monday to Friday (an out-of-hours messaging service operates from 
7am to 8am and 6pm to 11pm weekdays and from 7am to 11pm at 
weekends).   
Bribery and Corruption 
The scope of corruption is vast and very complex. Although bribery is probably its 
most common form, it could encompass anything from petty extortion to the 
amassing of personal wealth through embezzlement or other dishonest means. It’s 
an issue that’s of increasing concern to politicians and policymakers both here and 
abroad. 
A classic definition of corruption is ‘the abuse of public or private office for personal 
gain’ but this is a very general description. If an ordinary citizen lies when they give 
testimony in court, this would be corruption of the criminal justice system. However, it 
does not involve abuse of public office by a public official. If a police officer were to 
fabricate evidence out of a misplaced sense of justice, this would be corruption of a 
public office, but not for private gain. 
Nepotism is another form of corruption. Unlike bribery, where the person who 
accepts the bribe is understood as being required to return the favour, (otherwise it 
wouldn’t be a bribe), the beneficiary of an act of nepotism doesn’t have to. 
Also known as 
Embezzlement, paying someone off, nepotism, cronyism, extortion, perjury,  
 
Protect yourself 
• vet employees’ CVs and references thoroughly 
• put a whistleblowing policy in place 
• control access to buildings and systems using unique identification and 
passwords 
• restrict and closely monitor access to sensitive information 
• impose clear segregation of duties 
• consider job rotation 
• promote a culture of fraud awareness among staff 
• adopt, and rigorously implement, a zero tolerance policy towards employee 
fraud, bribery and corruption 
• Implement a process of adequate procedures as defined by the Bribery Act 
2010. 
Buying or selling online 
Whenever you buy anything online, there are a number of steps you can take to 
make sure you don’t fall victim to a fraudster. 
 
Protect yourself 
• Deal with companies or people you know by reputation or experience. If you 
aren't familiar with the company, do your research. Find out their address and 
phone number. Don’t do business with a company that doesn't list an address 
or telephone number on its website. 
• Read the terms and conditions of the contract to make sure you understand 
the delivery options, return policy, and product or service warranty. When 
buying from abroad, ask for information about the exchange rate and any 
applicable duties and taxes.  
• Look for a privacy policy. Make sure you’re comfortable with how the 
company collects, protects, and uses your personal information before you 
submit any details. Responsible marketers have an ‘opt-out’ policy, which 
allows you to choose whether your information is shared with third parties.  
• Make sure the business has a fair and clear process for dealing with 
complaints and/or cancelling orders.  
• Before buying online, make sure your transactions are secure. Take a look at 
the symbol in your internet browser. Don’t enter any financial information if 
you see a broken key or open padlock symbol. This means the transaction is 
not secure and could be intercepted by a third party. When the key is 
complete or the padlock is locked, your browser is indicating a secure 
transaction. The beginning of an online retailer’s internet address will also 
change from ‘http’ to ‘https’ to indicate that the connection is secure. 
• Remember, unlike secure order forms on a website, email messages are not 
private. Never send confidential personal or financial information by email.  
• Check for endorsement by an association or a quality assurance program. 
There are several ‘seals of approval’ for websites that confirm the credibility of 
the company and the site.  
• Be particularly wary of spam (unsolicited marketing email) by being careful 
about disclosing your email address both on and offline.  
• Talk to your children about how to be safe online. Tell them to keep their 
personal information private and to check with you first. 
Charity fraud 
Here, fraudsters contact you pretending to be representatives of a charitable 
organisation. They ask for donations for a worthy, emotive cause which could be 
anything from helping disabled veterans or injured animals to victims of natural 
disasters, epidemics or conflict. Very often they’ll back up their request with 
information such as harrowing news stories and pictures or give you links to fake 
websites.  
The fraudsters often target older people with this kind of scam, and it’s easy to see 
how those who are always willing to help a good cause can be taken in. But once any 
money is handed over, it disappears into the pockets of the fraudsters. 
 
Also known as: 
Disaster appeals fraud, senior fraud 
 
Protect yourself 
• genuine charities are registered with the Charity Commission and print 
their registration details on all documentation, collection bags, envelopes 
etc. Check these details exist and also contact the Charity Commission to 
confirm they are authentic. You can call them on their helpline 0845 300 
0218 or by visiting charity-commission.gov.uk, where they have an online 
charity register 
• as well as identity documents, people collecting money for a genuine 
charity must carry documents from the charity confirming they are 
collecting legitimately. Ask to see these documents and check the details 
• if the collection is for a charity you know is genuine, check the collection is 
authorised by asking the charity directly, using contact details from the 
phone book or a website that you know is genuine 
• contact your local authority or police station to check whether the collector 
has been given a licence to collect 
• watch out for poor grammar and spelling in emails and other documents, 
including collection envelopes 
• send your donation to the charity directly. This may mean going to a little 
more trouble, but at least you can be sure your donation will get to where 
it’s intended. 
Criminal Cashback 
 
This is a common trick that fraudsters use. It works like this: A buyer approaches you 
about an item you have for sale at an online auction. You agree a price and the 
cheque duly arrives. Surprisingly, however, it’s for a lot more than the agreed price. 
Your buyer gives you an explanation, such as it includes an additional amount to pay 
a shipping charge as he wants the item sent through a particular shipping agent. He 
asks you to return the balance as a cash transfer, or pay it to his ‘shipping agent’ 
(another fraudster) and deliver the item at the same time. You wait three days for the 
cheque to clear then send off the goods and transfer the additional money as 
instructed. A few days later you find out that the cheque was stolen or counterfeit and 
the funds from it are not being credited to your account. But now the fraudsters have 
got your goods and your cash and you won’t be reimbursed by your bank for your 
loss. 
 
Also known as 
Overpayment fraud, shipping agent fraud,  
 
Protect yourself 
• Be particularly wary of any sale where the buyer appears to want to remain 
distant from you (for instance, he doesn’t want to meet you or see the goods 
prior to purchase, or wants to use a third party as an intermediary or ‘shipping 
agent')  
• Be suspicious if you receive a payment by cheque or banker's draft that’s for 
more money than your asking price, especially if you’re asked to send this or 
the difference to a third party or a ‘shipping agent' by way of money transfer  
• Don’t release any goods until the end of the sixth working day after paying the 
cheque in. After this time, if the funds are still in your account, you can be 
sure that the money is yours 
• Don't be afraid to ask your buyer questions  
• Don't be hurried along by your buyer - this is a tactic often used by fraudsters 
to get you to make a mistake  
• Check the details of any payment you receive. Make sure it corresponds with 
what you know of your buyer. If you’re paid by company cheque or banker's 
draft try to contact the company directly to verify its legitimacy  
• Talk to your bank – they’ll be able to give you guidance and clarify the status 
of any payments you receive  
• Ultimately, don't be afraid to turn down any suspect ‘buyer'  
 
Computer hacking and online frauds  
Computers, and the Internet in particular, have provided a means for fraudsters to 
commit crimes where previously an insider would have been required.  
Computer hacking or misuse is not a fraud as such, but a tool to enable fraud. These 
kinds of frauds could include: 
• Diverting funds from one bank account to another 
• Posing as a legitimate business on the Internet and obtaining payment for 
goods that fail to be delivered or are of a lower specification than advertised. 
• Manipulating the share price of a company or publicising incorrect news 
items. 
• Initiating a distributed denial of service attack on a website to make use of 
vulnerabilities within the system to access records and information. 
• Stealing intellectual property by unauthorised access to a network or 
computer system. 
 
Protect yourself 
• Be careful when undertaking any transactions online  
• Make sure your staff keep their user names/passwords safe 
• Make sure that your company PCs are secure. Keep your software fire walls 
and malware/spyware sweepers up to date.  
• Check your bank statements. If you find any unusual transactions that you 
can’t recall, speak to your bank immediately. 
 
 
Counterfeit cashier’s cheque fraud 
Counterfeit cashier's cheque fraud targets individuals who use the Internet to sell 
goods or services. An interested buyer, normally located in a foreign country, 
contacts the seller informing him that he has an ‘associate’ in the seller’s country. 
This ‘associate’, he says, owes him money and that he will pay for the goods for him 
by means of a cashier’s cheque. 
When this cheque arrives, it will be for a far greater amount than the price of the 
goods. The seller is given an appropriate excuse, such as that the excess amount is 
to cover shipping costs. The seller is instructed to deposit the cheque, wait for 
clearance, then wire the excess funds to the buyer or another associate (normally in 
West Africa).  
Because a cashier's cheque is used, the bank will typically release the funds either 
immediately or after a couple of days. The seller assumes the cheque has cleared 
and wires the money as instructed. However, a few days after that, the bank 
discovers that the cheque is counterfeit and the seller loses their money. 
 
Also known as  
Fake cheques, overpayment fraud, cheque fraud 
 
Protect yourself 
• Be particularly wary of any sale where the buyer appears to want to remain 
distant from you (for instance, he doesn’t want to meet you or see the goods 
prior to purchase, or wants to use a third party as an intermediary or ‘shipping 
agent')  
• Be suspicious if you receive a payment by cheque or banker's draft that’s for 
more money than your asking price, especially if you’re asked to send this or 
the difference to a third party or a ‘shipping agent' by way of money transfer  
• Don’t release any goods until the end of the sixth working day after paying the 
cheque in. After this time, if the funds are still in your account, you can be 
sure that the money is yours 
• Don't be afraid to ask your buyer questions  
• Don't be hurried along by your buyer - this is a tactic often used by fraudsters 
to get you to make a mistake  
• Check the details of any payment you receive. Make sure it corresponds with 
what you know of your buyer. If you’re paid by company cheque or banker's 
draft try to contact the company directly to verify its legitimacy  
• Talk to your bank – they’ll be able to give you guidance and clarify the status 
of any payments you receive  
• Ultimately, don't be afraid to turn down any suspect ‘buyer'  
Counterfeit goods 
Probably the most common form of Intellectual Property fraud is the theft of a brand 
name where fraudsters try to pass off their fake goods as originals. This can take the 
form of fake designer clothes, bags, accessories or perfumes etc. Another common 
forms are illegal copies of CDs, DVDs, computer games and software.  
 
Also known as 
Fake goods, designer fakes, illegal copies, pirate CDs, DVDs, games or software, 
sold as genuine 
Why should you avoid counterfeit goods? 
• You’re helping the trader to break the law and many fraudsters use the 
proceeds from selling counterfeit goods to fund drug dealing or other types of 
organised crime.  
• Buying fake goods contributes to job losses because genuine manufacturers 
are unable to match prices charged by rogue traders. You’re also depriving 
the genuine manufacturers of any profit.  
• Some counterfeit goods may be substandard, possibly dangerous and may 
even contain hazardous substances. 
Protect yourself 
• If something seems too good to be true, eg a Rolex watch being sold for £10, 
it probably is. Don’t be fooled into thinking you’re getting a great deal. 
• Always examine the quality of any goods you’re thinking of buying and check 
the labels to see if they are genuine. It’s often very easy to spot a fake as 
their labels may have spelling mistakes or other distinguishing marks.  
• Always ask the trader you’re buying from whether they offer an after-sales 
service, or a guarantee. Most rogue traders won’t. 
 
 
Dating scams 
In this kind of scam, the intended victim is befriended online, often via a chat room or 
social networking site. The fraudster creates a relationship with the victim, often 
tricking them by posting attractive pictures of someone else. Once the fraudster gains 
the victim’s trust, they ask for money for a variety of emotive reasons. 
These could include a whole range of false claims such as they’ve been trapped in a 
foreign country, that they have large medical bills to meet, or they need money to 
book a flight or hotel room. 
Also known as 
Con artists, online grooming, love scams, sweetheart scams, romance scams, 
relationship scams 
 
Protect yourself 
• Trust your instincts. If something feels wrong, it will be wrong 
• Guard your privacy 
• Never send money or give credit card or online account details to anyone you 
don’t know and trust 
• Communicate with people locally, not overseas 
• Never reply to communications from someone who sends you a note and 
immediately includes their email address for you to continue the 
communication. 
Domain name renewal frauds 
Every day, around 2,000 .org domain names become available. This is due to their 
registrants allowing them to expire or being unaware that their web address is up for 
renewal. The sophisticated, automated registration process for domain names leaves 
companies open to exploitation by fraudsters. For instance: 
• You might be sent an invoice for a domain name that is very similar to your 
own – the scammer hopes that you don’t notice the difference and that you’ll 
just pay it. 
• Alternatively, you could be sent a letter that looks like a renewal notice for 
your actual domain name, but it’s from a different company to the one you 
registered with 
• Make sure you don’t forget to re-register your domain name. If you do, 
someone else can take it over. You'll not only lose all the traffic you've built 
up, but your credibility could take a serious hit if your customers go to what 
they assume is still your website, only to find strange content there. 
Also known as 
Web address fraud, theft of IP and email addresses, corporate identity fraud 
 
Protect yourself 
• Check the website address carefully.  
• Try to avoid having a large number of people authorised to make orders or 
pay invoices. 
• Make sure the business billing you is the one you normally deal with 
• Make a note of when your domain names are due for renewal and be 
suspicious of invoices arriving too early.  
• Read all the terms and conditions of any offer very carefully - claims of free or 
very cheap deals often have hidden costs. 
Door-to-door sales and bogus tradesmen 
Many legitimate businesses sell things by going door-to-door, however, fraudsters 
also use this approach. 
Door-to-door scams can take many forms including home maintenance services such 
as pest control, building or garden work. Fraudsters have even been known to pose 
as electricity and telephone suppliers or say they are conducting a survey or 
collecting for a charity. They may make contact by simply knocking on your door or 
by slipping a leaflet through your letterbox. 
Such frauds involve promoting goods or services that are not delivered or are of a 
very poor quality. Fraudsters may also bill you for work that you didn’t agree to. Even 
in the case of genuine businesses and products, you could still come across an 
unscrupulous operator. There are specific laws about door-to-door sales. Many are 
required to give you a ‘cooling-off’ period (where you can change your mind or 
request your money back). Bogus tradesmen will offer none of these, and even if 
they do, their ‘guarantee’ will not be honoured. 
Rogue operators 
One common approach is that of the cowboy builder. He’ll knock on your door, tell 
you that he's ‘working in the area’ and that your roof, drive (or something else) needs 
work. Without a thorough inspection, he’ll provide you with a low quote, and perhaps 
also add that he has material left over from another job that he can use, thereby 
further reducing the cost to you. His vehicle will look unprofessional, he won't offer a 
specific schedule for the work, his only phone number will be a mobile, and he'll ask 
for payment before he begins - in cash - to avoid paying VAT.  If it's a big job, such 
as an extension, you might find that the work goes on and on, with frequent requests 
for money, but very little visible signs of progress. It's worth remembering that 
100,000 complaints are made every year in the UK against rogue builders.  
Casing prior to a burglary 
At worst, their real purpose for gaining entry to your home could be to prepare for a 
subsequent break-in.  
Also known as 
Cowboy builders, bogus callers, rogue operators, bogus utility providers 
Protect yourself 
• Get at least three written quotes to make sure you’re not being ripped off 
• Always ask for identification before letting anyone you don't know into your 
house 
• Check credentials, including a permanent business address and landline 
telephone number. The mobile phone numbers given on business cards are 
often pay-as-you-go numbers which are virtually impossible to trace  
• Ask for references from previous customers or ask to see examples of their 
work 
• Never pay for work before it has been completed, and only then if you are 
happy with it 
False accounting 
False accounting involves the overstating of assets or understating of liabilities in 
order to make a company appear financially stronger than it really is. The main aim 
could be to obtain additional financing, inflate share prices or attract new customers 
or investment. Commercial pressures could also play a part leading the company to 
report unrealistic profits or earnings. 
Also known as 
Commercial accounting fraud, business accounting fraud, exaggerated profits, 
understated losses, insider fraud 
Protect yourself  
Your organisation can take the following steps to help protect itself from false 
accounting: 
• vet employees’ CVs and references thoroughly 
• put a whistleblowing policy in place 
• control access to buildings and systems using unique identification and 
passwords 
• restrict and closely monitor access to sensitive information 
• impose clear segregation of duties 
• consider job rotation 
• use tiered authority and signature levels for payments 
• reconcile  bank statements and other accounts on a regular basis 
• audit processes and procedures from time to time 
• promote a culture of fraud awareness among staff 
• adopt, and rigorously implement, a zero tolerance policy towards employee 
fraud 
• have a clear response plan in place in case fraud is discovered. 
Financial fraud 
If your business offers any form of online trading there are many ways you could be 
targeted by fraudsters. 
One of the simplest frauds you may come into contact with is the use of stolen credit 
cards to pay for goods or services. Although card issuers carry much of the risk in 
such transactions, you’re obliged to ensure that the transactions are validated in 
accordance with your bank's contractual instructions. 
This is even more important when dealing with 'cardholder not present' transactions, 
especially when the delivery address of the items purchased is different from that of 
the cardholder. 
Also known as 
Online payment fraud 
 
Protect yourself 
• Your bank issues its own instructions and guidelines for processing card 
transactions. Make sure your staff know they should always follow them. 
• Get a 'Spot & Stop Card Fraud Pack' from Card Watch. Card Watch is the 
banking industry's body that works with police, retailers and other 
organisations to fight plastic card fraud. It offers advice to retailers and similar 
organisations who accept card payments.  
• Make sure you have sound accounting practices.  
• Always use a purchase order numbering system and never pay an invoice if 
there is no corresponding purchase order. 
Fraud recovery 
These frauds target former fraud victims. The fraudster poses as a legitimate 
organisation, claiming that they can apprehend the offender and recover any monies 
lost - for a fee.  
Another tactic fraudsters use is to contact former victims of 419 fraud and tell them 
that a fund has been set up by the Nigerian government to provide them with 
compensation. The fraudsters then ask for their personal details and request 
additional money as a fee to release the amount of the claim. 
 
Also known as: 
Fraud asset recovery scams, victims of fraud scams, 419 victims fraud, Nigerian 
Government compensation scheme fraud 
 
Protect yourself 
• Beware of any unsolicited communication you receive about being a victim of 
fraud from people you don’t know, or companies you’ve never contacted.  
• If they sound plausible, ask where they found out that you had been a victim 
of fraud. Any report of fraud is subject to data protection and would not 
normally be shared with anyone outside of law enforcement. 
• Genuine law enforcement and other agencies don’t charge fees when 
returning money to crime victims. Any request for fees indicates a fraud – 
particularly when you’re asked to pay upfront. 
• Criminals committing fraud recovery frauds often use the names of genuine 
law firms and agencies. Check any contact details the fraudsters give you 
against the real company’s details. You can check against entries in:  
o the telephone directory or Yellow Pages 
o the organisation’s genuine website (bearing in mind that criminals can 
copy a genuine website) 
o or regulatory agencies for lawyers. If you find that the details don’t 
match, it’s likely that you’re dealing with fraudsters. 
• Genuine government or law enforcement agencies and law firms don’t 
normally use webmail addresses such as @Yahoo or @Hotmail. So beware if 
you are asked to contact one of these email addresses. 
• Foreign law enforcement agencies and other official organisations normally 
ask UK authorities to help return money to fraud victims. If someone claiming 
to work for an official overseas agency contacts you directly, this is a good 
indicator of fraud. 
• If the service sounds too good to be true, then it probably is. 
Health & medical frauds 
Miracle cures 
These are emails claiming that a product is a 'miracle cure', a 'scientific 
breakthrough', an 'ancient remedy' or a quick and effective cure for a wide variety of 
ailments or diseases.  
They usually say they’re in very limited supply, request payment in advance, and 
offer a ‘no-risk money-back guarantee'. Case histories or testimonials by consumers 
or doctors claiming amazing results are often used, but are rarely genuine. 
Weight loss scams 
Such scams usually take the form of an email promising a revolutionary pill, patch, 
cream or other product that will result in weight loss without diet or exercise. Some 
products claim to block the absorption of fat, carbohydrates or calories. They may 
also offer a ‘guarantee’ of permanent weight loss or that you'll lose lots of weight at 
lightening speed. All such treatments are gimmicks. It’s highly unlikely that anything 
available through an email that could cause permanent or even significant weight 
loss.  
Fake online pharmacies 
These use the Internet and spam emails to offer drugs and medicine at very cheap 
prices or without the need for a prescription.  
Most spam email offers selling medicines or drugs are designed to steal your credit 
card details or to download damaging files onto your computer. 
Even if you actually do receive the products you order, there’s no guarantee that they 
are the real thing. In some cases, they may even damage your health. 
Psychic & clairvoyant scams 
Unsolicited emails and letters from bogus clairvoyants and psychics prey directly on 
the vulnerable and can be particularly unpleasant. There are a number of instances 
where people have received them at a time of misfortune, such as bereavement, and 
they’ve caused considerable distress.  
In some cases, these mailings adopt a more aggressive tone, suggesting that the 
recipient will actually experience some misfortune if they don’t respond by sending 
the money requested. 
Fraud committed against the National Health Service 
There are various instances including: 
• Patients avoiding payment of prescription charges by falsely claiming 
exemptions or use aliases to obtain controlled drugs.  
• Professionals who alter prescriptions, claim for work not undertaken or create 
‘ghost patients’.  
• Managers and staff who use false documents to gain employment or submit 
false claims – for example, timesheet and payroll fraud, claims for non-
existent employees and for equipment never purchased.  
• Contractors and suppliers who exaggerate or falsify records of work done for 
the NHS. 
 
Protect yourself 
With thousands of bogus health products for sale online, the best advice is to 
proceed with real caution when considering any new medicine or healthcare product. 
Always talk to your GP or local pharmacist first. They’ll be able to tell you whether the 
product is safe and effective. If you’re managing a health condition, never stop taking 
a prescribed medicine, or start taking a new medicine, without speaking to your GP 
or pharmacist first. 
If you do decide to go ahead and buy online: 
• try to avoid paying by money transfers. They aren’t secure 
• be careful when using direct banking transactions to pay for goods. Make 
sure transactions are secure 
• don’t send confidential personal or financial information by email. 
Fraudulent health and medical websites often: 
• promise a new miracle cure or wonder breakthrough. But their products are 
neither tested, nor proven to work 
• offer to supply prescription-only medicines without a valid prescription 
• try to convince you with testimonials from satisfied customers. How do you 
know these testimonials are genuine? Even if they are, anecdotal evidence is 
no substitute for the scientific evidence that lies behind genuine medicines 
• offer no risk money-back guarantees. But, if try to get your money back, the 
fraudsters simply disappear 
• feature endorsements from a doctor or health professional quoting scientific 
evidence. But if you look more closely, you’ll see that these individuals are not 
affiliated to any known institution or clinical practice. Nor has their evidence 
been published in a recognised journal.  
Identity theft 
Assuming someone else’s identity isn’t a crime in itself, but fraudsters often do it in 
order to commit other types of crime. 
Identity theft occurs when a fraudster gets hold of your personal information without 
your knowledge and then uses it to perpetrate a theft or fraud. This can be anything 
from renting a house or applying for a credit card or loan or even opening a phone 
account in your name. All kinds of information can be useful to them such as your 
name and address, national insurance number, credit card number or any other 
financial account information.  
Identity theft fraudsters approach people by pretending to be a legitimate 
organisation and can get in touch in any number of ways - by email, letter, fax or 
phone call. They have even been known to ‘bin dive’ or go through bins, searching 
for personal or account information such as statements or utility bills. They can also 
use far more direct methods such as stealing your handbag, wallet or post. 
 
Also known as: 
Application fraud,  
 
Protect yourself  
• Don’t throw out anything with your name, address or financial details without 
shredding it first. 
• If you receive an unsolicited email or phone call from what appears to be your 
bank or building society asking for your security details, never reveal your full 
password, login details or account numbers. Most banks will not approach 
their customers in this manner.  . 
• If you are concerned about the source of a call, ask the caller to give you a 
main switchboard number for you to be routed back to them 
• Check your statements carefully and report anything suspicious to the 
financial institution concerned 
• If you’re expecting a bank or credit card statement and it doesn’t arrive, tell 
your bank or credit card company 
• Don’t leave things like bills lying around for others to look at, such as at work 
• Get regular copies of your credit report from a credit reference agency  
• If you move house, always get Royal Mail to redirect your post 
Inheritance fraud 
A mass mailing is sent out to people who share the same surname, informing them  
that someone who may be related to them has died without leaving a will and that 
they may be in line to inherit. For a small fee, ‘research specialists’ offer to sell them 
an estate report which includes information on the inheritance and how it may be 
claimed. They may also offer to administer any inheritance claim for an additional 
fee. The fraudsters perpetrating this type of scam purposefully choose smaller 
inheritances just in case someone receiving their correspondence turns out to be a 
legitimate heir and subsequently mounts a successful claim. Any funds claimed are 
therefore likely to be less than their fee. 
Another approach they may use is to send you an email from an apparently legal firm 
to inform you that you’re the only known beneficiary of somebody’s will. 
 
They’ll tell you that this person died in an accident abroad and has left you millions of 
dollars. They’ll add that after intense research, they’ve discovered that you’re the 
only known beneficiary. To confirm the point, they also send you a copy of what looks 
like the deceased’s will, naming you as a beneficiary. The fraudsters will even create 
a website based around the name of a well-known law firm where you can find more 
information and contact telephone numbers. But be warned, this is just another 
scam. 
 
Also known as 
Estate locator fraud, research specialist fraud, will fraud, heir fraud 
 
Protect yourself 
• Although there are legitimate companies who make a living by tracking down 
heirs, they don’t do it in this way. If you’re asked for a fee for a report, it’s very 
likely to be bogus. 
• Letters/documents provided by the fraudsters are generally badly written. 
Look out for spelling mistakes and poor grammar. 
• Beware if you are asked to contact a webmail address such as @Yahoo or 
@Hotmail. As a rule, legitimate law firms do not use them. 
• A legitimate law firm is highly unlikely to pay out an inheritance to someone 
who isn’t entitled to it. Any offer of a payout indicates that someone is up to 
no good. 
• Fraudsters often claim that the person who has died was the victim of a well-
publicised incident, such as a plane crash. To add credibility, they may even 
use the identity of someone who really did die in the incident. 
Insider fraud 
Insider fraud is something that affects almost all organisations in some way or 
another. At one end of the scale, the problem may be limited to a few cases of 
expense fiddling or an employee having exaggerated their qualifications to obtain a 
job. But there are growing numbers of organisations whose assets make them a 
target for more serious kinds of fraud. 
There is evidence that organised crime groups deliberately target firms to place 
insiders to commit financial crime. They also take advantage of poor processes and 
inadequate internal systems and controls.  
Insider fraud can take many forms such as: 
• Theft of an organisation’s assets – for example, stealing money, goods, data 
or committing payroll fraud 
• Accepting bribes and engaging in activities involving a conflict of interest 
• Falsifying an organisation’s financial statements – for example, overstating 
revenues and understating liabilities or expenses.  
 
Factors that can help the fraudster 
Industries or businesses where there are high levels of organisational or process 
change are particularly vulnerable. Unchecked staff authority, high staff turnover or 
low staff morale all work in the fraudster’s favour – as does the trend toward business 
process outsourcing.  
Also known as 
Internal fraud, insider dealing, employee fraud, management fraud and staff fraud 
 
Protect yourself 
• vet employees’ CVs and references thoroughly 
• put a whistleblowing policy in place 
• control access to buildings and systems using unique identification and 
passwords 
• restrict and closely monitor access to sensitive information 
• impose clear segregation of duties 
• consider job rotation 
• promote a culture of fraud awareness among staff 
• adopt, and rigorously implement, a zero tolerance policy towards employee 
fraud 
• have a clear response plan in place in case fraud is discovered. 
Intellectual property theft 
Intellectual property includes items such as patents, design rights and customer lists, 
and is just as much a business asset as plant and machinery or stock. Like any other 
asset, intellectual property is susceptible to theft by staff and third parties. 
Cases of intellectual property theft could include: 
• Direct theft of assets or customer details 
• False expense claims 
• Payroll fraud diverting payments or creating fictitious employees 
• Receiving payment or commission from a preferred supplier. 
• Intimidation from third parties to disclose information or process 
inappropriate transactions. 
• Related party transactions where a staff member has an undisclosed 
financial interest in a transaction 
• Departing employees using critical business information to set up in 
competition. 
You and your IP 
You are responsible for enforcing your intellectual property (IP). If someone infringes 
your rights – if they use your intellectual property without your permission – it’s down 
to you to decide what action to take. You could seek injunctions and damages, or you 
might find it’s better and cheaper to try and negotiate a solution with the infringer 
before taking legal action. Your lawyer will be able to give you advice. 
If you have not registered your IP rights, you may still be able to take action under 
common law of ‘passing off’. 
 
Also known as 
Asset misappropriation, theft of IP and email addresses, corporate identity theft, 
copyright infringement, trademark infringement 
 
Protect yourself 
• For further information visit the Intellectual Property Office at: 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/home.htm 
International lottery frauds 
This is a widespread scam in which fraudsters randomly contact lists of e-mail 
addresses, postal addresses or faxes telling people that they’ve won a large sum of 
money in an International lottery.  
The recipient is asked to get in touch to claim their prize. Although this 
correspondence is generated abroad, a UK point of contact is often also included. 
The ‘winner’ is asked to pay an initial fee ranging from $100 to $5,000 to initiate the 
process and more fee requests follow later on. Often victims are told not to use credit 
cards as these 'can be traced' and prizes would be liable to local taxes. 
Fraudsters are completely unscrupulous - more than 80% of victims are aged over 65 
and it’s not unusual for them to target people more than once. Often they’ll phone 
their victims and build up a rapport to encourage the flow of money.  
What happens to the money? 
Communications from victims who respond to such scams are often sent to drop or 
P.O. Box addresses. These are then collected by couriers or third parties and sent on 
to the fraudsters, in most cases overseas.  
Cheques can be cleared through international clearing services and the money will 
go through a series of further transactions before finally arriving in the pockets of the 
fraudsters.  
Tax payments on lottery winnings scam 
This is a similar type of fraud in which you’re informed that you have a parcel 
containing a cheque for your lottery winnings which has been impounded by HMRC. 
The fraudsters tell you it will only be released when a substantial amount of tax is 
paid.  
Also known as: 
Foreign lottery fraud, overseas lottery fraud, Canadian lottery fraud, Spanish lottery 
fraud 
 
Protect yourself 
• Never respond to any such communication. If you haven’t entered a lottery 
then you can’t have won it. 
• Official lotteries in other countries operate in much the same way as the UK’s 
National Lotto.  No official lotteries that we know of contact people to tell them 
of their win. 
• Any request for a fee payment is a good indication that someone is trying to 
defraud you.  
• Never, ever disclose your bank details or pay fees in advance. 
• If they’ve provided an email address to respond to, be very suspicious of 
addresses such as @hotmail.com or @yahoo.com or numbers beginning with 
07 because these are free to get hold of. 
• Genuine lotteries thrive on publicity. If they ask you to keep your win a secret 
it’s likely to be a fraud.  
• Many fraudulent lotteries have bad spelling and grammar – see this as a 
warning that fraudsters are at work. 
Investment/investment seminar frauds 
The word ‘investment’ is often used loosely and misleadingly to disguise the true 
nature of a fraud. Scams such as pyramid schemes, chain letters or other types of 
scheme where a return depends on persuading others to join, fall into this category. 
In this case you’re asked to buy something – it could be high value or rare goods, 
stocks and shares or even property - in the expectation that it’ll increase in value, and 
even provide you with an exceptionally high return compared to other forms of 
investment. 
What potential investors don’t realise is that a lot of so-called investments are 
unregulated. This means that they’re not traded by authorised investment brokers, 
who might be expected to operate to professional standards. Nor are they traded on 
a regulated exchange, which means that their current value and prospects for 
appreciation are difficult or impossible to assess through any of the normal channels. 
There is no guarantee that the market will still be functioning when you come to sell 
your investment and almost no chance of any compensation if you’ve been mis-sold.  
Sometimes fraudsters hook you in by asking you to attend an ‘investment seminar’ in 
which you and other investors are offered a return which is far more attractive than 
usual. You can therefore expect it to be exaggerated or unrealistic.  
 
Also known as: 
Pyramid Investment Schemes 
 
Protect yourself  
• If a deal seems to be too good to be true it probably is 
• There’s no such thing as a ‘guaranteed risk-free investment’ 
• Beware of any communication in which you are asked to supply credit card or 
bank account details 
• Don’t be pressured into allowing a caller to ‘send round a courier’ to collect 
payment from you 
• Beware of being told you must act quickly or you’ll miss out on this ‘one-time 
deal’ 
• Beware of being told of a little-known legal loophole that could enable you to 
make a fortune 
 
Local Authority or Housing Association Fraud 
 
Here are some of the most common of these types of fraud: 
Housing fraud applies to anyone who: 
• Illegally sub-lets their council or housing association home  
• rented a property using a false identity  
• is applying for, or has already been given, the right to buy but doesn’t qualify  
• has applied to the council as homeless but has somewhere to live  
Housing benefits fraud applies to anyone who: 
• is working but hasn’t told the Housing Benefits team about their income  
• is sub-letting the property where they claim benefit but are living somewhere 
else  
• hasn’t told the Housing Benefits team about someone else living in their home  
• is claiming housing benefits using a false identity  
• has a property, assets or savings they haven’t told the Housing Benefits team 
about  
Residents parking / disabled badge fraud applies to anyone who: 
• is renting their garage or parking space to someone else  
• is using their garage to store stolen goods  
• obtained an estate parking permit illegally  
• is using a forged parking permit or disabled badge  
• is misusing a blue or white disabled badge  
 
Also known as 
Housing benefit fraud, disabled badge fraud, residents’ parking fraud, sub-letting 
fraud, right to buy fraud 
Long and Short Firm Fraud 
 
Long Firm Fraud 
This occurs when an apparently legitimate business is set up with the purpose of 
defrauding its suppliers and customers after a relatively long period of time. 
It starts off by placing numerous small orders with wholesalers and paying them 
promptly. This enables it to develop a good credit history and win the trust of 
suppliers. The fraudsters then place several larger orders with these businesses, but 
once they receive the goods, they promptly disappear and sell the goods on 
elsewhere. 
Short Firm Fraud 
This is similar to long firm fraud, but it occurs over a shorter period of time, and 
without the business trying to establish any form of credit history or creditability. 
The fraudulent business has no day-to-day trading activity, not even a cash- 
generating front. They obtain goods on credit which are delivered to third party 
addresses, often located at multi-occupancy trading estates. The goods are sold on 
for cash therefore creating no document trail. 
Also known as 
Fraud against suppliers, fraud against wholesalers, bribery & corruption, intermediate 
long term fraud, pre-planned long form fraud, organised crime 
 
Protect yourself 
There a several steps you can take to protect your organisation from long firm and 
short firm fraud: 
• Stop and evaluate before accepting a much larger order from a business 
you’ve only been dealing with for a relatively short time. 
• Check the trading history of any business you are dealing with. 
• Ask the business for trade references. And check the authenticity of the 
referees. Sometimes, criminals form companies to fraudulently provide 
references for each other. 
• Take steps to verify the identity of the office holders. 
• Visit potential new customers for a thorough on-site inspection of the 
business premises. 
• If it’s a limited company, find out if it has filed accounts; check whether the 
accounts are credible given the trading period; and ensure they have been 
prepared by a genuine reporting accountant.  
• Ask to check the credit histories of the people running the business. 
• Check for evidence that they do live where they say they live. 
• Check publicly-available databases on the Insolvency Service and 
Companies House websites to see if the individuals are bankrupt, or 
otherwise disqualified from acting as directors of a limited company. 
• Check who owns the domain names of any website the business uses. 
• Be wary if the only ways of contacting a business are through webmail-based 
email addresses and mobile telephone numbers. 
• Ensure that goods are delivered to identifiable individuals and addresses, and 
don’t allow goods to be cross-loaded to unidentifiable vehicles waiting at the 
delivery location. 
Mandate Fraud 
In a mandate fraud or false billing scam, the fraudster sends a professional-looking 
invoice for products or services that were never ordered or received, hoping that it 
will be paid without investigation. 
This type of scam is usually aimed at larger organisations with big billing/ payment 
systems, in the hope that smaller invoices will go through unnoticed. In some cases, 
false billing is pre-empted by a telephone call from the fraudster, intending to make 
the victim think that they may have bought something from them before at some 
point. 
Similar scams include: 
• Attempts to obtain payment for placing an advert in a non-existent publication. 
The fraudster may suggest that a previous advert has been placed and that 
this transaction is a follow-up or repeat. 
• Attempts to sell advertising space in a bogus or limited-distribution business 
directory. Whilst many of these transactions are not fraudulent, some are at 
best deceitful, and are a waste of both money and resources. 
 
Also known as 
False invoices, advertising sales fraud 
 
Protect yourself 
• The best approach is to have sound accounting practices.  
• Always use a purchase order numbering system and never pay an invoice if 
there is no corresponding purchase order. 
• Don’t leave things like bills lying around for others to look at and record details 
of standing orders and direct debits.  
• Always verify changes to financial arrangements with the organisation directly 
using established contact details you have on file.  
• If you are concerned about the source of a call, ask the caller to give you a 
main switchboard number for you to be routed back to them. Alternatively, 
hang up and call them back using established contact details you have on file. 
• Check your bank statements carefully and report anything suspicious to your 
financial institution. 
Mobile phone frauds 
There are a variety of frauds that target you on your mobile. Here are some of the 
most common: 
Missed call scams  
Your phone registers a missed call. You don’t recognise the number so you call it 
back. Most of the time the call will be perfectly legal and above board, but if not, you 
may be redirected to a premium rate service which means you’ll be charged a lot of 
money per minute, often up to £15 per call.  
Recorded message scams 
The number may be a recorded message telling you that you’ve won a prize of some 
sort, and giving you another number to call to ‘claim’ your prize. But what they may 
not tell you is how much this call will cost. This second number may be a premium 
rate one, which will charge you a lot of money. Your prize may be nothing more than 
a ring tone subscription—which can also be a fraud 
Text message scams 
In a text message fraud, you’ll be sent a text from a number you don’t recognise, but 
it’ll be worded as if it’s from a friend. For instance: ‘Hi, it’s John. I’m back! When do 
you want to catch up?’ So you call it back, thinking you’re doing them a favour by 
telling them they’ve got the wrong person, only to be charged a fortune for a premium 
rate call. 
You may also receive a text message which sounds like someone’s flirting with you. 
You text back to find out who it is, and end up engaging in a lengthy SMS exchange 
with the fraudster. Only later do you find out that you’ve been charged a high rate for 
your texts (and sometimes for your received messages as well). 
Ring tone scams 
These scams might attract you with an offer of a ‘free’ or low cost ring tone. What you 
may not realise is that by accepting the offer, you’re actually subscribing to a service 
that will keep sending you ring tones—and charging you a premium rate for them. 
There are many legitimate companies selling ring tones, but there are also fraudsters 
who will try to hide the true cost of taking up their offer. 
Text competition & trivia scams 
You may receive a text message or advert encouraging you to enter a competition for 
a great prize (like an mp3 player). The fraudsters make money by charging extremely 
high rates for the messages you send, and any further messages they send to you. 
These could be as high as £2 each.  
With trivia scams, the first few questions will be very easy. This is meant to 
encourage you to keep playing. However, the last one or two questions you need to 
answer in order to claim your ‘prize’ could be very difficult or even impossible (they 
may even require you to guess a random number). 
If you get as far as trying to claim your prize, you may well have to call a premium 
number (that begins with 0906 for example). You’ll then have to listen to a long 
recorded message and there’s unlikely to be a prize at the end of it anyway.  
Phone insurance scams 
Here, fraudsters target people with new phones and make them believe they are 
calling from the shop they bought it from or their mobile phone network. They often 
find your number by buying a cheap phone themselves, then calling numbers similar 
to their own. 
 
Also known as: 
Competition scams, premium rate number scams, telephone prize scams, prize draw 
and sweepstake scams 
 
Protect yourself 
• Most phone service providers have their own security policies in place to help 
protect your data; examples include a secret question or a personal PIN for 
your account. It’s always worth checking what they have and make sure you 
sign up to use them 
• Set up a password or passcode on your phone or tablet and keep it locked 
when you’re not using it. Your user guide will tell you how to do this.  
• Never store personal details like passwords or PIN numbers in texts or emails 
that are accessible through your phone or tablet.  
• If your phone is stolen, tell your provider straight away – they can blacklist 
and deactivate it remotely. You should then change any passwords for online 
accounts you access through your phone as soon as possible (for example 
online banking).  
• Never allow application or files to be installed from unknown sources 
particularly on smartphones/tablets (e.g. Android apps outside of Android 
Market™) 
• If you visit a website through your mobile or tablet and the URL looks 
suspicious, close it down straight away 
• Don’t respond to unknown numbers. 
• If you sell your phone/tablet or give it away, make sure you complete a factory 
reset  to clear all your content from it - you’ll find out how in your user guide.  
• Set up a secure pin on your voicemail so that only you can access your 
messages. Call into your voicemail service to do this. Follow your service 
provider’s guidelines if you're unsure. 
• Many smartphones and tablets now come with the ability to remotely lock and 
track it if it’s lost or stolen.  There are a number of apps but some handsets 
themselves are capable of this. Check with your manufacturer’s website.   
• Be extra vigilant when you have an upgrade due or your contract is near it’s 
end as this is a key time for fraudsters to target your mobile phone account 
with fake contract and insurance deals. 
Mortgage fraud 
Mortgage fraud could be anything from simple overstatement of income to obtain a 
mortgage to systematic abuses by organised crime groups for money-laundering 
purposes. Many people can be involved, either working alone or together, such as 
fraudulent brokers or intermediaries, valuers, surveyors, solicitors or accountants.  
Mortgage fraud can include: 
• over-valuing properties 
• overstating a salary or income 
• hijacking genuine conveyancing processes 
• taking out mortgages in the name of unsuspecting individuals or those who 
are deceased after identity theft 
• taking out a number of mortgages with different lenders on one address by 
manipulating Land Registry data 
• changing title deeds without an owner’s knowledge to allow the sale of a 
property. 
Also known as 
Mortgage application hijack 
 
Protect yourself  
Owners who are concerned their property might be subject to a fraudulent sale or 
mortgage can quickly alert Land Registry and speak to specially trained staff for 
practical guidance about what to do next by calling their Property Fraud Line on 0300 
006 7030 
Online auctions 
Shopping and online auction fraud usually involves the misrepresentation of a 
product advertised for sale, or the non-delivery of products purchased through an 
Internet auction site. 
If you’re buying something online, be careful if the seller requests to be paid via 
Western Union, Money-Gram, or bank-to-bank money transfer. These types of 
payment make your money virtually unrecoverable and you get no recourse if 
something goes wrong. 
Buyers from a legitimate auction site can also commit fraud by requesting a certain 
method of shipping in order to avoid tax, or if they use fraudulent cards or payment 
methods to purchase goods. 
 
Protect yourself 
 
Get to know the basics first 
• Get to know the rules and parameters set by the site – they’re there for your 
safety. Read the safety advice before trading. Never step outside of these or 
outside of the site no matter how enticing the deal. Fraudsters often try to trick 
you into doing this.  
• Always compare prices. Beware of people offering you a deal below the 
current bid or reserve price, especially if they contact you direct. Remember If 
an offer sounds too good to be true it probably is  
• Get to know the seller by looking at their selling history and the type of goods 
they sell. Be extremely careful when buying things from people with little or no 
selling history 
• Don't get carried away in the excitement of winning an auction. Fraudsters 
rely on you being keen and off your guard. It’s never too late to ask a seller 
questions to ensure that you are completely happy with what you’re about to 
pay for. If you think a fraud is involved, report the seller to the site 
• If your site offers ‘second chance’ bidding on an auction, verify that any 
notification actually comes from the site and not from a fraudster 
impersonating them. You can do this by carefully checking the email address 
or by contacting the site via its published website. Also be very wary of using 
any hyperlinks or numbers contained within such a ‘notification’ as these may 
also be false  
• Protect your on line auction account details as you would your own bank 
account details, including your log in and password to your auction account 
and your payment account. Never reveal your name or account details.  
• Be aware of phishing emails that look like they come from the online auction 
or payment site you are registered with, asking you to update your account 
details or re-enter them because your account has been suspended.  
Help in spotting illegal emails 
• Take a good look at the URL in the web browser. A tactic fraudsters often use 
is to change the address very slightly (if they’re spoofing an eBay site they 
may have an address such as ‘. . . @ebayz.com’ whereas the real site is ‘. . . 
@ebay.com’ 
• Often these emails will contain links that take you to pages on the real 
website to make them appear genuine. But they may contain others that 
direct you to fake pages set up by the fraudsters.  
 
 
Internet auction payment 
If you’re buying: 
• Never use money transfers as a payment method, no matter what anyone 
suggests to you, and don’t be tricked into doing a deal outside the online 
auction site. There is little security in this – you’re handing over your hard 
earned cash to a stranger ‘on trust’ alone  
• There is little security in using direct banking methods either, especially if the 
seller has no or little trading history 
• Always use the online payment options or a reputable ESCROW account to 
pay for things. ESCROW is a payment system where both the buyer’s and 
seller’s financial details are held separately by a legitimate third party 
company acting as middleman. The buyer makes their payment into the 
ESCROW account. The seller is only paid once the goods have arrived and 
are deemed satisfactory by the buyer. This offers far greater protection. Never 
enter an ESCROW account site through a link in an email. Fraudsters have 
been known to set up fake ESCROW websites. Use a search engine to locate 
the website or enter your chosen ESCROW site through its proper web 
address. Save this in your favourites. Always check the URL shown in your 
web browser address bar.  
 
If you’re selling: 
• After a cheque is paid into your account, wait 6 days before releasing any 
goods. Although your bank or building society may tell you a cheque has 
‘cleared’ after 3 days, all this means is that the money has passed between 
the banks. It could still turn out to be forged or stolen. If the funds from the 
cheque are still in your account at the end of the sixth working day, you can 
be sure that the money is yours.  
Phishing or spoofing email frauds 
Phishing and spoofing are ways of trying to obtain your personal financial details over 
the Internet, by means of a false website or email. 
Phishing and spoofing are somewhat synonymous. Spoofing generally refers to a 
fake website page which is designed to look like a legitimate one (such as an online 
login page to a bank). In many cases, the web site you are taken to will look just like 
the real one and will contain links to the genuine website. It will often also replicate 
the security padlock at the bottom of your screen. 
Phishing is the act of sending an email falsely claiming to be from a legitimate source 
(like your bank or building society). It generally attempts to get you to reveal 
personal, sensitive information such as passwords, credit card numbers, and bank 
account information after getting you to click on a link which directs you to a specified 
(spoofed) website. These details are then picked up by the criminals who will use 
them to steal money from your account. 
 
Also known as: 
Fake emails, financial institution fraud 
Protect yourself 
• Never, ever, respond to an unsolicited request from anyone asking you to 
pass on your security details (whether it’s your login name, password, 
mother’s maiden name or other security information). A legitimate 
organisation, such as a bank, will never ask its customers for these details in 
this way 
• If you’re ever in doubt, it is always safer to say no. Then, telephone your bank 
on an advertised number, and tell them exactly what you have received. 
They’ll always be happy to receive a call from you where security of your 
account is concerned 
• Alternatively, you can report any suspicious email or website to the internet 
service provider (ISP) that the fraudster is using 
• Never reveal you username/passwords/PINs to anyone 
• Make sure your PC is secure. There are many excellent software firewalls 
and malware/spyware sweepers that you can download for free 
• Check your bank statements regularly. If you find any unusual transactions 
that you can’t remember, speak to your bank immediately 
Phone frauds 
The global rise of telemarketing has produced a corresponding increase in 
telemarketing fraud. There are hundreds of excuses fraudsters can use for getting in 
touch with you in order to part you from your money and we’re all vulnerable. Here’s 
just one example: You’re at home and the phone rings. The voice on the other end 
claims to be a fraud investigator from your credit card company. He tells you there’s 
been suspicious activity on your card, but first, he needs to confirm some details as a 
security check. Naturally you’re worried about your account and you’re keen to help 
so you give him all the details he asks for. He promises to get back to you but you 
never hear from him again. He’s off spending on your credit card. 
However, the following pointers show how you can protect yourself: 
 
Protect yourself 
• One of the best ways to reduce the number of unsolicited phone calls you get 
is to register with the Telephone Preference Service. You can register online 
at tpsonline.org.uk or by calling  0845 070 0707   
• Never reveal any details of accounts or personal information. Remember, if 
the caller is genuine they’ll have access to all the relevant details. Let them 
give you the security details so that you can confirm them. Do not supply 
further security information unless you’re completely sure who you’re talking 
to. 
• If you’re concerned about the source of the call, ask the caller for a main 
switchboard number through which you can be routed back to them. 
Alternatively, take their details then make your own enquiries via a published 
contact number. 
• If it seems too good to be true, it probably is. Think very carefully before 
committing yourself to any 'amazing deals' 
• There is no such thing as a 'guaranteed risk-free investment'. 
• Beware of any unsolicited communication where you’re asked to supply any 
personal information such as your National Insurance Number 
• Beware of any unsolicited communication where you’re asked to supply user 
names and passwords for services that you use such as online banking, 
online shopping, your Internet account etc.  
• Be suspicious if you receive a message telling you that you’ve won a prize 
and should phone a certain number (often starting 900 or 0900. You’ll find 
that the telephone call is charged at premium rates and, in the unlikely event 
that there is actually a prize, it probably won’t be anything worth having. In 
some cases you may even be asked to send a fee to cover postal costs. 
• If you’re offered something on a 'free trial' basis, always check deadlines for 
returning the items. If the scam involves obtaining credit card numbers 
illegally, you could be charged for goods even if you haven’t (knowingly) 
supplied any payment information. 
• Think twice before giving information to unknown parties. For example, some 
fraudsters pretend to be charities (often using names that seem close to real 
organisations) and ask for bank or credit card details. 
• Other indications of possible fraud include: 
• Being pressured to allow the caller to 'send a courier around to take your 
payment' 
• Being told that you 'must act quickly or lose out on this one-time deal' 
• Being told of 'a little-known legal loophole' that will assist you in making a 
fortune 
• Being told that you are 'one of just a few special people to receive this offer' 
• Being told that you have purchased the caller's services previously 
Prime bank guarantees fraud 
International fraudsters have invented an investment scheme that supposedly offers 
extremely high yields in a relatively short period of time. In this scheme, they say they 
have access to ‘bank guarantees’ from ‘prime banks’ (hence the name) which they 
can buy at a discount and sell at a premium.  
By reselling the "bank guarantees" several times, they claim to be able to produce 
exceptional returns. For example, if $10 million worth of "bank guarantees" can be 
sold at a 2% percent profit on 10 separate occasions, or "tranches," the seller would 
receive a 20% profit.  
This kind of scheme is often referred to as a ‘roll programme’. Other official sounding 
terms used include "Prime Bank Notes" and "Prime Bank Debentures." Legal 
documents drawn up by the fraudsters often require their victims to enter into 
nondisclosure and non-circumvention agreements, offer returns on investment in "a 
year and a day", and claim to use forms required by the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC). In fact, the ICC has issued a warning that no such investments 
exist.  
 
The purpose of these frauds is to get you to send money to a foreign bank where it’s 
eventually transferred to an off-shore account under the control of the fraudster.  
 
Foreign banks do use instruments called ‘bank guarantees’ in the same way that they 
use letters of credit to pay for goods internationally. However, such bank guarantees 
are never traded or sold on any kind of market. 
 
Also known as: 
Roll programmes, Prime Bank Notes, Prime Bank Debentures, high yield 
investments 
 
Protect yourself  
• If a deal seems to be too good to be true it probably is 
• There’s no such thing as a ‘guaranteed risk-free investment’ 
• Beware of any communication in which you are asked to supply credit card or 
bank account details 
• Don’t be pressured into allowing a caller to ‘send round a courier’ to collect 
payment from you 
• Beware of being told you must act quickly or you’ll miss out on this ‘one-time 
deal’ 
• Beware of being told of a little-known legal loophole that could enable you to 
make a fortune 
 
Plastic card fraud 
There are two main types of credit and debit card fraud – ‘card not present’ and 
‘counterfeit card’. 
Card not present fraud occurs when a fraudster manages to get hold of your card 
details (in a restaurant or bar, for example, when you card is taken out of sight) and 
then uses them to make purchases over the phone, online or by mail order. 
Counterfeit card fraud mostly involves a process known as ‘skimming’, where a 
fraudster electronically copies your magnetic stripe details without your knowledge. 
This could happen at the till or a cash machine. Your details are later used to make a 
false card which is typically used in countries that do not yet have chip and pin.   
 
Also known as: 
Credit card fraud, debit card fraud, payment fraud 
 
Protect yourself  
• Look after your cards – treat them as if they were cash 
• Don’t let your cards out of your sight when paying for anything 
• Always check your statements carefully against your receipts 
• If you find a strange transaction tell your bank or card company straight away. 
You’ll find the emergency number on your statement or call Directory 
Enquiries 
• If you don’t want to keep your statements, shred them using a cross-cut 
shredder before throwing them away 
• Never keep your PIN with your card 
• Beware of ‘shoulder surfing’ at the cash machine, where a fraudster watches 
you entering your PIN then distracts your attention to steal your card 
• If your card gets trapped in the cash machine, beware if someone in the 
queue suggests you re-enter your PIN. A card-trapping device may have 
been used and once the fraudster knows your PIN, he’ll be able to remove 
the device and use your card 
 
 Pyramid or ponzi scheme fraud 
Pyramid schemes (also known as ponzi schemes) are investment scams in which 
you’re promised an abnormally high profit for making an investment and encouraging 
others to do the same thing.  
Early investors are paid returns with the money paid by later investors, but because 
the money is siphoned off by the fraudsters, the system eventually collapses with 
later investors receiving nothing - including their initial investment.  
The term ‘ponzi’ comes from the famous 1920’s fraudster, Charles Ponzi, who 
defrauded people with a get rich scheme. 
Fraudsters use various methods to contact you regarding such scams including e-
mails, letters, faxes or phone calls. They often provide you with fake referrals. 
 
Also known as: 
Investment fraud 
 
Protect yourself  
• If a deal seems to be too good to be true it probably is 
• There’s no such thing as a ‘guaranteed risk-free investment’ 
• Beware of any communication in which you are asked to supply credit card or 
bank account details 
• Don’t be pressured into allowing a caller to ‘send round a courier’ to collect 
payment from you 
• Beware of being told you must act quickly or you’ll miss out on this ‘one-time 
deal’ 
• Beware of being told of a little-known legal loophole that could enable you to 
make a fortune 
 
Revenue and VAT frauds 
The majority of Customs and VAT frauds involve an attempt to avoid payment of 
taxes. Another type is Carousel fraud. 
Carousel frauds involve goods being exported to another EC member state, then re-
imported without VAT by a newly formed VAT-registered company. The new 
company then sells the goods back to the original exporting company, plus VAT 
which the exporting company recovers as input tax. The newly registered company 
then vanishes before the VAT is due to be paid.  
 
Also known as 
Tax avoidance fraud, VAT fraud, Tax fraud 
 
HM Revenue & Customs impersonation scams 
These are some of the latest frauds carried out by people claiming to be a 
representative of HM Revenue and Customs:  
Customs duty payments or VAT payments requests 
Fraudsters have been known to contact members of the public by phone to demand 
‘customs payments’ on impounded parcels, or VAT payments on business activities 
unknown to the call recipient.  
Tax rebate emails 
If you are sent an email saying it’s from the HMRC, informing you that you are due a 
tax rebate, it will be a scam. HMRC would never inform customers of a tax rebate via 
email, or ask them to complete an online form to receive a tax rebate.  
Customs Service emails 
These emails will tell you that a parcel has been received for you and is being held 
en-route from another country. They then go onto request that you fill out a customs 
declaration. This is not an official HMRC email. The attachment may contain viruses 
and should not be opened. 
Tax or child benefit rebate phone calls 
If someone contacts you by phone, saying that they’re from the HMRC and that you 
may be entitled to a tax or child benefit rebate, beware. They are really after your 
personal details and bank account information. 
Tax payments on lottery winnings  
If you’re told that a parcel containing a cheque in respect of lottery winnings has been 
impounded by HMRC and that it’ll only be released when a substantial tax sum is 
paid, ignore it. It’s a scam to get hold of your money. 
Protect yourself 
• If you’re asked for any payment or personal details over the phone you should 
always check with HMRC that the caller is genuine by calling 0800 59 5000. 
Scams involving timeshares  
 
In Timeshare and Holiday Club scams the fraudsters will contact you at home, often 
by phone, to tell you that you have won a 'free' holiday. They may also approach you 
in the street while you’re on holiday and give you a scratch card which reveals that 
you have won a 'free' holiday. To claim your prize, all you need to do is go to 
a presentation, more often than not in a plush hotel, and learn more about a new 
holiday venture (which you’ll be told isn’t about timeshare). 
The brochures will all look glossy and convincing and you’ll be made to feel as if 
you’re joining an exclusive holiday club offering top class accommodation all over the 
world. 
Your 'free' holiday, as you’ll later discover, isn't free, as you’ll have to pay for extras 
such as flights and other add-ons, and go somewhere you don't want to go at a time 
that doesn't suit you.  
 
If you do consider joining, unlike the law covering timeshare arrangements, you won’t 
necessarily be given a chance to cancel if you have second thoughts. Furthermore, 
what the bogus holiday club tells you in the sales pitch and what’s in the contract you 
sign could be two very different things. You may well find out that you get no 
guarantee of dates or destinations and that holidays are often not available when and 
where you want them.  
 
Also known as: 
Holiday clubs 
Protect yourself against timeshare fraud 
• Be very wary of letters, phone calls or emails from companies you don’t know 
offering you business deals out of the blue.    
• If you are contacted by phone, don't continue the conversation.  
• Don’t pass on confidential information to people or companies who say you’ve 
been chosen especially, or that you’ve won something.   
• Never make investments without thorough research.  Check into the company 
and ask for several references. 
• However much pressure the sales people put you under, never agree to 
anything on the spot. Refuse to sign anything then and there. Take the 
documentation home with you and sleep on it. 
• Make sure a lawyer reads the contract before you sign it. Make a note of all 
the verbal promises you were given, and ensure they're in the contract. If 
they're not, refuse to sign.  
• Ask about your cancellation rights and get them in writing.  
• Remember, you can always walk out of the presentation. No one can make 
you stay, no matter what the salespeople may try and tell you. 
• Think of buying a timeshare in the same way you'd consider buying any other 
membership - is it worth the money? Research the market and discover the 
property values.  
• Remember, if something sounds too good to be true, it usually is. 
Share sales or boiler room fraud 
Boiler room fraud is the term for a fraud in which victims are cold-called by fake 
stockbrokers and persuaded to buy shares in worthless, non-existent or near 
bankrupt companies, with the promise of quick, high returns.  
Often these contacts are made from illegal offshore dealing rooms in Spain, 
Switzerland or the US. On the face of it they may appear quite legitimate as they may 
well have a well deigned website, glossy brochures and a phone number with a 
London prefix (which diverts overseas). ‘Boiler room’ refers to the high pressure 
nature of the sales. 
 
Also known as: 
Investment fraud 
 
Protect yourself  
• If a deal seems to be too good to be true it probably is 
• There’s no such thing as a ‘guaranteed risk-free investment’ 
• Beware of any communication in which you are asked to supply credit card or 
bank account details 
• Don’t be pressured into allowing a caller to ‘send round a courier’ to collect 
payment from you 
• Beware of being told you must act quickly or you’ll miss out on this ‘one-time 
deal’ 
• Beware of being told of a little-known legal loophole that could enable you to 
make a fortune 
Spam 
Spam, or unsolicited bulk email, is widely used to commit crimes such as financial 
institution fraud, credit card fraud and identity theft, among others. 
Criminals will send out thousands of emails to people who may not even have an 
account with the bank mentioned, in the hope that some (who do have such an 
account) will respond to it. Most people generally view it as a nuisance, but a number 
of people are tricked into responding to it and providing personal information to the 
fraudster. 
Spam can also act as a vehicle for accessing computers and servers without 
authorisation, often transmitting viruses and Botnets.  
 
Also known as: 
Fake emails, pfishing, spoofing, financial institution fraud, bank account fraud, 
personal account fraud 
Protect yourself 
• Never, ever, respond to an unsolicited request from anyone asking you to 
pass on your security details (whether it is your login name, password, 
mother’s maiden name or other security identifier). A legitimate organisation, 
such as a bank, will never ask its customers for these details in this way 
• If you’re ever in doubt, it is always safer to say no. Then, telephone your bank 
on an advertised number, and tell them exactly what you have received. 
They’ll always be happy to receive a call from you where security of your 
account is concerned 
• Alternatively, you can report any suspicious email or website to the internet 
service provider (ISP) that the fraudster is using 
• Never reveal you username/passwords/PINs to anyone 
• Make sure your PC is secure. There are many free software firewalls and 
malware/spyware sweepers available 
• Check your bank statements regularly. If you find any unusual transactions 
that you can’t remember, speak to your bank immediately 
West African communications (or 419 fraud)  
The term ‘419’ refers to the violation of Section 419 of the Nigerian Criminal Code. 
This kind of scam is a mixture of impersonation and advance fee frauds. It occurs 
when individuals who say they are Nigerian or foreign government officials get in 
touch with you by letter, email or fax, to offer you the ‘opportunity’ to share in a 
percentage of millions of dollars. All you have to do is help them place large sums of 
money in an overseas bank account. 
The fraudsters will give you a variety of reasons as to why they need your help, such 
as taxes, bribes to government officials or legal fees, which they’ll often describe in 
great detail. They’ll also promise you that all expenses will be reimbursed as soon as 
the funds are out of the country. Sometimes they’ll also ask you to fax them 
information such as blank letterheaded stationery, your bank details and account 
numbers, and other personal information.  
 
Also known as: 
Nigerian emails, advance fee fraud, overseas bank account frauds 
 
Protect yourself 
• The first question to ask yourself is "why me?" This person doesn't know you 
and has no reason to trust you. The best way to deal with an e-mail like this is 
to delete it straight away.  
• Governments and large corporations do not transfer money through another 
person’s bank account. Any suggestion that they do so is a reliable indication 
that you have been approached by fraudsters. 
• Letters and documents sent by fraudsters are usually badly written. Look out 
for spelling mistakes and poor grammar. 
• If a deal seems to be too good to be true, then it probably is. 
• Beware of being told you must act quickly or you’ll miss out on this ‘one-time 
deal’. 
• Never send your bank or personal details. If you have done, contact your 
bank immediately to stop money being withdrawn and sent overseas.  
• Never send any money.  
• Never, under any circumstances, travel anywhere in response to one of these 
scams. You won't see your money again, and you could put yourself in 
physical danger. 
 
 
Work-at-home Employment Frauds 
These are frauds in which bogus foreign-based companies recruit people living in 
other countries for a variety of work-at-home employment schemes. They work in 
various ways: 
• They can simply be a means of soliciting the personal details of victims under 
the guise of potential employment 
• They can use employees to resell/reship goods abroad 
• They can provide a cover for criminal cashback. This is a scam in which 
employees are informed that their salary will be paid by cheque by a company 
in their own country (reported to be a creditor of the employer). When the 
cheque arrives it’s significantly more than the employee is owed. The 
employee is instructed to deposit the cheque into their own personal bank 
account, and then wire the overpayment back to the employer's bank, often in 
Eastern Europe. The bank cheques are later found to be fraudulent, often 
after the wire transfer has taken place. 
Also known as 
Employment/business opportunities frauds, work scams, career opportunity scams 
 
Protect yourself 
• Don’t respond to unsolicited business propositions and/or offers of 
employment from people you are unfamiliar with 
• Never disclose your personal or financial details to anyone you don’t know 
• Wait at least 6 days after you’ve deposited a cheque into your account. A 
bank will know within that time whether it’s fraudulent or not.  
• Beware of adverts for business opportunities that state you can earn a 
specific or minimum amount of money. 
• Any advert that tells you that you can sit back and let a business run itself is a 
good indication of fraudsters at work. 
• Look out if the scheme operators give contact details that include mobile 
phone numbers beginning with 07 or web mail email addresses such as 
@yahoo or @hotmail. Genuine businesses do not use them. 
• Don’t be tempted by seemingly easy offers for work. You might find your 
personal details sold on to other scammers and you’ll become seen as an 
easy target. 
 
 Delivering the Recommendations of the 
Fraud Review 2006 
and the  
Paradox of Police Leadership 
 
 
 
   Appendix Ten 
 
NFRC Test Design and Content 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National Fraud Reporting Centre 
 
 
Test paper – NFRC Design & Content 
 
April 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Document 
Version 
 
Amendment Detail 
Author Date Approved 
01 First Draft SS 07/04/09  
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
 
Produced by: 
Insp Steve Strickland 
Fraud Review Team 
 
  
National Fraud Reporting Centre 
Test Paper – Web site Design & Content 
 
 
SS/01  
 
 
2 07/04/09 
Contents: 
         
 
Page 
1. Fraud Types      3 
2. Triage       5 
3.  Victim       10 
  3.1: Victim     10 
  3.2: On behalf of Victim   12 
  3.3: Business/Organisation  14 
4.  Fraud ‘MO’      16 
  4.1: Banking and Credit   16 
  4.2: Financial Investment   17 
  4.3: Advance Fee    19 
  4.4: Internet Preparatory acts  22 
  4.5: Online Shopping / Auctions  23 
  4.6: Moblie Phones    26 
  4.7: Door2Door & Bogus Traders  28     
  4.8: Business Trading   30 
  4.9: Business Assets & Acounting 32 
  4.10: Bribery & Corruption   34 
  4.11: Other – Non Defined   36 
5.  Suspect      41 
  5.1: Individual    41 
  5.2: Business/Oganisation   44 
6.  Additional Information    47 
7. Victim Support     48 
8. Submission & Fraud Crime Number  48 
  
  
National Fraud Reporting Centre 
Test Paper – Web site Design & Content 
 
 
SS/01  
 
 
3 07/04/09 
Fraud Types 
 
• Fraud Relating to the Banking and Credit Industry 
Credit Card Fraud NON-Recordable* 
Account/Facility Takeover NON-Recordable 
Application Fraud NON-Recordable 
Fraud Relating to Mortgages NON-Recordable 
 
• Identity Theft NON-Recordable 
 
• Fraud Relating to Financial Investment 
Share Sales or Boiler Room Fraud NFRC-Recordable 
Pyramid or Ponzi Schemes NFRC-Recordable 
Telemarketing Fraud NFRC-Recordable 
Prime Bank Guarantees NFRC-Recordable 
Investment Seminar NFRC-Recordable 
Time Shares & Holiday Clubs NFRC-Recordable 
 
• Fraud Relating to Advance Fee Payments 
West African Letter or "419" NFRC-Recordable 
Lottery Scams NFRC-Recordable 
Counterfeit Cashier's Cheques NFRC-Recordable 
Employment/Business Opportunities NFRC-Recordable 
Dating Scam NFRC-Recordable 
Charity Fraud NFRC-Recordable 
Fraud Recovery NFRC-Recordable 
Inheritance Fraud NFRC-Recordable 
 
• Preparatory acts relating to the Internet 
Phishing/Spoofing Emails NON-Recordable* 
Spam Emails NON-Recordable* 
 
• Online Shopping, Auctions and selling 
Shopping and Auction Fraud NFRC-Recordable 
Domain Name Renewal Frauds NFRC-Recordable 
Health & Medical Scams NFRC-Recordable 
 
• Mobile Phone Frauds 
Missed calls & Text messages NFRC-Recordable 
Ring Tone Scams NFRC-Recordable 
SMS competition & Trivia scams NFRC-Recordable 
Phone Insurance scams NFRC-Recordable 
 
• Door-to-door sales and bogus tradesmen NFRC-Recordable 
 
 
• Frauds relating to Business & abuse of position and authority 
Long Firm Fraud NFRC-Recordable 
National Fraud Reporting Centre 
Test Paper – Web site Design & Content 
 
 
SS/01  
 
 
4 07/04/09 
Short Firm Fraud NFRC-Recordable 
Asset Misappropriation NFRC-Recordable 
False Accounting NFRC-Recordable 
Insiders NFRC-Recordable 
Bribery and Corruption NFRC-Recordable 
 
• Computers Hacking & Unauthorised use NON-Recordable 
 
• Fraud Relating to Insurance NON-Recordable 
 
• Fraud Relating to Intellectual Property & Counterfeit Goods  
Intellectual Property Theft NON-Recordable 
Counterfeit Goods NON-Recordable 
 
• Fraud Relating to Revenue, Customs and benefits 
Revenue and Customs Fraud NON-Recordable 
Benefit Fraud NON-Recordable 
 
• Fraud Relating to the provision of public services 
Fraud Relating to the National Health Service NON-Recordable 
Fraud Relating to Local Authority or  Housing Association NON-Recordable 
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TRIAGE PAGE  
Are you making this report as the victim, on behalf of a victim, on behalf of a business or as a witness to a 
Fraud? 
 I am the Victim 
Is this the first time you have been a victim of this type of Fraud? 
• Yes / No 
Did the last fraud occur within the last 12 months? 
• Yes / No 
 On behalf of the Victim 
Is the victim aware that you are reporting the Fraud on their behalf? 
• Yes / No 
Why is the victim not able to report the fraud personally? 
 Due to Ill Health 
 Due to Language difficulties 
 Other 
Why is the Victim not aware of this Fraud report? 
Free text: 
 
 On behalf of a business or organisation 
 
 I am a Witness  
 
 I have not been a victim of Fraud. 
 
 
 
Are you in immediate threat from the fraud of, either physical attack or financial loss? 
 
• Yes / No 
 
How would you classify your vulnerability 
• I don't not consider myself vulnerable 
• I was vulnerable to this fraud but it was one off 
• I consider myself vulnerable because of my job &/or professional position 
• I consider myself vulnerable because of my personal circumstances 
• I consider myself vulnerable for other reasons 
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What is the Address of the Offence Location? 
Free text: 
 
 
From the list, which group best describes the Fraud you have been a victim of? 
• Banking & Credit Industry Fraud N* 
Have you reported the fraudulent activity to your bank or finance provider? 
 Yes / No 
Have they refused to reimburse you for the loss or required you to report the 
fraud to police? 
 Yes, they have refused to reimburse me 
 Yes, they have required me to report the fraud to the police 
 No, I am reporting this independently having reported it to the financial 
institution 
• Identity Theft N 
• Investment Fraud Y 
• Advance Fee Fraud Y 
• Preparatory acts relating to the Internet N* 
• Online shopping, Auctions and selling Y 
• Mobile phone fraud Y 
• Door-to-door sales and bogus traders Y 
• Frauds and corruption relating to business and abuse of position or authority Y 
• Computer Hacking & Unauthorised use N 
• Insurance Fraud N 
• Intellectual Property Fraud & Counterfeit Goods N 
• Revenue, Customs and Benefits N 
• Frauds relating to the provision of public services N 
• OTHER FRAUD - non classified Y 
 
Have you reported this Fraud elsewhere? 
• Yes / No 
Was your report Recorded? 
 Yes / No 
Where did you report the Fraud? 
 Police 
Free text: 
 Bank/Building Society 
Free text: 
 Insurance Company 
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Free text: 
 Trading Standards 
Free text: 
 Internet Crime Complaint Centre or Regulatory Authority 
Free text: 
 Other 
Free text: 
 
 
Have you done one of the following? 
• Supplied money 
 Yes / No 
How much money have you supplied? 
Free Text: 
• Supplied goods 
 Yes / No 
What is the value of the goods you supplied? 
Free text: 
• Supplied a service 
 Yes / No 
What is the value of the service you supplied? 
Free text: 
 
• Supplied sensitive information i.e passwords, account or pin number 
 
 Yes / No 
 
Is the suspect known to you? 
 Yes / No 
 Is the Suspect? 
• An Individual(s) 
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• A business/organisation 
• Both an Individual and a business/organisation  
Do you have any information which could help identify or locate the suspect, ? 
 Yes / No 
 What form does this information take? 
• Suspect known to family member, friend or associate  
• E-mail correspondence 
• Letters/mail correspondence 
• Contracts, quotes or legal papers 
• Photos, own CCTV, recordings or minutes of meetings 
• Other 
 
Are there any individuals who witnessed the Fraud? 
• Yes / No 
 
 
 
Was the Fraud or the suspects captured on any public or commercial electronic media? 
• Yes / No 
How was this captured? 
 Local Authority CCTV 
 Is the location of this media the same as the Offence location? 
• Yes / No 
 Commercial CCTV 
 Is the location of this media the same as the Offence location? 
• Yes / No 
 Congestion Charging 
 Is the location of this media the same as the Offence location? 
• Yes / No 
 ANPR 
 Is the location of this media the same as the Offence location? 
• Yes / No 
 Other 
 Is the location of this media the same as the Offence location? 
• Yes / No 
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VICTIM OR PERSON REPORTING 
Victim 
Title 
• Mr 
• Mrs 
• Miss 
• Ms 
• Dr 
• Other 
Surname 
Free text: 
Forename 
Free Text: 
Date Of Birth DAY 
Format DD/MM/YYYY: 
Gender 
• Male 
• Female 
Ethnic Appearance 
 
W1 W2 W9 M1 M2 M3 M9 O1 O9 B1 B2 B9 A1 A2 A3 A9 NS 
                 
Contact details 
Personal Address of Complainer/Victim 
Free text: 
 
 
E-mail Address 
Free text: 
Home Phone Number 
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Free text: 
Work Phone Number 
Free text: 
Mobile Phone Number 
Free text: 
Preferred Method of Contact 
• Home Phone 
• Work Phone 
• Mobile Phone 
• E-Mail 
How many victims of this fraud are you aware of? 
• I am the only victim 
• There are other victims who are known to me personally 
• There are other victims who are known to me professionally 
• There are other victims but they are not known to me 
• I don't know if there are any other victims 
Has any civil action been taken by yourself or others in relation to this fraud?  
• Yes / No 
Please provide a summary of the action taken and its outcome –  
Free text: 
 
 
How would you grade the impact that this fraud has had on you? 
• Severe - impacting on health & financial well being 
• Moderate - impacting on health or financial well being  
• Minor - negligible impact on either health of financial well being 
• Concerned - as to vulnerability but not impactive on health or financial well being 
• Embarrassed - at becoming a victim, not concerned about vulnerability or suffered any impact 
on health or financial well being 
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Reporting on Behalf of the Victim 
Title 
• Mr 
• Mrs 
• Miss 
• Ms 
• Dr 
• Other 
Surname 
Free text: 
Forename 
Free text: 
Date Of Birth 
Format – DD/MM/YYYY: 
Relationship to Victim 
• Spouse 
• Relative 
• Friend 
• Work associate 
• Carer / Health visitor 
• Other 
Are you also a witness to the Fraud? 
• Yes / No 
Contact details 
Address of Person Reporting 
Free text: 
 
 
 
 
E-mail Address 
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Free text: 
Telephone 
Home Phone Number 
Free text: 
Mobile Phone Number 
Free text: 
Preferred Method of Contact 
• Home Phone 
• Mobile Phone 
• E-Mail 
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Business/Organisation 
Person Reporting 
Position within the Business/Organisation 
Free text: 
Title 
• Mr 
• Mrs 
• Miss 
• Ms 
• Dr 
• Other 
Surname 
Free text: 
Forename 
Free text: 
 
Date Of Birth  
Format DD/MM/YYYY: 
Name of the Business 
Free text: 
Type of Business/Organisation 
Free text: 
Business Address 
Free text: 
 
E-mail Address 
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Free text: 
Telephone 
Work Phone Number 
Free text: 
Mobile Phone Number 
Free text: 
Preferred Method of Contact 
• Work Phone 
• Mobile Phone 
• E-Mail 
How many victims of this fraud are you aware of? 
• I am the only victim 
• There are other victims who are known to me personally 
• There are other victims who are known to me professionally 
• There are other victims but they are not known to me 
• I don't know if there are any other victims 
Has any civil action been taken by yourself or others in relation to this fraud?  
• Yes / No 
Free text: 
 
 
How would you grade the impact that this fraud has had on your business? 
• Severe - impact could potentially threaten the future of the business 
• Moderate - impact will be felt across the organisation  
• Minor - short term impact on profit or turnover but no long term effects  
• Concerned - as to the ongoing vulnerability of the business to future frauds 
• Embarrassed - at becoming a victim, not concerned about vulnerability of the business to future frauds 
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FRAUD MO 
Fraud Relating to Banking & Credit Industry 
How have you been targeted by the fraudsters? 
• Credit Card has been compromised and unauthorised transactions made 
• The fraudster has assumed your identity and made unauthorised transactions from your bank account 
• A fraudster has assumed your identity and opened new accounts or taken credit out in your name 
How much have you lost? 
Free text: 
Do you believe that you have been contacted by the fraudsters? 
Yes, by E-mail 
Free text: 
Yes, through a Website 
Free text: 
No, not that I know of 
Have you received any of the following? 
• Phishing E-mails 
• Spooking E-mails 
• Spam E-mails 
Were you asked to provide any of following information? 
• Credit Card details 
• Bank Account details 
• Passwords 
• None of the above 
Have you recently suffered any of the following? 
• Theft of property including personal / sensitive information 
• Mail containing personal / sensitive data has not been delivered and posting has been confirmed 
• Completed a survey or provided personal / sensitive information to anyone out of the ordinary 
• Suffered a computer virus or attack on a system where you hold personal / sensitive information 
• Had your household or business waste which contains personal / sensitive information interfered with. 
• None of the above 
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Fraud Relating to Financial Investment 
How where you contacted? 
Telephone 
Free text: 
Fax 
Free text: 
Post 
E-mail 
Free text: 
Website 
Free text: 
Investment Seminar invitation 
Free text: 
In Person 
Free text: 
When were you first contacted? 
Format DD/MM/YY: 
How often were you contacted? 
Between - 
• 1 & 5 times 
• 6 & 10 times 
• more than 10 times 
Were you contacted by? 
• Individual 
• Individual representing a business 
• Numerous representatives of business 
 
 
Were you offered or did you invest in a product or service? 
• Shares 
• Investment Service 
• Pyramid Scheme 
• Prime Bank Guarantee 
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• Time Share or Holiday Club 
• Other type of Investment or high yield scheme 
• None of the above 
How much did you invest? 
Free text: 
How did you pay for the product or service? 
Bank Transfer 
• Name of the Account holder _____________________________________________________________ 
• Name of the Bank______________________________________________________________________ 
• Account Number______________________________________________________________________ 
• Sort Code____________________________________________________________________________ 
Cheque 
• Who was the Cheque made payable to?_____________________________________________________ 
• What address was the Cheque sent to?_____________________________________________________ 
Cash 
Is the person the money was paid to the same as the suspect? 
• Yes / No 
Money Transfer 
Free text: 
Have you attempted to realise your investment? 
• Yes / No 
Have you Managed to realise any of the funds? 
• Yes / No 
How much you recover? 
Free text: 
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Fraud Relating to Advance Fee 
How would classify the fraud you have been a victim of? 
• West African letter / mass marketing fraud 
• Overseas Lottery Fraud 
• Employment or Business opportunity 
• Criminal Cash back / Counterfeit Cashiers Cheque 
• Dating Fraud 
• Charity Fraud 
• Fraud Recover Service Fraud 
• Inheritance Fraud 
• None of the above 
How where you contacted? 
Telephone 
Free text: 
Fax 
Free text: 
Post 
E-mail 
Free text: 
Website 
Free text: 
Investment Seminar invitation 
Free text: 
In Person 
Free text: 
When were you first contacted? 
Format DD/MM/YY: 
How often were you contacted? 
Between - 
• 1 & 5 times 
• 6 & 10 times 
• more than 10 times 
Were you contacted by? 
• Individual 
• Individual representing a business 
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• Numerous representatives of business 
Where you supplying a financial service or acting as an intermediary?  
• Supplier 
• Intermediary 
Who were you acting on behalf of? 
Free text: 
Where you offered or did you commence employment?  
• Employed 
• Offered Employment 
Did you receive an overpayment for goods, services or set up costs? 
• Yes / No 
Where you asked to refund the overpayment? 
• Yes / No 
When was this money Paid 
Format DD/MM/YYYY 
Were you asked to make a donation to charity? 
• Yes / No 
Were you asked to pay a tax or release fee? 
• Yes / No 
Where you Asked to fund one of the following?  
• Flight 
• Hotel 
• Medical bills 
• Other 
Had you previously been a victim of a Fraud? 
• Yes / No 
 
 
 
Was this reported to the Police or an appropriate regulatory authority? 
• Yes / No 
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Free text: 
How much did you pay? 
Free text: 
How did you pay the funds? 
Bank Transfer 
• Name of the Account holder _____________________________________________________________ 
• Name of the Bank______________________________________________________________________ 
• Account Number______________________________________________________________________ 
• Sort Code____________________________________________________________________________ 
Cheque 
• Who was the Cheque made payable to?_____________________________________________________ 
• What address was the Cheque sent to?_____________________________________________________ 
Cash 
Is the person the money was paid to the same as the suspect? 
• Yes / No 
Money Transfer 
Free text: 
Have you attempted to recover any monies paid? 
• Yes / No 
Have you Managed to realise any of the money? 
• Yes / No 
How much you recover? 
Free text: 
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Preparatory Acts relating to the Internet 
Have you received any of the following? 
• Phishing E-mails 
• Spooking E-mails 
How where you contacted? 
E-mail 
Free text: 
Website 
Free text: 
When were you first contacted? 
Format DD/MM/YY: 
How often were you contacted? 
Between - 
• 1 & 5 times 
• 6 & 10 times 
• more than 10 times 
Were you contacted by? 
• Individual 
• Individual representing a business 
• Numerous representatives of business 
Were you asked to provide any of following information? 
• Credit Card details 
• Bank Account details 
• Passwords 
• Non of the above 
Has any of this information been used in subsequent frauds? 
• Yes / No 
Has this been reported to the police or an appropriate investigative / regulatory authority?  
• Yes / No 
Free text: 
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On-line Shopping, Auctions & Selling 
Did you use  an online Auction site? 
• Ebay 
• cqout.com 
• ebid.net 
• Amazon Auctions 
• bid1p.co.uk 
• swoopo.co.uk 
• Other 
Free text: 
 
Did you use  an online shopping site? 
• Yes / No 
Free text: 
Where you acting as a buyer or seller? 
• Buyer 
• Seller 
Buyer 
Where the goods purchased?  
• Jewelry &valuables 
• Designer goods 
• Electrical goods 
• Collectibles 
• Domain Name renewal 
• Health or medical products 
• Other 
How did you pay for the goods? 
Bank Transfer 
• Name of the Account holder _____________________________________________________________ 
• Name of the Bank______________________________________________________________________ 
• Account Number______________________________________________________________________ 
• Sort Code____________________________________________________________________________ 
Cheque 
• Who was the Cheque made payable to?_____________________________________________________ 
• What address was the Cheque sent to?_____________________________________________________ 
Cash 
Is the person the money was paid to the same as the suspect? 
• Yes / No 
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Money Transfer 
Free text: 
Have you attempted to recover any monies paid? 
• Yes / No 
Have you Managed to recover any money? 
• Yes / No 
How much you recover? 
Free text: 
Seller 
Where you supplying the goods/service or acting as an intermediary?  
• Supplier 
• Intermediary 
Intermediary 
Who were you acting on behalf of? 
Free text: 
In relation to the payment for the goods?  
• No payment was received 
• Payment was received but not honoured 
• An overpayment was received 
Where you asked to refund the overpayment? 
• Yes / No 
When was this money Paid 
Format DD/MM/YYYY 
How did you transfer the overpayment? 
Bank Transfer 
• Name of the Account holder _____________________________________________________________ 
• Name of the Bank______________________________________________________________________ 
• Account Number______________________________________________________________________ 
• Sort Code____________________________________________________________________________ 
Cheque 
• Who was the Cheque made payable to?_____________________________________________________ 
• What address was the Cheque sent to?_____________________________________________________ 
Cash 
Is the person the money was paid to the same as the suspect? 
• Yes / No 
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Money Transfer 
Free text: 
Have you attempted to recover the overpayment? 
• Yes / No 
Have you Managed to recover any of the overpayment? 
• Yes / No 
How much you recover? 
Free text: 
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Mobile phone fraud 
How would classify the fraud you have been a victim of? 
• Missed Call Fraud 
• Text Message Fraud 
• Ring Tone Fraud 
• SMS Competition or Trivia Fraud 
• Phone Insurance Fraud 
How where you contacted? 
Telephone 
Free text: 
Fax 
Free text: 
Post 
E-mail 
Free text: 
Website 
Free text: 
In Person 
Free text: 
When were you first contacted? 
Format DD/MM/YY: 
How often were you contacted? 
Between - 
• 1 & 5 times 
• 6 & 10 times 
• more than 10 times 
Were you contacted by? 
• Individual 
• Individual representing a business 
• Numerous representatives of business 
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How much were you asked to pay for the service? 
Free text: 
How much did you actually pay for the service? 
Free text: 
How did you pay the funds? 
Phone Charges applied to monthly account 
Free text: 
Bank Transfer 
• Name of the Account holder _____________________________________________________________ 
• Name of the Bank______________________________________________________________________ 
• Account Number______________________________________________________________________ 
• Sort Code____________________________________________________________________________ 
Cheque 
• Who was the Cheque made payable to?_____________________________________________________ 
• What address was the Cheque sent to?_____________________________________________________ 
Cash 
Is the person the money was paid to the same as the suspect? 
• Yes / No 
Money Transfer 
Free text: 
Have you attempted to recover any monies paid? 
• Yes / No 
Have you Managed to recover any money? 
• Yes / No 
How much you recover? 
Free text: 
 
 
Door-to-door sales and bogus traders 
How would classify the fraud you have been a victim of? 
• Door-to-door - pressure sales 
• Door-to-door - sale of substandard good 
• Door-to-door - purchase of goods not delivered 
• Door-to-door - survey 
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• Door-to-door - Charity collection 
• Door-to-door - Utilities or services  
• Bogus Trader - substandard building work 
• Bogus trader - building work not started or completed 
• Other type of Door-to-door or bogus trader 
How where you contacted? 
Telephone 
Free text: 
Fax 
Free text: 
E-mail 
Free text: 
Website 
Free text: 
Post or Hand delivered flyer 
Free text: 
In Person 
Free text: 
When were you first contacted? 
Format DD/MM/YY: 
How often were you contacted? 
Between - 
• 1 & 5 times 
• 6 & 10 times 
• more than 10 times 
Were you contacted by? 
• Individual 
• Individual representing a business 
• Numerous representatives of business 
Have you previously been a victim of a Fraud? 
• Yes / No 
Was this reported to the Police or an appropriate regulatory authority? 
• Yes / No 
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Free text: 
How much did you pay for the service or goods? 
Free text: 
How did you pay the funds? 
Bank Transfer 
• Name of the Account holder _____________________________________________________________ 
• Name of the Bank______________________________________________________________________ 
• Account Number______________________________________________________________________ 
• Sort Code____________________________________________________________________________ 
Cheque 
• Who was the Cheque made payable to?_____________________________________________________ 
• What address was the Cheque sent to?_____________________________________________________ 
Cash 
Is the person the money was paid to the same as the suspect? 
• Yes / No 
Money Transfer 
Free text: 
Have you attempted to recover any monies paid? 
• Yes / No 
Have you Managed to recover any money? 
• Yes / No 
How much you recover?  Free text: 
National Fraud Reporting Centre 
Test Paper – Web site Design & Content 
 
 
SS/01  
 
 
30 07/04/09 
Business Trading Fraud 
When did you start trading with the business? 
Format – DD/MM/YYYY: 
How many orders where placed? 
Between 
• I and 5 
• 6 and 10 
• More than 10 
Where you supplying the goods/service or acting as an intermediary?  
• Supplier 
• Intermediary 
Intermediary 
Who were you acting on behalf of? 
Free text: 
What was the value of orders placed starting with earliest order 
Free text: 
Order 1 
Order 2 
 
How did you provide payment? 
Bank Transfer 
• Name of the Account holder _____________________________________________________________ 
• Name of the Bank______________________________________________________________________ 
• Account Number______________________________________________________________________ 
• Sort Code____________________________________________________________________________ 
Cheque 
• Who was the Cheque made payable to?_____________________________________________________ 
• What address was the Cheque sent to?_____________________________________________________ 
Cash 
Is the person the money was paid to the same as the suspect? 
• Yes / No 
National Fraud Reporting Centre 
Test Paper – Web site Design & Content 
 
 
SS/01  
 
 
31 07/04/09 
Money Transfer 
Free text: 
Have you attempted to recover any monies paid? 
• Yes / No 
Have you Managed to recover any money? 
• Yes / No 
How much you recover? 
Free text: 
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Business Assets and Accounting Fraud 
Have business assets been misappropriated? 
• Customer Lists 
• Intellectual Property 
• Payroll 
• Expenses 
• Procurement 
• Account information 
• Other 
Were the assets misappropriated by coercion or intimidation? 
• Coercion 
• Intimidation 
• Other 
Have business assets or accounts been overstated? 
• Public Literature 
• Accounts 
• Annual Report 
• Shareholder Report 
• Other 
To what extent has the business overstated its assets or accounts? 
Free text: 
Was this done with the intention of? 
• Attracting additional funding 
• Inflating the share price 
• Attracting new custom 
• Other 
Free text: 
How has this perpetrated against the business? 
• Member of direct Staff 
• Member of contract staff 
• External Business 
• External individual 
• Other 
Free text: 
Has the business has suffered as a result? 
• Yes / No 
 
 
Loss of Income 
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What would you estimate the total loss of income to be? 
Free text: 
Increased costs 
What would you estimate the increase of costs to be? 
Free text: 
Loss of Custom 
What would you estimate the loss of custom to be in financial terms? 
Free text: 
Reduced share price / business value 
What would you estimate the total loss to be in your share price or business value? 
Free text: 
Other 
Please explain how your business has suffered and what you estimate the financial loss to be. 
Free text: 
Has the business benefited as a result? 
• Additional finance has been provided to the Company  
• What is the value of the finance extended to the Company? 
• Further Credit has been extended to the Company 
• What is value of the credit extended to the Company? 
• Additional Investment has been made in the Company 
• How much has been invested in the Company? 
• Shares in the Company have been sold 
• What is the value of the shares sold in the Company? 
• Other - please provide details of how the business has benefited and the value 
Free text: 
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Bribery, Corruption and Insider Fraud 
Which of the following are you a victim of? 
• Received fraudulent/exaggerated CV's or applications for employment, advancement or promotion 
• You or your Business or Organisation has suffered as a result of an insider 
• Been asked to pay a bride or backhander by an official or individual 
• Been offered sensitive or confidential information by an official or individual 
• You or your Business or Organisation has suffered because sensitive or confidential information has been 
provided to another 
• You or your Business or Organisation has suffered because another has been given an advantage or treated 
more favourably  
• Other 
Free text: 
How would you classify the suspect? 
• Individual 
• Organised Crime Group 
• Government Official 
• Local Authority or Council Official 
• Other Public Official 
• Person in position of Authority 
• Person in position of trust 
What was the purpose of the act? 
• Gain employment 
• Advancement or promotion 
• Financial reward 
• Business advantage 
• Political advantage 
• Market advantage 
• Power and control 
• Other 
Free text: 
How was the act done? 
• Persuasion 
• Coercion 
• Intimidation 
• Threats 
• Other 
Free text: 
Have have you suffered as a result? 
• Yes / No 
 
 
Loss of Income 
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What would you estimate the total loss of income to be? 
Free text: 
Increased costs 
What would you estimate the increase of costs to be? 
Free text: 
Loss of Custom 
Free text: 
What would you estimate the loss of custom to be in financial terms? 
Free text: 
Other 
Please explain how your business has suffered and what you estimate the financial loss to be. 
Free text: 
National Fraud Reporting Centre 
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OTHER FRAUD - non defined 
How where you contacted? 
Telephone 
Free text: 
Fax 
Free text: 
Post 
E-mail 
Free text: 
Website 
Free text: 
Investment Seminar invitation 
Free text: 
In Person 
Free text: 
When were you first contacted? 
Format DD/MM/YY: 
How often were you contacted? 
Between - 
• 1 & 5 times 
• 6 & 10 times 
• more than 10 times 
Were you contacted by? 
• Individual 
• Individual representing a business 
• Numerous representatives of business 
Had you previously been a victim of a Fraud? 
• Yes / No 
Was this reported to the Police or an appropriate regulatory authority? 
• Yes / No 
National Fraud Reporting Centre 
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Free text: 
If you purchased goods or a service how much did you pay? 
Free text: 
If you have sold goods or a service what was the value? 
Free text: 
Have you attempted to recover any goods, funds or payments? 
• Yes / No 
Have you Managed to recover any of the goods, funds or payments? 
• Yes / No 
Where you acting as a buyer or seller? 
• Buyer 
• Seller 
Buyer 
What were you purchasing?  
• Goods 
• Service 
How did you pay for the goods or service? 
Bank Transfer 
• Name of the Account holder _____________________________________________________________ 
• Name of the Bank______________________________________________________________________ 
• Account Number______________________________________________________________________ 
• Sort Code____________________________________________________________________________ 
Cheque 
• Who was the Cheque made payable to?_____________________________________________________ 
• What address was the Cheque sent to?_____________________________________________________ 
Cash 
Is the person the money was paid to the same as the suspect? 
• Yes / No 
Money Transfer 
Free text: 
Have you attempted to recover any monies paid? 
• Yes / No 
Have you Managed to recover any money? 
• Yes / No 
How much you recover? 
National Fraud Reporting Centre 
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Free text: 
In relation to the goods or service purchased?  
• They were not received 
• They were received but not as advertised 
• The goods received were fake / counterfeit 
• The service received was substandard or not as stated 
Seller 
Where you supplying the goods/service or acting as an intermediary?  
• Supplier 
• Intermediary 
Intermediary 
Who were you acting on behalf of? 
Bank Transfer 
• Name of the Account holder _____________________________________________________________ 
• Name of the Bank______________________________________________________________________ 
• Account Number______________________________________________________________________ 
• Sort Code____________________________________________________________________________ 
Cheque 
• Who was the Cheque made payable to?_____________________________________________________ 
• What address was the Cheque sent to?_____________________________________________________ 
Cash 
Is the person the money was paid to the same as the suspect? 
• Yes / No 
Money Transfer 
Free text: 
Have you attempted to recover any monies paid? 
• Yes / No 
Have you Managed to recover any money? 
• Yes / No 
How much you recover? 
Free text: 
In relation to the payment for the goods?  
• No payment was received 
• Payment was received but not honoured 
• An overpayment was received 
Where you asked to refund the overpayment? 
• Yes / No 
National Fraud Reporting Centre 
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When was this money Paid 
Free text: 
How did you transfer the overpayment? 
Bank Transfer 
• Name of the Account holder _____________________________________________________________ 
• Name of the Bank______________________________________________________________________ 
• Account Number______________________________________________________________________ 
• Sort Code____________________________________________________________________________ 
Cheque 
• Who was the Cheque made payable to?_____________________________________________________ 
• What address was the Cheque sent to?_____________________________________________________ 
Cash 
Is the person the money was paid to the same as the suspect? 
• Yes / No 
Money Transfer 
Free text: 
Have you attempted to recover any monies paid? 
• Yes / No 
Have you Managed to recover any money? 
• Yes / No 
How much you recover? 
Free text: 
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Suspect 
Person 
Is the Suspect known to you personally? 
• Yes / No 
How is the Suspect known to you? 
• Relative 
• Friend 
• Neighbour 
• Colleague 
• Business associate 
• Other 
Title 
• Mr 
• Mrs 
• Miss 
• Ms 
• Dr 
• Other 
Surname 
Free text: 
Forename 
Free text: 
Is the Suspect known by any other names? 
• Yes / No 
Title 
• Mr 
• Mrs 
• Miss 
• Ms 
• Dr 
• Other 
Surname 
Free text: 
Forename 
National Fraud Reporting Centre 
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Free text: 
Gender 
• Male 
• Female 
Date Of Birth if given or recorded  
Format – DD/MM/YYYY 
Approximate Age if DOB not known 
Free text: 
Ethnic Appearance 
 
W1 W2 W9 M1 M2 M3 M9 O1 O9 B1 B2 B9 A1 A2 A3 A9 NS 
                 
 
Can you describe the suspect? 
• Yes / No 
Vehicle Details 
Was a Vehicle used? 
• Yes / No 
Make & Model 
Free text: 
Registration Number 
Free text: 
 
 
Colour 
Free text: 
Other Features 
National Fraud Reporting Centre 
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Free text: 
 
 
Address 
Personal Address of Suspect 
Free text: 
 
Business Address of Suspect 
Free text: 
 
E-mail Address 
Free text: 
Telephone 
Home Phone Number 
Free text: 
Work Phone Number 
Free text: 
Mobile Phone Number 
Free text: 
Additional Suspects 
Are there any additional suspects? 
• Yes / No 
National Fraud Reporting Centre 
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Business/Organisation 
Is the business/organisation known to you personally? 
• Yes / No 
How is the business/organisation known to you? 
• Established trading relationship 
• New customer/client 
• Referral by a business associate 
• Through trade body/association 
• Business members known personally 
• Other 
Free text: 
Name of the Business 
Free text: 
Type of Business/Organisation 
Free text: 
 
Business Address 
Free text: 
 
 
E-mail Address 
Free text: 
Web Site 
Free text: 
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Business Contact details 
Telephone 
Free text: 
Fax 
Free text: 
Have you met a representative from the business/organisation? 
• Yes / No 
Is this person the same as the Suspect? 
• Yes / No 
Please complete the additional fields for the representative you have met. (if different from suspect) 
Title 
• Mr 
• Mrs 
• Miss 
• Ms 
• Dr 
• Other 
Surname 
Free text: 
Forename 
Free text: 
Is the Suspect known by any other names? 
• Yes / No 
Title 
• Mr 
• Mrs 
• Miss 
• Ms 
• Dr 
• Other 
Surname 
Free text: 
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Forename 
Free text: 
Gender 
• Male 
• Female 
Approximate Age if known 
Free text: 
Ethnic Appearance 
 
W1 W2 W9 M1 M2 M3 M9 O1 O9 B1 B2 B9 A1 A2 A3 A9 NS 
                 
Can you describe the suspect? 
• Yes / No 
It is not necessary to record your description of the suspect at this stage, however, we request that you keep 
this information safe and if necessary make a note of the description as it may be necessary if this fraud is 
investigated. 
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Additional Information 
Please use this are to record any additional information about the fraud, suspects, witnesses or evidence. 
You can use this as a narrative to explain how the fraud occurred or simply as a list of events or facts: 
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Victim Care 
At this time there is no dedicated or specialist victim support services for the victims of Fraud or Financial Crime. 
This is currently under review and it is anticipated that there will shrotly be a dedicated service for these victims. 
In the meantime you can still call upon the services of Victim Support. 
Who is Victim Support? 
Victim Support is the national charity which helps people affected by crime in England, Wales Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and Republic of Ireland. They give free and confidential support to help you deal with what you've been 
through as a victim or witness, whether or not you report the crime to the police. 
How can Victim Support help you? 
If you are a victim of crime, their local Victim Support branches can give you and your family and friends 
information and support. And if you are going to court, their Witness Service can help before, during and after the 
trial. Or you can phone the national helpline, the Victim Supportline.  
For further information visit: http://www.victimsupport.org.uk/ 
The National Fraud Strategic Authority are conducting research in to support for victims of 
fraud. Would you be willing to participate in a follow up Victim Support Survey and for us to 
pass your contact details to them? 
Yes 
How would you Prefer to be Contacted for this follow up survey? 
Home Phone 
Work Phone 
Mobile Phone 
E-Mail 
No 
Report review/submission page 
 
Your report will be reviewed by the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau to assess and grade the 
appropriate level of response or action. If your report is assessed and graded as suitable for investigation an 
investigating officer will be in touch with you. Your report will also be used for intelligence purposes to help 
inform the police and their investigative partners of local and national fraud trends and may form part of a 
larger investigation into organised fraud networks. 
Your Unique Fraud Crime Number is ***************/09 
 
 Delivering the Recommendations of the 
Fraud Review 2006 
and the  
Paradox of Police Leadership 
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Centre for Investigative,
Security and Police Sciences
CISPS
We’re looking for informants
Combating increasingly sophisticated forms of fraud
requires new skill sets for analysts, investigators and
managers. Ourmission at the Centre for Investigative,
Security and Police Sciences (CISPS) is to create
practitioner programmes thatwill enable public and
private sector organisations to deal with the challenges
of economic crime, fraud, intelligence and security in the
21st century. To deliver cutting edge training and higher
education that reallymeets those needs, we are looking
to gather intelligence from thosewhowill ultimately
employ such programmes. If you’d like to give us your
input or to follow a programme, simply email us at
cisps@city.ac.uk.
www.city.ac.uk/cisps
Economic Crime and Fraud Investigation
Intelligence and Security
Applied Investigation
Policing
CISPS ads:Layout 1 26/6/09 13:50 Page 1
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Exploiting the National Fraud 
Reporting Centre (NFRC) and National 
Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB)
      
On behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) and the National Policing Improvement Agency 
(NPIA), I welcome you to the National Fraud Reporting 
and Intelligence Forum’s three day conference and 
symposium, Fraud: The Financial Frontier, here at NPIA, 
Ryton on Dunsmore.
This year, the country finds itself in the midst of some 
trying times, and policing is no exception. Individually, 
we are confronting difficult economic decisions; 
our partner agencies, colleagues from industry and 
communities are also faced with economic problems 
which were not anticipated a year ago which will 
undoubtedly lead to an unprecedented rise in fraud 
across all sectors. 
The conference and symposium is an important event 
in the ACPO calendar for 2009. It is supported by the 
Home Office and the National Fraud Authority and 
will focus on the historic and timely opportunities 
presented by the National Fraud Reporting Centre 
(NFRC) and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau 
(NFIB) in the fight against fraud.
The UK’s ability to succeed in the global fight 
against fraud is highly dependant on the successful 
implementation and use of the NFRC & NFIB. 
The NFRC and NFIB will bring together previously 
unconnected fraud data from the general pubic 
and industry, which, once analysed will provide 
opportunities to advance operational practices and 
procedures to prevent fraud and to bring fraudsters to 
justice. 
Through presentations and case studies, you will be 
provided with an insight into the NFRC and NFIB and 
how through cooperation between public and private 
sectors, they will enhance productivity and boost 
information, intelligence and investigation. 
The conference and symposium will provide you 
with the opportunity to develop a consensus around 
appropriate service level agreements and identify 
concrete measures that are quick to implement - with 
direct effects on communities, industry and public 
bodies. Tangible results will be built on public-private 
partnerships and a nationally acceptable service level 
agreement in the development, take up and expansion 
of NFRC and NFIB operating procedures. 
The conference and symposium will provide the perfect 
opportunity for us to connect and share knowledge 
and expertise. Over the three days we aim to promote 
and harvest ideas and participation in developing 
the practices and procedures necessary to take the 
NFIB and NFRC forward in support of our own local 
challenges to make the UK a hostile environment for 
the fraudster to operate in.
DCC. Stuart Hyde
Strategic lead for engagement on NFRC and NFIB 
Cumbria Police
     
National Fraud Reporting and Intelligence Forum
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Background to the National Fraud 
Reporting Centre and National Fraud 
Intelligence Bureau
     
The Government announced a review of fraud to 
Parliament in October 2005, with the aim: ‘to review 
the arrangements for dealing with fraud with the 
intent to reduce the amount of fraud and the damage 
it causes to the economy and society.’ The Fraud 
Review was completed in July 2006, and made 62 
recommendations encompassing the prevention, 
reporting, measurement, investigation, and prosecution 
of fraud.
Following a period of public consultation the 
Government published it’s response in March 2007. 
The government selected four key recommendations 
to progress as part of an integrated strategy to combat 
fraud.
To improve fraud recording•	
To improve service to victims•	
To improve fraud investigation and pursuit of the •	
perpetrator
To improve the volume and quality of intelligence •	
and analysis
In total there are seven work streams emanating from 
the recommendations, the NFRC/NFIB and NLF are two 
of those streams. The other streams are: 
Creation of the National Fraud Authority•	
Implementation of a Fraud Loss Measurement Unit•	
Extending Powers•	
Financial Court Study and Working Group•	
Opportunities for introducing a please negotiation•	
frameworkIt is widely held that fraud is the second 
highest source of harm to the economy and society. 
Fraud is conservatively estimated to cost the economy 
at least £20 billion1 in direct costs (based on 2005 
statistics), not taking into account the cost of trying to 
do something about these losses, however, the reality is 
probably far higher.
Action to tackle fraud is undermined by the highly 
fragmented way that fraud is reported and then 
analysed. 
Criminals exploit a routine failure of information 
sharing between organisations that hold fraud 
intelligence, which helps disguise the nature and 
extent of the criminal networks involved - increasing 
harm and driving up demand on police and the courts.  
Individuals and small businesses are often confused 
about where to report fraud.  
To be effective, action against fraud by industry, law 
makers and law enforcers must be based on robust 
intelligence.  But this in itself requires clear lines of 
reporting of fraud; and an ability to join-up pools of 
intelligence currently split between organisational silos; 
and strong links to law enforcements’ wider criminal 
intelligence systems. 
 
As set out in the government’s Fraud Review, the 
NFRC and NFIB will provide the vehicle through which 
relevant organisations can work together to tackle the 
fraud problem.  The NFRC and NFIB aim to close the 
gap between data gathering from multiple sources and 
analysis - much as JTAC2 does for terrorism. 
1 Levi et al “The Nature, Extent, and Economic Impact of Fraud in the UK” published by ACPO 2006 (foreword)
2 Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, a multi-agency unit staffed by members of the security agencies and other 
government departments. 
© NPIA (National Policing Improvement Agency) 2009 5
The Fraud Review 2006 made the 
following recommendations:
The NFRC/NFIB should be housed within the •	
national lead (police) force and staffed by police 
officers and civilians. It should work closely with the 
NFA3.
The NFRC/NFIB should have the capacity to accept •	
crime reports from victims (including businesses 
and Government departments, Regulators, etc) 
according to the Home Office Counting Rules 
(HOCR) and the National Crime Recording Standard 
(NCRS).
The NFRC/NFIB should work with police forces to •	
agree criteria for the screening and allocation of 
cases to forces. The criteria should be reviewed on a 
regular basis e.g. annual or bi-annual.
The NFRC/NFIB should be compatible with the •	
IMPACT programme and searchable by police 
forces. The NFIB should run reports on the system 
upon request from forces.
A pilot should be undertaken to match known frauds •	
against other police data sets using IMPACT.
The NFRC/NFIB should identify trusted partners in •	
different sectors and establish working relationships 
with them to identify how information on known 
fraudsters can be shared efficiently to prevent and 
detect fraud.
The NFRC/NFIB should analyse reports to provide •	
strategic, tactical and other assessments to 
the police and partner organisations. Strategic 
assessment would pass to the NFA and inform the 
United Kingdom Threat Assessment (UKTA). Tactical 
assessments would inform an operational response.
Devising and implementing public anti fraud •	
campaigns and warnings, drawing on generic and 
case specific information provided by NFRC/NFIB.
The NFRC is the public facing channel originally 
proposed in the 2005 Fraud Review. It has two strands 
– a website and a call centre.  
The first strand to be launched will be the website 
which will be hosted on Directgov – the designated 
portal for all transactions between citizens and the 
government. Ultimately the website will be the main 
channel for individual victims to seek advice on and 
report confirmed cases of fraud. Although at its 
launch it will be an advice only site with the reporting 
capability following. 
The site will retain the navigation of the main 
Directgov website and will incorporate a link from the 
home page to a campaign site which will be branded 
with the NFRC Know Fraud trademark. The main 
elements of the site will be an ‘intelligent’ reporting 
form supported by information on fraud types and 
advice on how to avoid becoming a victim, fraud 
prevention, developing trends and links to partner 
agencies within the counter fraud community. 
The website will be communicated to the general 
public as a portal for all fraud reporting, apart from 
where pre-existing reporting arrangements are in 
place, for benefits, credit card, copyright fraud etc. In 
these cases the website will signpost individuals to the 
appropriate organisation.
The website will be piloted in a specific region (to 
be determined) of the country and supported by a 
targeted marketing campaign within the area. The 
Pilot will last approximately 3 months.
National Fraud Reporting and Intelligence Forum
3 The National Fraud Authority (NFA) previously known as the National Fraud Strategic Authority, was established 
on 1st October 2008. An Executive Agency of the Attorney General’s Office will coordinate fraud activity across 
the whole economy, private and public sectors, to make the UK a hostile environment for fraudsters. It is aiming to 
initiate, co-ordinate and communicate on counter-fraud activity across the private and public sectors. 
The National Fraud Authority will have no operational responsibilities but will concentrate on measuring fraud, 
developing a national fraud strategy, assessing performance in the response to fraud and disseminating advice 
and assistance in response to fraud crime.
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Individual reports of frauds in progress will be
redirected to the appropriate local force as the website 
will not be designed to receive reports of active crimes 
in progress.
The second strand of the NFRC to be launched will be 
the call centre, which will be delivered in partnership 
with the Office of Fair Trading, and their Consumer 
Direct call centres. The Call centres will offer advice and 
guidance on all aspects of fraud and where appropriate 
record or direct the caller to a more appropriate 
agency.
Overview of the National Fraud 
Intelligence Bureau
The NFIB will bring together previously unconnected 
fraud information, analyse that information and 
share it across sectors in line with the National Fraud 
Strategy, bringing significant intelligence gains to the 
fight against economic crime.
 
The NFIB will produce intelligence products such as 
target profiles, problem profiles, highlight current and 
emerging trends and identify organised crime and 
associated organised criminal gangs.
There will be two primary sources of data into the NFIB 
to allow for data matching and analysis.
The NFRC Data Warehouse - This contains all a. 
confirmed reports of fraud at a national level. This 
information will be cleansed and prepared for 
matching and analysis by the NFIB.
Intelligence – The NFIB will have access to a variety b. 
of Intel inputs, including Police crime/intelligence 
systems and databases of counter fraud partners. It 
will be the analyst’s role to pull together confirmed 
fraud and intelligence to produce actionable 
intelligence packages. 
It is anticipated intelligence will be received from a 
variety of sources. Intelligence will be NIM compliant 
and graded on the police 5x5x5 system. Intelligence 
will not be accepted outside this format. Intelligence 
received by the NFIB will be processed according to 
existing intelligence procedures, with reports being 
input into COLP UNIFI crime and intelligence system. 
This approach has the potential to allow other law 
enforcement and organisations ability to see fraud 
intelligence received by the NFIB via the automatic 
load into the IMPACT system. 
Additional data4 collated by data providers will remain 
in their systems initially. The value of this data is 
recognised, however, it is yet to be determined the 
most appropriate format in which this data can be 
utilised both effectively and securely. Resources within 
the NFIB can access this data in line with The Data 
Protection Act 1998 in regards to specific cases or when 
working on specific intelligence products.
The NFIB is a private/public partnership operated and 
controlled by the City of London police. It will operate 
under a clear police driven management structure with 
clear supervisory roles and responsibilities. There will be 
long term and short term developmental secondment 
opportunities for all partners that submit data. 
All major partner organisations will be encouraged to 
have a SPOC within the NFIB to facilitate information 
exchange. Examples of resource origins are as follows: 
SOCA, APACS, CIFAS, and MPS e-crime.
Specialist resources including financial investigators, 
data analysts, and crime analysts and intelligence 
resources will be employed within the NFIB.
Input from government organisations, private industry 
and regulatory bodies during the development phase 
will inform the governance procedures and processes to 
ensure all data and intelligence dissemination complies 
with current legislation and guidance.
4 This could include information that does not amount to a fraud crime, however could be of value. For example if 
a person reported an incident to Consumer Direct and it didn’t amount to fraud it may however inform the wider 
intelligence picture
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Strategic Conference 1st July
Theme 1: The strategic dimension.
09:30 – 10:00  Registration and Refreshments
10:00 – 10:20  Event Opening and Welcome
    Conference Chair, Mr Hyde
10:20 – 10:50  The Fraud Review and the National Fraud Strategy
    Dr Herdan, NFA
10:50 – 11:30  Victims of Fraud – Meeting the Policing Pledge
    Colin Cowan
11:30 – 11:50  Refreshment Break
11:50 – 12:30  NFRC and NFIB, the Journey and the Destination
    David Clarke and Steve Strickland
12:30 – 13:00  Open Forum and Facilitated Discussion
13:00 – 14:00  Lunch Break
14:00 – 14:30  NFIB, proving the concept
    Tim Hutchings
14:30 – 15:00  Impacts for the NCRS and Home Office Counting Rules
    Steve Proffit
15:00 – 15:30  Issues for Local Implementation
    Mark Salt and Simon Wallis
15:30 – 15:50  Refreshment Break
15:50 – 16:30  Strategic Risks & Benefits (International case studies)
    L Hoppey, G Donewar and K Petryshyn
16:30 – 16:50  Open Forum and Facilitated Discussion
16:50 – 17:00  Conference Closing – Summary and the Next Steps
    Conference Chair, Mr Hyde
National Fraud Reporting and Intelligence Forum
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Fraud Practitioners Symposium 2nd July
Theme 2 – The tactical dimension
09:30 – 10:00  Registration and Refreshments
10:00 – 10:15  Event Opening and Welcome (including strategic overview of day one)
    Conference Chair, Mr Hyde
10:15 – 10:40  NFRC and NFIB, the Journey and the destination 
    David Clarke
10:40 – 11:20  Consistency in Fraud Investigation & Prosecution
    David Levy
11:20 – 11:50  Refreshment Break
11:50 – 12:30  Operational Risks and Benefits (an International case study)
    Leslie Hoppey and Greg Donewar
12:30 – 13:00  Open Forum and Facilitated Discussion
13:00 – 14:00  Lunch Break
14:00 – 14:30  An Operational Guide to the NFRC
    Steve Strickland 
14:30 – 15:00  NFIB, Proving the concept
    Tim Hutchings
15:00 – 15:30  NFIB, processes and products
    Amanda Lowe
15:30 – 15:50  Refreshment Break
15:50 – 16:35  Organised Crime and Fraud
    Prof Mike Levi
16:35 – 17:00  Open Forum and Facilitated Discussion
17:00 – 17:15  Symposium Closure Day 1 (Summary of the Day and Key Points)
    Conference Chair, Mr Hyde
19:00    Pre-dinner Drinks
19:30    Conference Dinner
    After Dinner Speaker SRO Tyson Hepple
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Fraud Practitioners Symposium 3rd July
Theme 2 – The tactical dimension
08:50 – 09:00  Review of Day one and overview for Day two
    Conference DeputyChair, David Clarke
09:00 – 09:30  Issues for National Implementation
    Charles Roe
09:30 – 10:00  Issues for Local Implementation
    Mark Salt and Simon Wallis
10:00 – 10:30  Impact of Local Crime Recording and Detection Figures
    Steve Proffitt
10:30 – 11:00  Refreshment Break
11:00 – 11:30  Perspective from the National Lead Force  
    Andy Fyfe
11:30 – 12:10  Operational Risks and Benefits (an International case study)
    K Petryshyn
12:10 – 12:30  Open Forum and Facilitated Discussion 
12:30 – 13:45  A National Resource, Making it work (Breakout Sessions)
    David Clarke and Steve Strickland
    Including Buffet Lunch
13:45 – 14:45  Facilitated Discussion - Findings of Break out Groups
    Steve Strickland and Marc Baker
14:45 – 15:30  Symposium Closure – Summary and the Next Steps
National Fraud Reporting and Intelligence Forum
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Deputy Chief Constable Stuart Hyde –  
Conference Chair
Stuart Hyde was born and educated in Bristol. 
On leaving school he studied Law at Birmingham 
University completing his studies in 1983. 
In 1983 he joined Avon & Somerset Constabulary 
where he held a variety of posts.
In 1997 he was promoted to Detective Superintendent 
in West Yorkshire Police where he managed a 
number of Force Crime departments. He moved 
to a Senior Investigating Officers role in Bradford 
and was subsequently promoted to Detective Chief 
Superintendent.  
In April 2004 he was promoted to the post os Assistant 
Chief Constable in the West Midlands and took on the 
portfolio for Operations then from August 2008.
His national responsibilities have included the Police 
use of DNA, creating the Child Exploitation and Online 
Protection centre CEOP and reducing crime against 
students. 
In 2006 to 2007 he was seconded to The Home Office 
(Immigration) as Strategic Director of Enforcement and 
helped to tip the balance of returning failed asylum 
seekers and increased the return of foreign national 
prisoners. 
On his return to force from the Home Office he 
undertook the Operations Portfolio and transformed 
the force state of preparedness for critical incidents and 
acts of terrorism. 
He is the lead nationally for Student Crime Reduction, 
Election Fraud and Forensic Pathology. 
Stuart is President of the Society for the Policing of 
Cyberspace (www.polcyb.org) and Chair of the Charity 
Bullying UK (www.bullying.co.uk). 
He recently received an Honorary Doctorate in 
Technology from the University of Wolverhampton 
in recognition of his achievements in tackling online 
crime.
In June 2009 he started a new role as Deputy Chief 
Constable of Cumbria Constabulary 
Dr Bernard Herdan
Dr Bernard Herdan has had a varied career in the public 
and private sectors in the UK and Continental Europe. 
A Graduate from Cambridge University, Bernard’s 
early career was in space science and technology: he 
spent eleven years at the European Space Agency in 
the Netherlands where his first position was Broadcast 
Satellites Programme Manager. 
Back in the UK, Bernard worked in the private sector 
for six years undertaking market research, consultancy 
and then managing a technology licensing and transfer 
company. 
Bernard moved into the public sector in 1990, initially 
as Director of Commercial Services at the Met Office. 
He was subsequently Chief Executive at the Driving 
Standards Agency, Criminal Records Bureau and UK 
Passport Service. More recently he has done freelance 
consultancy work for various parts of Government, has 
been interim Chief Executive of the Security Industry 
Authority, and is now Chief Executive of the National 
Fraud Authority. Bernard is also Deputy Chairman of 
Bedford Hospital NHS Trust. 
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Detective Superintendent Colin Cowan
Colin Cowan is a Detective Superintendent within the 
City of London Police Economic Crime Department and 
the head of the UK’s ‘Overseas Anti Corruption and 
Bribery Unit’. This role means that he is responsible 
for strategy and investigations relating to the policing 
of UK Citizens and Businesses, involved in corrupt 
practices overseas. In addition to this operational 
role Colin is the staff officer to Mike Bowron QPM, the 
Commissioner for the City of London Police, who is 
the UK Police lead for Economic Crime.  In 2008 Colin 
graduated with a Masters degree in Criminology, from 
the University of Cambridge, where he studied the 
impact of economic and social drivers behind internal 
banking fraud.
Detective Superintendent David Clarke
David was the Deputy Head of the City Police’s 
Economic Crime Directorate for two years and was a 
member of the original Fraud Review Team. He now 
leads the projects for the National Fraud Reporting 
Centre, National Fraud Intelligence Bureau and Lead 
Force for Fraud Investigation, which have emanated 
from the Fraud Review. 
He started his policing career in 1980, serving for six 
years with the Royal Air Force Provost, two years of 
which were in Northern Ireland. He joined the City 
Police in 1987 and has been involved in policing high 
profile events including the poll tax riots at Trafalgar 
Square and anti-capitalist protests in June 1999. 
He was involved in policing operations following the 
terrorist attacks in the City in the early 1990s and 7/7 
bombings in 2005. Secondments outside the Square 
Mile have included work on drugs and vice and as a 
Trainer at the Home Office police training college. 
In 2001 he was seconded to the UN in Bosnia & 
Herzegovina investigating human rights and corruption 
allegations. 
As a Senior Investigating Officer, he has managed a  
variety of violent and serious crime investigations. 
David remains a keen supporter of capacity building 
overseas and he and his team have assisted the EU by  
delivering investigative techniques training for law 
enforcement staff from Europe, the Middle East and 
beyond. 
Detective Inspector Steve Strickland
Detective Inspector Steve Strickland is the project lead 
for the design and implementation of the National 
Fraud Reporting Centre (NFRC), a project managed 
by the City of London Police’s Economic Crime 
Department (ECD) on behalf of the Attorney Generals 
Fraud Review Team. 
Steve started his policing career in 1996, serving 
with Cambridgeshire Constabulary stationed at 
Cambridge, Wisbech and Huntingdon. His duties 
included uniform patrol, local intelligence and 
volume crime management. Steve was also attached 
to Cambridgeshire’s National Intelligence Model 
implementation group as an operational advisor.
Steve qualified as a police trainer and in 2000 was 
seconded to National Police Training (now National 
Policing Improvement Agency – NPIA) where he 
worked as law trainer and specialist & tactical skills 
trainer. 
He joined the City of London Police in 2004 and has 
served in a variety of roles and support functions. 
He was involved in policing operations following the 
London bombings in 2005 and has worked as the 
Inspector and Head of Learning and Development. 
In 2006 Steve qualified as a project manager and 
was seconded to City University, London where he 
conducted international research into models and 
methods of police training. Steve then designed and 
implemented a unique degree programme for new 
recruits to the police service. Whilst seconded to 
the university Steve also designed the first modular 
‘Professionalising the Investigation Process’ (PIP) 
which has been promoted as a model of best practice 
for the training of new investigators. 
Key Note speakers
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Tim Hutchings
Tim joined National Westminster Bank (now part of 
the RBS Group) in 1976 and worked at branches and 
offices within the City. In late 1992 he obtained a 
role within the banks Group Audit function and on to 
Internal Investigations.
He has also worked as an Area Manager Operations 
and in 2004 set up a proactive fraud investigation 
team.
In September 2008 Tim was given the opportunity to 
be seconded to the Fraud Review project team at the 
City of London police and he is now responsible for 
delivering the NFIB stream.
Detective Sergeant Steve Proffit
Steve is a Detective Sergeant with the Metropolitan 
Police and has 28years service. He has spent most of 
his service in the CID. He has worked on crime squads, 
murder and rape squads and has spent a number of 
years working on protracted fraud enquiries covering 
National Health Service Fraud, Mortgage fraud, Legal 
Aid fraud and collusive cheque and credit card fraud. 
Ten years ago he took a break from operational police 
work to work on the Mets Crime Recording System 
and helped develop the current system with outside 
contractors.
Steve has spent the last seven years as one of the 
MPS’s Assistant Force Crime Registrars. During this 
time he obtained a Law degree from the University of 
East London.
Three years ago, Steve went on secondment to the 
Home Office as the National Counting Rules Manager 
for Recorded Crime. As part of this role Steve was 
responsible for writing the new Fraud counting rules for 
recorded crime that were necessary following the new 
Fraud Act 2006. The Attorney Generals Review of Fraud 
team also consulted with him during the preparation of 
their report into fraud.
Detective Inspector Amanda Lowe
Detective Inspector Amanda Lowe joined the Attorney 
Generals Fraud Review programme in 2007. She is the 
project lead for crime and intelligence process design 
and the operational interface with law enforcement. 
Her responsibility encompasses the National Fraud 
Reporting Centre (NFRC), National Fraud Bureau (NFB) 
and National Lead force (NLF).
Amanda began her policing career in 1996 and she 
served with the British Transport Police until 2004 
where she carried out the roles of neighbourhood 
policing officer, response officer and later her duties 
progressed to crime investigation and performing the 
role of Duty Officer.
Amanda joined the City of London Police in 2004 and 
has served in a variety of operational roles and Head 
Quarter support functions. As Acting Chief Inspector 
she was involved in the policing operations dealing with 
the aftermath of the 2005 bombings and was head of 
operations at Snow Hill. In 2006 she was responsible for 
implementing the ‘drug testing on arrest legislation’ in 
the City of London.
In 2007 Amanda joined the Economic Crime 
Directorate in the area of intelligence and was 
responsible for the National Threat Assessment 
on Motor Insurance Fraud in partnership with the 
Insurance Fraud Bureau (IFB). Amanda is a keen 
supporter of diversity taking an active role in the initial 
conception of the City of London Police Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) group working closely 
with the Metropolitan Police (LGBT).
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Detective Inspector Mark Salt
Mark Salt , Detective Inspector, West Midlands Police 
28 years policing service. Mark is an experienced Senior 
Investigating Officer with many years of experience 
in murder investigation and other serious crime 
investigations on a regional and national level. Mark 
joined West Midlands Police Economic Crime Team 
in May 2008 and has been the National Police SPOC 
for Electoral Crime and is committed , on behalf of 
his ACPO , to a number of national Working Groups 
and projects . Mark fills his spare time as the Force Co 
Ordinator for negotiators with many years experience 
at a high level in this area. He is in the final stages of 
study for a Doctorate of Psychology. 
Simon Wallis, Detective Chief Inspector , 
West Midlands Police 
He has 23 years policing service. Simon has worked 
within the West Midlands Police Economic Crime Team 
for four years enjoying the chance to contribute to a 
number of ACPO Working Groups and projects. With 
responsibility for implementation of local Proceeds of 
Crime opportunities he also manages the Regional 
Asset Recovery Team. He is a Director of the Midland 
Fraud Forum Ltd ,a public / private venture to share 
good practice in the prevention and reduction of fraud . 
He is part of the investigative response to critical crimes 
in action. Academic qualifications include an upper 
second degree in Law.
Supervisory Special Agent Leslie Hoppey
Acting Unit Chief (A/UC) Leslie D. Hoppey began her 
federal career with the National Park Service as a Park 
Ranger throughout her college summers. She worked 
in the Boston Historical National Park, Morristown 
National Park, and Yellowstone National Park.   
After these seasonal assignments, A/UC Hoppey began 
working with the United States Customs Service (USCS) 
in the North Eastern part of the United States as a 
Customs Inspector. 
After her assignment with the USCS, she became 
a Special Agent with the Drug Enforcement 
Administration.
She joined the FBI in 1991 as a Special Agent and 
was responsible for investigating all different types of 
federal crimes to include, Violent Crimes, White Collar 
Crimes, and Domestic Terrorism. 
Shortly after 9/11, she joined a Joint Terrorism Task 
Force.  During this assignment she was temporally 
assigned to the Strategic Information and Operations 
Center at the FBI Headquarters.
In October of 2005, SSA Hoppey was promoted to 
the Supervisory Special Agent position in the Cyber 
Division. She is currently assigned as the Acting Unit 
Chief of the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) 
in Fairmont, WV. The IC3 tracks the latest Internet 
schemes and provides trend analysis to the field. SSA 
Hoppey works directly with Case Agents and has the 
opportunity to work with Legats and foreign police 
officers worldwide.    
Key Note speakers
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Greg Donewar
Greg Donewar is the Manager of the Internet Crime 
Complaint Centre.  He holds a Masters Degree in 
Management and has attended the FBI National 
Academy, FBI Hazardous Devices School for bomb 
technicians, and the FBI Southwest Command College. 
He also has nearly fourteen years of experience as a 
police chief and over twenty years of experience in law 
enforcement with a through-the-ranks progression of 
achievement. He has served as a certified fire fighter 
and Program Leader of West Virginia University’s fire 
academy. He also developed and delivered Homeland 
Security training programs for colleges and universities 
nationwide. 
Inspector Kerry Petryshyn
Inspector Kerry Petryshyn is the Officer in Charge of 
Major Frauds and Bankruptcy in the Commercial Crime 
Branch of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police located 
at the RCMP National Headquarters in Ottawa, Ontario, 
Canada.
Inspector Petryshyn graduated from University with 
degrees in Sociology, Criminology and Law before 
joining the RCMP in June of 1988.  He served his first 
18 years in the Province of New Brunswick performing 
a variety of duties which included: General Duty 
Policing, Highway Patrol, Customs & Excise along the 
Canada/US Border, Marine Patrol in the Bay of Fundy, 
Underwater Recovery, Commercial Crime Investigations 
and lastly managing the Provincial Emergency 911 
Police Dispatch Centre. 
In January of 2007 Kerry was transferred to National 
Headquarters where he took over the role of National 
Counterfeit Coordinator in the Commercial Crime 
Branch.  In September of 2008 he received his 
Commission and assumed his current duties which 
also include the management of PhoneBusters, the 
Canadian Anti-Fraud Call Centre located in North Bay, 
Ontario.
David Levy Assistant Director  
Fraud Prosecution Service
David is a Solicitor and Higher Court Advocate who has 
been based in London since 1988. He began his career 
in South Shields, North East England in private practice 
mainly dealing with defence advocacy and prosecuted 
for the Police and the NSPCC.
He joined Durham Police Prosecutions Department in 
1984 and in 1986 transferred to Hertfordshire with the 
CPS, moving to London in 1988. He has held senior 
posts in Harrow, Wood Green & Stratford followed by 
Acting Assistant Chief Crown Prosecutor and Sector 
Director as well as Head of the Central Criminal Court 
HOMICIDE Unit.
In 2005 he was asked to set up the FPS and was 
appointed Head.  In 2006 the FPS became a National 
Entity and he was appointed the Assistant Director.
David has a managerial and operational role both 
in the Crown and Magistrates Court.  He also deals 
with Eurojust and OLAF in Europe and on a wider 
international basis. 
Professor Mike Levi 
Dr. Michael Levi has degrees from Oxford, Cambridge, 
Southampton and Cardiff Universities and has been 
Professor of Criminology at Cardiff University since 
1991.  
He has been conducting international research on the 
control of white-collar and organised crime, corruption 
and money laundering/ financing of terrorism since 
1972, and has published widely on these subjects as 
well as editing major journals, including Criminology 
and Criminal Justice. He was granted a D.Sc. (Econ.) 
from Cardiff University (2007) and elected to the 
Academy of Social Sciences (2006).  
In 2007, he was awarded a 3-year Professorial 
Fellowship by the UK Economic and Social Research 
Council to develop research on transnational economic 
and organised crime and on responses to it. 
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Tyson Hepple 
A biography will be provided in separately in your pack.
Charles Roe
Charles is enjoying an 18-month secondment to the 
NFRC/NFIB project team from the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), where he was a manager within their 
small firms division. 
At the FSA Charles was the Business Implementation 
Manager for an electronic data analysis and 
management information system, which enabled the 
FSA to analyse over 30,000 financial returns received 
from organisations on an annual basis.
Before working at the FSA, Charles spent 10 years in 
the travel industry where he worked in the accounting 
and management information areas of the business, 
enjoying extended stints working in Germany, Spain, 
Malta and the United States. 
He started his career in International Corporate 
Banking, spending 10 years working with a number of 
FTSE 100 firms who had significant international trade 
relationships in the Far and Middle East and Africa.
In his spare time he enjoys spending time with his two 
children and sailing; recently spending time on a 68ft 
round the world racing yacht learning how to sail it in 
race (and gale force) conditions!
Detective Inspector Andy Fyfe
DI Andrew Fyfe is a Physics Graduate, having gained a 
BSc (Honours) from London University in 1988. 
He joined the City of London Police in 1991, and after 
4 years as a uniformed officer he became a Detective in 
1995, specialising in Fraud Investigation. 
In 2006 he was invited to become Head of Training 
in the Economic Crime Department. In this role he 
devised the Force Fraud Reduction Strategy, and he 
introduced the groundbreaking theme of sharing 
knowledge, intelligence and skills with the financial 
industry.
In May 2008 Andrew returned to mainstream fraud 
investigation, heading one of the operational teams 
making up the Fraud Squad within the Economic Crime 
Department.
Since April 2009 Andrew has been tasked with 
building the Lead Force Centre of Excellence for Fraud 
Investigations.
Conference and Symposium Abstracts
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The Fraud Review and the National Fraud 
Strategy
Dr Bernard Herdan  
National Fraud Authority
An abstract will be provided separately in your pack. 
Victims of Fraud & the Policing Pledge
D.Supt Colin Cowan
Victims of Fraud Project Lead 
During this session Colin Cowan will discuss the ‘Victim 
Support for the Victims of Fraud’ project. This will 
include an overview of existing structures and services 
before presenting the results from the project research. 
Colin will then use this evidence base, showing what 
victims really need, to detail the way forward for victim 
care.
NFRC & NFIB, the Journey & the 
Destination
D.Supt David M Clarke
NFRC and NFIB Project Director  
david.clarke@cityoflondon.police.uk
The Fraud Review is seen as a landmark piece of work, 
a once in a generation look at a dangerous virus that 
has spread across society. The decision to commence 
the Review in 2005, ahead of the current economic 
turmoil appears to have been a shrewd move. The 
nature, scale and harm from fraud are beginning to 
emerge but are still unclear.
The Review illustrated the difficulties a victim 
experiences when they seek to report a fraud - three 
years on and reporting such crime can still be a 
challenge and much fraud goes unreported. The NFRC/
NFIB project team have built relationships with dozens 
of organisations across the public and private sector – 
groups that record fraud against them, their customers 
and the state. What has emerged is that confirmed 
reports of fraud sit in silos across many organisations.
The Police service rarely has access to these reports of 
crime, police forces do not count them the service does 
not see the full picture. Consequently, the authorities 
and the community do not know who has been 
victimised, when, where and by whom. For a victim, 
their loss frequently goes unrecorded, their distress 
unrecognised, often leading to feelings of despair 
and a loss of trust. Conveniently for fraudsters, law 
enforcement bodies often do not see the full nature 
of their activity – they effectively stay under the radar 
as law enforcers target those whose attacks are more 
visible.
The recommendations from the Review were endorsed 
by the Government and public alike and resulted in 
three year funding for the National Fraud Programme. 
The Programme offers some laudable solutions but are 
they workable? We are now into year two of the process 
and whilst the Lead Force has a string of successful 
joint investigations underway, eyes are now fixed on 
the NFRC and NFIB. The important questions are can 
they be delivered? Can they make a real difference? 
If they do really work, can the services survive the 
economic downturn. 
Doing nothing is not an option. This once in a 
generation opportunity offers some unique but simple 
solutions to tackle the menace of fraud – the message 
from every law-abiding citizen and organisation must 
be, lets make this work.
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An Operational Guide to the NFRC
D.Insp Steve Strickland
NFRC Project Lead
The reporting of fraud across law enforcement and 
industry has arguably become fragmented. It is quite 
feasible for a fraudster to operate within different 
arenas and still go undetected because of the shortfalls 
in the recording, sharing and analysis of fraud data 
across Law Enforcement and industry. 
Until the formation of the National Fraud Authority 
(NFA) and the publication of the National Fraud 
Strategy there was no overarching strategy recognising 
the need a single national structure to co-ordinate the 
recording and analysis of fraud data. The National 
Fraud Reporting Centre (NFRC) and National Fraud 
Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) is the solution to this issue. 
Discussion will begin with the remit of the NFRC, how 
it will feed into the NFIB and how this fits with existing 
fraud reporting structures. The NFRC will combine 
national standards for crime reporting with the data 
requirements of specialist fraud investigations. 
Consideration will then be given to the scope of fraud 
recorded by the NFRC, the level of data recorded and 
what happens to those who find themselves unable to 
report their fraud via the NFRC. Finally, the NFRC brand, 
what does it look like and how will be this used across 
law enforcement and industry. 
NFIB, proving the concept
Tim Hutchings
NFIB Project Lead
The Fraud Review in 2006 articulated that one of the 
key issues is one of knowledge management – without 
a central repository of knowledge detailing what fraud 
is perpetrated, where, by whom, against whom, in 
what form and at what cost, it is impossible for law 
enforcement agencies and other key stakeholders 
adequately to combat this crime or to reduce the direct 
and subsidiary harm it causes to the economic well-
being of the nation.
Fraudsters benefit from the lack of continuity and the 
lack of strategic or operational oversight that could 
otherwise detect multiple frauds in different areas with 
similar or identical characteristics.
The objective of the National fraud Intelligence bureau 
is to improve fraud investigation and pursuit of the 
perpetrator as well as providing trend and pattern 
analysis by bringing fraud data under one roof. 
As part of our first steps on this journey we have 
obtained confirmed fraud data from a small number 
of providers, which has been cleansed and matched as 
part of the first Proof of Concept pathfinder stage.
My talk will share with you some of the high-level 
findings and learning’s from this first stage and inform 
you of plans for the next stage of this part of the 
project.
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NFIB, Processes & Products
D.Insp Amanda Lowe
Project Lead for NFRC & NFIB Products
The National Fraud Reporting Centre (NFRC) and 
National Fraud Intelligence Bureau  (NFIB) will 
undoubtedly impact on fraud (crime) reporting and 
investigation at a national level, but what will it mean 
for individual organisations. 
With change comes apprehension, uncertainty and 
many questions. Consultation is a key part of any 
new programme, but more so in the case of the NFRC 
and NFIB. Discussion will commence with what the 
NFIB will look like and how it will integrate with the 
NFRC. The detailed process of analysis and National 
Intelligence Model product formation will be explored 
and the associated dissemination procedures that will 
follow. 
Consideration will be given to the various Service Level 
agreements that will be needed and how products will 
integrate and add value to individual force working 
practices and national fraud intervention. Finally, the 
impact of the NFRC and NFIB on community policing 
and compliance with the policing pledge will be 
addressed.
Impacts for the NCRS and Home Office 
Counting Rules
D.Sgt Steve Proffit
Home Office Counting Rules Manager
Fundamental to the processes of the National Fraud 
Reporting Centre (NFRC) is that they are compliant 
with the National Crime Recording Standard 
(NCRS). This is non negotiable from the Home Office 
Perspective.
The Fraud Home Office Counting Rules were re-drafted 
in 2007 to accommodate the New Fraud Act. As part 
of this re-write there was a new concept of recording 
Cheque and Credit card Fraud. This involved victims 
reporting the crimes to their Financial Institution who 
would then pass the details onto APACS. There was 
no need to report to police. The Home Office then 
obtained figures for this type of fraud from APACS. This 
process has been inspected by HMIC and passed as fit 
for purpose. 
With the implementation of NFRC the cheque and 
credit card model has been extended to cover most 
areas of fraud and the new rules are being drafted to 
reflect this.  The opportunity to develop a ‘fraud type’ 
approach has also been taken, rather than count all 
fraud in a General category within fraud.
It is hoped that in the future, most fraud will be 
reported direct to the NFRC by victims and Industry 
and very little will be recorded by Police freeing up their 
time to investigate solvable fraud and not just record f
Perspective from the Proposed Pilot Force 
(West Midlands Police)
Detective Inspector Mark Salt 
West Midlands Police, Economic Crime Unit
The non London experience of fraud will seek to 
describe recent case examples of why fraud is anything 
but a white collar accountant” fiddling the books”. 
Simon and Mark will talk through their experience of 
the inter relationship between fraud and other serious 
criminal enterprises including guns , drugs , extortion 
and corruption. 
The impact upon victims can vary tremendously. 
They will talk through a small number of cases which 
demonstrate the more severe consequences to 
individuals and communities. The reputation at stake 
is not only that of the police service. They will talk of 
a small number of cases where getting it right and 
getting it wrong can have strategic consequences! 
Drawing on these experiences they will seek to 
rationalise the West Midlands appetite for the National 
Fraud Reporting Centre and National Fraud Intelligence 
Service and the early thoughts of their force on how 
they hope to take the pilot forward .
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The Strategic/Operational Risks & Benefits– 
An International Experience
Supervisory Special Agent Leslie Hoppey  (FBI)
Greg Donewar (IC3)
Inspector Kerry Petryshyn (RCMP,  
Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre)
In May of 1999, the Internet Fraud Complaint 
Center (IFCC) was formed to serve as the nation’s 
central repository to receive Internet related crime 
complaints, research, develop, and refer intelligence to 
law enforcement agencies for any investigation they 
deem appropriate.  At its inception as the IFCC, and 
as it evolved into the Internet Crime Complaint Center 
(IC3), the project emphasized serving the broader law 
enforcement community to include federal as well 
international, state and local agencies combating 
Internet crime.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) has for decades sought to establish partnerships 
in order to best capitalize on the benefits and expertise 
of diverse work groups. 
The National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C) 
enjoyed a long and prosperous history in supporting 
law enforcement agencies’ investigations of fraud and 
white collar crime, so the partnership seemed a natural 
fit. NW3C’s intimate knowledge of the challenges faced 
by law enforcement at the local level coupled with 
the FBI’s far reaching law enforcement authority met 
the need for both addressing crime at the individual 
level while at the same time applying a wide area 
of influence; an essential element for internet crime 
issues. 
The FBI perspective will include a brief synopsis on 
how we has taken aggressive steps to exponentially 
strengthen law Enforcement’s ability to identify and 
combat Internet crime, by creating and expanding 
alliances with private industry.  Large companies have 
also adopted a very proactive posture in teaming 
with the FBI to identify and respond to cyber crime 
schemes.  As part of this effort, several companies have 
provided guidance and/or links for their customers to 
the IC3 website.  
In general, the FBI’s effort to increase its alliances with 
private industry has become a key component of its 
success.  The information received from private industry 
coupled with the IC3 database complaints, produce 
valuable intelligence which can provide future trend 
analysis.  The FBI follows a very proactive approach 
to educating the consumer through Public Service 
Announcements.  
     
The NW3C perspective will include a brief explanation 
of the scope and purpose of the national initiative 
to learn from local law enforcement how NW3C’s 
participation in the project could improve. Discussion 
will reveal the results of the national initiative. From 
the results, an implementation plan was developed 
where concurrent strategies were defined coupled 
with prioritization of the strategies and proposed 
timelines for process completion. As resources have 
been extremely limited, the presentation will reveal 
how those obstacles were hurdled while keeping 
development moving forward. Within the first part of 
the calendar year of 2008 portions of the process plan 
were completed and tested while others would not 
come to fruition until much later in the year. 
We will explore the outcome of the testing with 
a target date of January 1, 2009 for launching a 
reengineering of the NW3C participation in the 
IC3 process. The presentation will conclude with an 
exploration of problem solving for issues that were 
unanticipated and untested as well as the solutions 
that were applied. 
Conference and Symposium Abstracts
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Consistency in Fraud Investigation and 
Prosecution
David Levy
Fraud Prosecution Service
The overall need for the Fraud Prosecutor is to maintain 
the highest standard of prosecution procedure is 
followed in handling complex and serious frauds by 
sharing best practice with the police and other partners 
in the Criminal Justice system to ensure investigations 
follow the correct path both in the UK and abroad with 
the ultimate aim of maintaining a high and fair success 
rate in prosecutions. Examples of how this is achieved 
are by effective planning, training and liaison together 
with an active involvement with Head Quarters Policy, 
the National Fraud Authority and the Lead Fraud 
Force. Examples of significant successes in multi-victim 
crimes will be given (Boiler Room Frauds) as well as in 
corruption both nationally and internationally.
Organised Crime and Fraud
Professor Mike Levi
Cardiff University
Levi@Cardiff.ac.uk
When assessing the links between fraud and organised 
crime, one simple question is what is disorganised 
about serious frauds, i.e. the sorts of frauds that are of 
interest to the NFA and to major police and non-police 
agency units?  
The paper will question that traditional assumption 
that white-collar crimes are not organised crime, 
and review what evidence there is about the overlap 
between the sort of people who commit fraud and the 
sort of people who commit other major crimes for gain, 
including those that threaten and/or use violence for 
gain. 
Such linkages are more likely with volume fraud than 
with elite frauds, but the talk will examine whether 
some of these labels have outlived their usefulness for 
media, operational and strategic purposes.  Fraud and 
forgery can be used to fund and supply false identities 
for use in terrorism: the paper will also disentangle 
some of the issues involved in fraud-terrorism linkages.  
Issues for National Implementation
Charles Roe
NFRC and NFIB Deputy Director
The development of the NFIB and NFRC give 
police and law enforcement organisations a unique 
opportunity to collate, understand and act upon fraud 
data from a central point. This opportunity should be 
seen as a pivotal point in the UK’s fight against crime. 
Whilst the first day of the conference focused on the 
background to the journey we have taken; the early 
results and experiences of some of our International 
partners, I will attempt to highlight and address some 
of the issues that forces need to consider prior to a 
national roll out. The presentation will cover future 
milestones, key issues, explore some of the myths and 
give a 5 point plan for implementation for forces to 
take away with them.
Perspective from the National Lead Force
D.Insp Andy Fyfe
National Lead Force – Centre of Excellence
Since April 2008, the City Police has already been 
operating as the national lead force for fraud. As such, 
50 extra investigators have been recruited to help 
tackle the large increase in fraud cases taken on. Some 
64 extra cases have been taken on so far, representing 
approx £1billion in losses to the UK economy.
Discussion will begin with how the Lead Force helps 
other forces and law enforcement agencies through 
the provision of resources, expert assistance and the 
provision of advice and guidance as required.
Consideration will then be given to the 3 key strands 
of the Lead Force Centre of Excellence and how 
they can support forces with the implementation 
of  the NFRC & NFIB. The 3 strands are the centre 
for fraud investigation resources; the centre for 
fraud investigation training – which is available to 
law enforcement and the financial industry; and the 
centre for fraud analysis and information - through 
operational learning, dissemination of fraud alerts, 
and the dissemination of intelligence and evidential 
packages. 
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A National Fraud Reporting Centre –  
Risks & Benefits The Canadian Perspective
Royal Canadian Mounted Police – Commercial Crime 
Branch
Fraud, often categorized as a white collar crime, does 
not receive the attention from law enforcement and 
government that it deserves.  In Canada fraud has 
been historically under reported, poorly measured 
and limited with regard to studies and research.  All of 
this has propagated a false perception that fraud has 
limited impact on citizens and the economy placing 
fraud regrettably low on most priority lists.
A National Fraud Reporting Centre (NFRC) serves many 
purposes.  Firstly, it provides a central point of contact 
where victims, both domestic and international, can go 
to not only report the crime but seek help in recovering 
from the financial attack.  It also stands as a platform 
for coordinating a national prevention strategy through 
education and awareness.  A central national repository 
for fraud complaints gathers data and statistics that 
form the most comprehensive snapshot of the level 
of fraud available.  Most importantly a NFRC provides 
analysts with the data needed to create strategic 
and tactical intelligence reports.  Reports that piece 
together complex puzzles created by organized crime 
groups that commit their crimes across numerous 
domestic and international boundaries.  Crimes that 
might not otherwise be investigated or connected to a 
bigger picture.
With the benefits come risks.  A National Fraud 
Reporting Centre can become the dumping ground 
for complaints that some police agencies can’t, or 
don’t, want to be bothered with.  It can be mistaken 
for an investigative body by victims who expect their 
complaint to be acted upon.   The NFRC can suffer 
from too much success with an inability to handle 
the volume of complaints and demands for service 
from victims, law enforcement, government and the 
media.   And lastly, the NFRC can suffer from lack of 
support due mostly to those issues identified in the 
first paragraph above.  This can affect funding levels 
creating shortfalls with regard to human resources, 
operating costs and keeping up with technology and 
demand.
The RECOL Experience 
Multi-jurisdictional Issues, Risks, Benefits & 
Solutions
Royal Canadian Mounted Police – Commercial Crime 
Branch
The issue of policing jurisdictions in Canada is rather 
unique.  The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 
is responsible for municipal policing, provincial policing 
and/or federal policing mandates depending upon 
the region of Canada.  In many areas of the country 
all 3 roles are performed at the same time.  Given 
this unique arrangement there exists the means 
to gather national crime data through a national 
records management system.  Historically however, 
the greatest concentrations of victims and scammers 
are located in major cities and regions in which the 
RCMP is not the police force of jurisdiction.  In these 
instances the RCMP relies heavily on partnerships and 
information sharing.
To address this shortcoming the RCMP decided to 
develop and launch an online presence whereby victims 
of Canadian based fraud, or residents of Canada 
victimized by scammers outside the country, can log 
on and report frauds.  As a result RECOL.ca (Reporting 
Economic Crime OnLine) was created.   The intent in 
the beginning was to have RCMP analysts review the 
complaint data and produce intelligence reports for law 
enforcement.  
Funding and resource issues however made it 
impossible to keep up with the volume of complaints.  
In time it was decided to leverage the capabilities of 
the Intelligence and Analysis Unit of the Canadian 
Anti-Fraud Call Centre (CAFCC – formerly known 
as PhoneBusters) where RECOL complaint data is 
forwarded for addition to their database.
PhoneBusters was initially created in 1991 by the 
Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) in response to the 
victimization of citizens in the City of North Bay, 
Ontario by telemarketing fraud.  It is now jointly 
managed by the RCMP, OPP, and Competition Bureau 
Canada and has expanded its mandate nationally 
and includes numerous types of fraud.  It houses 
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a Call Centre, Intelligence and Analysis Unit, and 
the SeniorBusters volunteer assistance program.  
Complaints are received from across Canada and 
around the world via telephone, e-mail, facsimile and 
regular post. 
Being jointly managed provides a variety of benefits 
through multiple revenue sources, leveraged resources 
and varied expertise and skill sets but this same 
arrangement also comes with its challenges.  Survival 
and viability regularly depends on the continued 
financial and strategic commitment of partners     
which can change based on each agency’s shift in 
priorities.  As well, management and operational 
decisions are often slow to occur when consensus is 
required.
A specialist exhibition will accompany both the one day 
conference and two day symposium – giving delegates 
the opportunity to meet and chat to representatives 
of some of the leading companies in the antifraud 
industry.
This is your chance to see products and innovative 
solutions in action, ask questions and be
kept up to date with the changing technologies that 
you will need to rely on in your continuing
fight against fraud.
Conference Organising Committee
Conference Chair
Deputy Chief Constable Stuart Hyde
Strategic lead for engagement on NFRC & NFIB
Conference Director
Detective Superintendent David Clarke
NFRC & NFIB Project Director
Organising Committee Members 
Charles Roe
NFRC & NFIB Deputy Director
D.Insp Steve Strickland
NFRC Project Lead
Tim Hutchings
NFIB Project Lead
D.Insp Amanda Lowe
NFRC & NFIB Products, Project Lead
Event management 
Katie Purnell
Events Manager, NPIA Ryton-on-Dunsmore 
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Exhibitors and Sponsors
Amethyst Risk Management Ltd. 
Amethyst’s Information Assurance (IA) services to 
the Public Sector focus on security accreditation 
support, advice and solutions. We also provide 
specialist training, covering technical risk assessment, 
accreditation, and IA within Government. Amethyst 
has a strong and extensive background of successful 
delivery and support to a wide variety of public sector 
organisations for both IA and risk management.  
Within the criminal justice sector, Amethyst 
consultants have worked closely with the National 
Policing Improvement Agency to provide professional 
accreditation support for national systems and projects 
such as Airwave, PNC, DORS, and PentiP. We are also 
working with the City of London Police Fraud Review 
Team, addressing issues around data ownership and 
sharing.
We also undertake penetration testing of IT systems, 
and are pursuing opportunities to establish other 
technical and forensic data recovery and analysis 
services to meet the needs of UK policing and law 
enforcement. 
Our consultants have a breadth and depth of 
knowledge and experience that allows Amethyst to 
provide IA support at all levels within a project or 
programme. Our services are of particular value to 
Senior Information Risk Owners (SIRO), Information 
Asset Owners (IAO), and project or programme 
managers who have responsibility for systems 
accreditation. 
Telephone: +44 (0)1256 345612
Fax:  +44 (0)1256 811876
E-mail:  jude.jones@amethystrisk.com
Web:  www.amethystrisk.com
Teesside University 
For a number of years Teesside University has been 
the only higher education institution to deliver an 
MA Fraud Management During this time we have 
developed a wide partner base which includes the 
Police and other enforcement agencies, for example 
the Department for Works & Pensions, the Law Society 
and the Financial Services Authority.
Our partnerships with the Serious Organised Crime 
Agency and the National Policing Improvement Agency 
have led to the delivery of a masters level course in 
financial investigations and financial crime whilst 
elsewhere we have delivered a foundation degree in 
the discipline and our new BA (Hons) programme will 
commence in 2010.In addition to this the university is 
now in its 10th year of accrediting the Police National 
Fraud Course and its second year of accreditation for 
the Fraud Supervisors programme.
The success of these programmes have led Teesside 
University to create the Centre for Fraud and Financial 
Crime which is fast gaining national and international 
acclaim for its work in the field. 
The centre is justifiably proud of its modern approach 
to teaching which pays particular attention to the 
needs of both the student and the employer
The university has a stand in the exhibition hall where 
you can meet a meet a member of staff to discuss your 
needs.
Telephone  01642 342843
Fax   01642 342925
E-mail:   n.wise@tees.ac.uk
Web:   www.tees.ac.uk
Also present - The Forensic Science Service, Key Forensic 
Services Ltd and Consumer Direct.
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Also present - 
Key Forensic Solutions
Forensic Science Services
Police Review
Teeside University
Police Mutual
DCPCU
Consumer Direct – Scambusters
Conference Bags Sponsored by Amethyst Risk
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DRAFT
‘Projections Document’
NFIB Products and Referrals
What is the purpose of document?
The document and the table overleaf is intended as a guide for the NFIB project team to assist them with the planning and
implementation of the NFIB; it shows the potential impact that changes to fraud reporting and the subsequent intelligence functions
could have on policing areas.
For illustration purposes, the current impact of fraud on forces has been estimated by using the percentage of fraud victims and fraud
addresses per force area that have then been used to identify the potential cost of fraud to that force area. These figures exclude
some major areas such as income tax and EU fraud where it has not as yet been possible to gather data or where statistics are simply
not available.
With the limited data available, an assumption has been made that these figures are representative of all frauds and have been used
as an initial projection of what forces could potentially receive from the NFIB, this includes ‘real time’ referrals and packages (termed
products). Due to the lack of detailed figures available for the volume of fraud, the figures assume the maximum number of products
that are anticipated to be produced per annum.
As more accurate data becomes available this table will be updated to reflect the volumes and location of actual fraud reported.
Footnotes
1: This document draws on data from CIFAS documents on ‘Impersonations/Facility Takeovers by Police Force’ and ‘Fraud Addresses by Police
Force’. Whilst the figures presented in columns 2 and 3 are based on actual data gathered, the derivations must be seen as no more than an estimate
of the impact.
2: The projected number of packages is based on the assumption that each member of the NFIB team will produce one package, per person per
month. The number of analysts in the NFIB will increase as the process moves from pilot – implementation – business as usual, for illustration
purposes an illustrative staffing of 30 & 45 personnel has been assumed. The actual number will depend on the level of seconded staff that joins the
team.
3: ‘Real-time’ referrals are reports that the NFIB have assessed which require immediate action by the local force. The actions could include support
and aftercare for vulnerable victims, retrieval and retention of time sensitive evidence or positive investigative leads including (but not exclusive to)
identifiable suspects or recoverable proceeds of crime.
Understanding the Table
Column 1: lists all of the Home Office police forces of England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Crown Dependencies of Isle
of Man, State of Jersey and State of Guernsey.
Column 2: shows the percentage of victims that live within a particular policing area. This figure is derived from CIFAS¹ data based on
an assumption that this data is indicative of all fraud victims.
Column 3: shows what percentage of fraud addresses sit within a particular policing area, these are addresses actively involved or
directly linked to fraud and include both victim and suspect addresses. This figure is derived from CIFAS data based on an
assumption that this data is indicative of all UK based fraud addresses.
Column 4: is the projected cost (based on the percentage from column 3) of fraud to each policing area based on annual cost to UK
plc of 14 billion (Button et al, 2009). This is a conservative estimate; the true cost could be much higher.
Column 5 & 6: these columns project the number of packages² a police force could receive per annum (based on the percentage from
column 3) if the NFIB output was 300 packages (column 5) and 450 packages (column 6).
Columns 7, 8 & 9: these columns project the number of ‘real-time’ referrals³ (based on a 1% referral rate) that a force could receive
from the NFIB based on total frauds reported (direct to NFIB from stakeholders and via the NFRC by individual victims). Column 7 is
representative of the upper estimates for year 1 of business as usual for the NFIB. Columns 8 & 9 show how, if the reporting of fraud
increases to a level that is representative of the number of victims nationally how these increases could impact on real time referrals to
forces.
The assumptions made within this document have been made by the NFIB project team, not by CIFAS.
SS/02 Draft 22/09/09
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Police Force
% Fraud
Victims
% All Fraud
Addresses
Cost to
Victims
Fraud
Packages
Circa.
300pa
Fraud
Packages
Circa.
450pa
Est Fraud
Referrals
Circa.
2.5m
Est Fraud
Referrals
Circa
3.75m
Est Fraud
Referrals
Circa
5m
Avon & Somerset 2.1 1.6 £224m 5 pa 7.5 pa 400 600 800
Bedfordshire 1.3 1.2 £168m 3.5 pa 5.5 pa 300 450 600
Cambridgeshire 1 1.2 £168m 3.5 pa 5.5 pa 300 450 600
Central Scotland 0.25 0.2 £28m 0.6 pa 1 pa 50 75 100
Cheshire 1.7 1 £140m 3 pa 4.5 pa 250 375 500
Cleveland 0.6 0.6 £84m 2 pa 3 pa 150 210 270
Cumbria 0.5 0.3 £42m 1 pa 1.5 pa 75 112 150
Derbyshire 1.1 1 £140m 3 pa 4.5 pa 250 350 450
Devon & Cornwall 2 1.3 £182m 4 pa 6 pa 325 487 650
Dorset 1.2 0.7 £98m 2 pa 3 pa 175 262 350
Dumfries & Galloway 0.1 0.08 £11m 0.25 pa 0.35 pa 20 30 40
Durham 0.5 0.5 £70m 1.5 pa 2.5 pa 125 187 250
Dyfed-Powys 0.4 0.25 £35m 1 pa 1.5 pa 62 93 124
Essex 4.6 4.5 £630m 13.5 pa 21 pa 1125 1672 2250
Fife 0.4 0.3 £42m 1 pa 1.5 pa 75 112 150
Gloucestershire 0.8 0.5 £70m 1.5 pa 2.5 pa 125 187 250
Grampian 0.5 0.4 £56m 1.5 pa 2 pa 100 150 200
Greater Manchester 3.6 5.7 £798m 17 pa 25 pa 1425 2112 2850
Gwent 0.4 0.4 £56m 1.5 pa 2 pa 100 150 200
Hampshire 3.3 2.1 £294m 6 pa 9 pa 525 787 1050
Hertfordshire 3.6 2.3 £322m 7 pa 11 pa 575 862 1150
Humberside 1 1 £140m 3 pa 4.5 pa 250 375 500
Isle of Man 0.08 0.01 1.4m 0.05 pa 0.1 pa 2.5 3.7 5
Kent 3 2.6 £364m 8 pa 12 pa 650 975 1300
Lancashire 1.6 1.5 £210m 4.5 pa 7.5 pa 375 562 750
Leicestershire 1.4 1.4 £195m 4.5 pa 7 pa 350 525 700
Lincolnshire 0.8 0.6 £84m 2 pa 3 pa 150 225 300
London, City of 0.07 0.06 £8.4m 0.2 pa 0.3 pa 15 22 30
London Metropolitan 22 31 £4,340m 93 pa 139 pa 7750 11625 15500
Lothian & Borders 1 1 £140m 3 pa 4.5 pa 250 375 500
Merseyside 1.4 1.5 £210m 4.5 pa 7.5 pa 375 562 750
Norfolk 1 0.8 £112m 2.5 pa 4.5 pa 200 300 400
North Wales 0.5 0.4 £56m 1.2 pa 2 pa 100 150 200
North Yorkshire 0.8 0.5 £70m 1.5 pa 2.5 pa 125 187 250
Northamptonshire 1 1.1 £154m 3 pa 4.5 pa 275 412 550
Northern 0.4 0.2 £28m .5 pa 1 pa 50 75 100
Northern Ireland 0.8 0.8 £112m 2.5 pa 4.5 pa 200 300 400
Northumbria 1.4 1.4 £196m 4.5 pa 7 pa 350 525 700
Nottinghamshire 1.3 1.5 £210m 4.5 pa 7.5 pa 375 562 750
South Wales 1.5 1.5 £210m 4.5 pa 7.5 pa 375 562 750
South Yorkshire 1.2 1.4 £195m 4.5 pa 7 pa 350 525 500
Staffordshire 1.1 0.9 £126m 3 pa 4 pa 225 337 450
State of Guernsey 0.03 0.01 £1.4m 0.05 pa 0.1 pa 2.5 3.5 5
State of Jersey 0.03 0.01 £1.4m 0.05 pa 0.1 pa 2.5 3.5 5
Strathclyde 2.3 2.7 £378m 8 pa 12 pa 675 1012 1350
Suffolk 1 0.6 £84m 2 pa 3 pa 150 275 300
Surrey 3 1.5 £210m 4.5 pa 7.5 pa 375 562 750
Sussex 2.7 1.8 £252m 5.5 pa 8 pa 450 675 900
Tayside 0.4 0.3 £42m 1 pa 1.5 pa 75 112 150
Thames Valley 5.3 3.7 £518m 11 pa 16 pa 925 1387 1850
Warwickshire 0.9 0.5 £70m 1.5 pa 2.5 pa 125 192 250
West Mercia 1.5 1 £140m 3 pa 4.5 pa 250 375 500
West Midlands 4.9 5.9 £826m 18 pa 27 pa 1475 2212 2950
West Yorkshire 2.6 3 £420m 9 pa 13 pa 750 1125 1500
Wiltshire 1.1 0.7 £98m 2 pa 3 pa 175 262 350
DRAFT                             
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NFRC Yorkshire Evening Post Article 
Exclusive: Workload fears for police in 
new purge on fraud 
Published Date:  
02 August 2009  
By Simon Bristow  
 
A NEW national centre to tackle fraud is expected to unearth so many new crimes 
that police fear they will lack the resources to investigate them all. 
Humberside Police has already admitted it does not expect to be able to cope with the 
likely surge in reported crimes and none of the region's other three forces could give 
assurances they would be able to handle the increased workload. 
 
The extra work is expected to be generated from the new National Fraud Reporting 
Centre which is being set up to encourage the public and businesses to highlight 
suspected cases of fraud. 
 
The centre, which is expected to be fully operational next year, is partially in response 
to the massive rise in economic crime that has swept through the country in recent 
years. 
 
Identity fraud is soaring – CIFAS, the UK's fraud prevention service, has reported a 
40 per cent increase in people falling victim compared with the same period in 2008. 
The recession has also brought an increase in economic crime. 
 
Now police are concerned they will be unable to deal with issues such as anti-social 
behaviour because of the extra demand. 
 
The acting Chief Constable of Humberside Police, David Griffin, warned in a report 
to Humberside Police Authority: "The National Fraud Reporting Centre is likely to 
impact on the force with a considerable rise in reported crime which the force does 
not currently have the capacity to investigate. This could impact on public confidence 
and divert resources from existing police authority targets." 
 
Two pilot schemes are to be launched later this year, including a website offering an 
online crime reporting facility, run in conjunction with West Midlands Police and a 
dedicated call centre. 
 
The information gathered through both channels will be assessed by analysts at the 
National Fraud Intelligence Bureau, which will decide what is passed on for 
investigation, either by individual forces or other organisations such as the Serious 
Organised Crime Agency or counter-terrorism units. 
 
Mr Griffin's report continues: "The National Fraud Reporting Centre is likely to be 
fully operational by 2010. 
 
"This is likely to lead to an increase in reported crime, particularly relating to Internet, 
credit card and identity fraud. 
 
"As the purpose of the centre is to make it easier for the public to report fraud, the 
capacity of the force to adequately deal with such an increase is questionable and this 
could have an impact in overall confidence." 
 
The report said the rise in fraud cases could harm Humberside's efforts to meet its 
own policing priorities, which include tackling anti-social behaviour, protecting the 
public, responding to issues at neighbourhood level, and increasing public confidence 
and satisfaction in the service. 
 
One MP said a better co-ordinated response to fraud was overdue, but it was up to the 
Government and police to make sure adequate resources were available to investigate 
crime. 
 
East Yorkshire Tory MP Graham Stuart said: "If there's a new fraud reporting centre 
and it's being brought in because fraud tends not to be taken seriously by police then 
this should be welcomed, and resources and priorities will need to be suitably adjusted 
to respond. 
 
"If there's a genuine need for investigation they will have to take this information on 
board and prioritise resources." 
 
Both North Yorkshire and West Yorkshire Police said they were still assessing the 
likely impact of the plans and could not comment further at this stage. 
 
South Yorkshire Police referred inquiries to City of London Police, the lead force on 
fraud. 
 
A City of London spokesman said: "As a result of this initiative figures for reported 
cases of fraud are likely to rise. 
 
"However, this data will be collated and specifically used to find matches in offending 
that can assist police investigations." 
 
A Home Office spokesman said it was up to individual forces to set their priorities. 
 
 
• Last Updated: 03 August 2009 9:05 AM  
• Source: n/a  
• Location: Yorkshire 
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NFIB Case Study 
Detica system helps bring  
fraudsters to justice
 A DETICA CASE STUDY: NFIB
Fraud has been described as a ‘silent’ crime.  But it is not 
a victimless one.  It affects tens of thousands of people in 
the UK each year and is second only to the illegal drugs 
trade in terms of its impact on the UK.  Each year fraud 
costs every adult living in the UK around £621.
The human cost is even higher because the proceeds of 
fraud are used to fund crimes such as drug smuggling and 
people trafficking.  The challenge for law enforcement is 
combating the increasingly sophisticated and professional 
methods employed by the criminals.
The National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) was 
established in 2010 as a central body to help the police, and 
their partners, catch and disrupt fraudsters.  It is also working 
to make the UK a more fraud-resistant society, by alerting 
communities to threats from fraud and working together to 
prevent crime.  
To catch and disrupt fraudsters, the NFIB recognised that 
it needed to build a more detailed picture of the criminals 
and their techniques.  To do this, large volumes of fraud 
information needed to be gathered, analysed and turned into 
actionable intelligence.  This intelligence could then be used 
to support law enforcement operations or alert organisations 
and the public to fraudulent behaviour.
The business challenge
Commercial organisations – from retail banks and insurance 
companies through to telecommunications companies – 
have departments responsible for tackling different types 
of fraud.  Government departments are also trying to catch 
fraudsters – from law enforcement agencies through to 
revenue and customs.  All of these organisations gather  
and keep data that could be useful for detecting and 
prosecuting fraud.  
One of the NFIB’s key strategic priorities was to generate 
and share knowledge about fraudsters and their techniques 
within this widely-affected community.  They needed a 
system that could convert fraud reports into investigations 
and arrests.  A particular challenge faced by the NFIB was 
assembling the data from across the community and using it 
to build a single view of fraudulent activity.
Detica was chosen to build a fraud-detection system based 
on our advanced data analytics capabilities, specialist 
technical expertise and experience of providing similar 
services to a number of other customers.
“Detica provided some of the most 
talented, dedicated colleagues I have ever 
encountered in my career”
David Clarke, Director of the NFIB
www.detica.com
What did Detica do?
Initially, we worked with key stakeholders to work out the 
best way of using technology.  We recognised that the 
NFIB was a new organisation, with new staff and without 
defined procedures.  We worked with the newly-appointed 
investigators to understand their requirements and to help 
them learn how the ‘KnowFraud’ system would be used.  We 
also helped them to define the procedures they would use 
along the way. 
We worked with the organisations and government 
departments that would be sharing data with the NFIB – 
data that would be entered into the KnowFraud system.  It 
was vital that we understood where the data was coming 
from, the format and its potential value or use.
The KnowFraud information intelligence system is based on 
Detica NetReveal® – a fraud-detection product that uncovers 
hidden relationships between people and data to detect both 
opportunistic and large-scale organised fraud.  KnowFraud 
needed to enable investigators to search and retrieve data 
quickly and easily.  It also needed to assess high volumes 
of data and then quickly prioritise the results. We tailored 
Detica NetReveal® to match the specific requirements of 
the NFIB. 
The KnowFraud system pilot went live within twelve weeks. 
The NFIB’s investigators were able to analyse fraud data 
immediately.  Over the next four months the pilot system 
was developed further so that it could accept daily updates 
from different data providers.  The system had to be robust 
enough to be able to cope with data of varying quality, 
quantity and complexity. 
A revolutionary new system
Once the data has been entered into the system, KnowFraud 
then uses advanced data analytics and social network 
analysis to link millions of fraud-related entities – such as 
people, addresses and documents – into networks.  This 
single “network view” of fraud activity was previously 
unavailable when investigators were forced to use pockets 
of data in isolation.  The networks are scored and prioritised 
according to the risk associated with the behaviours apparent 
within them.  Suspicious networks are visualised and 
investigated.  The resulting intelligence is then collated into 
fraud intelligence packs for the law enforcement community 
to act upon. 
The entire KnowFraud system was delivered in six months 
– from proof-of-concept to final solution.  It processes 
data from more than 50 organisations including 43 police 
forces, Land Registry, Companies House and the Royal Mail.  
The time taken to investigate a case has been considerably 
reduced as KnowFraud makes all the information related to 
a case readily available to the investigators.  The system has 
already delivered a number of significant leads.  A recent case 
prioritised by the system led to conviction in less than 37 
days – a first within the world of fraud.
About Detica
By combining technical innovation, domain knowledge and 
information intelligence, we develop, integrate and manage 
world-class solutions to help our clients deliver critical 
business services more effectively and economically.  We 
also develop solutions to strengthen national security and 
resilience, enabling citizens to go about their lives freely and 
with confidence.
Detica is part of BAE Systems.
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NFIB Newsletter October 2011 
eNewsletter
HEADLINE NEWS
A major NFIB campaign to shut down 
the websites, email addresses and 
telephone numbers fuelling much of 
today’s fraud has already stopped at 
least £7 million being lost to fraudsters 
in the last 2 months.
During September and October the NFIB 
has suspended 12 websites, 179 telephone 
numbers and 155 email accounts, which 
were enabling organised crime gangs to target 
and steal from individuals and the public and 
private sector. 
The threat of personal information being  
stolen through phishing e-mails is now being 
tackled in partnership with UK Payments 
Administration (UKPA).  978 emails have  
been passed to the UKPA-run  
www.banksafeonline.org.uk, for suspension.
NFIB analysis has shown how fraudsters can 
be resilient, with the ability to quickly reinvent 
their criminal operation.
Re-creation of websites
In recent months the NFIB has identified 
fraudsters who are reproducing suspended 
websites with a similar sounding name and/
or signing up for new phone numbers with a 
different provider. The public is told this has 
been done for ‘technical reasons’. 
Online and phoneline fraud disruption sees NFIB save millions 
The NFIB has moved quickly to block this new 
line of attack.
People who visit certain suspended websites 
are now being automatically redirected to an 
alert page on the NFIB website. This provides 
users with a fraud warning and directs people 
who believe they have been a victim of 
fraud to Action Fraud. For legal reasons some 
ISPs have not been able to comply with the 
redirection but overall the system is making a 
positive impact. 
Click on www.saltzmankramer.com to see 
how the NFIB is unmasking the criminal 
practices of online fraudsters.   
 
The NFIB is taking a similar approach with 
phone numbers. Once a number is identified 
as part of a fraudulent operation, the NFIB 
looks to suspend the line and leave a message 
to callers explaining exactly why, along with 
details on how to contact Action Fraud. 
The aim is to stop the same victim being 
repeatedly conned and to protect any new, 
prospective victims. 
To hear an NFIB message call:
020 3318 1273 or 020 3318 1274
NFIB launching response to the threat of cyber crime
In November, the NFIB and Action Fraud  
will launch a response to financially- 
motivated cyber crime and computer 
enabled fraud. 
Phase 1 will see the introduction of a system 
able to deliver fast-time response to the 
threat of phishing emails that often seek to 
extract people’s personal information for use 
in fraud. This will be followed by the launch of 
cyber crime reporting and analytical tools. 
The threat to the UK from cyberspace 
(including the internet, wider 
telecommunications networks and computer 
systems) has been identified as one of the 
highest priorities for UK national security over 
the next five years. 
The NFIB and Action Fraud will be part of a 
close partnership between the Government, 
industry and the counter-fraud community 
in delivering a multi-faceted approach to the 
cyber threat, providing a core front line 
reporting and analytical function.
Deputy Director of the NFIB, Richard Waight, 
said:  “When you consider the UK consumer 
already spends £4.4 billion shopping online 
there is no surprise this is also our largest 
area of fraud reporting. This new resource 
will play a key role in making cyberspace a 
safer place to do business.” 
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Message from Tony Crampton 
OPERATIONAL UPDATE
Welcome to our new 
look NFIB newsletter 
to keep you fully 
updated on how the 
Bureau is helping to 
combat national and 
international fraud. 
The fraud landscape 
is constantly evolving 
an early stage through the suspension of the 
key enablers that facilitate fraud – websites, 
emails and phone numbers.
We are also increasing our public and private 
sector engagement, delivering on a number 
of initiatives. Our work with the Department 
for Work and Pensions’ Identity Assurance 
Programme and the launch of our cyber 
response demonstrates the importance we 
place on greater online security. 
Close ties with UK Payments Administration 
are also bearing fruit, with the Know 
for those good and bad, and so must the 
NFIB. I hope you enjoy reading about how 
we are responding to this ever changing 
challenge. 
The NFIB is already demonstrating its 
commitment to the UK’s strategic plan for 
reducing fraud, Fighting Fraud Together and its 
core objectives to be tougher on fraudsters 
by disrupting and punishing them more 
efficiently and effectively. 
In the last couple of months we have 
successfully focused on reducing harm from 
Intelligence and information for the counter fraud community and beyond 
The power of the Know Fraud system and 
the potency within Action Fraud reports are 
now well harnessed. During the last quarter 
the NFIB circulated 71 themed intelligence 
products alerting law enforcement, the  
wider counter fraud community and the 
general public. 
These reports included: 
•	
f		 The public alerted to fraudsters offering 
tickets online to Coldplay’s sell-out tour. 
f		 City of London Police, Surrey Police, 
Durham Constabulary and the FSA 
received an intelligence summary about a 
fraudulent land banking scheme
f		 Banks via UKPA were sent a warning of 
commodities being sold by bogus brokers
f		 Dissemination of an intelligence network 
alerted the MPS to a property rental fraud
f		 CIFAS members were alerted to a payment 
diversion fraud. Victim companies received 
false invoices purporting to represent 
genuine suppliers and instructions 
to change account details for future 
payments
f		 A networked series of fraudulent insurance 
claims was sent to West Mercia
f		 A bank has launched an investigation after 
being alerted to Green Carbon Credits 
potentially linked to a boiler room fraud 
f		 Intelligence from the NHS linking an 
organised crime gang involved in theft, 
burglary and payment card fraud was sent 
to West Midlands Police
f		 Kent Police was informed of two suspects 
linked to card not present fraud suspected 
of other crimes in the Kent area.
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Fraud system finding a high number of 
links between Action Fraud reports and 
bank reported information, which is being 
disseminated to law enforcement. 
Looking further afield we are working with 
SOCA and our US and Canadian partners 
to counter India-based criminal call centres 
targeting people on both sides of the Atlantic. 
An international threat combated with an 
international response. 
Tony Crampton
Director of the NFIB
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Fighting Fraud Far and wide
Charity bag fraud targets the people 
working to help some of the most 
vulnerable in society both at home and 
abroad. in the last year, tens of millions 
of pounds worth of second hand clothes 
destined for charities have been stolen 
off the streets and sold in shops across 
eastern europe. 
in September, intelligence from the nFiB 
Charity Fraud desk led the City of London 
Police to make a major strike against an 
organised crime gang suspected of stealing 
charity bags worth hundreds of thousands  
of pounds. 
during an early morning raid at an essex depot, 
four men were arrested and £20,000 in cash 
was seized, along with charity bags and criminal 
evidence. this operation generated considerable 
media interest, featuring prominently in The 
Times, BBC One Show and BBC London TV news.
importantly the charity desk has noticed that 
some gangs are altering their approach to 
avoid getting caught. when this crime was 
first reported as a problem, the gangs posed as 
either legitimate charities or completely fake 
ones. But in recent weeks a new strategy is 
emerging, with bags and flyers being produced 
giving the impression the cause is charitable but 
does not mention a charity at all. this could be 
considered as fraud by false representation but 
could be difficult to prove. 
investigations have also provided further 
evidence of the links between the  
Lithuanian organised crime gangs involved 
in charity bag fraud and other crimes that 
include driving insurance fraud, fuel theft  
and human trafficking. 
the Fundraising Standards Board held a 
meeting in September to discuss the problem 
of charity bag fraud. nick hurd, the Minister 
for Civil Society was the keynote speaker and 
di amanda Lowe, who heads up the national 
Fraud desk, provided an update on the work  
of the nFiB and City of London Police. 
International investigations
More often, NFIB intelligence is being used 
by law enforcement operating far beyond 
these shores to disrupt frauds committed 
within or running through  
their jurisdiction. 
•	
in September the nFiB uncovered evidence of 
a major share purchase fraud using a network 
of national and international bank accounts 
to launder stolen money. in response, analysts 
circulated intelligence summaries via interpol to 
law enforcement in hong Kong, Spain and italy 
alerting them to accounts registered within 
their borders suspected of facilitating the fraud. 
as a result, hong Kong Police has launched  
its own money laundering investigation.  at the 
same time details of addresses linked to the 
criminal network were sent to uK police forces, 
with local intelligence checks being fed back 
into a wider City of London Police investigation. 
Boiler room fraud
in separate cases nFiB intelligence has directed 
Seychelles Police to a bank account suspected 
of being used by a boiler room company and 
alerted dubai Police to a possible boiler room 
fraud operating on their patch. 
Charity bag fraud: major strike 
CoLP officer asking questions during the  
early morning operation
In November, hundreds of UK citizens are 
likely to find their dreams of making a 
once in a life-time pilgrimage to Mecca 
damaged or destroyed by fraudsters 
disguised as travel agents.  
For the second year running, the nFiB and 
City of London Police are working with the 
Muslim community to raise awareness of 
hajj fraud and encourage victims to report 
the crime to action Fraud. 
the Muslim Council for Britain’s deputy 
Secretary general, dr Shuja Shafi, said: 
“Prospective hajjis are urged to remain 
careful and vigilant and do due diligence by 
checking that their tour operator is a current 
atOL holder. the MCB also encourages 
Muslims to report immediately to the police 
any fraudulent activity.”
go to www.nfib.police.uk, for a hajj fraud 
leaflet available in seven languages.
Hajj fraud
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Partners against crime
During August and September, the NFIB 
assessed more than 7,500 Action Fraud 
reports. From this data, 672 crime reports 
containing total losses of more than  
£19 million were disseminated to UK  
police forces.  
The most prevalent of these were:
Online shopping 278
Other Consumer Non Investment 108
Other financial investment 75
Other advance fee frauds 62
And the main recipients of crime reports were:
MPS 271
Trading Standards, Merseyside  
and City of London Police 
47
Greater Manchester Police 43
Sussex Police 36
Notable and continuing trends include 
growing cases of companies claiming to  
sell voluntary and government funded 
carbon credits, money transfer services 
being used as a key enabler of fraud and 
voucher based e-money products being 
used in loan lender fraud.
A new form of reporting
A new Crime Related Information tool has 
been developed to enable the public and 
small businesses through Action Fraud to 
report information that does not constitute a 
crime. This has already become an invaluable 
data source for the NFIB in the assessment of 
crimes for national distribution and intelligence 
development. The top five information 
categories are banking and credit industry fraud, 
computer software service fraud, inheritance 
fraud information and lottery scams. 
Action Fraud in forces
Leicestershire Police is the latest force to join 
the pilot and refer all reports of fraud to Action 
Fraud. Learning from the City of London Police 
pilot is already being incorporated into the 
reporting tool. For example, corporate bodies 
and financial institutions revealed problems in 
reporting large corporate frauds via the Action 
Fraud web reporting tool. System and process 
development is underway to address this.
Making sure police forces have the training 
and support to use Action Fraud and 
understand their role and responsibilities 
is critical to the success of both the pilot 
programme and the national roll out. The NFIB 
and Action Fraud are currently working on an 
e-learning training package to help forces that 
are preparing to change the way they handle 
reports of fraud.
Feedback
The NFIB has just finished collecting feedback 
from those forces which have received Action 
Fraud-generated crime reports. But we will 
not be stopping here. Feedback from all our 
partners is essential to the improvement of 
our service. The information you provide is 
invaluable. It enables us to better understand 
what you want so we can provide the products 
that best fit your needs. 
To provide feedback please contact DI 
Amanda Lowe & DCI John Osibote (see 
page 2 for contact details). Please give as 
much information as possible on the quality 
of crimes disseminated to you, operational 
learning gained from investigations and any 
other relevant information. 
A new specialist police unit to tackle 
insurance fraud is being set-up in January. 
Paid for by the insurance industry and 
housed and run by the City of London 
Police, the Insurance Fraud Enforcement 
Department (IFED) will act with 
operational independence to combat a 
crime valued at £3 billion per year. 
By working with the NFIB and drawing on 
its intelligence and expertise, the unit will 
be capable of bringing to justice hundreds 
of offenders each year. It will also benefit 
from the City of London Police’s position 
as national lead force for fraud and forge 
close ties with UK law enforcement and 
the insurance industry.  
Ahead of the launch the NFIB is 
finalising the General Insurance Threat 
Assessment for publication in November.  
As well as reporting on the problem, the 
recommendations will assist direction 
of IFED’s enforcement response. Special 
thanks to RBS Insurance for seconding one 
of their team to us in support of  
this activity. 
NFIB AND ACTION FRAUD 
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Forward 
My first year as Commissioner began with the challenges of the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) and 
the need for the City of London to make savings of 20% over four years. In such times there two options, 
streamline and reduce resources and potentially services to meet financial constraints or more ambitiously, 
identify alternative methods to generate income to maintain or increase resources to deliver the services 
the City has come to expect from the City of London Police. 
This Business Case sets out my vision for funding to expand the Centre of Excellence functions which has 
the potential to become self funding within three years, generating significant income to help offset the 
CSR budget cuts.   
The City is an international stage and the City of London Police is an international brand recognised for 
excellence within fraud intelligence, investigation and training, this Business Case aims to capitalise on this 
and maximise opportunities for income generation through the Centre of Excellence.  Understanding and 
recognising the business imperative is essential in maintaining confidence in the City of London Police and 
our ability to provide specialist fraud and front line policing services. 
Through the proposals set out in this Business Case the City of London Police aims to continue its ground 
breaking national drive to investigate and deter fraud, incorporating new methods and ways of working to 
deal with the growing threat from fraud and cyber crime.  The Centre of Excellence will draw together 
operational learning and real time intelligence to lead the way internationally with fraud prevention 
activities, awareness & educational campaigns, target hardening and delivery of cutting edge training 
programmes. Investment in the Centre of Excellence will enable the City of London Police to continue to 
deliver and improve the service to the public that it is rightly recognised for throughout the world. 
In conclusion, I would like to thank you for taking the time to read this Business Case and consider the 
proposals for investment and growth.  I realise it is not always easy to justify new investment in hard 
economic times but I believe the potential of the Centre of Excellence is a worthy  investment for the City 
of London, the financial community and UK as a whole. 
Adrian Leppard  
Commissioner of Police for the City of London 
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Introduction 
Context 
Fraud has a detrimental impact on society and can have a devastating effect on 
businesses and individuals within the UK and internationally. The National Fraud 
Authority (NFA) published its second Annual Fraud Indicator (AFI) Jan 2011, which 
estimates fraud is costing the UK over £38 billion a year. The new estimate and 
comprehensive data breakdown is testament to improved methodologies and 
cooperation across Government and industry. It also shows the real impact fraud 
has on individuals, businesses and Government. Loss estimates to fraud by sector: 
 Public - £21 billion 
 Private - £12 billion 
 Individuals - £4 billion 
 Charity - £1.3 billion 
What is a Centre of Excellence? 
Following the Attorney General's Fraud Review of July 2006, The City of London 
Police was granted government funding to enhance the UK's fraud capabilities 
nationally and internationally through the Development of a Centre of Excellence 
for fraud investigations, including organised training, disseminating best practice, 
general fraud prevention advice, advising on complex enquiries in other regions, 
and assisting with or even directing the most complex of such investigations.  
In general terms, a Centre of Excellence is regarded as a nationally or 
multinationally sponsored entity, which provides recognised expertise and 
experience for the benefit of its business area. It consists of a team of people that 
provide support and training, promote collaboration and using best practices 
around a specific focus area to drive business results. 
The City of London Police Centre of Excellence, as above, will focus on five key 
functions: 
 Support 
 Guidance  
 Shared Learning 
 Measurement 
 Governance  
 
The Centre of Excellence and Economic Crime Directorate functions  
In April 2008 as a result of this funding a National Lead Force for Fraud and National 
Fraud Intelligence Bureau were established. These national assets sit within City of 
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London Police's Economic Crime Directorate. To date the primary focus of National 
Fraud Intelligence Bureau and National lead Force have been the investigation and 
prosecution of organised fraud groups who cause the most harm to UK plc. 
In the current economic climate with limited resources available to both the public 
and private sectors to tackle fraud it is more important now than ever before to 
focus, not on enforcement but on the opportunities for prevention and disruption. 
The Centre of Excellence has started a programme of fraud training for public and 
private sector organisations focussed on fraud awareness, prevention and 
disruption.  
The demand for these programmes far exceed the Centre’s current capacity, this 
business case looks at the opportunities for growth, investing in the Centre of 
Excellence to capitalise on the fraud training opportunities to enhance City of 
London Police brand and generate income for the Economic Crime Directorate. 
The Economic Crime Directorate are dedicated to preventing and investigating 
fraud at all levels and have a world-renowned reputation for their levels of 
professionalism and effectiveness in tackling fraud, with the operational experience 
that comes from investigating more serious fraud criminal cases than any other law 
enforcement organisation in the UK.  
The Centre of Excellence will capitalise on the operational learning from the 
Economic Crime Directorate and National Lead Force together with the power of 
National Fraud Intelligence Bureau and the Know Fraud system to maximise fraud 
prevention activities.  
Combining the business areas of fraud prevention with training will give the Centre 
of Excellence a business advantage not afforded to any other commercial training 
provider. Aligning fraud alerts, trend analysis and educational products with cutting 
edge training products underpinned by the City of London Police and the Economic 
Crime Directorate brands will establish the Centre of Excellence globally as a 
premier counter fraud training and resource organisation. 
A separate Business Case covers the key functions of the Economic Crime 
Directorate; this business case has been produced separately to distinguish 
between core business and business & growth opportunities. The submissions 
complement one another and together they will ensure that the progress and 
achievements delivered since April 2008 will be built on and taken further.  
Structure of Document 
This document has been structured in the following sections: 
 In Section 2, we provide an Executive Summary, providing an overview of the 
key proposals and arguments 
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 In Section 3, the Strategic Case, we set out the overarching rationale and 
objectives for additional funding of Centre of Excellence responsibilities for 
fraud  training and the development of new/linked Fraud Prevention Unit 
 In Section 4, the Options & Benefits Case, we identify and appraise the 
options for developing the Centre of Excellence training and Fraud Prevention 
Unit. We project the potential for income generation from training provision 
together with a model for benefit realisation for savings from prevention 
activities.  
 In Section 5, the Financial Case, we set out the financial projections and 
implications of the proposed growth and demonstrate that it is affordable 
 In Section 6, the Management Case, we propose next steps to build on the 
success to date of Centre of Excellence 
 In Section 7, the Commercial Case, we identify the key risks to be mitigated. 
 
 Page | 7  
 
CoLP/CoE-BC          Version SS.0.4 
Executive Summary 
 
1.1 Summary 
 
This business case demonstrates that the Centre of Excellence, through 
investment and growth can deliver a broader range of services at a national and 
international level and be self funding generating profit for the City of London by 
year three of operation. The initial plans set out within this business case 
demonstrate how the Centre of Excellence is uniquely placed to deliver fraud 
training, accreditation, professional registration and prioritise fraud prevention 
and disruption via the Know Fraud system. The Business Case sets out criteria to 
deliver value for money and generate income, namely; 
 Is the activity essential to meet force priorities and support City First 
 Does the City of London / City of London Police need to fund this activity 
 Does the activity provide substantial economic value 
 Can fraud prevention activity be prioritised and the benefits quantified 
 How can the activity be provided to generate income 
 How can the activity be provided on a sustainable self funding basis 
 
At a high level the case for new funding and growth of the Centre of Excellence is 
set out below with further detailed information and evidence provided within the 
subsequent chapters of the business case.  
 
1.2 Strong rationale for Growth & Investment in the Centre of Excellence 
 
Since the Fraud Review of 2006 significant efforts to raise awareness, and 
understanding of the scale, nature and impact of fraud across the UK has grown. 
The evidence has highlighted that: 
 
 Fraud  is more prevalent than previously estimated  - with current fraud 
losses estimated at £38bn per year  
 Fraud is more complex and international in nature and part of organised 
criminal activity. Organised Criminal Groups are estimated to have an 
association with and be responsible for £7.8bn of fraud per year 
 Fraud is far from victimless -  many complex cases have multiple victims, with 
potentially negative health, social and economic impacts to the individual and 
businesses that are victims of fraud 
 The strength of the UK economy, and London's financial sector in particular 
make the UK and London an attractive target for fraudsters. 
 
The growing scale, complexity and nature of fraud require a quality and robust 
response from all organisations, public and private sector that not only tackles the 
threat effectively, but also caters to needs of victims.  
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Efforts to raise awareness, prevent fraud and prioritise quick time disruption 
opportunities will reduce the increasing pressure and demand on UK law 
enforcement, other agencies and industry partners, reducing risk and minimising 
harm and loss. 
The UK's current response to fraud is wide ranging but complex, with concerns 
from the public and private sectors over the availability of the knowledge, skills 
and experience to tackle the threat effectively.  
 
The Centre of Excellence has a key role to play in developing knowledge and 
building capacity across UK law enforcement agencies and industry sectors to 
allow resources to be targeted more effectively. 
The UK Fraud Training Landscape is littered with organisations delivering a 
multitude of fraud prevention and investigation courses. A small percentage of 
these courses are accredited but none of them work to common standards or are 
mapped against a standard or core curriculum. This lack of common standards and 
core curriculum hinders the effectiveness of cross sector working and coordination 
of fraud prevention, disruption and enforcement activities. 
The effectiveness of the public and private sector counter fraud community is 
crucial to protecting citizens, companies and UK PLC.  Strategic direction for the 
counter fraud community is driven by the ACPO Economic Crime Portfolio (ECP), 
Chaired by Commissioner Adrian Leppard. 
On 1st March 2011 at the ECP, Terry Burke, Head of Investigations for the Bank of 
England identified the gap between public and private sector fraud training, he 
called for the City of London Police and the Centre of Excellence to take on a role 
coordinating cross sector training and providing accreditation and registration 
brining fraud professionals in line with other recognised or chartered professions.  
The proposal was backed by all of the members of the ECP as necessary to 
improving the UK’s response to fraud. 
It is clear that there is a skills gap across the sectors which hinders the UK’s 
capacity to effectively tackle fraud, this business case, if realised has the potential 
for reducing the Skills gap, increasing capacity and cross sector working making the 
UK a more hostile environment for the fraudster. 
 
1.3 Why Centre of Excellence is uniquely placed to deliver enhanced functions 
The Centre of Excellence is Located within the City of London, the largest financial 
district in the world and is uniquely placed to deliver  fraud training, accreditation, 
professional registration and prioritise fraud prevention activities to enhance 
effectiveness of the UK's response to fraud.  
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Over the years the City of London Police has developed a reputation as specialists 
in fraud and economic crime both domestically and internationally. The City of 
London Police has been integral to national and international efforts to combat 
fraud through their work in tackling organised crime groups, securing major 
convictions, raising public awareness and leading the way in fraud victim support. 
In support of this activity the Centre of Excellence has played a key role in 
delivering specialist fraud training, disseminating best practice and the 
coordination of awareness and prevention activities. 
The case for new funding to deliver enhanced services through the Centre of 
Excellence can be summarised as follows: 
 City of London Police have a long history of tackling fraud and economic 
crime, and have developed an international reputation, and strong 
partnerships with counter fraud agencies domestically and internationally to 
deal with the threat effectively which can be capitalised on by the Centre of 
Excellence 
 City of London Police have leveraged established relationships within UK and 
internationally to contribute to the successfully delivery of the Centre of 
Excellence 
 Centre of Excellence has significant exposure to and experience of policing 
economic crime, and provides the skills, knowledge and experience not found 
in other fraud training establishments around the globe 
 Economic Crime Directorate is uniquely placed within a global financial centre 
to continue to build and extend the reach of Centre of Excellence 
 Centre of Excellence has a proven track record of delivering quality fraud 
awareness, prevention and disruption training to public and private sector 
partners. 
 
Given the scale, value, nature and complexity of fraud within the UK, and the 
comparatively modest funding required, the Centre of Excellence delivered by 
Economic Crime Directorate can deliver a low cost / high benefit ratio. The fraud 
focus of City of London Police, and the experience, knowledge, skills and 
reputation offered by Economic Crime Directorate provide a unique offering for 
Centre of Excellence to continue to deliver high quality training, accredit external 
courses & providers, create a register of fraud professionals and coordinate fraud 
prevention activities. 
 
1.4 Options & Benefits Case 
 
In the Benefits case we identify and assess options for delivery of 3 key Centre of 
Excellence Functions: Fraud Training Faculty, Fraud Professionals Accreditation 
Board & Institute of Fraud Professionals and Fraud Prevention Unit.  
The benefits case concludes that new investment in the Centre of Excellence 
represents a sound investment in relation to efficiency, loss & harm reduction and 
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income generation through a sustainable approach that becomes self funding by 
its third year of operation. 
We have analysed the benefits generated by delivery of the National Fraud 
Intelligence Bureau’s system, Know Fraud, and mapped this to produce a new 
model of data sharing and prioritised prevention and disruption. Analysis indicates 
that substantial benefits are being be delivered, on average 48.4 times quicker 
than that of a traditional enforcement approach; when enforcement is undertaken 
via this approach the activity takes place on average 212 days earlier reducing 
harm and minimising harm and loss.   
Working hand in hand with the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau the fraud 
prevention unit will be able to use products from the Bureau to maximise 
prevention opportunities, raise public awareness and minimise loss and harm from 
fraud.   
About 80% of the Centre of Excellence resources are currently dedicated to 
designing and delivering training for other forces, agencies and industry partners. 
Demand exceeds current capacity and considerably more could be done, both at 
home and overseas.  
To date the Centre of Excellence has worked on a cost recovery basis, charging 
well below the market rate for what is probably the most sought after fraud 
training available. A staged readjustment of the Centre charging model will see the 
Centre generate a real profit by year three. 
The Centre of Excellence has designed and delivered a number of specialist 
programmes for public and private sector bodies to help prevent fraud, raise 
awareness, and advice on how to make organisations more resilient to the threat 
of fraud. Officers have also organised and facilitated a range of workshops and 
seminars designed to find consensus on counter fraud strategies and how best to 
implement them including: 
 Multitude of training programmes delivered with over 1,800 people trained 
 A 3-day Fraud reporting and intelligence conference in July 2009 
 A 3-day National Fraud Forum in October 2009. 
Within the Financial case we set out financial projections showing how the service 
can be provided, moving from a funded model in year one to a self funding and 
profitable model by the end of year 3. A rigorous process has been followed to 
ensure affordability, as follows: 
 We start with the Centre of Excellence baseline positions on the basis of a 
detailed analysis of expenditure in 2010-11, each expenditure item has been 
challenged and evidence sought where possible; using this base position we 
extrapolate a forecast from 2012-13 up to 2014-15 
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 We have made projected income based on a proven formula for contact / 
development and preparation time and a readjustment of the Centres costing 
model  
 We predict that Centre of Excellence will deliver programmes to extend the 
reach of the Fraud Training Faculty and the Fraud Professionals Accreditation 
Board & Institute of Fraud Professionals up to and including 2014-15 to 
capitalise on new markets and maximise income generation opportunities. 
 
1.5 Income generation and City of London reputation and branding 
 
The City of London see clear benefit in providing the many multinational 
businesses it hosts access to the UK's national fraud expertise that are delivered 
through the Economic Crime Directorate and the Centre of Excellence, as it 
enhances the City of London and UK's reputation as a place to do business.  
Considerable research has been conducted to support the business case; case 
studies have been used to demonstrate the achievability of the efficiencies of the 
Prevention and Disruption Unit and the income generation opportunities of the 
Fraud Training Faculty and the Fraud Professionals Accreditation Board and 
Institute of Fraud Professionals. Based on this research and the financial 
projections the income / profit will continue to rise year on year well in excess of 
any additional growth or expansion of the Centre beyond that covered here.  
The Centre of Excellence currently receives £256,098 a year from Home Office 
funding for the basic functions currently provided by the Centre. This funding 
provides for a small team to deliver core fraud training for City of London Police 
and a small amount for other police forces and industry partners. With investment 
and development the Centre of Excellence will become self funding, enabling the 
Home Office funding to be redirected to frontline service.  
We show below the level of funding required for all three Centre of Excellence 
functions and the income generation projected within this business case.  
Combined Centre of 
Excellence Functions 
2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 
HO Funding £256,098 £256,098 NIL 
Carry over Profit / Funding NIL £1,505,423 £5,001,802 
Additional Funding Req.  £3,011,599 £4,338,877 £1,605,779 
Total Funding £3,267,697 £6,100,398 £6,607,581 
Income £4,773,120 £11,102,200 £14,414,000 
Profit or Loss  £1,505,423 £5,001,802 £7,806,419 
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Realisable Income Nil Nil £1,198,838 
 
 
In the current economic climate it needs to be stressed that the core aims of this 
investment & expansion strategy are: 
 
 To fill a gap in training &accreditation of fraud professionals and address 
the disparities between public and private sector bodies extending our 
reach providing for more effective cross sector working 
 To become self financing, reducing the burden on the Home Office Grant. 
 To generate income which can be used to increase policing resources for 
City of London Police bridging the funding shortfall as a result of the 
Comprehensive Spending Review. 
 
1.6 Future plans – options for further development 
The business case highlights the high level of skills, knowledge and experience that 
has been developed within the Economic Crime Directorate & Centre of Excellence.  
With the development of the Centre of Excellence there are great opportunities to 
further enhance these assets and develop the City of London brand as a global lead 
within the field of fraud prevention, disruption and enforcement.  
Key stakeholders highlighted that there is high demand and high expectations on 
the Centre of Excellence to deliver and expand the quality of service currently 
provided.  
The Centre of Excellence is uniquely placed to drive the development and extension 
of its functions that law enforcement and industry desires. This development will be 
planned carefully with continued negotiation and support from national and 
international partners from the public and private sectors. Future developments 
that will extend the remit of the Centre of Excellence are: 
 The Centre of Excellence will conduct an industry wide Training Needs 
analysis and skills/role assessment and produce a core curriculum and skill 
framework for all counter fraud specialists.  
 Developing accredited training packages and work with industry to build the 
investigative capacity across the public and private sectors to facilitate a shift 
to a "self-policing model" whereby industry investigators undertake more of 
the investigation work increasing speed and efficiency and enhance civil 
recovery, with the National Lead Force managing the investigation through 
the criminal justice system 
 Map the Core Curriculum against the Core Investigative Doctrine and Initial 
Crime Investigators Development Programme to develop a range of 
programmes to bridge the skills gap for fraud investigation within the police 
service. 
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 Build on the work of the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau, using the data 
from across the government agencies to inform new training products to 
improve and standardise cross agency practices and procedures enabling 
more effective collaborative working.  
 Develop an accreditation and registration model to regulate and recognise 
fraud professionals from across public and private sectors developing a new 
professional body united in the fight against fraud. 
 Extending the reach of the Centre of Excellence by developing closer strategic 
and operational partnerships with big business and small & medium 
enterprises to build a greater awareness of how to effectively prevent, detect 
and investigate fraud across a broader spectrum of sectors 
 
The above activities and developments are driven by a desire to prevent fraud 
or disrupt the activities of fraudsters at the earliest opportunity minimising the 
harm and loss caused. Working with National Fraud Intelligence Bureau the 
Centre of Excellence will develop quality public awareness & education products 
and distribute timelier, targeted alerts. 
 
To maximise the opportunities in this business case and achieve the potential 
that has been projected a partnership with a respected commercial organisation 
that can bring expertise in business marketing, profitable business practices may 
be advantageous. An alternative would be to consider the direct employment of 
experienced business and finance specialists. A partnership with an academic 
institution or formation of a new chartered body has also been considered to 
underpin the establishment of the professional body. 
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2. Strategic Case 
 
2.1 Summary 
The National Fraud Authority (NFA) published its second Annual Fraud Indicator 
(AFI) Jan 2011, which estimates fraud is costing the UK over £38 billion a year. The 
new estimate and comprehensive data breakdown is testament to improved 
methodologies and cooperation across Government and industry. The public sector 
remains the highest proportion of the fraud loss at £21 billion - 55% of the total 
figure. This estimate, for the first time, includes new and more accurate figures for 
procurement (£2.4 billion) and grant fraud (£515 million).  
Private sector fraud losses of £12 billion make up 31% of the total annual figure. 
 The financial services industry recorded the highest loss to fraudsters at 
£3.6 billion. This is a slight decrease on the 2010 AFI figure of £3.8 billion 
due to improved fraud prevention methods involving plastic card (£440 
million) and cheque fraud (£30 million) 
 Online banking, however, has seen an increase of 14% (£60 million). The 
sector continues to invest heavily in counter fraud systems and solutions 
to help stay one step head of the criminals 
 Mortgage fraud (£1 billion) and insurance fraud (£2.1 billion) remain high.  
 A new inclusion in the AFI is fraud losses to small and medium enterprises 
at £780 million. The NFA and the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) 
worked together to produce this estimate - the first of its kind. It is hoped 
that raising awareness of the scale of loss will spur new fraud prevention 
initiatives in this sector. 
Individual citizens' losses equated to 10% of the overall fraud figure (£4 billion), 
covering loss from mass-marketing fraud such as share sale, lottery and advanced 
fee frauds as well as newer frauds such as online ticketing and rental fraud. This 
additional information along with data included from Action Fraud, widened the 
scope of last year's figure (£3.5 billion) to produce an increased figure within this 
AFI. Action Fraud saw over 70,000 contacts made by the public and 10,000 crimes 
reported totalling £93 million lost by individuals over the past 12 months to 
fraudsters. 
City of London Police and the Economic Crime Directorate are working with the 
NFA to build increased capacity for disruption of criminal attacks against 
individuals, as well as better intelligence sharing and analytics to support 
enforcement action. Cross-government and industry work also continues to 
increase public awareness of fraud and how to protect against it.  
2.2 Value and volume of fraud 
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The NFA now estimates that fraud costs the UK around £38.4 billion a year. The 
below diagram, courtesy of NFA Annual Fraud Indicator 2011 provides a breakdown 
of fraud loss by sector: 
 
2.3 Future fraud trends – growing and scale and complexity 
 
With lengthy time frames of major frauds, we are now only starting to see 
examples of some of the worst cases that occurred during the period leading up to 
the financial crisis. 2008/9 saw a record of 271 fraud cases reaching court that were 
valued in excess of £100,000. The total value of these cases was £1.3 billion. 
Consultation with experts within the counter fraud agencies suggests that as the UK 
economy emerges out of the recent recession, and with growing technological 
expertise, the volume, scale and complexity of fraud will continue to grow, 
requiring an increasingly sophisticated response. 
At the lower end of the scale, the low value - high volume fraud is expected to 
continue to grow as fraudsters move from one fraudulent scheme to another, 
exploiting the financially naïve.  
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A rise in occupational fraud is also expected to increase as employees, seeking to 
repair the damage caused to their personal finances by harsher economic 
circumstances, seek ways to defraud their employers.  
Continued technological growth and the ability to communicate and perform 
financial transactions instantly between remote geographical locations, will mean a 
growth in cross-border and multi-jurisdictional fraud perpetrated not only by 
organised criminal groups but by also reputable businesses pushing the boundaries 
of acceptable business practice. 
 
2.4 Links with Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) 
 
Fraud has also been recognised to have strong associations with other types of 
serious and organised crime such as immigration crime, human trafficking, money 
laundering and terrorism. Reducing fraud therefore has a role in tackling a broader 
range of criminal activity and at an international level. 
The Association of Chief Police Officers estimated that 11% of identified OCGs are 
involved in fraud, of which 64% have direct links into other crime groups. Where 
police forces tend to investigate fraud they do so in connection with organised 
crime fraud.  
The Home Office highlight that approximately £7.8billion of fraud is associated with 
OCGs, second only to the drugs trade.  
The threat of fraud committed by OCGs has also been growing in complexity and 
scale with organised criminals increasingly exploiting modern technology to evade 
traditional forms of surveillance, to access criminal markets and to commit fraud. 
 
2.5 Policy and delivery context 
 
The UK government through 'The Coalition: our programme for government' has 
committed to continue taking a robust and focussed approach to tackling fraud, 
and to create a single agency to take on the work of tackling serious economic 
crime.  
Whilst the details of the single agency are still to emerge, developments should be 
seen in the context of the governments overriding commitment to reduce the 
deficit and improve efficiency.  
The role of the Centre of Excellence to design and deliver counter fraud training will 
have to consider this commitment to deficit reduction; by generating income to 
help fund fraud prevention activities it will be ideally placed to support the 
activities of a single agency. 
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2.6 Clear remit for the Centre of Excellence 
 
There are clear opportunities and a continued requirement to enhance the UK's 
response to tackling fraud - through the Centre of Excellence we will be able to find 
synergies in the activities of those organisations involved in the prevention, 
disruption, detection, investigation, and prosecution of fraud within the UK and 
internationally.  
Through investment and growth of the Centre of Excellence and expansion of its 
fraud training capabilities we will be able to help educate and focus public and 
private sector resource more effectively to continue to build fraud prevention 
capacity and capabilities across the counter fraud landscape.  
Given the scale and value of fraud within the UK the Centre of Excellence can 
deliver a low cost / high benefit ratio given the comparatively modest funding 
required.  
The business model projects that the Centre of Excellence will be self funding and 
generating a profit for City of London Police and Economic Crime Directorate by the 
end of year 3. 
The scope of the Centre of Excellence is set out below: 
 
2.6.1 The Centre of Excellence Fraud Training Faculty 
 
 
 Provide national/international counter fraud training programmes 
 To coordinate counter fraud training across public & private sector 
organisations 
 Provide a single point of contact for Counter Fraud advice and learning 
resources  
 Disseminate best practice and operational learning 
 
2.6.2 The Centre of Excellence Fraud Professionals Accreditation Board & 
Institute of Fraud Professionals 
 
 
 Validate training courses suitable for the accreditation of counter fraud 
professionals 
 Accreditation and certification of Counter Fraud professionals 
 Provide continuous professional development programmes for counter fraud 
professionals  
 To create and manage a professional register or institute of accredited 
counter fraud professionals  
2.6.3 The Centre of Excellence Fraud Prevention Unit 
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 Prioritise intelligence products from the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau to 
identify prevention opportunities to reduce losses from fraud in the public & 
private sectors 
 Produce and distribute Fraud Alerts 
 Develop Fraud awareness products 
 Conduct fraud trend analysis and work with industry partners to engineer out 
weaknesses and opportunities for fraud 
 Coordinate media, website and public relations and promotional activities on 
behalf of Centre of Excellence, Economic Crime Directorate, National Lead 
Force and National Fraud Intelligence Bureau. 
 
2.7 The role of Economic Crime Directorate and Centre of Excellence 
2.7.1 Reputation and commitment for policing economic crime 
The City of London Police is responsible for one of the largest financial districts in 
the world; it has a long tradition, expertise and corporate knowledge of policing 
economic crime that is valued by those individuals, businesses and organisations 
which it works with. 
In April 2008, City of London Police and the Economic Crime Directorate established 
the National Lead Force and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau, going live with 
‘Know Fraud’ intelligence system in June 2010.  
The technology behind ‘Know Fraud’ and the diversity of data in the system is 
unparalleled; it is recognised as probably the most advanced and powerful 
intelligence system in use by law enforcement globally. 
Over the years City of London Police has developed a reputation as specialists in 
fraud and economic crime both domestically and internationally.  
City of London Police have been integral to national and international efforts to 
combat fraud through their work in tackling organised crime groups, securing major 
convictions, raising public awareness and leading the way in fraud victim support.  
The Economic Crime Directorate was responsible for the development of the 
Association of Chief Police Officers fraud doctrine and instrumental in raising the 
profile of fraud amongst police forces across England & Wales. 
The Centre of Excellence will consolidate the achievements and operational 
learning of City of London Police and the Economic Crime Directorate with a 
comprehensive programme of Fraud prevention, investigation and management 
courses; the centre will coordinate fraud prevention, awareness and educational 
activities at a national and international level developing the brand and status of 
City of London Police. 
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 2.7.2 Working in partnership 
 
As already stated City of London Police has a unique level of knowledge, skills and 
expertise and international reputation as economic crime experts. Their success in 
tackling increasingly complex multi-jurisdictional cases is in part due to the well 
established relationships City of London Police officers have developed over time 
with key counter fraud agencies, government departments, and businesses both 
domestically and internationally.  
Key partners include the National Fraud Authority, Department for Work and 
Pensions, the HMRC, the Serious Fraud Office, the Serious Organised Crime Agency, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Australian Federal 
Police, Australian Crime Commission, Financial Services Authority and the Solicitors 
Regulatory Authority. It has also forged strong partnerships with financial 
institutions and private sector interests such as UK Payments, the Insurance Fraud 
Bureau, CIFAS, the Federation Against Copyright Theft and Prevention of Fraud in 
Travel.  
The Centre of Excellence has been working with international law enforcement 
bodies, most recently the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, sharing best practice in 
fraud prevention, disruption, investigation and lessons learnt in the design and 
delivery of the ‘Know Fraud’ system.  
As the City of London Police continue to work  with International partners there is 
the potential that in the not too distant future there could be an opportunity to 
create an international network of intelligence hubs, sharing information and 
coordinating fraud prevention and disruption activities in real time at a global level.   
 
2.7.3 Leveraging Additional funding and resources 
 
In addition to the funding received from the Home Office to deliver the National 
Lead Force, National Fraud Intelligence Bureau and develop the Centre of 
Excellence, the Economic Crime Directorate have been able to secure additional 
funding to support the development of the National Lead Force and National Fraud 
Intelligence Bureau including £1m per annum from the Corporation of London 
towards the cost of the National Lead Force. 
The City of London see clear benefit in providing the many multinational businesses 
it hosts access to the UK's national fraud expertise that is delivered by Economic 
Crime Directorate, as it enhances the City of London and UK's reputation as a place 
to do business.  
With the Centre of Excellences’ new Fraud Prevention Unit, losses to fraud will be 
reduced, protecting our citizens and organisations from financial loss and 
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reputational harm, making the City of London the safest and preferred place to do 
business.  
 
2.7.4 Delivery and performance of Centre of Excellence 
 
In developing the Centre of Excellence and building capacity across the counter 
fraud community, City of London Police has also created the National Fraud 
Training Plan and is in the process of developing a new cross sector Fraud 
Investigators Manual. 
The Centre of Excellence has designed and delivered a number of specialist 
programmes for public and private sector bodies to help prevent fraud, raise 
awareness, and advise on how to make organisations more resilient to the threat of 
fraud.  
The Centre of Excellence has also organised and facilitated a range of workshops 
and seminars designed to find consensus on counter fraud strategies and how best 
to implement them including: 
 
 Multitude of training programmes delivered with over 1,800 people trained 
 A 3-day Fraud reporting and intelligence conference in July 2009 
 A 3-day National Fraud Forum in October 2009. 
 
2.8 Centre of Excellence Developments 
 
The Centre of Excellence has been operational since April 2010 and has been 
working to deliver key counter fraud programmes that will: 
 
 Educate counter fraud bodies on prevention strategies and tactics 
 Increase knowledge of disruption opportunities 
 Develop skills to maximise technology to combat fraud 
 Enhance investigative capability of counter fraud bodies 
 Disseminate best practice and lessons learnt to professionalise and 
standardise investigative practices across organisations in the public and 
private sectors 
 Explore organisational vulnerabilities and identify solutions for target 
hardening and loss prevention. 
 
 
In addition to the fraud training programmes the Fraud Prevention Unit will 
support this function by: 
 
 Identifying the volume and value of confirmed fraud crimes in the UK 
 Mapping geographical fraud hot spots 
 Analysing where specific types of fraud occur and against whom 
 Page | 21  
 
CoLP/CoE-BC          Version SS.0.4 
 Target awareness and prevention campaigns across the UK 
 Produce and disseminate fraud alerts for the public and private sectors 
 Manage media, website and public relations and promotional activities on 
behalf of Centre of Excellence 
 Disseminate learning to the Fraud Training Faculty for real time incorporation 
in to new training programmes. 
 
The concept of the Centre of Excellence is well regarded and supported by law 
enforcement and industry, who not only recognise the value and importance of 
what it can deliver, but also recognise what is required to deliver on the value and 
potential it has.  
 
Whilst much work is still to be done to expand the capabilities of the Centre of 
Excellence and develop the Fraud Prevention Unit, Key achievements to date 
include the design and delivery of the following programmes: 
 
 Bespoke Fraud Foundation Course for Serious Fraud Office investigators; 4 
cohorts have successfully completed the programme. 
 Programme for senior investigators from the Serious Fraud Office, Managing 
Serious and Complex Investigations; 3 cohorts have successfully completed 
the programme. 
 Programme for senior investigators from Medicines & Health Regulatory 
Authority, Managing Serious and Complex Investigations.  
 Specialist Internet Investigators course; delivered to a multitude of police 
forces and industry sectors including airlines, insurance, banking and 
transport to name but a few. The demand for this course far exceeds capacity 
of the Centre and could be delivered back to back year round if resources 
permitted. 
 FSA-Search and Exhibit Handling Course; currently being rolled out to all FSA 
enforcement staff. 
 National Fraud Foundation Course; on average two courses a year are being 
delivered to officers from police forces across the country 
 Professional Witnesses Programme, designed to prepare organisations for the 
challenges of preparing and presenting evidence for prosecution cases 
 Intelligence Handling & Management; delivered to a number of organisations 
including IFB. 
 International Payment & e-Crime – Investigation & Prevention programme 
designed for international markets and is programmed for delivery in Kuala 
Lumpur in July 2011 and Dubai in Aug 2011. 
 
 
"The Insurance Fraud Investigators Group (www.ifig.org) have employed 
the City of London Police ECD on several occasions to deliver training to our 
members.  We would unhesitatingly recommend them to any financial 
institution for relevant and practical training in fraud investigation and 
prosecution techniques."  
 
Peter Upton, Group Head of Financial Crime Investigation Prudential plc 
(former Chair of IFIG) 
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The achievements of Centre of Excellence listed above have, for 2010/11, 
generated over £250,000 income for City of London Police. The pricing of these 
programmes have historically been kept low as the main focus was to enhance the 
brand and deliver programmes on a cost recovery basis.  
With the financial challenges facing City of London Police as a result of the 
Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) a revised Centre of Excellence Costing 
Model has been produced to make the most of the opportunities to generate 
income to support City of London Police and Economic Crime Directorate functions.  
It is clear that City of London Police and Economic Crime Directorate has utilised its 
strengths, reputation and knowledge in support of the set-up and delivery of 
Centre of Excellence, and been able to leverage support and demand for 
programmes from across the public and private sectors.  
The benefits of this development work are slowly being realised, with increased 
investment the Centre of Excellence will be able to meet local demand and exploit 
current untapped markets both nationally and internationally1.  
Whilst the fraud training programmes designed by the Centre of Excellence for 
external markets is still a new and developing area of business, demand made of 
the Centre has been used to scope & design a comprehensive prospectus of new 
and proven programmes.  
The Centres initial prospectus will include: 
 Internet Investigators Course      (2 days) 
 Advanced Internet Investigations Course     (3 days) 
 Technology Enabled Crime Course      (2 days) 
 Fraud Researchers Course       (3 days) 
 Risks and Threats from Social Media and Networking Sites Course  (1 day) 
 Senior Fraud Investigators Programme – Public Sector Course  (5 days) 
 Organisational Fraud Awareness and Reduction Course   (3 days)  
 Introduction to Fraud Intelligence Course     (1 day) 
 Introduction to sensitive Intelligence Techniques Course   (1 day) 
 Professional Witnesses Course      (2 Days) 
 Fraud Investigators Foundation Course     (4 days) 
 Intelligence Led Fraud Investigations Course    (2 days) 
 Stage 2 Fraud Analysts Course      (5days) 
 Stage 3 Fraud Analysts Course      (5 days) 
 Organisational Intelligence Transformation Programme   (5 days) 
 Volume and Priority Fraud Investigators Course    (3 days) 
 Specialist Fraud Search Training Course     (1 day) 
 Managing Serious and Complex Fraud Investigations Course  (5 days) 
                                                          
 
1 S.26 of the Police Act 1996 requires consent of Secretary for the provision of services to an overseas organisation or 
police service. Covered in Appendix A 
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 Cheque and Plastic Card Crime Course     (4 days) 
 Financial Investigation for Fraud Investigators   (2 days) 
 Investigating & Presenting Evidence of Bribery & Corruption  (3 days) 
 Accredited Fraud Investigator Programme    (15 days) 
The Centre of Excellence is working closely with the National Fraud Intelligence 
Bureau to ensure that new programmes deliver the knowledge and develop the 
skills to tackle fraud that is causing the most harm.  
The National Fraud Intelligence Bureau Threat Assessment represents the first 
multi-agency threat assessment on fraud. 
Analysis suggests that the operational areas that will require the focus and 
attention of public and private sector counter fraud specialists are: 
 
 Professional,  Financial & Technical enablers 
 Mass marketing fraud 
 Combating OCG activity and serious and organised crime 
 Accommodation addresses used to facilitate fraud 
 Money-laundering and recovering the profits of fraud 
 Threat of fraud and financial crime to elderly & vulnerable victims 
 Identity crime. 
 
Each of the areas listed above require the skills and expertise which the Centre of 
Excellence is uniquely positioned to deliver through quality training programmes 
and learning resources.  
An informed and coordinated approach to the training and accreditation of public 
and private sector counter fraud bodies, both within the UK and internationally will 
enhance the City of London Police brand and ensure the City of London remains the 
city of choice to do business.  
 
2.9 Analysis of Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
 
In developing this business case it is important that we consider the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities & threats (SWOT) of the current situation and operating 
model for the Centre of Excellence.  
This helps to identify the preferred option and drivers for future delivery. Our 
analysis is summarised in the Table below: 
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Strengths Weaknesses 
 Strong corporate knowledge, skills and 
expertise within City of London Police 
contributing to success of Centre of 
Excellence 
 Ability to generate income for City of 
London Police 
 Uniquely geographically located within the 
largest financial district and vulnerable 
potential 'high value' victims (and 
perpetrators)  of fraud  
 Unrivalled international reputation of City 
of London Police as 'economic crime 
experts'; 
 Operational synergies with collocation of 
Centre of Excellence with NFIB and NLF 
 City of London Police has a proven track 
record of delivering high quality cross 
sector fraud training 
 Due to its reputation as economic crime 
specialists, City of London Police and the 
Centre of Excellence has the ability to 
attract new business in local international 
markets 
 Perception of a national/international 
provider with a London bias  
 Bound by police performance metrics and 
National Police Improvements Agency 
(NPIA) governance 
 Limitations of the estate and high quality 
training venues to meet current and future 
demand 
 Complexity in funding and financial 
management within City of London Police 
make performance and benefits 
attribution challenging with no clear 
framework in place to help demonstrate 
return on investment 
 Separation of Crime Training from Centre 
of Excellence restricts departmental 
expertise and limits qualified training 
resource. 
 Shared Services could be restrictive in 
running the Centre of Excellence as 
business enterprise 
Opportunities Threats 
 Ability to draw stronger links with public 
and private sector partners 
 Ability to extend reach of Centre of 
Excellence with international markets 
 Extend reach of Centre of Excellence into 
managing disruption and prevention 
activities 
 Deliver efficiencies across the counter 
fraud landscape through greater 
partnership working and collaboration 
with organisations and interventions 
 A change in government priority and/or 
strategy to tackle fraud 
 Uncertainty over remit of a single 
economic crime agency and role of Centre 
of Excellence 
 Action to reduce budget deficit may lead to 
cuts in City of London Police budgets and 
the commitment to provide additional 
resources without recharging  
 Other funding streams leveraged may also 
be at risk 
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3. Options & Benefits Case 
 
3.1 Benefits Realisation Planning & Management 
 
The Centre of Excellence Business Case is focused on delivering benefits, in 
particular, enhanced fraud prevention and disruption activities, income generation 
and national/international brand development.  
In this Business Case for the benefits realisation to work it has been essential to 
identify clear outcomes that relate to unambiguous business objectives, and to 
assign ownership to those responsible for planning and managing their 
achievement.  
A central goal of this process has been to bring structure, accountability, clarity and 
discipline to the definition and delivery of the benefits inherent in this business 
case.  
The Business Case has set out the basis of an investment or change plan. The 
Business Case has also projected the potential return or value that City of London 
Police will achieve by the proposition in the business case, both from prevention 
and training functions.  
The Business Case has also set out how the value or return will be delivered, by 
identifying specific benefits that will be accrued via making the investment / 
change.  
Many of the anticipated benefits will not start to materialise until after the Centre 
of Excellence development/change project has been delivered. It is therefore 
essential that the ownership of the benefits realisation plan is maintained beyond 
project delivery through to complete realisation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Below is the model used in the benefit realisation plan: 
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The benefits case for each of the business areas is covered in more detail in the 
Financial Case section. 
 
3.2 Opportunities for Centre of Excellence – Fraud Prevention Unit 
 
To realise the full potential of the Centre of Excellence and to maximise the 
opportunities to prevent fraud a new approach to intelligence management is 
necessary. The ‘Know Fraud’ intelligence system, currently sited and used 
exclusively by National Fraud Intelligence Bureau provides the means to enable the 
enhanced prevention function of the Centre of Excellence. 
 
The National Fraud Intelligence Bureau is unique an unlike any other intelligence 
function, the ‘Know Fraud’ intelligence system is used to identify prevention, 
disruption and enforcement  opportunities simultaneously , this reduces the 
traditional bottle neck and time lag that previously caused delay in intelligence 
being made available for prevention and disruption activities.  
 
Historically this had the potential to extend the duration and harm caused by the 
fraud putting more people and organisations at risk, in comparison to Prevention & 
Disruption prioritised function.  
 
With the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau prioritising prevention and disruption 
as a primary work stream of the ‘Know Fraud’ system will enable real time 
packages and profiles to be actioned by the Centre of Excellence resulting in more 
timely dissemination and disruption of fraud activities, providing real opportunities 
to minimise harm and exposure to risk, protecting people and organisations.  
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With the Centre of Excellence working in partnership with National Fraud 
Intelligence Bureau; Implementing a Prevention and Disruption led approach to 
managing the ‘Know Fraud’ will make the Centre of Excellence the premier fraud 
prevention unit in the UK, serving both the public and private sectors. 
Below is a representation of a Traditional Intelligence & Enforcement model which 
can be compared against the Data Sharing, Prevention & Disruption model which is 
the method used by National Fraud Intelligence Bureau and will be exploited by the 
Centre of Excellence Fraud Prevention Unit: 
 Traditional Intelligence & Enforcement Model 
 
Data Sharing, Prevention & Disruption Model 
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3.3 Opportunities for Centre of Excellence – Training & Accreditation 
 
The Centre of Excellence is well regarded and supported by law enforcement and 
industry, who not only recognise the value and importance of what it delivers, but 
also recognise what is required to deliver on the value and potential it has. 
 In 2010/11 the Centre of Excellence generated over £250,000 income for City of 
London Police, the pricing of the programmes were kept well below market rates, 
pitched at a cost recovery level.  
With the financial challenges facing City of London Police as a result of the 
Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) a revised Centre of Excellence Costing 
Model has been produced to make the most of the opportunities to generate 
income to support City of London Police and Economic Crime Directorate functions.  
Whilst much work is still to be done to expand the capabilities of the Centre of 
Excellence a lot can be learnt from a study of the market place, national and 
international counter fraud institutes, both on approach and potential.  
 
3.3.1 Case Study Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) 
Established in Austin, Texas in1988 the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners is 
the world's largest counter fraud organization and probably one of the largest 
providers of counter fraud training and educational products.  
The ACFE has more than 55,000 members in 125 countries worldwide, primarily 
focussed on reducing business fraud world-wide. Its activities include producing 
fraud information, tools and training.  
ACFE members have investigated more than two million cases of suspected 
criminal and civil fraud.  
Many influential agencies value the CFE credential. In April 2006, the U.S. 
Department of Defence announced they officially recognise the CFE credential. In 
February 2006, Gregory Kutz, managing director of the Forensic Audits and Special 
Investigations Unit for the Government Accountability Office, announced that 
everyone in his unit must obtain their CFE credential. 
 
The FBI officially recognises the CFE designation as a critical skill set under the 
Diversified Special Agent hiring sub-programme. The U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, in response to criticism in the wake of the Madoff scandal, has 
partnered with the ACFE to train hundreds of its investigators to become Certified 
Fraud Examiners. 
 
The ACFE is also one of the founding members of the nonprofit Institute for Fraud 
Prevention (IFP), a consortium of domestic and international universities dedicated 
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to cutting-edge research into the causational factors of a wide variety of white-
collar crimes.  
 
Today the ACFE is recognized globally as a premier anti-fraud training and resource 
organization supporting its members and the anti-fraud profession by providing 
conferences, seminars and other training events 
 
The ACFE established and administers the Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) 
credential, which denotes proven expertise in fraud prevention, deterrence, 
detection, investigation and prosecution. CFEs are trained to identify the warning 
signs and red flags that indicate evidence of fraud and fraud risk.  
 
ACFE courses are designed to give professionals the skills and information they 
need to address fraud in a truly comprehensive manner. The ACFE focus on the 
entire range of effective anti-fraud programmes that include controls and systems 
to prevent fraud as well as audit techniques to detect and investigate fraudulent 
conduct.  
 
 
In the last five years, annual attendance at ACFE Seminars, training events and 
conferences has increased over 45%. 
 
The ACFE organise a number of conferences every year, including major 
international events including a 6 day event in the USA, a 4 day event in Canada 
and a 3 day event in Europe. The ACFE also offer a comprehensive programme of 
seminars / courses delivered at international sites or client venues, these include: 
Fraud Examiner Core Courses 
 Legal Elements of a Fraud Examination 
 Investigating on the Internet 
 Conducting Internal Investigations 
 Principles of Fraud Examination 
 Auditing for Internal Fraud 
 Introduction to Digital Forensics  
 Professional Interviewing Skills 
 Fraud Prevention 
 
Fraud Examiner Intermediate Courses 
 
 Interviewing Techniques for Auditors 
 Contract and Procurement Fraud 
 Digital Forensic Tools and Techniques 
 Investigating Conflicts of Interest 
 Money Laundering: Tracing Illicit Funds 
 How to Testify 
 CFE Exam Review Course 
 Financial Statement Fraud 
 
Fraud Examiner Advanced / specialist Courses 
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 Advanced Fraud Examination Techniques  
 Advanced Interviewing Techniques Workshop 
 Fraud-Related Compliance 
 Healthcare Fraud  
 Mortgage Fraud 
 Building Your Fraud Examination Practice  
 Financial Institution Fraud 
 Fraud Risk Management 
 
 
 
To put this into perspective, below are some figures (based on 2011 ACFE pricing) 
to demonstrate the income generation potential of such an enterprise. 
To Become a Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) it is necessary to complete a course of 
study remotely with ACFE Fraud Manuals and on-line Study support.  
The cost of the CFE Preparation Course materials is £615 and to take the CFE exam 
costs £155, a discount of £62 is applied if the exam is booked at the time of 
purchasing the Preparation Course giving a total £708 per person. The exam is 
conducted on-line and is completely automated. 
If the growth of the ACFE had been steady over its 22 year existence this would 
equate to 2,500 new members per year, which if they all sought to become CFE’s 
that would equate to 2,500 x £708 = £1,770,000 per year. 
Each member must renew their membership of ACFE yearly which costs £110 for 
associates and £180 for certified members, for its 55,000 members, based on 
35,000 associates and 20,000 members this would equate to 35,000 x £110 = 
£3,850,000 and 20,000 x £180 = £3,600,000 giving a total of £7,450,000 per year. 
On top of this each member must complete a minimum of 20 days (160 credits) of 
Continuous Professional Education (CPE) a year. All of the ACFE events are mapped 
against a CPE credit framework, an average of 8 credits is awarded for each day of 
learning. 
 CPE events range in price between £204 and £261 per day for courses & seminars 
and an average of £330 per day for Conferences giving an overall average of £265 
per day. Working on a very conservative ratio, if members only completed 10% (2 
days) of their CPE through ACFE this would equate to 2 x £265 = £530 x 55,000 = 
£29,150,000 per year. 
Based on the above figures through professional accreditation, registration, 
training and CPE alone, the ACFE are able to generate £38,370,000 per year. 
 
 
3.3.2 City of London Police and the UK Counter Fraud Training, 
Accreditation and Registration Landscape 
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Over the years City of London Police has developed a reputation as specialists in 
fraud and economic crime both domestically and internationally.  
The Fraud Review recognised the pivotal role played by the City of London Police 
and its Economic Crime Directorate and made a number of recommendations in 
relation to its remit: 
43) A National Lead Force for fraud should be established with the following 
functions: 
 
a) To create, develop and manage the National Fraud Reporting Centre and its 
analytical unit; 
b) To disseminate intelligence and analysis to the network of Police Fraud Squads 
and, subject to appropriate protocols, other organizations investigating fraud (e.g. 
Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA)) to help them target fraud investigations 
and anti-fraud work generally; 
c) To act as a Centre of Excellence for fraud investigations, including organized 
training, disseminating best practice, general fraud prevention advice, advising on 
complex enquiries in other regions, and assisting with or even directing the most 
complex of such investigations. 
44) The National Lead Force should be based around the existing City Of London 
Police Fraud Squad. (This is without prejudice to the issue of whether that squad 
would remain part of a separate City force, as now or within a revised London 
police structure.) 
Whilst not a statutory function, it could be argued that there was a greater 
expectation from the Government that the Centre of Excellence not only delivered 
but undertook a role coordinating and quality assuring fraud training (in addition 
to other functions) across the public and private sectors 
 
City of London Police have been integral to national and international efforts to 
combat fraud through their work in tackling organised crime groups, securing 
major convictions, raising public awareness and leading the way in fraud victim 
support, the operational learning from these investigations is central to the 
development and maintenance of the Centres fraud training materials.  
The Centre of Excellence is well regarded and supported by law enforcement and 
industry, who not only recognise the value and importance of what it delivers, but 
also recognises what more can be achieved with specialist fraud training and 
accreditation of courses and investigators. 
Across the UK there is no single counter fraud accreditation or professional body. 
The closest thing to a professional body is the Counter Fraud Professional 
Accreditation Board (CFPAB) which was created in 2001 from the merger of the 
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National Counter Fraud Accreditation Board and the NHS National Professional 
Accreditation Board.  
The CFPAB has representatives from both the public and private sectors, including: 
DWP, Job Centre Plus, Local Authorities, Department of Health, NHS CFSMS, 
HMRC, IPS, CSA, KPMG, CIPFA, UKBA and the University of Portsmouth. 
The CFPAB accredit a number of courses and professional designations including: 
 
 Accredited Counter Fraud Specialists (ACFS) 
 Accredited Counter Fraud Managers (ACFM) 
 Accredited Counter Fraud Trainers (ACFT) 
 Certified Counter Fraud Specialists (CCFS) 
 Graduate Counter Fraud Specialists (GCFS) 
 
Since its inception the CFPAB has made over 11,500 awards, an average of 1,150 a 
year. Unlike the ACFE membership, once qualified or certificated there is no 
requirement for Continuous Professional Development and no professional 
registration.  
 
The CFPAB have been engaged by the National Fraud Authority (NFA) as part of 
the NFA’s work coming out of the Home Office report Extending our Reach, 
published in July 2009. Key activities in this area were to “create and implement 
and accreditation framework for fraud investigation qualifications” and to 
“develop common standards for fraud investigation to enable more efficient and 
effective transfer of cases between private and public sectors.  
 
The NFA consulted a number of training providers and held a seminar / workshop 
on 16/07/2010. From this a core curriculum was produced and the following 
recommendations were made:-  That the CFPAB is asked to: 
 
 Agree in principal to take on responsibility for the maintenance and promotion 
of the basic core curriculum. 
 Agree to further work to specify a process to validate already accredited 
courses against the basic core curriculum; 
 Agree to the proposals to revise its membership  
 
This is a positive move forward but the core curriculum is lacking in substance and 
falls short of addressing the core issues of cross sector investigations and working 
practices. The core curriculum was developed without a formal training needs 
analysis and is not underpinned by role profiles or a skills framework.  
 
Although the NFA found in favour of extending the remit of the CFPAB for the 
management of the curriculum, course accreditation and approved provider 
management this may be limiting and may not satisfy the requirements of 
mapping and harmonising cross sector investigative practices and procedures in 
line with the Governments thinking in the report Extending our Reach.  
 
The proposal also fails to build on the existing system by recognising counter Fraud 
Professionals as a professional body requiring registration and continuous 
professional development (CPD). 
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Although this solution has sound academic underpinning it lacks occupational 
competence and credibility which could be provided by the Centre of Excellence 
working hand in hand with the Economic Crime Directorate, the National Lead 
Force and National Fraud Intelligence Bureau. This structure will ensure that the 
curriculum is current, reflecting current threats, risks and operational practices.  
 
Where appropriate, the Centre of Excellence could still work with CFPAB but 
would not limit accreditation to them where alternatives or more suitable options 
are available.  
 
A number of other academic institutes offer Fraud management and Investigation 
programmes at undergraduate and post graduate levels. Teesside University offer 
a number of specialist fraud programmes at undergraduate and postgraduate 
levels. In addition Teesside University also accredits external fraud courses, 
providing both certification and credit transfer.  
 
An example of this is the police national 3 week Fraud Foundation Course, this has 
been accredited and achieves 60 credits from Teesside and achieves a Post 
Graduate Certificate, the new Volume and Priority Fraud Investigators course has 
been assessed by Teesside and could be accredited achieving 20 credits towards 
and undergraduate fraud programme. 
 
Within the public sector there is a number of law enforcement and regulatory 
bodies that investigate fraud and either deliver their own training or buy it in from 
another public sector body. These organisations include: 
 
 Serious Fraud Office (majority of training is delivered by CoLP Centre of 
Excellence) 
 NHS Protect (have their own training arm and provide CFPAB accredited 
courses – mainly internal) 
 Department of Work and Pensions (have their own training arm and provide 
CFPAB accredited courses – mainly internal) 
 Financial Services Authority (majority of training is delivered by CoLP Centre of 
Excellence) 
 Office of Fair Trading (Some training provided by CoLP Centre of Excellence, 
remainder outsourced to public and private sector organisations) 
 HMRC (have their own training arm and provide HMRC specific courses – some 
training for HMRC is now being undertaken by CoLP Centre of Excellence) 
 SOCA (historically SOCA have delivered their own training but CoLP Centre of 
Excellence is now providing a selection of courses to SOCA) 
 
The National Policing Improvements Agency (NPIA) manage and provide the 
framework and materials for law enforcement officers who elect career pathways 
as detectives via the Professionalising the Investigative Process (PIP). However, for 
officers wishing to specialise the NPIA have historically offered little in the field of 
fraud training due to niche market and highly specialist nature of the training.  
 
The NPIA supports a number of specialist fields of work linked to fraud, one being 
the coordination of financial investigation training and management the FISS 
database which requires Financial Investigators (FI) to register and maintain CPD. 
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Although this process is managed by NPIA the principal delivery agent for FI 
training has historically been GMP police and their fraud training unit.  
 
The NPIA Specialist Crime Unit at Wyboston also delivers a computer forensics 
programme which is highly specialised and a key feature of most fraud 
investigations. Highly specialist training such as this will probably always remain 
the responsibility of the NPIA or other specialist providers. 
 
With the uncertainty over the future role of NPIA and the formation of a new 
national body, either under ACPO or as professional institute it would probably not 
be the best time for us to look at the NPIA undertaking new responsibilities 
regarding the development and management of a national fraud curriculum and 
implementation of a new register or professional body for cross sector counter 
fraud specialists.  
 
City of London Police and the Centre of Excellence would look to build on its 
relationship with the NPIA as its future remit and direction is agreed as the 
specialist arm for fraud training ensuring that any progress made now is 
sustainable and compatible with the future vision for the NPIA and the proposed 
Economic Crime Agency.  
 
The Commissioner of the City of London Police chairs the ACPO Economic Crime 
Portfolio (ECP) and sitting under the ECP is the Fraud Training Sub-Group which at 
present is chaired by the Head of Investigative, Intelligence & Cyber Crime Training 
at the NPIA. Police membership of the sub-group includes the specialist fraud 
training centres of GMP, WMP, MDPGA and CoLP. The four police representatives 
are responsible for the design and delivery of all fraud, bribery and corruption 
training for all police forces in England & Wales.   
 
In the commercial arena there are a whole host of programmes the majority of 
which are not accredited and do not reflect or take into account the need for 
greater cross sector working and the harmonisation of procedures and practices. 
The content of the courses offered are not governed which has led to the police 
and public sector counter fraud bodies finding it difficult to work with investigators 
from the private sector because of the disparity in the training. 
 
Examples of commercial offering include: 
 
CIFAS -  
 Introduction to Basic Fraud Awareness    (1 hour) 
 Identity Fraud Training      (6 hours) 
 Basic Fraud prevention Techniques    (6 hours) 
 Organised Fraud Intelligence Gathering    (1 day) 
 Dealing with Deception      (1 day) 
 Whistle-blowing      (3 hours) 
 Cybercrime and Computer Misuse   (6 hours) 
 Fundamentals of Financial Investigations   (6 hours) 
 
Investec –  
 The Principles of Fraud Risk management   (1 Day) 
 Fraud Risk Management Implementation   (3 Days) 
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Questgates – 
 Accredited Counter Fraud Specialist (ACFS)   (20 days) 
 Insurance Fraud Technician     (5 days) 
 Internet Investigation course     (1 day) 
 Fraud awareness      (1/2 day) 
 
Argent Associates –  
 Investigative Interviewing     (3 days) 
 Basic SCAN Statement Analysis     (3 days)  
 Advanced SCAN Statement Analysis   (2 days) 
 Cognitive Interviewing Skills     (3 days) 
 Difficult Suspect Interviewing     (3 days) 
 Telephone Interviewing     (3 days) 
 
ARC Training, International Academy for Security Management - 
 Workplace Investigation & Interviewing    (4 days) 
 Advanced Investigation Techniques     (5 days) 
 Investigating Fraud in the Workplace    (3 days) 
 Investigating IT Misuse      (2 days) 
 
The review of the training on offer across the fraud marketplace highlights a lack 
of consistency and consideration to cross sector working. Although there is some 
very good training being offered this confirms the need for a nationally recognized 
core curriculum and professionalisation of the counter fraud community.  
 
3.3.3 Centre of Excellence – current position 
In reviewing the progress made by the Centre of Excellence since its inception in 
May 2009, a lot has been done to promote and establish the Centre of Excellence 
as the centre for excellence in Fraud Investigation Training and generate income 
for the City of London Police.  
 
From the progress made it is clear that there is a finite amount of training that can 
be delivered, limited by both space within City of London Police premises and 
suitably qualified training staff which in turn will limit the income generation 
opportunities for the Centre of Excellence.  
 
Some of the course delivery is dependent on external provision & expertise and 
external resources are regularly brought in. This does however reduce the 
profitability of training and could potentially jeopardise the reputation of the City 
of London Police if it were delivered and badged as a Centre of Excellence course 
and not suitably quality assured. 
 
Once the Centre of Excellence has reached the limit of its training delivery this 
would also equate to the limit of income generation under the current structure 
and direction. To overcome this, the Centre of Excellence has entered into a 
number of partnerships with other training providers who have started to deliver 
some of the training that was previously developed and delivered by Centre of 
Excellence staff.  
 
 Page | 36  
 
CoLP/CoE-BC          Version SS.0.4 
Two examples are the partnerships with PAR Associates Ltd and Snowdrop 
Consulting Ltd. These partnerships only focus on the training that can be delivered 
which does not rely on current or specialist knowledge only available from 
Economic Crime Directorate staff.  
 
This compensates for minimal staffing in the Centre of Excellence and helps the 
department achieve maximum use from its training resources but it does little in 
promoting the Centre of Excellence in the private sector or capitalising on the 
large volumes of Counter Fraud Training currently being delivered by commercial 
organisations. 
 
The Current establishment of the Centre of Excellence is:  1 Detective Inspector, 
1.6 Detective Constables & 0.6 Support Staff giving a staff cost of £170,598. Total 
running costs (excluding premises) for the Centre in 2010/11 are: 
Staff:  £170,598 
Consumables: £7,500 
Expenses: £78,000 (inc professional fees) 
Total:  £256,098 
 
At the time of completing this Business Case the final accounts for 2010/11 for the 
Centre of Excellence had not been completed but the yearly target for income 
generation of £250,000 has been achieved.  
 
 
 
 
The financial health of the Centre of Excellence can be demonstrated as: 
 
Centre of Excellence running costs: £256,098 
Income generation:   £250,000 
 Total:     £6,098 - 
Savings from internal staff training: £65,080 
 Total:     £58,982 + 
 
3.3.4 Centre of Excellence – future projections 
 
To realise the potential of the Centre of Excellence investment will be required to 
enable the Centre to become self funding and generate income at a level to be of 
value to City of London Police and the Economic Crime Directorate.  
 
Below shows the income generation potential of the Centre of Excellence by 
improving efficiency of the department, increasing resources and expanding the 
methods and locations of course delivery.  
 
This is broken down over a three year period of growth and development; the 
figures do not include the additional revenue that could be achieved by 
accreditation of externally delivered programmes or the implementation of a 
professional body/register similar to that of ACFE which is covered separately. 
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As a starting point each full time member of Centre of Excellence staff has 224 
working days available per year, with no allowance for course development this 
equates to 112 days course / material preparation and 112 days delivery / contact 
time.  
Without dedicated training support the available contact time can be impacted 
upon if the trainer is responsible for course administration, booking speaker, 
managing course bookings etc.  
As the trainer becomes more familiar with the materials the need for course / 
material preparation is reduced but this should not be counted as regular contact 
time but can be utilised in exceptional circumstances up to a ratio of 84 days 
course / material preparation with 140 days delivery / contact time.  
By maximising trainer delivery, increasing delegate numbers and brining the 
delegate fees inline with the market average, income per member of staff would 
increase at the following rate: 
 
 
 
Year 1 - per trainer daily return.  
Average day rate per delegate (external) £350, average course size 12 giving a 
daily average £4,200 - per Trainer yearly maximum revenue:  
112 x £4,200 = £470,400  
 
Year 2 – per trainer daily return.  
Average day rate per delegate (external) £385, average course size 14 giving a 
daily average £5,390 - per Trainer yearly maximum revenue:  
112 x £5,390 = £603,680 
 
Year 3 – per trainer daily return. 
Average day rate per delegate (external) £425, average course size 16 giving a 
daily average £6,800 - per Trainer yearly maximum revenue:  
112 x £6,800 = £761,600 
Combining the income per member of staff with the proposed establishment 
(training Staff) it is possible to project the potential income for the Centre of 
Excellence Fraud Training Faculty as:  
Year 1 – Centre of Excellence return. 
With an establishment of 2 Inspectors (0.3 contact), 2 Sergeants (0.6 contact), 6 
Constables (full contact) it is possible to achieve:                                  
7.8 x 112 = 873.6 x £4,200 = £3,669,120. 
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Year 2 – Centre of Excellence return. 
With an establishment of 2 Inspectors (0.3 contact), 2 Sergeants (0.6 contact), 12 
Constables (full contact) it is possible to achieve:                                                            
15 x 112 = 1680 x £5,390 = £9,055,200. 
Year 3 – Centre of Excellence return. 
With an establishment of 2 Inspectors (0.3 contact), 2 Sergeants (0.6 contact), 12 
Constables (full contact) it is possible to achieve:                                              
15 x 112 = 1680 x £6,800 = £11,424,000. 
A detailed financial analysis of this function is included in the Financial Case. 
 
 
 
 
3.3.4.1 Partnership options with Academic or professional Institutes 
 
To set the Centre of Excellence apart from other training organisations and to 
provide a sound foundation for the establishment of a professional body it could 
be beneficial to be aligned with a reputable academic institute. There are many 
options for how the Centre of Excellence could work Higher Education but for the 
Business Case only two have been considered: 
Sole alignment:- this option would align the Centre of Excellence to a single 
academic institute renowned for research and learning in fraud and economic 
crime. At the volume end of the market are Portsmouth University which is 
primarily a research institute or Teesside which is more of a teaching institute, at 
the prestige end of the market is Jesus College, Cambridge which is host to annual 
Symposium on Economic Crime, currently in its 28th year. Jesus College is world 
renowned for both teaching and research and the prestige of Cambridge 
University may be more in keeping with this business case. Draw backs with sole 
alignment could be the additional cost of accreditation and award for courses, 
restrictions of accreditation boards and management of student registration and 
management outside of recognized term times.   
 
Education Partnership:- this option would see the Centre of Excellence endorsing 
colleges and universities to provide expert anti-fraud courses and programmes.  
Colleges and Universities around the world could become key providers of Centre 
of Excellence developed anti-fraud programmes. This unique type of partnership 
would provide a national / international portfolio of specialist fraud venues for 
delivering CPD events and conferences. The Partnership would provide greater 
scope in addressing the increasing need for counter fraud education at further and 
higher education levels. In pursuit of this objective, the Centre of Excellence would 
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commit to providing timely world-class educational tools and resource to 
Universities and Colleges around the world. This approach would have greater 
flexibility at all levels whilst still giving the Centre of Excellence academic 
credibility and alignment. 
3.3.5 Role of the Centre of Excellence as an Institute for Fraud 
Accreditation, Registration and Training 
A new business opportunity could be had by establishing a Centre of Excellence 
Fraud Professionals Accreditation Board (COE-FPAB) and Institute of Fraud 
Professionals (IFP) creating and managing a professional register of Accredited 
Fraud Professionals, building on the progress made by the CFPAB mirroring the 
model that has proved such a success for the ACFE.  
 
The COE-FPAB and IFP would, for a fee, review and accredit courses delivered by 
public and private sector organisations (including FE and HE institutes); these 
courses would then receive Centre of Excellence endorsement and joint 
certification, the Centre of Excellence receiving a fee for each delegate trained.  
 
A new web site would need to be developed to service the promotion of internal 
and external accredited courses, seminars, conferences, on-line learning 
resources, academic research on fraud, fraud alerts and awareness – this could be 
a joint website with other Centre of Excellence functions.  
 
Individuals passing an accredited course would receive the first year free on the 
Institute of Fraud Professionals register (which would also be managed and 
promoted via the Centre of Excellence website) and like all professional bodies, 
this would require yearly renewal (for a fee) and completion of compulsory 
‘Continued Professional Development’ (CPD). The ACFE case study is a testament 
to the business and income generation opportunities from this approach. 
 
The CPD elements would bring in another revenue stream accrediting short 
courses, lectures and conferences. Short CPD events are the most lucrative area 
of business; once an individual is accredited and professionally registered they are 
reluctant to surrender this status.  
 
This can help protect the Centre of Excellence from reductions in core training 
demand affected by fluctuations in the external financial environment.  
 
The COE-FPAB & IFP would become the lead agency/body for both public and 
private sector fraud training, standardising programme development and guiding 
the development of core content. This would be the first time fraud training has 
been reviewed and accredited from a public/private sector perspective which 
would also benefit the service by standardising investigative practices and case 
file development across the sectors. 
 
The COE-FPAB & IFP could expand the operation further and undertake a role in 
the development of specialist ‘open’ fraud training materials, courses and CPD 
sessions. Instead of the Centre of Excellence delivering all of the courses the COE-
FPAB would look to deliver train the trainer programmes and franchise delivery of 
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the Centre of Excellence developed courses and sessions, this could be especially 
useful in exploiting international markets. 
 
Recognising the fact that within Economic Crime Directorate there are limited 
resources with the skills and qualifications to deliver specialist fraud / crime 
training merging Centre of Excellence with City of London Police Crime Training 
team would immediately boost specialist knowledge and capacity to deliver more 
and varied programme of courses.  
 
The Centre of Excellence should not be bound by trying to identify suitable staff 
from within the City of London Police but should also look externally to other 
police forces, law enforcement agencies and commercial organisations – 
identifying experience and expertise which could support and serve the aims of 
the Centre. To achieve this, a framework for facilitating secondees and 
transferees will need to be implemented.  
 
Using the figures from ACFE and the volumes from the CFPAB combined with 
figures from training requested received by the Centre of Excellence we can 
project a minimum return from the development of COE-FPAB & IFP. The figures 
are calculated on a ratio of 2,300 course delegates and 1,150 associates (£110 pa) 
and 1,150 full members (£180 pa). The yearly projections are calculated on 
compounding the figures year on year. 
 
Year 1.   
 
Course endorsement for professional status: £161,000  
Professional Registration / membership: £333,500 
APL/APEL bridging seminars & conferences: £609,500 
Total:      £1,104,000 
 
Year 2. 
 
Course endorsement for professional status: £161,000 
Professional Registration / membership: £667,000 
CPD courses, seminars & conferences:  £1,219,000 
Total:      £2,047,000 
 
Year 3. 
 
Course endorsement for professional status: £161,000 
Professional Registration / membership: £1,000,500 
CPD courses, seminars & conferences:  £1,828,500 
Total:      £2,990,000 
 
From the above it is clear that the potential from establishing a COE-FPAB & IFP 
has the potential to generate income which will continue to increase yearly as the 
professional register grows and members have to maintain CPD and renew their 
membership. Years 4 and 5 are projected at: 
Year 4: £3,933,000 
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Year 5: £4,876,000 
The COE-FPAB & IFP is an integral function of the Centre and the Fraud Training 
Faculty will be responsible for delivering CPD and training events for the IFP side of 
the business so income streams should be viewed collectively. 
A detailed financial analysis of this function is included in the Financial Case. 
The below table summaries the combined income generation form both the Fraud 
Training Faculty and Professional Institute and makes the distinction between 
existing funding and new money year on year.  
Combined Centre of 
Excellence Functions 
2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 
HO Funding £256,098 £256,098 NIL 
Carry over Profit / Funding NIL £1,505,423 £5,001,802 
Additional Funding Req.  £3,011,599 £4,338,877 £1,605,779 
Total Funding £3,267,697 £6,100,398 £6,607,581 
Income £4,773,120 £11,102,200 £14,414,000 
Profit or Loss  £1,505,423 £5,001,802 £7,806,419 
 
The above includes employment costs for specialist management and financial 
functions which could be provided by a partnership with a commercial 
organisation as an alternative to direct recruitment. Although a commercial 
partnership would reduce staffing costs and funding requirements it is impossible 
to project how this would influence the profit margin or realisable income as this 
will be heavily dependent on the agreement of a profit share arrangement.  
The options for a Commercial partnership or direct employment are explored 
below. 
3.3.6 Establishment of a Royal or Chartered Institute  
In establishing a professional body consideration will need to be given to its 
structure and governance. UK Royal and Chartered Institutes are recognised 
around the world and when combined with the City of London brand would 
provide a business advantage in global markets not afforded any other institute or 
professional body.  
Information on what defines a Chartered Institute is included as Appendix D.  
3.4 Commercial / Business Knowledge and Expertise 
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The proposals in this Business Case are a world away from the core business of the 
City of London Police and will require the acquisition of knowledge and expertise 
in international commercial practices, business development and financial 
management which are unfamiliar to City of London Police personnel.  
There are two options, a partnership with an established commercial organisation 
or the direct employment of key business personnel – organisational charts 
detailing the structure are covered at Appendix C.   
If the correct commercial partner is selected there would be commercial benefits 
for the organisation through alignment and partnering with the City of London 
Police, likewise, we would benefit from their established business practices and 
knowledge of the international markets.  
This would however require a form of profit sharing which would reduce our 
income share but conversely, set up and ongoing costs would be reduced and 
shared between the two organisations. 
Direct employment of key business personnel would appear to be the simplest and 
cheapest option, only having to finance staff costs without any share of profits. It 
could also reduce the bureaucracy of joint management boards allowing for a 
more dynamic business model.  
The drawback with this approach is that the business will have to establish itself 
from the ground up, with no corporate knowledge this would potentially slow 
down the development and realisation of the Business Case thereby limiting 
income and a move to a self funding income generating model.  
A direct employment approach could also hinder the City of London Police from 
establishing or applying for chartered institute status as it would be hard to 
evidence its established business practices, sound financial (business) status or its 
ability to demonstrate a track record of achievement over a number of years.  
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4. Financial Case 
 
4.1 Summary 
 
In this Section we set out the Financial Case for the combined development 
streams of the Centre of Excellence, focusing on a progressive level of investment 
which correlates to a corresponding level of income generation through to a self 
funding model by year three.  
The reduced budget allocated to the City of London Police has resulted in the 
Economic Crime Directorates review of current working practices to achieve 
savings, improve performance and were possible generate income to plug the 
budget deficit .   
Resources have been prioritised in line with the Government's tough criteria on 
ensuring value for money, and describe in the Management Case how the Centre 
of Excellence will achieve a step change in the drive for the effective and efficient 
use of resources and move to a self funding income generating model by the end 
of year three. 
 
4.2 Centre of Excellence financial case 
 
A three year plan for recruitment and growth has been produced to mirror the 
three year plan for increased training delivery and income generation. 
 If business opportunities are generated at a rate exceeding the projected growth 
and capacity there will be a need for accelerated recruitment to year 2 or 3 levels.   
 
Year 1.  
1 DCI, 3 DI, 4 DS, 8 DC, 15 Support Staff.  
 Staff:  £1,458,657 
 Consumables: £56,000 
 Expenses:  £640,000 
 Total:   £2,154,657 
 
 
 
 
Year 2.  
1 DCI, 3 DI, 7 DS, 16 DC, 26 Support Staff.  
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 Staff:  £2,621,665 
 Consumables: £112,000 
 Expenses:  £1,280,000 
 Total:   £4,013,665 
 
Year 3.  
1 DCI, 3 DI, 7 DS, 16 DC, 34 Support Staff.  
 Staff:  £2,922,721 
 Consumables: £123,000 
 Expenses:  £1,400,000 
 Total:   £4,445,721 
 
The above growth and funding (in line with City of London Police practices) does 
not include accommodation, but it should be noted that the current 
accommodation for the Centre of Excellence has already exceeded its capacity for 
both staff and training provision. With the realignment of resources as a result of 
City first an assumption has been made that sufficient accommodation will be 
available within the existing estate to accommodate all Centre of Excellence Staff. 
External training venues have been included within the costing for training delivery 
but the cost can be prohibitive, in London the average cost for basic venue is £500 
per day. Courses will be offered at a more favourable rate for corporate bookings 
delivered off-site at the client venue; this reduces not only the venue costs but 
also reduces the administrative burden and associated costs. International 
programmes will be offered under both models, per delegate and corporate 
bookings. 
Income generation for years 1 to 3 works on a projection of 873, 1680 and 1680 
days of training delivery, calculating accommodation at £500 per day the cost of 
external training venues would be approximately £436,500, £840,000 and 
£840,000 per year respectively. 
The COE-FPAB& IFP would rely exclusively on external venues for seminar and 
conferencing facilities, hired around the country or overseas to meet CPD demand, 
the costs for these venues varies on location and capacity so a ratio of £50 per 
person per day has been used.  
The development model for years 1 to 3 works on a projection of no CPD for year 
1, 4600 units year 2 and 9200 units year 3.  
A model of Accredited Prior Learning and Experiential Learning may be considered 
for admission to the Institute of Fraud Professionals so a quantity of CPD events 
may be delivered in year 1 as part of a bridging programme, for costing purposes 
we have calculated this at rate of 2300 units.  
Based on the above projections the accommodation costs work out at 
approximately £115,000, £230,000 and £460,000 per year respectively. 
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In addition to the above costs there will be an ongoing investment required for IT, 
to establish and maintain a Centre of excellence web site, produce promotional 
materials and Centre of Excellence merchandise.  
These costs are weighted in year one and have been calculated at 25% of core 
budget, reducing to 20% year two and 15% each year thereafter. 
 
Year 1.  
 Staff, expenses & Consumables:  £2,154,657 
 Training Delivery Accommodation:  £436,500 
 CPD Delivery Accommodation:  £115,000 
 IT & marketing materials:   £676,540 
 Total:     £3,267,697 
 
Year 2.  
 Staff, expenses & Consumables:  £4,013,665 
 Accommodation:    £840,000 
 CPD Delivery Accommodation:  £230,000 
 IT & marketing materials:   £1,016,733 
 Total:     £6,100,398 
 
Year 3.  
 Staff, expenses & Consumables:  £4,445,721 
 Accommodation:    £840,000 
 CPD Delivery Accommodation:  £460,000 
 IT & marketing materials:   £861,860 
 Total:     £6,607,581 
 
Below, using the above expenditure projections combined with the projected 
income are profit & loss forecasts for the Centre of Excellence if funding is 
received and suitable staff are recruited to the roles: 
 
Year 1. 
 Funding:     £3,267,697 
 Training Delivery Income:    £3,669,120 
 Professional Institute Income:  £1,104,000 
 Profit:     £1,505,423 
 
Year 2. 
 Funding:     £6,100,398 
 Training Delivery Income:    £9,055,200 
 Professional Institute Income:  £2,047,000 
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 Profit:     £5,001,802 
 
Year 3. 
 Funding:     £6,607,581 
 Training Delivery Income:    £11,424,000 
 Professional Institute Income:  £2,990,000 
 Profit:     £7,806,419 
 
The above figures represent a best case scenario, if staff are not recruited or the 
Centre of Excellence web site not developed for example, these figures could be 
considerably lower.  
The income generation and profit margin increases considerably over the first 
three years but will gradually reach a plateau when it is unrealistic to expand the 
Centre of Excellence Fraud Training Faculty further, this is where the Fraud 
Professionals Accreditation Board and Institute of Fraud Professionals takes over 
and will continue to increase income year on year with repeat business through 
CPD and registration / membership renewals.. 
Prioritising fraud prevention as a primary work stream of the Centre of Excellence 
could allow for a mix of existing staff from National Fraud Intelligence Bureau staff 
and new personnel, some staff may even come from the commercial business 
partner if that approach is progressed.  
 
Because of the more timely assessment, dissemination and disruption of fraud 
activities this will provide real opportunities to minimise harm and exposure to 
risk, protecting people & organisations; as a result this may attract industry 
secondees and funding in the same way that the National Fraud Intelligence 
Bureau has.  
 
 
 
4.3 Baseline position 
 
Set out below is projected funding requirements for the next 3-year period 2012-
13 to 2014-15, set against forecast expenditure.     
A rigorous process has been followed to ensure affordability, as follows:  
 We start with the Centre of Excellence baseline position on the basis of a 
detailed analysis of expenditure in 2010-11; using this base position we then 
extrapolate a forecast up to 2014-15 
 We have made an assumption that staff costs will remain constant based on 
the current pay freeze. 
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 We assume that City of London Police will deliver programmes to extend the 
reach of the Centre of Excellence up to and including 2014-15 as part of the 
City First programme. 
 
The baseline position for the Centre of Excellence on the basis of a detailed 
analysis of their 2010-11 expenditure is, as follows: 
 
Centre of Excellence  
baseline expenditure 
(£) 
Employment costs - £204,288 
Expenses & Professional  fees - £78,00 
Consumables & variable IT costs - £7,500 
Savings (Internal training) +£65,080 
Income +£250,000 
Total +£58,982 
 
 
Set out below is the base line analysis for the combined functions of the Centre of 
Excellence over the Spending Review period up to 2014-15. 
 
 
Combined Centre of 
Excellence Functions 
2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 
HO Funding £256,098 £256,098 NIL 
Carry over Profit / Funding NIL £1,505,423 £5,001,802 
Additional Funding Req.  £3,011,599 £4,338,877 £1,605,779 
Total Funding £3,267,697 £6,100,398 £6,607,581 
Income £4,773,120 £11,102,200 £14,414,000 
Profit or Loss  £1,505,423 £5,001,802 £7,806,419 
Realisable Income Nil Nil £1,198,838 
 
The above includes employment costs for specialist management and financial 
functions which could be provided by a partnership with a commercial organisation 
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as an alternative to direct recruitment. Although a commercial partnership would 
reduce staffing costs and funding requirements it is impossible to project how this 
would influence the profit margin or realisable income as this will be heavily 
dependent on the agreement of a profit share arrangement.  
From year three the staffing and funding requirements remain relatively constant 
whilst the income continues to grow year on year. With a profit of £7,806,419 in 
year 3 and year 4 funding requirement of £6,607,581 a realisable income of 
£1,198,838 is achievable for year 3, moving into year 4 the centre becomes 
completely self funding. 
Using the above projections it is possible to project realisable income for years 4 
and 5 based on the year on year growth for the Professional Institute: 
 
Combined Centre of 
Excellence Functions 
2015-16 2016-17 
Total Funding £6,607,581 £6,607,581 
Income £15,357,000 £16,300,000 
Profit or Loss  £8,749,419 £9,692,419 
Realisable Income £2,141,838 £3,084,838 
 
Key deliverables for the Centre of Excellence functions would be: 
 Deliver a national fraud training and educational capability via the Centre of 
Excellence Fraud Training Faculty 
 Enhance fraud prevention advice 
 Produce regular alerts and awareness products 
 Professionalise and regulate accredited counter fraud training 
 Create a professional register / institute to support and mange cross sector 
counter fraud specialists    
 Collaborate with partner agencies to prioritise prevention & disruption of 
fraud. 
4.4 Conclusions 
Our financial projections show how the Centre of Excellence can deliver the Fraud 
Training Faculty, Fraud Professionals Accreditation Board & Institute of Fraud 
Professionals and the Fraud Prevention Unit for a relatively low investment and 
will be profitable and fully self funding by year 3.  
A commercial partnership; maximising industry support, and seconded staff could 
see the Centre generating a realisable income prior to year three. 
 Page | 49  
 
CoLP/CoE-BC          Version SS.0.4 
 
5. Management Case 
 
5.1 Summary 
 
The Management Case provides detail on the next steps that will be delivered so 
that the Centre of Excellence can continue to build on the success to date. Set out 
is how the Centre of Excellence will deliver continuous improvement going 
forward in terms of:  
 Performance management 
 Governance structures 
 Funded to self funded 
 Successful joint working 
 Extending the reach of the National Lead Force and National Fraud 
Intelligence Bureau 
 Proposed action plan. 
 
 
Proposed next steps are summarised in an action plan at the end of this Section. 
 
5.2 Performance management 
 
The Centre of Excellence will formulate a strategy covering core business, required 
outcomes, key performance indicators (including stretch targets) and productivity 
(internal efficiency) benchmarks.  
This strategy will underpin the expansion of the Fraud Training Faculty into new 
markets, the establishment of a new Fraud Professionals Accreditation Board & 
Institute of Fraud Professionals and the prioritisation of disruption interventions 
with a focus on prevention and minimising the harm and loss from fraud.  
It will provide a robust basis for ensuring that resource inputs achieve measurable 
results that show trend improvement and outcomes that people care about. 
The performance of the Centre of Excellence will continue to be integrated with 
the monthly performance management arrangements of the Economic Crime 
Directorate. 
 
 
5.3 Governance structures 
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The proven governance structures will continue to guide the delivery and 
management of the Centre of Excellence. The structures will however be reviewed 
to identify any areas where the effectiveness of challenge and scrutiny can be 
improved within the context of prioritising prevention and disruption and moving 
to a self funding profit making structure. 
Detective Chief Superintendent Stephen Head will continue to guide the Centre of 
Excellence, supported by Detective Superintendent Tony Crampton who directs 
Fraud Intelligence, Performance and Projects.  
The Centre of Excellence proposes, via DCS Head and Commissioner Leppard to 
report progress and achievements mapped against the Business Case to the Police 
Committee as a standing agenda item. It is recognised that the support and 
cooperation of the Police Committee is a critical success factor.  
In addition to Police Committee reporting and governance a cross industry team 
will be brought together with responsibility for overseeing and advising on the 
delivery and coordination of the Fraud Prevention Units activities. A Non-Executive 
Board will also be established to oversee the running of the Fraud Professionals 
Accreditation Board and Institute of Fraud Professionals.  
The Centre of Excellence will improve accountability and transparency in terms of 
monitoring performance, corrective action to keep within budget, financial 
reporting, and provision of information on potential or anticipated problems and 
preparation of detailed budgets. 
 
5.4 Funded to Self Funded 
 
The Centre of Excellence will achieve a step change in the drive from funded to self 
funding by year three of operation. 
The Centre of Excellence will simplify and integrate organisational arrangements, 
drive out wasteful spending on support functions, and reduce bureaucracy and 
increase efficiency and move to self funded status at the earliest opportunity.  
As part of the analysis for this business case three main value for money themes 
have been identified: 
 Viability 
 Desirability 
 Achievability. 
 
Viability 
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For the Centre of Excellence to be viable, the investment objectives and desired 
outcomes need to be translatable into outputs that can form the basis of a 
contract and a sound set of performance metrics.  Operational flexibility and 
efficiency can be balanced with longer term performance targets with clear 
funding and income generation targets in place.   
The Centre of Excellence is confident that this can be managed as part of a three 
year strategy for growth sitting within the Economic Crime Directorate but 
managed separately.   
Desirability 
 
Consistent high quality services can be incentivised through performance and 
reporting targets from the Centre of Excellence throughout each of the new 
business areas.  
The Centre of Excellence believes that it is capable of managing and demonstrating 
performance against any the funding and income projections for 2012-13 to 2014-
15. The Centre will innovate and develop solution and services that meet the 
requirements of industry partners to prevent fraud and reduce harm and loss. 
Achievability 
 
The Centre of Excellence is a new area of business but is well respected in both the 
public and private sectors; the Centre is efficient and effective which, through a 
combination of police and civilian sector skills will determine the industry best 
practice rules that will continue the strong relationships established with the 
counter fraud community and which involve significant monetary values. 
 
 
 
 
5.5 Successful joint working 
 
Successful joint working with other forces and agencies through strategic and 
operational relationships with key partners and industry will be key to continuing 
to develop the Centre of Excellence. The Centre will formalise and manage its 
relationships through the development of a stakeholder management plan for 
each of the Centre of Excellence functions.  
This plan will identify: 
 The nature of the existing relationship and Centre of Excellence offering for 
all existing strategic and operational partners 
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 Those organisations with whom relationships need to be built and 
strengthened to extend the reach of the Centre of Excellence 
 Relationship managers for all strategic and operational partners of the Centre 
of Excellence. 
5.6 Extending the reach of Centre of Excellence 
 
 
The business case highlights the high level of skills, knowledge and experience that 
has been developed within the Economic Crime Directorate & Centre of 
Excellence.  
With the development of the Centre of Excellence there are great opportunities to 
further enhance these assets and develop the City of London brand as a global 
lead within the field of fraud prevention, disruption and enforcement.  
Our consultation with key stakeholders highlighted that there is high demand and 
high expectations on Centre of Excellence to continue to deliver and expand the 
quality of service currently provided, and that the quality of fraud training has 
been critical to the reputation and support for Economic Crime Directorate.  
With fraud forecast to grow in both scale and complexity, the Centre of Excellence 
will manage the increasing demands on its resources whilst continuing to protect 
the quality of its service. 
 In meeting this challenge the Centre of Excellence will develop a longer-term 
business development strategy to expand the products and services it offers to 
maximise income generation opportunities. 
The Centre of Excellence is uniquely placed to drive the development and 
extension of its functions that industry desires. This development will be planned 
carefully with continued negotiation and support from national and international 
partners from the public and private sectors.  
Once funding of the Centre of Excellence is confirmed a detailed 3-5 year business 
plan and strategy to deliver an extended remit within the approved funding 
envelope will be formulated. 
 
5.7 Potential quick wins that will extend the remit of Centre of Excellence are: 
 
 Centre of Excellence developing accredited training packages and working 
with industry to build the investigative capacity across the public and private 
sectors to facilitate a shift to a "self-policing model" whereby industry 
investigators undertake more of the investigation work increasing speed and 
efficiency and enhance civil recovery, with National Lead Force managing the 
investigation through the criminal justice system 
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 Extending the reach of the Centre of Excellence by developing closer strategic 
and operational partnerships with big business and small and medium 
enterprises to build a greater awareness of how to effectively prevent, detect 
and investigate fraud across a broader spectrum of sectors 
 Through the Fraud Prevention Unit partnerships, develop the quality of 
intelligence held in the Know Fraud system by increasing the scope of data 
providers to take in a broader spectrum of sectors 
 
The Economic Crime Directorate has to-date succeeded in attracting secondments 
from organisations across the private and public sectors; it is anticipated that a 
percentage of roles within the Centre of Excellence can be met through 
secondments from police forces, law enforcement agencies and industry partners.   
This approach delivers additional value by enhancing relationships with key 
organisations whilst also providing a mechanism to share and build knowledge and 
experience within the Centre of Excellence and the secondee organisations.  
 
The proposed next steps are Summarise in the action plan below. 
 
 
 
 
5.8 Proposed action plan & Next steps 
 
 
Performance management 
 
Strategy Centre of Excellence to prepare discussion paper on core 
business, required outcomes, key performance indicators 
(including stretch targets) and productivity (internal efficiency) 
benchmarks 
 Workshop with Centre of Excellence staff to discuss and agree 
 Disseminate findings with Centre staff 
 Six month review of the situation 
Tighter resource 
planning and 
performance 
management  
Specify simple system to track internal efficiency and economy, 
including time monitoring trainer contact, development and 
administrative time. 
 Set benchmarks for use of time 
 Monitor performance weekly against targets, and use results for 
resource planning and to manage performance 
 
Governance structures 
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Governance Review the governance structures for Centre of Excellence in 
order to improve the effectiveness of challenge and scrutiny 
 Centre of Excellence management team to introduce more 
focused agendas and papers to improve the efficiency and focus 
of their meetings and decision-making 
Clear accountability Draft a 'budget accountability' paper covering roles and 
responsibilities e.g. monitoring performance, corrective action to 
keep within budget, financial reporting, provision of information 
on potential or anticipated problems, and preparation of detailed 
budgets 
 Review job descriptions to ensure aligned with draft paper 
 Identify accountable managers and match to the 'chart of 
accounts' listing 
 Circulate for comment the draft paper and proposed 
accountabilities 
 Finalise paper and accountabilities, and amend job descriptions if 
necessary 
 
 Implement new rules, procedures and authorisation levels that 
need to be understood and followed in order to sharpen 
accountability 
 
Efficiency improvements 
 
Organisation of 
Centre of 
Excellence within 
Economic Crime 
Directorate and City 
of London Police 
Consider options for achieving a step change to implementing the 
three year growth and development plan: 
 simplification of organisational structure 
 development of profit /loss business model sitting outside of 
shared services 
 Workforce modernisation and realising the benefits of new 
technology. 
 Continually reassess the productivity of teams where appropriate 
to determine the number of posts required in the structure and 
any transfers between teams 
 Design and implement new detailed structure 
 Review the impact of new structure every 6 months; refine as 
necessary 
Process 
improvement 
Identify and map key processes to drive efficiencies 
 Implement process improvements, including staff training 
 Review the impact of process changes every 6 months; adjust as 
necessary 
Skills gaps Develop business case to invest in strengthening skills if gaps exist 
Driving Conduct procurement spend analysis to provide management 
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procurement 
efficiencies 
information on how much is spent with whom and on what goods 
and services; transaction costs; procurement routes/frameworks; 
likely future demand for products and services 
 Based on analysis of procurement spend, identify and agree 'quick 
win' initiatives to drive procurement efficiencies 
 Set up projects to deliver 'quick win' initiatives with clear scope, 
objectives and targets 
 Implement projects and monitor progress 
 Review the impact of 'quick win' initiatives after 3 months; adjust 
as necessary 
Tighter control over 
discretionary spend 
Increase the scrutiny and challenge of expenditure including 
expenses 
Targeting Set annual targets for achieving net cashable annual efficiency 
savings 
 
Successful joint working 
 
Stakeholder 
management 
Develop a stakeholder management plan for Centre of 
Excellence to identify: 
 The existing relationship and offering for existing partners 
 Relationships that need to be built / strengthened to extend 
Centre of Excellence reach 
 Relationship managers for all partners. 
 
 Six monthly review of the situation 
 
 
Extending the remit of the Centre of Excellence 
 
Business 
development 
Develop a longer-term draft business development strategy to 
expand the Centre of Excellence into new markets with 
sustainable solutions for Centre of Excellence services and 
products and maximise income generation opportunities 
 Discuss draft strategy with senior management and industry 
partners  
 Formulate a detailed 3-5 year business plan to deliver an 
extended remit 
Quick wins Develop accredited training packages and work with industry to 
build investigative capacity across the public and private sectors 
to facilitate a shift to a "self-policing model" 
 Develop closer strategic and operational partnerships with big 
business and small and medium enterprises 
 Develop the quality of intelligence in the Know Fraud system 
and the subsequent prevention & disruption opportunities by 
increasing its data providers across a broader spectrum of 
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sectors 
Capacity building  Develop a secondment recruitment strategy / plan to attract 
resources in order to meet additional capacity requirements, 
and to share and build knowledge and experience within Centre 
of Excellence and the secondee organisations 
 
 
 
The Centre of Excellence management team will produce allocate actions once the 
business case is approved which identifies for each of the actions in the Table 
above: 
 Where applicable, the projected amount of the benefit to City of London 
Police, e.g. the net cashable annual efficiency saving, additional income or an 
improvement in productivity 
 The timescales and SMART objectives for implementation 
 Responsibilities for delivering the actions 
 Other factors to consider e.g. risk, requirement for any initial funding to 
deliver the improvement, mechanism to monitor the actual benefits realised 
and any consequential impact on other areas of City of London Police and 
Economic Crime Directorate. 
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6. Commercial Case 
 
6.1 Risk Register 
 
The Commercial Case sets out and identifies the key risks. Set out in the Table 
below is the analysis of risks and their mitigation in order to identify key residual 
risks. These risks and mitigation measures will be continually reviewed as part of 
the performance management regime of Centre of Excellence. 
Ref Risk Odds Impact 
Level 
of risk 
Mitigation 
Residual 
risk rating 
Policy risks 
1 
With the 20% reduction in 
budget over 3 years the Police 
Committee and City of London 
may be reluctant to invest in 
new growth and business. 
M H H 
Take the Business Case to Police 
Committee, City of London and 
key Industry partners to secure 
support and funding for growth. 
H 
2 
The public sector budget cuts 
may impact on the interfaces 
and working relationships of 
those undertaking fraud 
related activity. 
M M M 
Discussions with relevant policy 
lead on current plans - using the 
business case to influence as 
appropriate. 
M 
Operational and capacity risks 
3 
Risk that Centre of Excellence 
does not reach its potential in 
terms of the business and 
income generation 
M M M 
Put in place a time limited plan 
to expand and enhance the 
business offerings with 
consideration of diversifying 
into additional untapped 
sectors. 
M 
4 
Secondments from the private 
sector and other agencies do 
not happen as expected, 
increasing costs and reducing 
capacity and expertise 
M L M 
Liaise with relevant 
organisations to demonstrate 
the benefits of secondments 
and fully understand when 
resources may be available. 
M 
5 
Police service and the Centre 
of Excellence are bound by 
specific targets and metrics, 
which are not necessarily 
M M M 
Develop robust and relevant 
reporting and benefits 
realisation frameworks to 
demonstrate the value of the 
L 
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applicable to this business case 
and could hinder the 
realization of its benefits. 
services. 
6 
Demand on fraud resources is 
expected to increase. 
Resources may become 
stretched as demand 
increases. 
M L M 
Collect and collate robust 
figures to ensure impact and 
reach are demonstrable. 
M 
7 
As activity undertaken 
increases more issues are likely 
to be identified (fraud and 
other crime). Resources may 
not be sufficient to deal with 
all of the issues. 
 
L M M 
Robust information will 
highlight any additional effort 
and resulting resourcing 
requirements. 
M 
8 
A reliance on temporary staff 
and a shortage of relevant 
skills, particularly in Fraud 
Training Faculty, limits 
potential and jeopardizes 
service delivery and City of 
London Police brand. 
L M M 
Continue to develop and run 
appropriate training courses 
and attract talent through 
effective marketing. 
M 
Reputational risks 
9 
Centre of Excellence is 
perceived as a London focused 
rather than a national / 
international brand. 
M M M 
Focus on roles such as training 
and capacity building for other 
markets and industry sectors 
and communicate the national / 
international capability. 
M 
10 
City of London police brand 
was used to get Centre of 
Excellence up and running, if 
demand is increased 
expectations may not be met, 
which may damage the brand. 
L M L 
Ensure service standards are 
maintained and communicate 
performance. 
L 
Financial risks 
13  
Implications of getting less 
money for one or more of the 
Centre functions. This may 
impact on the rest of Centre of 
Excellence and the business as 
a whole. 
M H M 
Identify alternative plans to for 
the Centre of Excellence based 
on reduced or limited funding. 
M 
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14  
Police Committee and City of 
London may decide not to 
support and finance the 
Business Case. 
L M M 
Continue close dialogue with 
the Police Committee and City 
of London and highlight wider 
benefits of providing this 
funding. 
M 
15 
Increased costs if Industry 
partners do not second staff or 
fund staff positions with the 
Centre of Excellence. 
L M M 
Liaise with Industry partners 
regularly on secondment and 
funding arrangements, 
highlighting benefits of current 
arrangements. 
M 
16 
Failing to build on existing 
relationships due to poor 
relationship management  
M H H 
Develop stakeholder 
management plan to support 
Centre of Excellence 
enhancements  
H 
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7. Appendices 
 
APPENDIX A 
Overseas business opportunities (City Solicitors) 
 
S.26 of the Police Act 1996 states that: 
  
1) Subject to the provisions of this section a police authority may provide advice 
and assistance - 
  
a) To an international organisation or institution, or  
b) To any other person or body which is engaged outside the United Kingdom in 
the carrying on of activities similar to any carried on by the authority or the chief 
officer of police for its area. 
  
2) The power conferred on a police authority by sub section (1)  includes a power 
to make arrangements under which a member of the police force maintained by 
the authority is engaged for a period of temporary service with a person or body 
within paragraph (a) or (b) of that sub section. 
  
3) The power conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised except with the 
consent of the Secretary of State or in accordance with a general authorisation 
given by him. 
  
4) A consent or authorisation given under subsection (3) may be given subject to 
such conditions as appear to the Secretary of State to be appropriate. 
  
 
The important point is the need to have the consent or authorisation of the 
Secretary of State.   
  
 
Further it should be noted that whilst the police authority can make charges for 
the advice/assistance, it cannot make grants/loans, give guarantees/indemnities 
or invest by acquiring share or loan capital. 
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APPENDIX B 
Summary of Legal Advice (City Solicitors) 
 
Section 18 Police Act 1996 provides the Common Council acting as police authority 
with the power to enter into agreements with a third party for the provision of 
goods and services in return for payment.  
While this power is given to the police authority, section 107 Local Government Act 
1972 provides that the Commissioner may discharge functions of the police 
authority which are delegated to him. ACPO produce guidance on charging for 
police services which is very helpful on costing methodology.  
 
The City of London Police would not need to set up a separate business in order to 
charge for services on an income generation basis. 
 
 Section 95 Local Government Act 2003 (power to trade in function-related 
activities through a company) specifically excludes police authorities (including the 
Common Council acting as a police authority) from the authorities able to exercise 
the power. 
 
This excludes the City of London police from being able to establish a trading 
company.  
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 APPENDIX C - I 
Organisational Structure – Commercial Partnership Option 
Colour Coding: 
 Red denotes Staff recruited in year one of operation 
 Orange denotes staff recruited in Year two of operation 
 Green denotes a total of 16 staff that are recruited progressively 
over the three years 
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APPENDIX C - II 
Organisational Structure – Direct Employment Option 
Colour Coding: 
 Red denotes Staff recruited in year one of operation 
 Orange denotes staff recruited in Year two of operation 
 Green denotes a total of 16 staff that are recruited progressively 
over the three years 
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APPENDIX D 
What is a Royal or Chartered Institute? 
A Chartered Body is an incorporated body which has applied for a Royal Charter 
via the Privy Council. Charters are normally granted to institutions or bodies2 “that 
work in the public interest (such as professional institutions and charities) and 
which can demonstrate pre-eminence, stability and permanence in their particular 
field”.  
The City of London Police / Centre of Excellence would be expected to make a 
petition to the Sovereign through the Privy Council. The broad criteria for any 
application are: 
(a) The institution concerned should comprise members of a unique profession, 
and should have as members most of the eligible field for membership, without 
significant overlap with other bodies. 
(b) Corporate members of the institution should be qualified to at least first 
degree level in a relevant discipline3 
(c) The institution should be financially sound and able to demonstrate a track 
record of achievement over a number of years 
(d) Incorporation by Charter is a form of Government regulation as future 
amendments to the Charter and by-laws of the body require Privy Council (i.e. 
Government) approval. There therefore needs to be a convincing case that it 
would be in the public interest to regulate the body in this way. 
(e) The institution is normally expected to be of substantial size (5,000 members or 
more).  
A Chartered Institution for Fraud Professionals would effectively turn the 
members of the Counter Fraud Community in the UK (or even internationally) into 
a single legal entity.  
The body would have all the rights and powers of any individual, including the 
right to litigate and be litigated against. In present times Royal Charters are usually 
only awarded to bodies which have pre-eminence in their field and a significant 
record of achievement.  
                                                          
 
2 www.privy-council.org.uk 
3 This does not require all members to be qualified to degree standard. It refers only to corporate members where the 
expectation is that 75% of those corporate members would have a degree qualification. Not having a Degree qualification is 
not a barrier to becoming a member of the professional institution. 
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The body would be viewed as being the expert repository for all things connected 
to its business and would have a regulatory role in the delivery of its business. 
 A Chartered Body affords status to all its members at various levels and effectively 
awards them a qualification to practice in their field, which is internationally 
recognised. 
 The City of London Police / Centre of Excellence would be the first police service / 
Counter Fraud community in the world to become a Chartered profession. 
It is important to note that a Royal Charter affords to the Government a degree of 
control of the internal business of the Chartered body. 
In real terms this means that there will be a degree of Government regulation of 
the body and it will be the role of the Privy Council to ensure that “Regulation 
accords with Public Policy”4. Any amendments to a Charter will only be made via 
application to the Privy Council. 
 
 
                                                          
 
4 www.privy-council.org 
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2 For the latest course dates and availability please visit http://bit.ly/fraudtrainingacademy
The Economic Crime & Fraud Training Academy has been established to
provide a centre of excellence for training in the prevention, detection and
investigation of fraud and economic crime. 
You will see, by the variety of programmes offered in this brochure, that we
have worked hard to design a curriculum that meets the need of the modern
day investigator seeking to acquire the vital skills needed in an ever changing
and fast moving world; a world where fraudsters have become increasingly
advanced in their methods to exploit a more sophisticated environment. We
know that we can only hope to reduce the threat posed by such criminality 
by ensuring that our investigators are trained to the highest standards. 
By sharing our knowledge and know how we aim to make the UK and the
international markets in which we operate a safer place and a more difficult
territory for fraudsters to function.
But why choose the City of London Police to deliver your training?
We are proud to be responsible for policing one of the top financial service centres in the world. Our status as
the national lead force for fraud investigation is a result of over 170 years of protecting the confidence and
integrity of the City of London – part of a dynamic and prestigious capital.
Our Economic Crime Directorate, which houses the National Lead Force, National Fraud Intelligence Bureau
and the Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit, has quickly established itself with a world-class reputation for possessing
the necessary skills and expertise to investigate, detect and prevent serious and complex economic crime and
fraud. We have forged ground-breaking partnerships with those in industry to widen our resources to fight fraud
on a wider scale and to deepen our specialist knowledge; we encourage closer working with our partner
agencies and those responsible, in both the public and private sector, for preventing and detecting fraud. 
We can provide comfortable and state-of-the-art training rooms across London and the UK which are easily
accessible through the many rail and public transport networks. Additionally, we have the capability and
flexibility to visit a venue of your choosing to ensure that your training is as trouble free as possible. 
Our knowledgeable and enthusiastic training team are on hand to discuss, in greater depth, the courses that
we offer or the possibility of delivering bespoke training specifically designed to meet your own particular
needs. 
We look forward to welcoming you to the Economic Crime & Fraud Training Academy in the future. 
Adrian Leppard
Commissioner
ªMessage from Adrian Leppard –
Commissioner of the City of London Police
For the latest course dates and availability please visit http://bit.ly/fraudtrainingacademy 3
ª
Welcome to our 2012-13 Fraud, Bribery & Corruption and Financial
Crime Prospectus where you will find one of the most extensive
programmes in the country designed to broaden and develop your 
skills and knowledge.
The City of London Police, the national lead force for fraud investigation, 
is recognised world-wide for providing the highest quality of training,
delivered by highly skilled professional trainers hand-picked from the very
best available from within the force and our partner agencies. These
trainers have considerable knowledge in developing and delivering
bespoke programmes which have been delivered all over the world.
The force’s Economic Crime & Fraud Training Academy has been
developed in response to the global threat from fraud, corruption and
cyber-crime. Through these carefully designed training courses, we’ll be
disseminating to you national and international practices in investigation,
disruption and prevention and incorporating new methods and ways 
of working.
The personal service – we’re here for you
We recognise that quality training should deliver organisational and
operational improvements that are tangible and measurable. We want 
to help you realise these improvements – which is why we offer a
comprehensive pre and post course customer support service. We can help
you identify training needs, develop a bespoke course or programme and
offer a range of post course services from mentoring to work-based
assessment and analysis of benefits.
Contained within this prospectus are the tools which will help you to
combat the threat from fraud, corruption and cyber-crime. If you can’t see
exactly what you are looking for, then please talk to me or one of my
training development team. We may be able to help you develop or tailor
a course which best suits your needs.
We look forward to welcoming you to our City of London based training
venue or one of our remote sites provided by our partners in the UK and
internationally. Alternatively, if you have a suitable training venue of your 
own and would like us to come to you, then please let us know.
A warm welcome to the Economic 
Crime & Fraud Training Academy
Detective Superintendent
Robert Wishart 
Director of Business and Relationship
Management
Detective Inspector 
Steve Strickland
Head of Training & Educational Services 
4 For the latest course dates and availability please visit http://bit.ly/fraudtrainingacademy
ªEconomic Crime & Fraud Training Academy
Course delivery dates
The Prospectus and an electronic version of the booking form can found online at:
http://bit.ly/fraudtrainingacademy
Please note that not all course dates are advertised as many organisations pre-register an interest for a
particular course and so they can be fully booked before they have been timetabled. Please contact our
training team for further information, or to register an interest in a particular course.
A flexible approach to training delivery
With a national network of high quality training venue, all of our courses can be delivered at a time
and location to suit the demands of your business. If you have a suitable training venue of your own,
we will be happy to bring the training to you.
Tailored Training Solutions
All of our courses have been developed for delivery to counter fraud professionals across the public and
private sectors in the UK and overseas. If you do not see what you are looking for in the Prospectus then
please contact Academy@cityoflondon.police.uk 
The Prospectus only contains our ‘core’ programmes which represent a small selection of our current
offering. The majority of our portfolio is dedicated to the design and delivery of bespoke training
solutions which are tailored to particular clients so if you have a unique area of business or would like a
particular course tailoring for your needs then please speak to the training team. 
Course Costs
The costs in this prospectus are for individual bookings on core programmes delivered at a City of
London venue. Discounts are available for multiple and block bookings. Further discounts are available
for block/corporate bookings delivered at the clients venue. To discuss eligible discounts please speak
to training team.
Foundation Clients
If your looking for a fully managed, ongoing training solution for your organisation or business sector
we can provide a full end-to-end service including comprehensive Skills & Training Needs Analysis,
modular/progressive programme design, flexible delivery options, work place assessment and
accreditation. To discuss the options available as a Foundation Client please speak to our training
team.
For the latest course dates and availability please visit http://bit.ly/fraudtrainingacademy 5
ª International Options
We welcome course bookings from overseas delegates on any of our core programmes delivered in the
UK. For block/corporate bookings from international clients we can tailor any of our programmes to comply
with the relevant legislation and procedures of the home country. Programmes tailored for international
clients can be delivered at one of our locations in the UK or we can send our team to you.
If you would like to discuss the options for international programmes please contact the Director of
Relationship and Business Development, D.Supt Robert Wishart at robert.wishart@cityoflondon.police.uk
Accreditation
In 2008 the Centre for Fraud and Financial Crime at Teesside University was
officially opened by the former head of City of London Police’s Economic Crime
Directorate; since 2008 the University has been working with the City of London
Police on the development and accreditation of national fraud programmes. Since
2009 the National Fraud Investigation Course (formerly the National Fraud Foundation Course) has been
mapped against the Teesside University Certificate in Postgraduate Professional Development in Fraud
Management.
Further to that positive, successful and ongoing relationship, and as a testament to the quality of the course
provision within City of London Police, Teesside University is pleased to be able to afford all participants, on
all City of London Police courses, at all levels, the opportunity to have those courses formally accredited by
the University and given an appropriate and universally accepted academic credit value. 
This fully transferable value can then either form part of the University’s work-based studies programme,
which enables progression at all levels of undergraduate and postgraduate award, or be used towards
obtaining other higher education institutions’ awards. In this way, participants on City of London Police
courses will benefit not only from excellent course content and delivery but also achieve appropriate
academic credit for undertaking those courses.
Contact Details
The training team – telephone: +44 (0) 20 7601 6978 email: academy@cityoflondon.police.uk
,]Zr\hnkl^ <h]^B??=
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ª
Identity Fraud and False
Documentation
Target Audience
Counter fraud professionals, desk top investigators and first line document verification and loss 
prevention staff.
Course Aim
To provide staff and investigators with the skills and knowledge necessary to identify fraudulent
documents and identities.
Overview
This course aims to develop the skills necessary to check and verify a range of identity documents from
around the world and to identify signs of forgeries and altered documents to protect organisations and
the UK from the threat from those using and supplying false identity documents. This course will also
assist organisations in developing strategies and practices to counter the threat from identity fraud.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Identify offences concerned with production and use of false documents
5 Identify the threat from identity fraud
5 Understand and profile individuals who commit identity fraud
5 Understand the impact of identity fraud on the UK
5 Identify when documents have been altered
5 Recognise the security features of numerous national documents
5 Produce 5 part statements to an evidential standard
Cost
£900
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
+]Zr\hnkl^<h]^FHKL
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ª
Identifying Organisational Risk and
Implementing Counter Fraud Measures
Target Audience
Senior analysts, counter fraud professionals, loss prevention and security and risk managers.
Course Aim
To provide senior members of staff with a strategic insight into establishing and evaluating effective
counter fraud measures.
Overview
This course is designed to educate senior managers and leaders in the development and implementation
of effective counter fraud strategies and procedures. Case studies will be used to scrutinise fraud
indicators and red flags, reporting procedures and safeguards—identifying where things have gone
wrong and what could have been done to prevent the harm and loss.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Recognise the financial and reputational organisational risks
5 Balance risk against reputational and operational harm
5 Evaluate strategies for effectiveness in tackling risk and security
5 Develop strategies to tackle risk and harm that are compatible with their organisations
business objectives
5 Assess and analyse situations where strategies have failed and organisations have 
been exposed
Cost
£600
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
+]Zr\hnkl^<h]^BBM
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Identifying the Insider Threat
ªTarget Audience
Managers within the counter fraud, compliance, audit and security industry responsible for developing and
implementing strategies and policies to protect organisations from the insider threat.
Course Aim
To provide individuals with a strategic insight into the insider threat in order to develop effective counter
measures.
Overview
This course is designed to educate delegates in the threat from insiders, understanding how good staff can turn
bad and the tactics used by criminal groups to recruit or place insiders within organisations. Once the threat is
understood, assess existing policies and procedures, identify risks and weaknesses and develop more robust
but manageable policies and procedures.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Understand the insider threat
5 Profile the risk of the insider within their organisation
5 Identify effective measures to counter the insider threat
5 Evaluate and amend existing polices and practices for effective counter measures
5 Develop organisational strategies to counter the Insider threat
Cost
£600
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
+]Zr\hnkl^<h]^?:I
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ª
Fraud Awareness & Prevention
Target Audience
Counter fraud professionals, desk top investigators and first line loss prevention staff.
Course Aim
To provide staff and investigators with the skills and knowledge necessary to implement tactics to reduce
and prevent the threat from fraud.
Overview
This course is designed to educate delegates in basic fraud awareness and prevention in order to
protect their organisation and its employees from the threat of fraud. This course will look at the
development of organisational policies and practices aimed at identifying and preventing fraud,
minimising the financial and reputation harm.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Understand the fraud landscape
5 Define the profile of a fraudster
5 Identify the insider threat
5 Identify fraud triggers or red flags
5 Recognise tell tale signs of suspicious activity
5 Apply appropriate ‘know your customer’ (KYC) procedures
5 Test and measure effectiveness of existing fraud prevention practices
Cost
£600
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
.]Zr\hnkl^<h]^BEI
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ª
Initial Law & Procedure Course
Target Audience
Individuals who are new to role or intending to move into a field of counter fraud work with no previous
legal or investigative experience who require a sound grounding in core legislation and legal practices.
Course Aim
To provide those new to the counter fraud work with a sound foundation in the principles of UK Law and
to enable them to work within established practices and procedures applicable to both public and
private sector investigations.
Overview
This is an intensive 5 day crammer taking in many areas of criminal and civil law, codes of practice and
established procedures relevant to those charged with conducting investigations. Learners will develop
an understanding of UK law, overarching legislation and specific Acts and powers applicable to law
enforcement and corporate investigators across the counter fraud community.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegates will be able to:
• Describe the basis of the UK legal system
• Identify primary sources of legislation applicable to public and private sector investigators
• Outline key offences applicable to economic crime and fraud.
• Interpret and comply with relevant codes of practice
• Identify the various methods available to get a suspect to court
• Manage material within an investigation
Cost 
£1500
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
.]Zr\hnkl^<h]^:EI
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ª Target Audience
Individuals who have been working within counter fraud but have a limited knowledge of legislation and
investigative practices and require a more comprehensive and in-depth understanding of core legislation
and legal practices.
Course Aim
To provide those working within the counter fraud community with an in-depth understanding of UK Law
applicable to economic crime and fraud investigations and to enable them to apply best practice and
procedures applicable to both public and private sector investigations.
Overview
This is an intensive 5 day crammer building on the Initial law & Procedure Course providing a more in-
depth study of criminal and civil law, codes of practice and established procedures relevant to economic
crime and fraud investigations. Learners will develop a deeper understanding of UK law, overarching
legislation and specific Acts including Police and Criminal Evidence Act, Human Rights Act, Criminal
Procedure and Investigations Act, Data Protection Act, Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, Proceeds
of Crime Act, Theft Act and Fraud Act.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegates will be able to:
• Apply the relevant legislation and practice to live investigations
• Identify and set parameter for investigative practices in line with legislation and codes of
practice
• Implement processes and practices to comply with best practice and published guidance.
• Identify complex offences applicable to economic crime and fraud.
• Evaluate options for civil or criminal remedies
• Apply appropriate procedures to manage case files and material in anticipation of 
court proceedings
Cost 
£1500
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
Advanced Law & Procedure Course
,]Zr\hnkl^<h]^OI?
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ªTarget Audience
Police officers (all ranks) and other law enforcement and dedicated fraud professionals with investigative
experience who are moving into the investigation of volume and priority Fraud.
Course Aim
This course enhances the skill set of the experienced investigator providing them with an understanding of
fraud and fraud investigative practices applicable to volume and priority fraud investigations.
Overview
This course focuses on the development of the fraud investigators mindset with a focus on high volume/low
value fraud work loads. Learners will develop the skills to identify appropriate intervention options and 
co-ordinate investigations. Learners will complete a simulated investigation and apply the knowledge they
have learnt.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Describe the nature of fraud and the fraudster
5 Identify relevant legislation in relation to fraud investigations
5 Identify specialist agencies to support fraud investigations
5 Maximise existing skills within fraud investigations
5 Manage volume and priority fraud investigations
5 Apply best practice in the recovery of material
Cost
£900
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
Volume & Priority Fraud
Investigation
-]Zr\hnkl^ <h]^=BMB
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ª Target audience.
Public and private sector investigators, compliance officers, auditors, personnel and call centre staff
responsible for receiving complaints, claims or reports resulting in desktop investigation and telephone
interviews.
Course Aim
To provide learners with the knowledge and skills necessary to instigate and conduct desktop investigations
and telephone interviews as a result of complaints, claims and reports received from external sources.
Overview
The course develops the knowledge and skills necessary to conduct evidential/GAP analysis of
documentary material within the context of desktop investigations. The learners will then plan, prepare and
undertake the interviews or testimony analysis by methods other than face to face meetings.
Course objectives
After attending the course delegates will be able to:
5 Conduct Evidential/Gap Analysis
5 Develop remote/desktop investigation plan
5 Manage material in remote/desktop investigations
5 Understand the limitations of remote analysis and interviewing
5 Apply a structured approach to questioning and challenging during remote interview situations
5 Apply active listening skills in telephone and other remote interview situations
5 Apply conversation management techniques to gain full disclosure
5 Create a personal method of note taking which is future proof
5 Better Identify anomalies in both written and verbal discourse
Cost
£1200
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
Desktop Investigator and
Telephone Interviewer
.]Zr\hnkl^<h]^B?B
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ªTarget Audience
Police Constables & Police Staff Investigators and other law enforcement and dedicated counter fraud
professionals new to their role.
Course Aim
To provide staff with responsibility for fraud prevention and investigation with the skills and knowledge
necessary to support investigation teams, conduct enquiries and manage initial investigations.
Overview
The course provides participants with a primary skill set to investigate fraud. It includes planning the
investigation, using intelligence effectively, gathering evidence, writing statements and working with the
police. This five day classroom based course involves a mixture of lectures, practical exercises and
group work.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Understand the relevant legislation in relation to fraud investigations
5 Demonstrate an intelligence led approach to investigative practices
5 Complete evidential statements (5 part structure)
5 Understand and identify threats from fraud and fraudsters
5 Prepare investigation plans and manage initial fraud investigations
5 Prepare evidential packages suitable for civil or criminal proceedings
Cost
£1500
Discounts are available for police 
and law enforcement
Initial Fraud Investigation
“The course has supplied
me with a level of
knowledge and confidence
needed to seek
development opportunities
in the near future. It has
truly taught me to think
more laterally about the
tasks that I am involved
in”  
Case Support Officer
*.]Zr\hnkl^!,q*p^^dfh]ne^l"<h]^G?B
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National Foundation Fraud
Investigation Course
ª Target Audience
Experienced investigators from the police (all ranks) and other law enforcement and dedicated counter fraud
professionals. Delegates should have a sound understanding of core legislation relating to fraud and
economic crime investigations prior to attending this course.
Course Aim
To enhance the skills, knowledge and investigative mindset of investigators responsible for conducting
serious and complex fraud investigations. 
Overview
This is an accredited programme leading to the designation ‘Accredited National Fraud Investigator’. It is an
intensive course and replaces the old National Fraud Foundation Course. The course consists of three
modules: Instigating an investigation, Managing and directing an investigation and maximising tactical and
strategic options. The course is very interactive with a heavy focus on the use of real life and topical case
studies, operational learning and debate from professional discussion panels. 
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Apply rigorous and transparent case acceptance criteria
5 Maximise intelligence development opportunities
5 Prioritise prevention and disruption opportunities
5 Develop investigation plans and hypothesis
5 Conduct ethical fraud investigations
5 Manage and prioritise case loads
5 Engage and co-ordinate multi-agency/jurisdictional fraud investigations
5 Evaluate and maximise intervention opportunities
5 Manage major fraud investigations
5 Extract and disseminate operational and organisational
learning
Cost
£4500
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
“This course was
excellent…the
content was
informative and
relevant and the
trainers were a credit
to the City of London
Police” 
North Yorkshire Police
.]Zr\hnkl^<h]^?FE
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ªTarget Audience
Team leaders and middle management from the police, law enforcement and dedicated counter fraud
organisations.
Course Aim
To provide team leaders and managers with the skills and knowledge necessary to manage and lead
fraud investigation teams.
Overview
This course focuses on the development of core management skills required to effectively manage fraud
investigation teams and develop the knowledge and skills to take initial command and direct the
investigation of major and complex fraud cases.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Apply the principles of Core Investigative Doctrine to complex fraud cases
5 Maximise ‘golden hour’ opportunities and fast track actions
5 Develop policy for fraud prevention, disruption and enforcement
5 Create policy files and record strategic decisions
5 Develop investigative strategy
5 Review and manage performance against investigative strategy
5 Conduct operational debriefs and identify organisational learning
Cost
£1500
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement “The exercise, to
plan a new Boiler
Room case was a
high point…I learnt
a lot about seeing
the investigation as
a whole”
Manager, SFO 
Initial Management 
of Fraud Investigations
.]Zr\hnkl^<h]^FL<
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Advanced Management 
of Fraud Investigations
ª Target Audience
Senior management and directors from the police, law enforcement and dedicated counter fraud
organisations who fulfil the role of Senior Investigating Officer.
Course Aim
To provide Senior Investigating Officers with the skills and knowledge necessary to set priorities and
strategic policy for investigations, teams and departments.
Overview
This course focuses on the development of the Senior Investigating Officer mindset with a focus on major
and complex fraud. Learners are required to undertake and manage one or more serious and complex fraud
investigations (simulated). Their ability to manage the initial response, implement fast track actions, develop
investigation strategy and complete accurate policy logs will be tested.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Describe the role of the Senior Investigating Officer in serious & complex fraud cases
5 Explain the decision making process when selecting a methodology for the Investigation
5 List the considerations when designing a communication strategy for an investigation 
5 Define the benefits of working with other agencies and advisory groups when managing
investigations
5 Apply a logical approach to the investigative process
5 Outline the issues that may arise when investigating serious & complex fraud cases
5 Appreciate and manage the outcome of an investigation
Cost
£1500
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
“The course has reinforced
the need for effective
investigation planning and
the development a robust
hypotheses and strategy
regardless of the scale of
the investigation”
Senior Manager, MHRA 
,]Zr<hnkl^ <h]^L?<K
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ªTarget Audience
Senior police investigators and investigating officers , other senior law enforcement personnel , and
senior counter fraud professionals who are involved in managing or directing serious & complex fraud
investigations.
Course Aim
Provide the opportunity for delegates to explore the role and responsibilities of a reviewing officer and
how to apply the principles in the review of a serious & complex fraud investigation.
Overview
This course develops key skills for investigators in how to plan and conduct a review of any type of
investigation either as a solo lead reviewer or as a review team member. It examines reviewing by
looking at major crime investigations and how to use reviews as support to a senior investigating officer
or investigating officer. The course is underpinned by the Core Investigation Doctrine and is integral to
the new Fraud Investigation Model.
Objectives
At the end of the course the delegates will be able to:
• Outline the role and responsibilities of a review officer.
• Summarise how to perform the role of a review officer and conduct a review.
• Give examples of the different types of review.
• Identify the investigative skills required to conduct a review.
• List the key members required to establish a review team.
• Describe how to construct a review report and structure recommendations.
• Demonstrate practical application of conducting reviews.
Cost
£900
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
Fraud Case Reviews
*]Zr\hnkl^<h]^BI<
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ª
An Investigators, Prosecutors and Compliance 
Officers guide to the Bribery Act 2010
Target Audience
Police officers (all ranks), other law enforcement officers, dedicated counter fraud professionals,
compliance officer and public/private sector prosecutors.
Course Aim
To provide investigators, compliance officers and prosecutors with a sound understanding and
interpretation of the Bribery Act 2010.
Overview
This course aims to instruct investigators, compliance officers and prosecutors in the new Bribery Act
2010 and the various elements of the offences. It will advise delegates of the relevant Criminal Justice
System (CJS) Policies with regard to Bribery offences and linked issues (such as self-referral) and
adequate procedures.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Provide consistency of decision-making by identifying various parameters for prosecution
5 Implement a co-ordinated approach to CJS Bribery prosecutions by permitting investigators
and prosecutors to appreciate the relevant factors and issues that inform their decision-
making
5 Demonstrate a sound understanding of the Bribery Act 2010 and the various sections,
guidance and policy
5 To act as a local expert in the Bribery Act 2010 and advise colleagues as a source of
excellence
Cost
£300
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
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Investigating Bribery & Corruption
ªTarget Audience
Police officers (all ranks) and other law enforcement and those dedicated to the prevention and investigation
of bribery and corruption.
Course Aim
To provide investigators with the skills and knowledge necessary to conduct investigations in to allegations
of bribery and corruption.
Overview
Learners will discuss the impact of corruption on society and why cases of bribery and corruption should be
investigated. Delegates will develop a sound understanding of the legislation relating to corruption including
the Bribery Act 2010.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Describe the impact of bribery and corruption on society
5 Identify relevant legislation in relation to bribery and corruption
5 Identify how intelligence is obtained and developed in corruption cases
5 Apply Core Doctrine to the investigation of bribery and corruption
5 Develop investigative strategies for corruption cases
5 Develop strategies and apply best practice in the recovery of material
Cost
£900
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
-]Zr\hnkl^<h]^<I<
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ª
Cheque & Plastic Card Crime
Investigation
Target Audience
Police officers (all ranks) and other law enforcement investigators and dedicated counter fraud
professionals.
Course Aim
To provide investigators with the skills and knowledge necessary to investigate payment crime and
provide evidence as an expert witness.
Overview
This course provides investigators with specialist skills and knowledge in respect of payment card crime
as well as other forms of payment crime. The course also accredits successful candidates as expert
payment card examiners, enabling them to give evidential statements for Court purposes.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Understanding how the payment card system works
5 Identify how criminals clone and compromise payment cards
5 Identify Pin Entry Devices – compromises
5 Understand the role of the Dedicated Cheque and Plastic Card Unit (DCPCU)
5 Understand how computer networks are used in payment crime and data compromise
5 To identify cases of counterfeit currency and the role of the Bank of England
Cost
£1200
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
.]Zr\hnkl^<h]^?BLB
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Fraud Interview Skills—Initial
ªTarget Audience
Police officers (all ranks) and other law enforcement and dedicated counter fraud professionals.
Course Aim
To develop understanding and skills in the principles of investigation and interviewing at Professional
Investigator Level 2.
Overview
The methodology employed allows the development of a systematic approach to both investigation and
interviewing which is suitable for all investigative enquiries, be they internal intervention, leniency or PACE
compliant in nature. The scenario based approach adopted exposes participants to not only what and how
but why questions are fundamental to evidence in a persuasive case.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Understand the concept of an active prosecution stance
5 Develop systems to effectively collect and analysis information to inform an enquiry
5 Develop conversational skills in an interview situation
5 Plan, prepare and undertake interviews in a variety of situations
5 Develop analytical note taking skills
5 Produce Section 9 structured witness statements
5 Plan and deliver pre-interview disclosure as part of a tactical proactive investigative approach
5 Effectively undertake a conversation management interview through free recall, clarify and 
challenge phases
5 Evaluate performance and evidence
Cost
£1500
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
*)]Zr\hnkl^<h]^?BL:
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ª
Fraud Interview Skills—Advanced
Target Audience
Police officers (all ranks) and other law enforcement and dedicated counter fraud professionals. 
This Advanced Interview Skills is limited to a maximum of 8 delegates per course.
Course Aim
The advanced investigative interviewer’s course will assist in the development of individuals involved in
the investigation of serious and/or complex cases.
Overview
This module builds on the skill sets examined in the initial investigators course by focusing in-depth on the
elements of the conversation management approach through detailed practical application. Participants
will be encouraged to implement an holistic approach to the process, encompassing both the emotional
and physical conditions that present themselves as part of a tactical plan.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Apply psychological processes to information gathering investigations
5 Define and apply the conversation management model when applied to serious and
complex suspect and witness interviews
5 Evidence a good understanding of active prosecution and defence and adopt a tactical
approach to interview planning and disclosure
5 Understand basic psychology in relation to resistance, ego, bias and compliance
5 Understand the hierarchy of questioning and how this will effect productive and unproductive
questioning
5 Display assertive behaviour when applied to the context of investigative interviews and
professional encounters
5 Be able to deal effectively with lies, silence and no-comment interviews
Cost
£3300
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
“This course was aimed at
improving the skills and
abilities of investigators
within the group. I have
since recommended the
course to the European
Commission”
OFT, Cartels and Criminal
Enforcement Group
+]Zr\hnkl^<h]^IPI
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Professional Witness Programme
ªTarget Audience
Police officers (all ranks) and other law enforcement and dedicated counter fraud professionals.
Course Aim
To provide participants with the confidence and knowledge to plan, provenance, preserve and produce
testimony in an efficient manner and to present it effectively in court proceedings.
Overview
This course focuses on the need to effectively produce and provenance information from across the public
and private sectors in the support of civil and criminal prosecutions. The effective presentation of such
evidence in court proceedings can be critical in achieving best evidence.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Have an awareness of how a prosecution case is built
5 Understand the law and regulations in respect to witness testimony
5 Have knowledge of how to act once a request for information is received
5 Understand the importance of recording actions (Continuity)
5 Understand how to provenance information
5 Be able to plan and produce a structured written witness statement
5 Understand the legal system and court procedure
5 Understand the importance of positive verbal and non-verbal communication cues
5 Gain experience of providing oral testimony and being cross-examined
Cost
£600
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
*]Zr\hnkl^<h]^LHI>
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ª
Search-Operational Planning &
Execution for Fraud Investigations
Target Audience
Police officers (all ranks) and other law enforcement and dedicated counter fraud professionals.
Course Aim
To provide investigators with the skills and knowledge necessary to plan and conduct searches of
premises linked to fraud, corruption and financial investigations.
Overview
This course focuses on the operational planning of searches using the IIMARCHE model and the powers
and considerations applicable to searches in complex investigations.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Produce an IIMARCHE briefing
5 Develop a search strategy
5 Identify need for specialist functions and support ie Digital Forensic Examiners
5 Correctly identify, record, seize and retain exhibits
5 Understand the relevant legislations, procedures and best practice
5 Conduct an effective and efficient search
5 Evaluate and assess search outcomes
Cost
£300
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
“This was a well-
presented and
thoughtful course,
which had plenty of
useful interaction”
Financial Services
Authority
+]Zr\hnkl^<h]^BBB
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Internet Investigators 
Course—Initial
ªTarget Audience
Aimed at police officers and other law enforcement and dedicated counter fraud professionals. 
Course Aim
A prerequisite for this course is a basic familiarity with the Internet and an appreciation of cyber spaces
investigative potential. 
This course aims to teach investigators how to use the ‘Net as an effective investigative tool and escape the
trap of simple Google searching in favour of a more dynamic (and productive) search engines and cyber
tools. Delegates will develop an instant ‘value added’ capability for their business where the internet can be
used to leverage this capability effectively within the context of an investigation.
Overview
The Internet has become a ubiquitous feature of the modern world, a technology that permeates all aspects
of out lives and blurs the line between our work and business lives on an ever-increasing basis. Due to the
vast amount of personal data on the ‘Net’ the World Wide Web has become a treasure trove of
information that can enhance any fraud, counter terrorism, criminal or intelligence led investigation, as long
as the correct approach is adopted by the investigator. 
This course will unravel the technical jargon and provide investigators with an understanding of the
technology and tools available to maximise results from internet based intelligence.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
• Understand the jargon associated with the Internet 
• Effectively use the internet as an investigative research tool
• Maximise the opportunities for harvesting intelligence from social networks and media sites 
• Conduct anonymous web browsing 
• Better utilise search engines, meta browsers, deep web and people search tools
• Design a cyber investigative strategy 
• Cyber space tools and techniques 
Cost
£650
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
“A very relaxed
and first class
course that was
pitched at just the
right level”
Aviva
*]Zr\hnkl^<h]^BB:
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ª
Internet Investigators Course—
Advanced
Target Audience
Police officers (all ranks) and other law enforcement and dedicated counter fraud professionals 
Course Aim
A prerequisite to this course is the completion of the Initial Internet Investigators Course or similar and
have a good grounding in the use of open source intelligence using the Internet and want to develop
their skills in order to take on more ambitious Internet based cases.
Overview
The course is aimed at intelligence and investigation professionals looking at bridging the gap between
covert passive surveillance on the Internet to more active investigations that involve closer interaction with
individuals and subjects on the Internet. 
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
• Understand the principle of cyber-HUMINT (human intelligence Source)
• Risk assess and manage cyber–HUMINT operations 
• Understand how intelligence operations are conducted online 
• Differentiate between different mediums in cyber space and how to approach and interact
with them
• Develop a safe and legal intelligence led approach to cyber operations
Cost
£325
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
,]Zr\hnkl^<h]^NM><
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Understanding Technology 
Enabled Crime
ªTarget Audience
Police officers (all ranks) and other law enforcement and dedicated counter fraud professionals.
Course Aim
To provides investigators with an in-depth understanding of how criminals exploit technology in the 
furtherance of crime.
Overview
This course focuses the range of technological tools and techniques open to them; the tools and techniques
available to investigators to detect, intervene, disrupt, prevent and deter crime; and the collection and
preservation of evidence from technology based systems to assist in criminal and civil court cases.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Indicate the criminal groups, organised and otherwise, likely to exploit technology
5 Identify the law enforcement and other groups/agencies that exist to counter technology 
enabled crime
5 Understand the methods that need to be applied during the investigation of technology enabled
crime
5 Define the types of intelligence and evidence that can be collected during investigations of
technology enabled crime
5 Understand techniques used to assist surveillance, counter-surveillance, intervention disruption,
prevention and deterrence
5 Identify developments in technology and likely scenarios of the crime it may enable
5 Understand relevant legal and regulatory issues
Cost
£900
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
*]Zr\hnkl^<h]^F<?F
For the latest course dates and availability please visit http://bit.ly/fraudtrainingacademy 29
ª
Material and Case File Management 
for Fraud Investigations
Target Audience
Police officers (all ranks) and other law enforcement and dedicated counter fraud professionals.
Course Aim
To provide fraud investigators and intelligence operatives with the skills and knowledge necessary to
effectively record, retain and reveal relevant material obtained during, or in anticipation of, civil or
criminal proceedings.
Overview
This course focuses on the development of organisational practices for material and case file
management in accordance with legislation, guidance and established best practice. Civil and criminal
procedures will be compared and delegates will be introduced to the application of disclosure as
defined by the Criminal Procedures Investigation Act (CPIA).
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Identify key guidance and legislation relevant to protective marking of materials
5 Use relevant legislation and guidance to manage materials in civil and criminal proceedings
5 Differentiate between material obtained during an investigation and relevant material
5 Implement measures and procedures for recording, retaining and revealing relevant material
5 Evaluate relevant material for disclosure and produce robust disclosure schedules
Cost
£300
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
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ªTarget Audience
Police officers (all ranks) and other law enforcement and dedicated counter fraud professionals.
Course Aim
To ensure that intelligence officers are aware of the latest and relevant intelligence practices and to
ensure that the intelligence officers are aware of sensitive policing techniques and relevant legislation.
Overview
This course focuses on the development of an intelligence-led mindset and introduces delegates to the
core legislation and guidance applicable to intelligence operatives.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Identify key guidance and legislation which impacts upon the role of the intelligence officer
5 Use relevant guidance (MOPI, NIM, National Briefing Model) to ensure that good practice
is followed and that relevant sharing protocols are followed
5 Be aware of the intelligence cycle and the role of the intelligence officer to develop
intelligence via 5x5x5 intelligence logs
5 Detail how the National Intelligence Model is used effectively with the organisation
5 Identify relevant sensitive policing techniques which may assist tactical operations
5 Have an awareness of relevant legislation which is used for sensitive policing techniques
Cost
£300
Discounts are available for
police and law enforcement
Introduction to Intelligence
*]Zr\hnkl^<h]^BMB
“The Insurance Fraud Investigators Group
have employed the City of London Police
on several occasions to deliver training to
our members. We would unhesitatingly
recommend them to any financial
institution for relevant and practical
training in fraud investigation and
prosecution techniques.”
Head of Financial Crime Investigation – 
Prudential plc
+]Zr\hnkl^<h]^BEB
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ª
Intelligence Led Investigations
Target Audience
Police officers (all ranks) and other law enforcement and dedicated counter fraud professionals.
Course Aim
To introduce participates to the concept of a strategic intelligence led method of operation.
Overview
This course focuses on the development of an intelligence-led mindset and introduces delegates to the core
legislation and guidance applicable to intelligence operatives. The scenario based sessions will focus on all
aspects of the process from collection and analysis to the appropriate conclusion. Working in syndicates
utilising paper fed information and ‘live sources’, participants will establish an effective Information Collection
System. Legal and theoretical tutor led inputs and discussions will guide, advise and support as the scenario
progresses through to its conclusion.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Explain risk assessment and prioritisation
5 Understand the role of ‘confidential contacts’ (including whistle blowers) in relation to the
business’s Policies and Procedures
5 Identify sensitive intelligence and how it is managed
5 Understand how to recruit and handle Human Intelligence Assets
5 Explain implications of Article 8 Human Rights, RIPA and Lawful Business Practice Regulations
5 Demonstrate tactical and strategic tasking and co-ordinating meeting management
5 Understand the cost and benefits of human and technical asset deployment
Cost
£600
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
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Effective Human 
Asset Management
ªTarget Audience
Public sector investigators and dedicated counter fraud professionals.
Course Aim
Identification and exploitation of all available information streams that are essential to the adoption of a
proactive intelligence led investigative framework.
Overview
The cultivation, use and management of human intelligence assets is a vital aspect of such an approach. It
provides the opportunity to corroborate and inform in a controlled manner. However, such activity requires
strict control to ensure that cost/benefit issues are understood and addressed. This course takes the form of a
5 day live exercise through which participants are introduced to established best practice methodology and
given the opportunity to put the skills into practice. This course has been specifically designed for non-police
public and private sector organisations and will be tailored to fit the aspirations of the participants at their
anticipated level of operation.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Develop a human asset use strategy as part of the tactical response to an identified requirement
5 Understand the law and regulations in relation to Public Interest Immunity and disclosure
5 Examine recruitment, handling and oversight issues pertaining to the use of ‘human assets’
5 Develop a suitably robust hierarchical based asset management system
5 Devise and implement considered asset management protocols
5 Undertake comprehensive risk identification and management reviews
5 Plan and undertake appropriate ‘Tradecraft’ in relation to asset contacts
5 Develop the ability to use communication as an effective asset handling skill
5 Examine how to risk assess, plan and undertake appropriate meetings with ‘human assets’ safely
5 Understand ethical and human rights issues pertaining to the use of ‘human assets’
Cost
£1500
Discounts are available for police 
and law enforcement
.]Zr\hnkl^<h]^>A:F
“The course proved to be
extremely successfully in both the
short and the long term with my
company adopting many of the
best practices suggested”
Head of Cyber Reconnaissance 
Team, Verisign
,]Zr\hnkl^<h]^?K<
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ª
Fraud Researchers Course
Target Audience
Police research officers/staff and other law enforcement personnel and dedicated counter fraud
professionals.
Course Aim
To provide researchers with the skills and knowledge necessary to contribute to the effective production
and delivery of intelligence products.
Overview
This course focuses on the development of the researcher to ensure that they are fully aware of their role,
under the principles of the National Intelligence Model, in identifying sources and information which
may be used by analysts and intelligence officers.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Understand the role of the researcher within a law enforcement environment
5 Detail the core components of the National Intelligence model
5 Define the ‘Intelligence Cycle’ and how this model is core to the role of the researcher
5 Be aware of key collection planning processes and the systems available to the researcher
5 Be conversant to relevant legislation which may impact upon their role
Cost
£900
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
.]Zr<hnkl^<h]^B:<
34 For the latest course dates and availability please visit http://bit.ly/fraudtrainingacademy
ª
Investigative Analyst Course
Target audience:
Police, law enforcement and private sector researchers and Individuals involved in compliance,
regulation, analysis or investigations. 
Course aim
To cross-pollinate and enhance the skills bases of two closely linked but separate roles within
investigation promoting a greater understanding and enable a more cohesive approach to investigation
and information analysis.
Overview
This course focuses on the gap between two important disciplines and examines the theory and
practical application of the inductive and deductive processes within each and how they can be aligned
in the search for best evidence. 
Course objectives:
By the end of the course the delegate will be able to
5 Apply an investigative mindset across disciplines
5 Understand and apply an analytical perspective to critical data
5 Explain the hierarchy of data and how the methodology behind its collection
5 Demonstrate how best to brief data collectors and analysts
5 Understand how to fit data to an investigative strategy
5 know how to effectively identify anomalies and gaps in information
5 Understand the move from intelligence to evidence and disclosure
5 Define how to effectively identify and deal with risk
Cost
£1500
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
.]Zr\hnkl^<h]^L+:
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Stage 2 Analyst
ª Target Audience
Police analysts and other law enforcement analysts and dedicated counter fraud professionals.
Course Aim
To provide Analysts with the skills and knowledge necessary to contribute to the effective production and
delivery of intelligence products.
Overview
This courses focuses on the development of intelligence analysts who provide support to their organisation in
developing refined products both tactically and strategically using standard, nationally defined analytical
techniques.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Explain the National Intelligence Model (NIM), in particular the techniques used by the National
Fraud Intelligence Bureau and partner agencies within the counter fraud community
5 Gather information from a variety of sources that has the potential to become actionable
intelligence
5 Analyse intelligence and use the defined analytical techniques to create intelligence products
that support operational objectives
5 Evaluate intelligence in accordance with the requirements outlined in the NIM
5 Disseminate intelligence in an appropriate manner
5 Apply problem solving techniques and propose intelligence based solutions to address strategic
and tactical problems
5 Demonstrate the ability to contribute to meetings and develop effective working relationships
Cost
£1500
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
.]Zr\hnkl^<h]^L,:
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ªTarget Audience
Prospective senior/higher analysts from police, law enforcement agencies and dedicated counter fraud
departments.
Course Aim
To provide experienced analysts with an enhanced skill set necessary to contribute to the effective
production and delivery of intelligence products.
Overview
Completion of the Stage 2 Analysts Course (or equivalent) is compulsory prior 
to attending this course.
This course focuses on the further development of experienced analysts and the enhancement of their
skills using sensitive and closed source data, which may be used to develop intelligence into evidence.
Course Objectives
After attending the course the delegate will be able to:
5 Review the outcomes and learning from Stage 2 Analysts Course
5 Apply sensitive data within a practical relevant scenario
5 Negotiate terms of reference for the development of intelligence analysis products
5 Understand and apply analytical techniques working in UK and international law
enforcement
5 Develop inferences from collated information, identify intelligence gaps and make
appropriate recommendations
5 Evaluate the effectiveness of analysis against the terms of reference
Cost
£1500
Discounts are available for police and law enforcement
Stage 3 Analyst
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Booking a Speaker for your 
own event or Conference
ªSpeaker Topics
The Academy can offer speakers on all aspects of the prevention, disruption and investigation of Economic
Crime, Fraud and Bribery & Corruption.
Due to the frequent requests for the Academy to supply speakers we can usually offer no more than one
speaker from the Academy for each event and, whist we will make every effort to provide you with an
appropriate speaker, we can not always guarantee this
What we need to know
5 name of organisation running the event, and details of status (eg commercial company, registered charity)
5 event date and title
5 event location
5 event programme, including the aims and objectives of the event
5 requested speech title or topic
5 confirmed and invited speakers
5 audience level, background, expected numbers and method of advertising the event.
This information will help us to help you. Working with you, we will be able to identify the most appropriate
speaker for your event. If you already have a speaker in mind, please let us know.
We will contact you within 7 days of the receipt of your request to let you know whether or not we can
provide a speaker for your event.
Speaker Fees
The Academy will charge for providing speakers for events run by commercial conference providers. The rates
are £1,000 plus VAT plus travelling expenses (and the cost of an overnight stay, where necessary) for a
presentation lasting up to 40 minutes. This covers liaison with you, preparation, time, attendance and delivery
of the presentation.
The Academy may provide speakers free of charge for certain not-for-profit organisations, trade associations,
professional bodies and Institutes, but will require reimbursement of any appropriate travelling expenses in line
with CoLP policy (and the cost of an overnight stay, where necessary). The Academy will accept a
complimentary place at the conference in return for speaking.
Course Objectives
The Academy may be willing to distribute your conference brochures to its partners and clients (for a fee) by
post or by e-mail. The charge is dependent upon the staff effort required, the number to be sent and the
postage cost. If you are interested in exploring this with us, please contact our training team.
For the latest course dates and availability please visit http://bit.ly/fraudtrainingacademy
Terms and Conditions
Definitions
“CoLP” means the City of London Police under the auspices of the Mayor and Commonalty and Citizens of the City of
London,( the Common Council) as Police Authority for the City of London, the entity conducting business under these terms:
“Client” means the organisation booking or paying for a delegate: “Delegate” means a person attending a CoLP training
course: “Charge” means the fee (if any) payable by the Client to CoLP in consideration of CoLP providing the course:
“Course” means the open training course provided by CoLP and booked by the Client in accordance with these Terms and
Conditions: “Course Portfolio” means the CoLP course prospectus: “Location” means the venue at which the Course is to be
held or such other Location deemed appropriate by CoLP: “Site” means anywhere within the area known as the City of
London: “Terms” means this set of terms and conditions governing the Client’s booking on a CoLP Course.
Equality Act 2010 and Equal Opportunities Policy
CoLP take their legal obligations under the Equality Act 2010 as amended by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act
2011 to promote equality of opportunity seriously. Each Delegate will be expected to abide by CoLP’s Equal Opportunity
Policy (copies of which are available on request) at all times while at the Location and any behaviour which is deemed by
CoLP in its absolute discretion to be a breach of that policy will result in that Delegate immediately being removed from the
Course and the behaviour in question being reported to the Client.
Bookings
Bookings must be confirmed by the Client on an official CoLP Booking Form. A commitment will be required from the Client.
This will take the form of either a valid purchase order or up-front payment. Once the above are received and processed, the
booking will be confirmed by CoLP in writing. The number of delegates and their names must be given at the time of
booking. CoLP will take provisional bookings but will incur no liability in respect of them. Either party may cancel such
bookings prior to such bookings being confirmed as set out above. Bookings made by the Client will only be accepted
subject to these Terms and Conditions and a Booking by the Client will be taken as acceptance of and agreement to these
Terms and Conditions.
Prices & Payments
Some CoLP Courses are chargeable to some or all Clients. These are clearly marked in the corporate Course Portfolio. The
Client will be notified of any charges at the time of booking and this will be confirmed in writing. Any relevant duties or taxes
including VAT will be added to the cost of all Courses at the prevailing rate. Where relevant, Clients will be invoiced direct
by CoLP and should render payment within 28 days to the address shown on the invoice prior to confirmation by CoLP in
accordance with the bookings procedure set out above.
Cancellations
Whether or not a charge is to be levied for a CoLP course, cancellation fees will apply once CoLP has confirmed the
booking. The fee is based upon the price of the course. Notice of cancellation must be made by letter or email. If the Client
advises CoLP of a cancellation or postponement more than eight weeks before the planned start date, no charge will apply.
After this date, a sliding scale of charges will be applied, as set out in the Booking Form. If a Delegate fails to attend a
course, and the Client has failed to notify CoLP in writing, the Client will be charged the full fee for the course. Any appeals
to the cancellation fees imposed should be made in writing to the CoLP for consideration.
Substitutes
Where applicable, CoLP will accept a substitute Delegate from the Client providing they have the relevant experience
and/or qualifications (if needed for the particular Course). In order for the substitute to be accepted, CoLP must be informed
in writing no later than 09:00 on the last working day prior to the day of arrival, in order that it may make appropriate
changes to accommodation bookings and security arrangements. Please note that it is not CoLP’s intention to profit from
unavoidable late cancellations.
Accommodation & Travel Costs
All course costs quoted in corporate Course Portfolio exclude overnight accommodation, if by special arrangement
accommodation is included in a Course, CoLP will endeavour to locate all Delegates on Site but reserves the right at its sole
discretion to accommodate them off site. Where Delegates are accommodated off Site, CoLP will provide transport or cover
the cost of transport from the accommodation to the Course Location. All other transport costs for Delegates will remain the
responsibility of the Client. As such any taxi costs or other fares will be met by the Client or Delegate and 
not CoLP.
Pre-requisites
The Client shall ensure that its Delegates have attained any pre-requisite standards or qualifications, as set out in the Course
literature, prior to attending the Course. CoLP reserves the right to refuse access to the Course at any time at its sole discretion
if it appears to CoLP that a Delegate has not attained the prerequisite standards or qualifications for the Course in question.
ª
For the latest course dates and availability please visit http://bit.ly/fraudtrainingacademy
Terms and Conditions
ªEquipment and BelongingsCoLP will not accept liability for loss of or damage to any equipment or other belongings save where such loss or damage is due
to the negligence of CoLP. Delegates are responsible for the care of such items and should ensure these are secured adequately
when left unattended. Delegates are responsible for the safekeeping and appropriate usage of items loaned to them. Damage
caused by inappropriate use, or loss of such items will be charged to the Client.
Systems and Document Review
Where the Client or Delegate provides materials or processes for review or provides details of their systems or measures in place to
protect against economic crime, such materials and processes, systems or measures are reviewed solely for the purposes of
developing the agreed training course(s) and are not to be regarded as an audit for compliance purposes or security of systems
adequacy. Neither the Common Council nor CoLP accept any liability what so ever in respect of such matters. Or for any failure or
inadequacy in the Client’s systems or measures to protect against economic crime. 
Health and Safety
Each Delegate will be expected to abide by CoLP’ Health & Safety Policy (copies of which are available on request) at all times
while at the Location and any behaviour which is deemed by CoLP in its absolute discretion to be a breach of that policy will result
in that Delegate immediately being removed from the Course and the behaviour in question being reported to the Client.
Security
Badges or passes will be issued to all Delegates and must be worn prominently at all times on all CoLP Locations or other premises
used or connected with the Course or accommodation provided for it. CoLP reserves the right to refuse access to any Delegate
who does not comply with the security procedures in place at the relevant Location.
Confidentiality & Data Protection
Delegates should respect the security classification of any materials received whilst on CoLP Courses and store them as required by
the ACPO/ACPOS Information Systems Community Security Policy and the Protective Marking Scheme. Any personal data
received by CoLP from Delegates will be stored in accordance with the Protective Marking Scheme and the Data Protection Act.
Freedom of Information
The parties acknowledge and accept that the Common Council and CoLP are bound by the Freedom of Information Act 2000
(“FoIA”) and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (“EIR’s”). In the event that the Common Council or the CoLP receive a
request ir respect of the either the FoIA or the EIR’s the Client agrees to assist the Common Council or the CoLP as reasonably
requested by them and without charge in responding to such request
Right to Remove or Exclude 
CoLP reserves the right, at its sole discretion, to remove or exclude any Delegate from any CoLP Course or Location on grounds of
misconduct or upon failure of any mandatory section of any Course without refund or other compensation and, where appropriate
to exclude the Delegate from any futures courses run by or on behalf of CoLP.
Termination
CoLP reserves the right to postpone cancel terminate the Course at any time with or without notice and to refund to the Client
without deduction any fees already paid to CoLP. CoLP shall have no further obligation or liability to the Client or the Delegate
whatsoever. 
Force Majeure 
The provision of any Course may be totally or partially suspended by CoLP to the extent that delivery is prevented through any
circumstance beyond its reasonable control. CoLP will not be liable for costs incurred by the Client or any Delegate.
Copyright
CoLP retains its intellectual property rights in all of its materials, documents and software, none of which may be reproduced,
modified, amended, stored in any retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, otherwise than for the purposes of
the CoLP Course for which its use was intended, without the prior written permission of CoLP.
Variation 
No variation or amendment of these Terms will be valid unless evidenced in writing and signed by a duly authorised officer of
CoLP. These terms supersede any prior written or verbal communication between the parties.
Law and Jurisdiction
This agreement is made in England in accordance with and subject to English law and the jurisdiction of the Courts of England
and Wales.
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Fraud Authorised Professional Practice 
 
1: Understanding Fraud 
Fraud is a type of criminal activity, defined as: 
'abuse of position, or false representation, or prejudicing someone's rights for personal gain'. 
Put simply, fraud is an act of deception intended for personal gain or to cause a loss to 
another party.  
The majority of criminal activity classified as fraud are captured by offence under the Fraud 
Act 2006. For further information see: Fraud Act 2006 
 
1.1: What is Fraud? 
In the UK there are 61 different types of fraud (as recorded by Action Fraud) that can 
be  recorded  and  potentially  disseminated  to  forces  for  investigation.  Each  fraud  type  is 
unique and may require different strategic and tactical considerations.  
There are many ways  in which  fraud  can be  committed, however, offences which 
cause the most harm at an individual level, based on those most reported to Action Fraud, 
are often classified as live ‘crimes in action’, with the criminals continuing to target victims 
putting  them  and  their  monies  at  risk.  Under  these  circumstances,  investigators  must 
consider whether the priority is to investigate and preserve potential evidence or to disrupt 
the criminal activity and prevent crime. 
For further information see: Fraud Types & Prevention Advice 
 
1.2: Scale and Impact of Fraud 
The volume of  fraud  impacting on the United Kingdom  is growing  in  its complexity 
and diversity. Those who commit  fraud exploit and profit  from misplaced  trust and act  to 
the detriment of public through the serious harm they cause.  
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Fraud has been globalised and the reach of the fraudster has increased through the 
use of new technologies, enabling traditional crime to be committed  in new ways through 
the use of computers, computer networks or other  forms of  information communications 
technology. 
Fraud  is not  the  'victimless crime'. The  impact  from  rapidly emerging national and 
trans‐national trends on  local communities and businesses of all sizes has not always been 
fully  recognised  or  realised  with  offenders  committing  offences  at  a  local,  regional  and 
national  level.  In  response,  the  UK  Government  has  established  public‐private  sector 
partnerships and collaborations, such as those developed by the National Fraud Intelligence 
Bureau (NFIB) hosted by the City of London Police (CoLP).  
 
Case Study: Impact of Fraud 
The Motor  Insurance  Industry highlighted a new and growing crime threat referred 
to  as  Ghost  Broking.  The  activities  of  the  ghost  broker  are  illegal  owing  to  them  being 
unregistered and unlicensed. 
Fraudsters design convincing insurance websites that offer greatly reduced insurance 
quotes for motor cover. When contacted by an unsuspecting motorist, the fraudster alters 
certain ‘risk factors’ such as the risk address, age of the driver, driving and accident history 
to make  the premiums artificially  low. The  fraudster  illegally brokers  this  insurance  cover 
with  a  genuine  insurance  company  who  are  unwittingly  insuring  a  motorist  that  should 
attract far higher premiums.   
The  customer  pays  the  broker  for  the  policy  but  in  the  event  of  a  claim,  the 
insurance  company  discover  the  details  provided  are  inaccurate,  rendering  the  policy 
invalid. The motorist  is therefore at risk of prosecution for no  insurance and also at risk of 
liability for damage repairs and personal injury.  
One  such  illegal  website  was  closed  down  by  the  Insurance  Fraud  Enforcement 
Department (IFED) and the fraudster behind the scam was located. Over a period of months, 
he  had  defrauded  500  young  motorists  out  of  premiums  in  excess  of  £1000  each.  The 
offender  had  used many  different  insurance  companies  to  unwittingly  provide  insurance 
cover  for his  customers.  IFED detectives worked  closely with  the  Insurance Fraud Bureau 
and Insurance Industry Fraud Teams who were able to fast track the evidence in support of 
the investigation and prosecution.  
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This offender was sentenced to 7 ½ years imprisonment. 
 
1.3: Offender & Victim Profiles 
Fraud  is often called a ‘white collar crime’. The phrase ‘white collar crime’ was first 
defined  in  1939  by  the  eminent  sociologist  /  criminologist  Edwin  Sutherland  as  ‘a  crime 
committed  by  a  person  of  respectability  and  high  social  status  in  the  course  of  his 
occupation’. 
There  is a danger  that  fraud, when seen as  ‘white collar crime’ can carry an air of 
respectability. Certainly, in a lot of cases, the criminal who commits, or attempts to commit, 
fraud may have traits over‐and‐above the average thief but fraud can never be a crime of 
respectability. 
Although the National Fraud Authority conducted research into the scale and cost of 
fraud to the UK, the true cost  is still unknown; the  loss  impacting on every part of society, 
especially  the  most  vulnerable.    It  represents  money  that  individuals,  businesses  and 
Government can ill afford to lose. 
As  for  a  crime of  ‘nonviolence’, on  the 4th December 2012,  a national newspaper 
reported  on  an  international  £2.4 million  ‘lottery  scam’  fraud,  perpetrated  by  a  gang  of 
London based Nigerian fraudsters.  Their victims, all of whom were duped into believing that 
they  had  won  either  a  large  sum  of  money  on  an  Australian  lottery,  inheritance  or  an 
investment  benefit, were  all  defrauded  of  an  average  of  £204,000  each.   One  particular 
victim  from  Los  Angeles,  was  shot  dead  by  her  husband  who  then  turned  the  gun  on 
himself,  after  she  had  wired  the  gang  £264,000  (for  taxes  and  admin  costs  in  order  to 
release the winnings) – blowing their hard‐earned pension.1 
 
1.4: Warning Signs & Red Flags 
Warning signs 
                                                            
1  http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article‐2242985/Jailed‐London‐based‐Nigerian‐fraudsters‐ran‐2‐7million‐
lotto‐scam‐led‐murder‐suicide.html 
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Warning signs have been described as organisational indicators of fraud risk and are 
often used  to  implement counter  fraud measures by understanding where  the  fraud  risks 
are; an  investigator can use this  information to  identify trigger points which may allow for 
resources  to be more effectively  focused  in  the  investigation and  the  search  for material.  
See Fraud Warning Signs for some examples of warning signs, this  is not an exhaustive  list 
and the investigator will need to consider the unique dynamics of each of each investigation 
to identify the warning signs, risk and potential for evidence.  
The  warning  signs  and  risks  are  subdivided  into  business  risk,  financial  risk, 
environmental risk and information technology and data risk.  
 
Fraud Alerts or Red Flags 
Fraud  alerts  have  been  described  as  specific  events  or  red  flags,  which  may  be 
indicative of fraud and are often used by organisations as part of real time fraud detection 
systems.  The Guide  to  Red  Flags  provides  a  list  of  possible  fraud  alerts  but,  as with  the 
warning signs, this should not be considered an exhaustive or exclusive list, as alerts and red 
flags may appear in multiple guises according to circumstances. 
There are a number of warning signs that, once identified by the investigator, can be 
used to inform both lines of investigation and real time preventative action for the victim or 
similar organisations that may have the same vulnerabilities. A single fraud  indicator on  its 
own may pose  little or no  risk but when  a number of  fraud  indicators  are  identified  the 
correlation of these flags or risks can often be linked to the fraudulent activity.  
As with the fraud risk, the investigator will need to consider the unique dynamics of 
each investigation to identify the red flags and associated risk for potential evidence leads.  
 
1.5: Local, Regional & National Structures & Responsibilities 
There are number of national and regional functions available to assist police forces 
with crime management,  intelligence dissemination and the  investigation of offences  from 
volume and priority through to the most serious and complex fraud cases. 
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The  law  enforcement  response  to  fraud  has  been  designed  to  complement  the 
Government’s strategy to combat organised crime through the process of Pursue, Prevent, 
Protect and Prepare:  
Pursue 
Anyone committing fraud against a UK victim will face the risk of prosecution, loss of 
assets  and dismantling of  their operations. The  combined  law enforcement  response will 
attack the finances of organised crime, across regional, national and  international borders, 
exploiting  all possible  enforcement options, using  the  full powers of  the  State  to detect, 
investigate  and  disrupt  criminality  at  the  earliest  possible  stage,  prosecuting  those 
responsible and recovering assets. 
Prevent 
The  law  enforcement  response  aims  to  deter  people  from  engaging  in  fraud  by 
demonstrating  that  it  does  not  pay.  The  combined  law  enforcement  response  will  raise 
awareness about  the corrosive nature of  fraud  from  the volume and priority crime  to  the 
most  serious  and  organised  cases  aimed  at  reducing  public  tolerance  of  its  impact  on 
individuals and communities. 
Protect 
By working together the combined  law enforcement response aims to educate the 
public  and businesses  to  prevent  them  becoming  victims of  fraud. Activities  are planned 
across  the  full  spectrum  of  public  and  private  sector  partners  to  ensure  lessons  from 
incidents  of  fraud  are  rapidly  communicated  to  potential  victims.  By  using  our 
understanding  of  emerging  threats  and  victim  profiles  the  combined  law  enforcement 
response to fraud will be able to drive targeted communications to help individuals protect 
themselves. 
Prepare 
By utilising our relationships across the public and private sectors, law enforcement 
can ensure that a  thorough and current understanding of  the cause and effect of  fraud  is 
available. By promoting the principle that those engaged  in  fraud will be subject to multi‐
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track  investigations,  facing  parallel  sanctions  of  criminal  prosecution,  civil  recovery  and 
reparation to their victims, a real deterrent is created. 
For more  information on  the  local,  regional  and national  counter  fraud  structures 
see: Combined Law Enforcement Response  
 
2: Reporting & Countering Fraud 
Action Fraud is currently the only area of policing where there is a central reporting 
process to support victims of fraud on behalf of all police services of England and Wales and 
is hosted by  the City of  London Police within  the National  Fraud  Intelligence Bureau.  For 
further information see: http://www.actionfraud.police.uk/  
 
2.1: Reporting Processes 
With  the exception of  crimes meeting  the  call  for  service  criteria,  the majority of 
fraud will be recorded at the NFIB directly by data providers, or by victims using the Action 
Fraud template on‐line or through the Action Fraud contact centre. 
 Where victims contact their  local police to report a fraud, police should advise the 
victim that they can report to Action Fraud. If this advice is taken, there is no need for police 
to record a crime or record a crime related incident. Where victims decline this facility and 
ask their local police to take the report, then the police should take full details of the fraud 
and record it on the Action Fraud system.  
Police will record all the following fraud offences locally:  
 offences where offenders are arrested by police or  
 where there  is a call  for service to Police and the offender  is committing or 
has recently committed at the time of the call for service for all fraud types, 
or  
 where there is a local suspect  
A local suspect is where through viable investigative leads;  
 the police can or could locate a suspect with the details provided, or  
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 have sufficient details to apprehend an offender.  
‘Local’ has its everyday meaning and has been used to ensure that, as for any other 
type of  crime, where  there are  local  viable  investigative  leads police  should  consider  the 
crime for investigation.  
Where this is not the case the crime needs to be recorded through the Action Fraud 
call  centre  or  web  portal.  The  NFIB  will  then  deal  in  the  same  way  as  with  any  other 
reported crime.  
For more information see guide to Action Fraud Reporting  
2.2: Home Office Counting Rules (HOCR) 
In January 2007 the Fraud Act 2006 became law and repealed much of the previous 
fraud  legislation. While  it  is not possible to prosecute offenders under the new  legislation 
for offences committed before the new act became law, the Home Office require police to 
record fraud crime, for statistical purposes, under the new legislation.  
The Home Office will  collate  levels  for  recorded  fraud  from  the NFIB. This will be 
representative of the total national level of NFIB recorded fraud.  
This is not broken down by: 
 police force area. 
 the demand on police by force area 
 the result on that demand  
The NFIB codes used enable  them  to  record specific  fraud  types  reported  that are 
then passed to the NFIB. These codes are also used to count fraud types passed to the NFIB 
in bulk data transfers from partners organisations. All confirmed fraud held within the NFIB 
database would use the NFIB codes.  
Action  Fraud  can  only  record  NFIB  crimes.  Where  other  notifiable  offences  are 
identified  they  should  be  recorded  under  the  relevant  HOCR  and  the  victims  should  be 
referred to their local police. 
The location for allocation and dissemination of fraud crimes will be:  
 where offenders are arrested by the police  
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 where the false representation was made  
Where  there  is  a  call  for  service  and  the  offender  is  committing,  or  has  recently 
committed an offence: 
 the  location  for  allocation  and  dissemination  will  be  where  the  false 
representation was made.  This  is  regardless  of  the  address  of  the  suspect 
subsequently being established.  
 
Where there is a local suspect the location for allocation and dissemination will be:  
 The police  force  area  covering  the  location of  the  fraudulent operation, or 
the suspect‘s address or for business related fraud the office address of the 
employee  or,  if  no  office  address  is  available,  the  Head  Office  of  the 
company.  
 For goods ordered remotely: the delivery address to which the  fraudulently 
ordered goods were delivered or are to be delivered. 
 For  fraudulent  applications:  the  location  from  which  the  fraudulent 
application  is  sent.  However,  if  the  offender  has  arranged  for  a  mail  re‐
direction from the originating address, then the re‐directed address shall be 
deemed to be the location.  
Where NFIB  recorded  crime, or  a  linked  series of  crimes,  are  to be passed  to  the 
police  for  investigation  (except  frauds  relating  to  the  railways),  the  receiving  force will be 
determined from the following set of principles. The principles are listed in order of priority 
and it is only when a principle cannot be achieved, or is not known, that the next principle 
will apply:  
1st The  police  force  area  covering  the  location  of  the  fraudulent 
operation/suspect‘s address or for business related fraud the office address 
of the employee or if no office address, the Head Office of the company.  
2nd The  police  force  area  with  the  greatest  number  of  individual  usages  or 
offences  
3rd The police force area where the first offence was committed  
4th The police force area where the victim resides or works.  
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5th In the event that a force area cannot be determined using these principles, 
the NFIB will designate a force area.  
Fraud  related  to  the  railways  (BTP  jurisdiction),  will  be  forwarded  to  BTP 
Headquarters and the above principles will not apply. Where there are a series of different 
linked frauds and one of those relates to the railways, the NFIB will only forward the linked 
series of crimes to BTP if the railway fraud is the most serious offence disclosed.  
Where there is more than one suspect, and suspects reside in different force areas, 
the NFIB will apply principles 2 to 4 to establish primacy  for the  investigation.  If this does 
not determine primacy, then the NFIB will allocate primacy.  
Where assigned cases or crimes have been detected or otherwise  resolved,  forces 
should  contact  the NFIB  providing  the  case  number,  crime  numbers,  suspect  details  and 
outcome  details.  The  NFIB  will  then  update  their  database  and  identify  the  relevant 
detections for the force.  
Where  specimen  charges  or  an  all‐embracing  conspiracy  have  been  charged, 
provided  that  these  charges are  reflective of all  the  crimes within  the  case,  the NFIB will 
note all the crimes within the case as detected.  
 
2.3: Initial Prioritisation & Assessment 
The NFIB crime reviewers conduct the initial prioritisation and assessment of reports 
of  fraud providing  the  link between  the NFIB and external agencies. The  crime  reviewers 
provide administration, crime assessment and analytical tasking.  
The role of the crime reviewers includes:  
 initial assessment, evaluation and allocation of crimes,  
 tasking of analytical staff,  
 evaluation and dissemination of intelligence reports,  
 facilitating intelligence requests,  
 facilitating requests for information about fraud crime,  
 facilitating disclosure requests,  
 facilitating freedom of information requests,  
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 quality assurance and audit functions.  
A crime report will be subject to basic evaluation to ensure quality and suitability for 
investigation, prior to dissemination to a force. This will include:  
 Police National Computer,  
 NFIB Organised Crime Group database,  
 Electoral data check,  
 Consented land/mobile phone database,  
 Business database,  
 Mortality database,  
 further victim contact, if/where necessary,  
 NFIB analytical hub.  
This  is not an exhaustive  list and the crime assessment team will determine checks 
on  a  case‐by‐case  basis.  Positive  results  from  any  of  these  checks  will  enhance  the 
usefulness of a crime  report and  is attached  to  the package. The crime  reviewers will not 
routinely undertake checks to secure evidence relating to a crime, such as:  
 Gateway request for information or evidence from HMRC and DWP.  
The  crime  reviewers perform  regular  sampling of  fraud  crimes  recorded by Action 
Fraud. This verifies  that output  from  the automated process  is appropriate  for  identifying 
crimes for further investigation.  
 
2.4: Allocation & Dissemination 
Crime packages may be disseminated to:  
 police forces,  
 partner agencies.  
All crime packages sent by the NFIB to forces will be sent via the secure ‘pnn’ email 
system (CJX). Recipients will be local SPOCs, identified at individual force level.  
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Certain crimes identified by Action Fraud may not require police investigation. They 
may  however  require  referral  to  external  partner  agencies,  such  as  Local  Authorities  or 
Trading Standards.  
On such occasions, the  information contained within the Action Fraud crime report 
will be entered onto a NIM‐compliant, 5 x 5 x 5 intelligence log. This log will then be emailed 
via the secure pnn email system (CJX) to the partner agency.  
Recipients  should be  identified  SPOCs within  each  agency. An  information‐sharing 
agreement should be obtained when sharing  information with a partner on a  frequent or 
cumulative basis occurs.  
On receipt of a crime package, the receiving force is required to record the crime on 
their crime recording system; however, the investigation of these crimes is a matter for each 
Chief Constable.  
The receiving force must  inform the NFIB of the allocated crime reference number. 
This  ensures  that  any  supplementary  information  can  be  conveyed  quickly  to  the 
investigating officer. 
The decision on whether to investigate an allegation of fraud, and on the resources 
to be devoted  to any  investigation,  rests  solely with  the police  (see Home Office Circular 
47/2004).  The  police  will  only  investigate  in  circumstances  where  there  are  grounds  to 
believe  that  a  criminal  offence  has  been  committed.   When  a  police  force  assesses  the 
validity of an investigation it is imperative that the process is robust and transparent, it may 
therefore be beneficial to implement a local crime assessment matrix to assess and evaluate 
cases from Action Fraud. See Action Fraud Matrix for a sample ‘local’ assessment matrix.  
 
3: Fraud Investigation Common Themes 
The type of activity fraud investigators engage in and the material gathered will vary 
depending on whether  investigators  follow  the  traditional Process of  Investigation or  the 
Fraud  Investigation  Model2.  The  basic  principles  of  investigation  are  the  same  and 
investigators will complete similar stages, however, the Fraud Investigation Model has been 
                                                            
2 City of London Police 2014 
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designed to simplify  fraud  investigations and enable more timely outcomes with a greater 
likelihood of success. 
Every investigation is, however, different and may require a different route through 
the process,  so  it  important  that  the  investigator uses  the model as a guide, not as  rigid 
process that must be followed in every case.   
 
3.1: Fraud Investigation Model 
Fraud  can  be  complex  and  is  often  difficult  to  understand.  This  gives  defence 
solicitors an opportunity to exploit the complexity and confuse a jury in order to undermine 
the prosecution. The simpler the presentation of evidence to the jury, the higher the chance 
of a conviction.  
 
3.1.1: Traditional Investigative Approach 
In a  reactive  investigation  the offence has been  committed and  the  investigator  is 
charged  with  searching  for  the  truth  and  securing  a  conviction  through  a  fair  and  just 
investigation.  
The  investigator  achieves  this  by  gathering  all  the  evidence  available,  pursuing  all 
reasonable  lines  of  enquiry  and  assessing  the  facts  to  establish what  has  happened  and 
identify the perpetrators to achieve a successful prosecution. 
Utilising this approach  in a fraud  investigation means that the  investigator  is at risk 
of creating an unwieldy and complex investigation.   
This  approach  has  contributed  to  the  reputation  that  fraud  investigations  are 
excessively time consuming, often taking years to get to court. 
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Figure 1: Process of Investigation 
Fraudsters are generally entrepreneurial and will take every opportunity to maximise 
the  profitability  of  a  particular  fraud  and/or  diversifying  into  alternative  fraudulent 
enterprises  before  investigators  have  got  to  grips with  their  original  crime.   Often  their 
‘business’ plan will  include contingency plans  for diversification to avoid  identification and 
prosecution.  
Because  of  this  fraud  should  be  considered  a  ‘live’  crime,  or  a  ‘crime  in  action’, 
where the criminal is active and will continue to offend until stopped. There is the potential 
for further victims to be targeted and significant loss to be incurred even while the offence 
is being investigated (see Figure 2, Traditional Fraud Landscape).  
With  this  type  of  crime  the  danger  is  that  investigators  become  so  focussed  on 
building their case they  lose sight of fact that the harm  is still on‐going and the growth of 
the criminal activity could quickly out pace that of the investigation. 
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Figure 2: Traditional Fraud Landscape 
 
3.1.2: The Fraud Investigation Model  
The  NFIB  have  developed  a  significant  understanding  of  how  fraudsters  operate 
through  analysis  of  past  fraudulent  offending.  As  a  result  the  City  of  London  Police  has 
developed  a  new  model  for  fraud  investigation  better  suited  to  the  complexities  and 
seriousness of both volume and major fraud investigations.   
The  fraud  investigation  model,  Figure  3,  provides  an  alternative  outcome  based 
framework for approaching a fraud investigation. It encourages the investigator to consider  
alternative  outcomes  and  sanctions  from  the  outset.  At  the  same  time,  if  a  criminal 
investigation  is  to be pursued,  investigators will be able  to build a case  that provides  the 
greatest chance of success reflecting the seriousness of the offences under investigation. 
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  Figure 3: Fraud Investigation Model 
 
3.1.3: How the Fraud Investigation Model Changes the Fraud Landscape 
Applying the Fraud Investigation Model to the Traditional Fraud Landscape, Figure 2, 
combined with  the benefits of  the NFIB and  the automation of  ‘trigger points’,  the  fraud 
landscape is changed considerably from the traditional model.   
The  model  focusses  on  the  prioritisation  of  prevention  and  disruption  activities, 
meaning the period of harm and  loss  is greatly reduced and with the central repository of 
fraud data  the potential  for enforcement activity occurs much earlier. The benefits of  the 
new model of  investigation, when combined with  the activities of  the NFIB, are  shown  in 
Figure 4: 
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Figure 4: Data Sharing Fraud Landscape 
This  approach  reduces  the  opportunities  for  fraudsters  to  diversify  as  well  as 
restricting the success and duration of the original fraud. Benefits include: 
Financial 
 reduced financial loss 
 product pricing / reduced premium prices / more custom 
Personal 
 protection of personal identity 
 protection of livelihood 
 prevention of personal ruin 
Business 
 product protection 
 business security 
 reputational protection 
 mission success 
 
3.1.4: Using the Fraud Investigation Model 
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Utilising  this  model  of  investigation,  it  is  possible  to  increase  capacity  and  bring 
successful case conclusions through a simplification of the investigative process and the use 
of alternative sanctions. 
 
3.1.5: Instigation 
As with any  investigation, a  fraud  investigation  can be  instigated using  reactive or 
proactive approaches See: Instigating an Investigation    
In addition to the common methods of referral cases of fraud may be referred via:  
 Action Fraud to National Fraud Intelligence Bureau  
 industry report direct to police 
 whistleblowing or speak up lines 
 internal or external audit activity  
 domestic and international law enforcement & regulatory partners  
 Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs). 
Instigation  will  result  in  the  initial  recording  of  the  report,  classification  and 
allocation  to  a  particular  investigator(s)  or  team  depending  of  the  organisations  internal 
fraud management policy.     
 
3.1.6: Investigative / Desktop Evaluation 
Unlike  the  majority  of  crime  where  the  first  time  any  investigative  action  is 
undertaken  is  after  the  incident  has  been  reported  to  the  police,  the  majority  of  fraud 
reported  by  corporate  body  will  already  have  been  subject  to  an  internal  investigative 
process. This process will have established if a potential criminal offence has occurred. This 
internal investigative process can take many different forms but will generally fall within one 
of the following categories: 
 private investigation 
 external fraud prevention and detection  
 internal fraud response. 
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Each process can differ considerably but for the police  investigator the key factor  is 
being  able  to  establish  what  processes  have  taken  place,  the  extent  to  which  the 
investigation has been conducted and the admissibility of any evidential package passed to 
the police.   
Although  a police  investigator would  consider  a  criminal process  from  the outset, 
non‐law enforcement organisations may have different priorities. Those working within the 
regulated sectors may purse an  investigation for many months before  identifying potential 
criminal  links or overlaps. Commercial organisations and  their  investigators may prioritise 
loss prevention and reputational harm over any criminal process. The reputational damage 
to the organisation of making an investigation public being considered worse than the crime 
itself. 
It  is  important  for  the  police  investigator  to  understand who was  involved  in  the 
investigation,  the  processes  that  they  followed  and  any  investigative  policies  or  fraud 
response plans that govern their actions. 
 
A fraud response plan? 
This  outlines  the  policies  and  procedures  that  an  organisation must  follow  in  the 
event  of  a  fraud  being  discovered  or  suspected.  There  are  now  specific  British  (BS)  and 
International (ISO) standards that companies can accredit to that will guide them on how to 
implement such plans. A good fraud response plan should aim to: 
 outline  the  fraud  investigation  process  (who,  what,  when  and  how)  from 
receipt of the  initial allegation through to preparation of the final ‘outcome’ 
report, 
 clearly define the roles and responsibilities of senior management and other 
staff involved in the investigation process, 
 set out the organisation’s policy on reporting fraud both within the company 
and to third parties, 
 demonstrate the organisation’s commitment to take appropriate disciplinary, 
regulatory,  civil  or  criminal  proceedings  against  fraudsters  and  to  recover 
losses, 
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 ensure  that  any  lessons  learned  are  applied  to  strengthening  anti‐fraud 
controls and processes. 
The scope of an organisation’s fraud response plan will vary depending on the nature 
and size of the business (Fraud Advisory Panel, 2010). 
Although the  fraud response plan will not provide all the answers,  it will provide a 
good  insight  into an organisations stance on fraud, whether any  internal  investigation was 
commenced with a view  to protecting  the organisations  reputation,  supporting a criminal 
investigation or both. 
 A well prepared  ‘crime package’ prepared by professional  investigators, compliant 
with  relevant  laws3, procedures and practices  can assist  the police and  save  considerable 
time and resources. Thorough consideration to these  issues  from the outset can minimise 
wasted time and duplication of effort. 
 
Case Study: Corporate Handover 
In February 2014 Willis Ltd reported a suspected fraud involving a former employee, 
Mr H a senior broker in their Marine Division. Initially it was thought that Mr H had set up a 
third party company between 2005 and 2009 in St Kitts & Nevis, which he then claimed had 
conducted introducer work in many of his deals and was, therefore entitled to commission.  
The total commission paid in this period was $1,350,000. It was then identified that a 
second  third party  company had also been  set up by Mr H,  this  time between 2001 and 
2012 in Ecuador. Mr H had been carrying out the same conduct with that company, leading 
to further commission payments of $1,030,000. Mr H was dismissed in October 2013. 
 It was  then  identified  from  the bank accounts belonging  to  these entities  that  the 
money had mostly been paid to Mr H, his partner Miss W and his estranged wife, Mrs H.  
                                                            
3 Like a police officer, any person ‘charged’ with the investigation of an offence is duty bound to comply with 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and any ‘relevant’ material obtained during the investigation must 
be retained as per the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.  Any failure to comply with the relevant 
legislation could deem material inadmissible. 
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Since this was referred Willis Ltd have been very easy to contact, have held several 
meetings and are now getting towards the final draft for the statements which will include 
all the exhibits. They have also, wherever possible, offered full disclosure regarding the civil 
case against Mr H and Miss W which is running alongside this investigation. 
 
The  investigative/desktop analysis will complement the above assessment and may 
occur  more  than  once,  for  example,  each  of  the  following  stages  may  require  an 
independent desktop analysis: 
 crime  package  –  hand  over  between  originating  organisation  and  law 
enforcement 
 crime assessment and dissemination  ‐ NFIB 
 disseminated package – receiving law enforcement unit 
Regardless  of  the  processes  that  have  gone  before,  it  is  important  that  the 
investigating  force/agency  conducts  its  own  investigative/desktop  analysis  and  gives  full 
consideration  to  the  crime  and  its  relevance  to  local,  regional  and  national 
strategic/operational  priorities.  What  may  have  justified  dissemination/hand  over  for 
investigation may, on  re‐evaluation  and when mapped  against  local  strategic/operational 
priorities, be considered more suitable for disruption and preventative action. 
Unlike the majority of crimes, when conducting an investigative/desktop analysis the 
focus  is not  limited  to a  single  crime  and  the  identification of  the  suspect but  should be 
more holistic, taking into account more than purely an investigative outcome. In addition to 
routine crime assessment/evaluation this should as a minimum include: 
 initial hypothesis of what has happened 
 identification and location of suspect(s)/person(s) of interest 
 location of potential material/evidence 
 involvement of professional enablers 
 scale and use of financial enablers 
 use of cyber enablers 
 involvement of an organised crime group 
 assessment of jurisdictional issues 
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 modus operandi – how was the fraud perpetrated 
 identifiable investigative leads 
 estimate and impact of harm caused 
 scale and location of known victims 
 potential for unknown victims 
 opportunities for asset recovery 
 prognosis of future harm & loss 
 how does the crime map against strategic/operational priorities 
 issues and potential complexities of an investigation 
 likelihood of bringing a case to a successful conclusion. 
Because of  the evolution of cyber enabled crime, new methods of committing old 
style frauds are being devised on a daily basis with no need for the perpetrator to know or 
even  be  located  in  the  same  country  as  the  victim(s)  requiring  a  large  proportion  of 
investigations to involve cross border/international enquiries.  
Although  there  are established  and effective procedures  for  international working 
there  are  a  number  of  countries  where  any  prospect  of  international  enquiries  or 
cooperation would rule out the  likelihood of a successful  investigation. Early  identification 
of the location of suspects, material and key lines of enquiry are essential to minimise false 
starts and wasted effort. 
 
3.1.7: Disruption 
The effectiveness of disruption activity depends on the timeliness of the intervention 
and the range of tactics that can be deployed. There is always the potential that disruption 
activities could have the negative effect of making the target stronger and more resilient to 
future disruption activities.  
It is therefore, important that disruption activities and interventions are deployed at 
the earliest opportunity, and strategies are implemented to maintain and diversify tactics to 
minimise  the  opportunities  for  the  offender  to  re‐organise. Ultimately,  the  aim  of  these 
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activities  is  to  force  criminals  and  organised  crime  groups  to  become  more  exposed, 
enabling more effective and consistent targeting and disruption of their criminal activities. 
 
Measuring the effectiveness of disruption activities 
Like a criminal conviction or civil sanction, it is possible to measure and report on the 
effectiveness of disruption  activities  and  interventions. There  are  five main  indicators  for 
measuring the effectiveness of disruption activities: 
 reduction in the targets rate of communication/information flow 
 reduction in the ability of the target to conduct its business  
 reduction in reported crime 
 failure or reduction of the targets management & business processes 
 restriction or removal of financial services. 
By  using  these  measures  it  is  possible  to  report  on  how  the  interventions  have 
impacted on the criminal or organised crime group to pass information, dispatch or receive 
goods and share knowledge.  
 
Focus of disruption activities and interventions 
Disruption activities can be focused on individuals within a criminal/organised crime 
group  or  they  can  be  focussed  on  the  organisation.  If  targeting  an  individual  the  focus 
should be on the most senior person  in the organisation. The more senior the person the 
greater  the  potential  disruption  as  these  individuals  are  often  critical  to  the  flow  of 
information and conduct of the business enterprise.  
Before  disruption  activities  are  deployed,  it  is  important  to  understand  the 
criminal/organised crime group and its structure. A comprehensive understanding, as far as 
possible, will help to identify and deploy the most effective intervention. 
 
Fraud disruption activities  
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Activities and interventions which could be used to minimise the impact and reach of 
fraud could include the following. This list is not exhaustive: 
 
Communications takedown 
Removal  of methods  of  communication will  seriously  impact  on  the  ability  of  the 
criminal to communicate with potential victims, particularly where technology is used as an 
enabler, eg, telecommunication services, email or online/web presence.   
Rather than  just suspend a particular website an option  is to automatically redirect 
visitors to the original site to an alert page. This can provide reasons for the takedown and, 
if they have been a victim of fraud, how to report  it. Similar  initiatives are achievable with 
automated email responses or voicemail messages. 
 
Merchant/payment facilities takedown 
As  with  communication  takedowns,  a  similar  intervention  can  be  deployed  to 
remove  the  ability  of  the  criminals  to  receive  and  process  financial  transactions. Once  a 
financial provider of merchant/payment facilities has been  informed that their services are 
being used  to  transfer  criminal  funds  they will usually  support  this  tactic. Because of  the 
relatively consistent approach to anti‐money laundering legislation internationally, a failure 
to remove the service, or rectify the situation, could see the financial institution vulnerable 
to various money laundering offences. 
 
Publicising fraudsters 
Some organisations publicise details and even photographs of the offendersers they 
capture.  This  can  happen  in  a  number  of  ways,  where  an  employee  is  involved,  some 
organisations, where they catch an offender, will highlight this to other staff. This may, or 
may  not,  happen  alongside  more  formal  criminal  proceedings.  Some  organisations  will 
publicise cases in newsletters, news releases and hope the media will become interested. 
To  calculate  the  benefits  of  this  type  of  intervention  considerable work  has  been 
done to provide values to estimate the amount of fraud prevented. This includes: 
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A  major  UK  bank,  using  information  that  was  supplied  by  the  NFIB  based  on  banking 
investment fraud calculated the average bank account disruption figure.  
Bank disruption…£8,802  
Research into the Impact of Mass Marketing Frauds using OFT Report Dec 2006 & the NFA 
Annual Fraud Indicator, Nov 2011 ‐ Assumes that 12 People saved from victimisation per 
Website Disruption 
 Web disruption …£10,000 
A further report by OFT in 2010 estimated the telephone disruption figure.    
Telephone…£850 
Care must be taken in the application of compulsive powers where purely disruption 
interventions  rather  than  prosecutorial  intentions  are  pursued  to  avoid  unlawful 
application.  For  further  advice  and  guidance  on  fraud  disruption  interventions  please 
contact the NFIB or the Economic Crime Academy. 
 
Case Study: Op Creative 
The  Police  Intellectual  Property  Crime  Unit  (PIPCU)  acts  as  the  law  enforcement 
gatekeeper for a range of interventions against online intellectual property crime, Operation 
Creative  is  an  innovative  approach  used  in  early  Intervention  and  disruption  of  online 
facilitators and enablers. 
 
The Approach 
 Operation Creative,  is a multi‐faceted operation  focusing on a number of tactics to 
deny criminals the opportunity to profit from on  line copyright  infringement. In the 
main, the operation focuses on limiting payment enablers either through the denial 
of payment services and/or advertising revenue. 
 In addition the Creative strategy embraces a collaborative approach encouraging all 
those businesses and services that operate within the internet to recognise their role 
in limiting and preventing on line crime.   
 Operation Creative is a partnership between PIPCU and rights owners including their 
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trade  associations  such  as  Federation  against  Copyright  Theft  (FACT),  the  British 
Phonographic  Industry  (BPI),  the  International  Federation  of  the  Phonographic 
Industry  (IFPI) and the Publishers Association  (PA) to  identify and present evidence 
of alleged  criminality  to any  stakeholder who wishes  to  collaborate with police  to 
stop on line criminality.  
 Collectively, the digital advertising  industry  is encouraged to participate with PIPCU 
in  order  to  prevent,  deter  and  disrupt  criminals  from  benefiting  from  brand 
advertising revenue generated by websites identified through Operation Creative.  
 
How PIPCU judges criminal infringement:‐ 
 
 In order for a website to be adopted by Operation Creative, PIPCU will quality assure 
the  standard  of  investigations  and  ensure  that  all  allegations  are  supported  by 
lawfully obtained evidence and supported by a statement from the rights holder or 
their  nominee.  All  evidence  presented  to  PIPCU  will  be  of  sufficient  standard  to 
support a criminal prosecution.  
 Where  the  referral meets  the  appropriate  evidential  standards,  the  details  of  the 
website(s) will be passed to the advertising industry with a view to them proactively 
preventing brands from advertising on those sites.  
 The owner/operator of any website will always have  the opportunity  to  challenge 
PIPCU  operational  activity.Where  evidence  exists  that  the  site  no  longer  commits 
any criminal offence(s); it will be removed from the list with immediate effect. 
 All  operational  tactics  (disruption,  enforcement  and  prevention)  for  Operation 
Creative will be decided on a case by case basis by  the Head of Unit. Any  learning 
derived from the outcome of PIPCU operational activity will be shared with partners 
where appropriate.  
 
Summary of operational tactics deployed on Operation Creative 
 
Prevention/Restorative justice 
 Contact  is  made  with  the  administrator/owner  of  the  target  website  and  their 
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criminal  acts  are  identified.    They  are provided with  the opportunity  to  legitimise 
their activities, through introductions to the relevant rights holder association.   
 If no positive contact is made the website will be further reviewed and if criminality 
is still confirmed then it will be dealt with by other phases of the Operation. 
 
Disruption 
1. Denial  of  advertising  revenue  to  websites  which  profit  from  income  generated 
through the sale of advertising space upon their site.  
2. Details if infringing websites known to Operation Creative where it is suspected that 
criminal  profits  are  being  generated  through  advertising  revenue  will  be  made 
available  to  companies  involved  in  the  creation,  sale  and  trading  of  display 
advertising.  
3. Removal of Payment Services:  If payment options are made available on a website 
then contact will be made with the payment provider or merchant bank requesting 
that this facility be removed. 
 
Enforcement: 
 Wherever it is deemed justified, proportionate and lawful, any suspect(s) that is/are 
identified  as  being  concerned  in  the  provision  of  crime  will  be  subject  to 
enforcement action. 
 
 
3.1.8: Prevention 
Because  fraud  is  often  a  ‘live’  a  proactive  approach  to  prevention  through 
operational  and  organisational  learning  is  required. Unlike  traditional  structured  debriefs 
and  serious  case  reviews  the  ‘Prevention’  element  of  the  Fraud  Investigation  Model  is 
applied at  the very beginning of  the  investigative process and  is  repeated  throughout  the 
duration of any  subsequent  investigation, often as part of  the  regular  investigative  review 
process.  
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The  ability  to  implement effective preventative  interventions  results  from  a  sound 
understanding of how the fraud was perpetrated, what contributed to its success and how it 
could have been prevented. Once this  is understood, by analysing the victim typology and 
demographics, it may be possible to identify where other victims may be located who could 
be  targeted by  this, or another  similar  crime. With  this  information, an effective  targeted 
and timely fraud prevention initiative is achievable.  
A structure  is provided for the  identification of prevention  interventions by asking 4 
simple questions. 
 What were the principle enablers that allowed this fraud to be perpetrated? 
 Who else could be at risk from this or a similar fraud? 
 What could have been done to remove or reduce the risk from this fraud? 
 How  can  the  lessons  learned  be  used  to  prevent  others  from  becoming  a 
victim of a similar fraud? 
 
Case Study: Buy to Let Mortgage Fraud 
UK Police investigatied a large scale, organised mortgage fraud reported to them by 
two mortgage lenders.  Following initial investigation a search warrant and arrest operation 
was carried out,  involving  raids on home and business addresses, as well as  the arrest of 
several members of an apparent OCG. 
At  the  main  subject  business  premises,  believed  to  be  the  kernel  of  the  fraud, 
mortgage application documentation was found pertaining to a number of further mortgage 
lenders, who had not previously made reports to police.  I was highly likely that further, so 
far unreported  frauds were being  carried out by  the OCG,  and  that  there was  a need  to 
prevent further crime occurring. 
A decision was made  to host a  “hot debrief” with mortgage  lender  firms,  to brief 
them on what had been uncovered by police and give them the opportunity to check their 
systems  for any applications  received  from entities connected  to  this OCG. Making use of 
established and trusted contacts via the Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML), this hot debrief 
was held within 36 hours of the police raids being completed.   
APP – Draft Content    Version: Final Draft 
 
Page | 28  
 
The decision came with  some  risk, as  the  investigation was not a matter of public 
knowledge at the time. However,  it was felt that the need to help prevent potentially high 
value fraud outweighed the need for maintaining the privacy of the investigation. 
 
For further guidance on fraud prevention and advice that can be given to victims of 
fraud see: Frauds & Prevention Advice 
 
3.1.9: End Game & Investigative Parameters 
Because the police focus on individuals who commit breaches of the criminal law, it 
is rare for an investigator to consider the ‘end game’ as the majority of cases pursued by the 
police  a  charge  and  criminal  prosecution  is  the  expected  outcome.  By  establishing 
alternative options for the endgame the investigator will better able to establish how these 
can  be  achieved,  implement  investigative  strategies,  recognise  when  the  focus  of  the 
investigation is lost and just as importantly, when the end has been achieved.  
 
End Game 
By having an end game and giving full consideration to all of the possible sanctions 
and  outcomes  available,  it  will  be  possible  to  use  resources  more  efficiently,  increase 
productivity and the likelihood of a successful outcome. When assessing a case to establish 
options for the possible end game, the investigator must consider the options for a parallel 
or multi‐track investigation; this consists of the investigator using processes and procedures 
available leading to criminal, civil, regulatory and disciplinary sanctions. More information is 
available under: Multi‐track Investigations 
Questions to help the investigator establish an endgame include: 
 What is the seriousness of the offence? 
 Impact the offence has had or is having on victims? 
 How would the needs of the victims be best served? 
 Opportunities to recover/repatriate the criminal proceeds? 
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 On‐going threat to existing or new victims? 
 Complexity of the investigation? 
 Jurisdictional issues? 
 What are the available resources? 
 Estimated time consumption of the investigation? 
 How does the offence link to current priorities? 
 What is a realistic outcome of a criminal prosecution? 
 Could  the  investigative  parameters  be  scaled  down  to  achieve  the  same 
outcome? 
 Does the outcome warrant the time and resources for its investigation? 
 Would a criminal prosecution be in the public interest? 
 What are the risks of not pursuing a criminal prosecution? 
 Could a more effective outcome be achieved by alternative means? 
 
Every investigation is different and there is no single solution to how an investigation 
should be structured, some may warrant a traditional criminal process, some may be served 
better through the use of regulatory or civil proceedings, others may benefit from a blended 
solution using a range of processes and sanctions appropriate to the role each individual has 
played within the criminal activity. 
 
Investigative parameters 
By establishing the end game, the  investigator can confidently place parameters on 
an  investigation  targeting  those  offences which  are  least  complicated  and  therefore  less 
resource  intensive. This will help to prevent the  investigation and subsequent prosecution 
becoming overcomplicated  and unwieldy.  This  should not, however, be  construed  as  the 
investigator simply looking for the easiest or quickest way to progress an investigation.  
In some cases a proactive covert investigation may provide the most effective means 
to protect victims and to bring the offenders to justice. 
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Case Study: Proactive Covert Investigation 
Operation  Flume  was  a  pro‐active  covert  enquiry  set  up  with  the  objective  of 
infiltrating an existing Boiler Room operated by an Organised Crime Group  (OCG)  through 
the use of undercover officer posing as a money  launderer. The  investigation was  initiated 
following contact  from Homeland Security  Investigations  (HSI) Florida Office, who entered 
into a joint investigation with UK law enforcement, named Operation Sundial 
 Operation  Sundial  subject,  Larry  HARTMAN,  had  avoided  arrest  and  had  fled  to 
Costa Rica. Following  the  indictment of his co‐accused, HARTMAN made contact with HSI 
agents with  a  view  of  reaching  a  plea  bargain  agreement  by  assisting  law  enforcement. 
HARTMAN  informed HSI  agents of  a  Female,  Evelyn  FALLAS,  concerned  in  a Boiler Room 
operation, who was seeking assistance with money laundering services for UK victims. 
 Undercover operatives  from the UK and USA were activated. HARTMAN  facilitated 
the introduction of the undercover operatives to FALLAS via a conference call, FALLAS then 
introduced the undercover operatives to her boss Jairo Alfonso BONILLA‐BONILLA. 
 BONILLA‐BONILLA  spoke  about his business  instructing  the undercover operatives 
that he was seeking an account to receive funds and then a further account to receive funds 
before  being  again  transferred  to  a  third  account  which  would  then  complete  outward 
transfers into the subjects nominated overseas accounts.  
For  the money  laundering  service he would  let  the undercover operatives  take 30 
points  from  each  transaction  received  as  commission.  BONILLA‐BONILLA  informed  the 
undercover  operatives  his  business was  very  grey  and  to watch  the  film  Boiler  Room  to 
understand what his business was. 
 Following  this  introduction  a  face  to  face  meeting  took  place  between  the 
undercover operatives and BONILLA‐BONILLA.  At this meeting they discussed the proposed 
particulars and how they would communicate with each other. Both sides agreed a test run 
of the money laundering accounts which were to be set up with £15k. 
 Following  the meet,  false  accounts were  opened  and  a  company  registered with 
Companies  House,  details  of  the  accounts  were  then  passed  through  the  agreed 
communications to BONILLA‐BONILLA and FALLAS. Following this the undercover operatives 
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would receive notification of incoming funds from FALLAS or BONILLA‐BONILLA.  
After £15k had been raised the  funds were retained  in the  initial recipient account 
and  then  funds  from  the  local UK police  covert human  intelligence  source  (CHIS) budget 
were  then  used  to  transfer  funds  onto  the  other  undercover  accounts.  The  undercover 
operatives were  then  provided with  instructions  of  how  to  send  the  funds  and  to what 
recipient account from FALLAS and BONILLA‐BONILLA minus their money laundering fee. 
 Once this was done and both parties were confident with the services provided and 
criminal agreement  the undercover operatives’ accounts were  then opened  to  receive all 
funds  from  the  BONILLA‐BONILLA  and  FALLAS  boiler  room  operation.  Further  to  this 
BONILLA‐BONILLA and FALLAS sought assistance from the undercover operatives in carrying 
out admin  functions  for  their boiler  room,  sending out  contract notes and  instruction  for 
payments for the boiler rooms intended victims. 
 After sufficient evidence had been secured the undercover operatives looked to set 
up a second  face to  face meeting to coincide with the next banking run. The  investigation 
team then presented the evidence to the CPS prosecutor, whom had been attached to the 
operation  since  its  inception  providing  advice  etc.  CPS  prosecutor  decided  sufficient 
evidence existed to reach the charging threshold for BONILLA‐BONILLA and FALLAS.  
First  instance  warrants  and  then  European  Arrest  Warrants  (EAW)  were  then 
obtained and  through an  International  Letter of Request  (ILOR) officers  from  the Spanish 
National Police extraditions unit were assigned to assist with the arrest phase. 
 At  the  second  proposed  face  to  face  meet  FALLAS  and  BONILLA‐BONILLA  were 
arrested.  Following  their  arrest  both  subjects were  then  extradited  to  the UK  and when 
presented with the strength of evidence secured against them from the use of undercover 
operatives both pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity.  
 HARTMAN was  to  be  used  as  a  prosecution witness  but  after  failing  to  reach  an 
agreement with HSI agents and the District Attorney he remained a  fugitive  in Costa Rica, 
until he was captured in 2013 travelling on a fake Venezuelan passport. 
 
3.1.10: Partner Agencies 
APP – Draft Content    Version: Final Draft 
 
Page | 32  
 
During  investigative  evaluation  it  may  become  apparent  that  a  more  effective 
approach would be to instigate a joint investigation with a partner agency. If this is the case, 
then early consultation with the partner agency will be required.  
For more information on partner agencies involved in countering fraud see Guide to 
Useful Organisations and for alternative sanctions see Multi‐track Investigations    
Whether  the  partner  agency(s)  are  all  police  or  from  other  law  enforcement, 
regulatory,  Non‐Governmental  Organisations  (NGO)  or  a  commercial  organisation,  it  is 
essential that each organisation understands the part they will play in the investigation and 
their responsibilities.  
Once  agreed,  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  (MoU)  should  be  formalised.  If 
something  was  to  go  wrong  with  the  conduct  of  the  investigation  and  the  roles  and 
responsibilities had not been clearly defined within a MoU an organisation could find  itself 
liable for the actions of the partner agency.  
A MoU  is  a  formal  document  that  describes  a  bilateral  or multilateral  agreement 
between parties encompassing both public and private sectors.  
It is not for use where a specific legal agreement is required. However it can have the 
legal power of a contract. The wording of any MoU should include disclaimers of legal effect 
(i.e. a failure to fulfil any aspects of it).  
When constructing a MoU, it should include, for example, if data is to be shared. The 
law allows for statutory disclosure under certain Acts (eg, Data Protection Act 1998, Serious 
Crime Act 20074, Freedom of Information, CRB checks) but; where there is no such statutory 
obligation,  then  it must be clearly  identified what  the policing purpose  is  for making such 
disclosures. 
The  document  should  include  both  the  policing  purpose  and  the  joint  aims  and 
objectives, including: 
 how the aims and objectives will be measured 
 how and by whom they will be assessed 
                                                            
4 CIFAS is an example of a Specified Anti‐Fraud Organisation recognised by the Serious Crime Act 2007 which 
provides a  specific  legal gateway  for public/private  sector data  sharing  for  the prevention and detection of 
fraud 
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 who will do what. 
A well‐drafted MoU, will prevent problems or issues arising such as:  
 absence of trust 
 fear of conflict 
 lack of commitment 
 avoidance of accountability 
 inattention to results. 
For a joint operation and partnership working to be successful it is essential that the 
4 C’s be in place: 
 coordination 
 collaboration 
 cooperation 
 communication. 
For information on European Joint Working see European Investigations  
Generic templates for joint working can be found at: MOU Templates 
Case Study: Joint working  
City  of  London  Police  (CoLP)  were  asked  to  assist  the  SFO  in  the  planning  and 
organising of a search warrant and arrest operation on a very high profile, high value fraud 
case.    Central  to  the  planning  process  was  the  formulation  of  a  Memorandum  of 
Understanding  between  COLP  and  the  SFO,  setting  out  and  distinguishing  the  roles  and 
responsibilities of each party. 
 Close consideration was also given to any applicable necessity grounds for arrest of 
suspects.  Such decisions were recorded for each suspect in decision logs written out by the 
SIO and careful cross reference was made to the information supplied to COLP by the SFO in 
justifying the arrests. 
Shortly  after  the  arrests  were  carried  out,  Judicial  Review  proceedings  were 
launched by  the Tchenguiz brothers against  the SFO and COLP, citing unlawful search and 
unlawful arrest. During the course of these proceedings, revelations were uncovered about 
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the  inaccuracy  of  information  the  SFO  had  provided  the Court when  applying  for  search 
warrants,  and  similarly with  the  information provided  to CoLP brining  in  to question  the 
necessity for arrest. 
The  Judicial  Review  concluded with  findings  that  the  SFO  had  acted  unlawfully  in 
obtaining  the  search warrants,  and  faced  an  extensive  civil  law  suit  from  the  Tchenguiz 
parties as a result. The fraud investigation was brought to a halt. 
COLP  were  found  to  have  acted  entirely  lawfully  and  reasonably,  given  the 
information provided to them by the SFO at the time. Reference was made to how the MoU 
clearly  placed  responsibilities  for  the  conduct  of  the  investigation,  and  the  accuracy  of 
information shared, upon the SFO.  Detailed decision log entries, demonstrating the careful 
consideration of arrest necessity grounds, were also praised by the High Court. 
 
 
 
3.1.11: NFA / Intelligence Submission 
If a decision  is made not  to  investigate a  fraud at  the  initial  Investigative/desktop 
evaluation or a subsequent evidential evaluation and no action has been  taken  to disrupt 
the  fraudulent  activity,  the  OIC  should  reconsider  the  options  available  for  disruption 
interventions. See: Disruption 
If the  individuals, or group, behind this crime are  later  identified for further acts or 
connected to the commission of new fraudulent activity,  it  is vital that all actions taken by 
the  original  OIC  are  fully  documented  and  supported  by  comprehensive  intelligence 
submission to both local and NFIB systems. 
 
3.1.12: Investigation 
Initial investigation 
Most frauds received by the police for  investigation do not fall  into the category of 
‘serious and complex’ and would be considered  ‘volume and priority’ crimes, although the 
investigation of these may be no less demanding than a major fraud investigation.  
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Unlike  regular  crime  investigation  when  an  officer  is  allocated  a  fraud,  in  the 
majority of cases,  it will be  long running, sometime spanning many months or even years.  
This,  together  with  the  single  fraud  reporting  process,  Action  Fraud,  means  that  in  the 
majority  of  cases  there  is  no  ‘initial’  attendance  and  subsequent  hand  over  to  the 
investigating officer. 
At  the point of  receiving  the  fraud  for  investigation  there  is  a possibility  that  the 
offence is still ongoing and the offenders are unaware of police involvement; that is, unless 
disruption  activities  have  already  been  deployed.  Opportunities  to  locate  and  gather 
material need to be considered very carefully, as the action of an investigator in recovering 
material  may  reveal  to  the  offender  the  involvement  of  the  police  and  jeopardise  the 
potential for a successful conclusion.  
The identification and recovery of material is a key strategic theme together with the 
identification  and  recovery  of  assets  and  tracing  of  the  people  involved  in  the  criminal 
activity  including victims, witnesses and suspects. This  is called M‐A‐P, an abbreviation  for 
Materials, Assets and People. 
 
Fast‐track actions 
These can be just as important in the investigation of fraud as they are in any other 
type of criminal activity. For further information see Fast Track Actions  
Fast‐track actions in fraud would generally be in relation to M‐A‐P 
 
Initial investigation 
For the majority of fraud  investigations there are few occasions where there would 
be an initial police response and investigation, with the exception of a crime in action where 
an officer is deployed to the scene, eg, a person paying for goods with a compromised credit 
card who is detained by in‐store security. 
When  a  crime  is  passed  to  the  police  by  a  corporate  or  partner  agency  that  has 
completed  its  own  investigation  this  should  be  considered  in  the  same  light  as  an  initial 
police investigation and should be reviewed considering the following points: 
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Scene management –  
 has anyone been identified 
 is it physical or virtual 
 where is it located / jurisdiction is it in 
 what actions have been taken to preserve it.  
For further information see Managing Scenes  
Material –  
 has any material been located / gathered 
 what powers or procedures were used 
 is the material available to the investigator 
 can the material be used in a criminal investigation. 
 For further information see Investigation Process ‐ Material 
Who conducted the investigation? 
 what level of training or competence does the investigator have 
 has their role in the investigation concluded 
 can they be of further assistance as the investigation progresses. 
 
Initial investigation conclusion 
The initial investigation phase is concluded when: 
 the NFIB decide there are no viable lines of enquiry and the crime is filed ‘no 
further action’ (NFA) 
 the NFIB disseminate a package to a local force for investigation 
 the officer attending a crime in action concludes initial actions at the scene 
 a  package  is  passed  by  a  corporate  or  partner  agency  to  the  police  for 
investigation. 
For further information see Initial Investigation Conclusion  
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Comprehensive records 
Although  the  police  have  no  control  over  how  an  investigation  is  recorded  by  a 
corporate  or  partner  agency,  as  soon  as  a  crime  or  package  is  passed  to  the  police  to 
investigate  it  is  essential  that  a  comprehensive  record of  all  enquiries  is  completed.  This 
should  include  the  assessment  of  the  crime  or  package  received.  This  will  benefit  the 
investigation by: 
 assisting an investigative evaluation, see Investigative / Evidential Evaluation 
 contributing to the national fraud intelligence picture 
 enables  supervisors  to  assess  the  appropriateness of  the  investigative plan 
and supporting strategies 
3.1.13: M – A – P  
The approach taken in the identification and recovery of material and criminal assets 
or in the tracing and management of people (victims, witnesses and suspects) will be similar 
to  the  those used  in other crimes; however,  in complex  fraud  investigation more  thought 
may  need  to  be  given  to  the  development  of  suitable  strategies which  reflect  the  scale, 
impact, geographical and  jurisdictional dynamics of the case. By recognising these areas as 
essential strategic considerations, the officer in the case (OIC) or Fraud Senior Investigation 
Officer (SIO), if one is allocated, will be more informed on the resourcing requirements and 
better able to plan for the effective and efficient conduct of the investigation. 
Each  case  will  be  different  but  below  are  a  number  of  questions  which  may  be 
relevant to ensure the right strategies to be developed and implemented: 
 
Material:    
 Where is the relevant/available material?  
 Is the material accessible and retrievable? 
 What are the implications for seizing the material? 
o storage 
o disclosure 
o analysis – physical / digital 
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o presentation. 
 Is the material necessary for achieving the end game? 
 Can the material be managed as 3rd Party material? 
 If the material is located overseas, what is the seizure and retention process? 
 Are there any potential issues for CPIA and Disclosure? 
Case Study: Operation Rye 
The case of the now infamous rogue UBS trader, Kweku ADOBOLI was a challenging 
investigation on many levels for the police. During the summer of 2011, ADOBOLI who was a 
rising star at Switzerland’s largest investment bank, lost his bank $2.3 billion in unauthorised 
trades  and  concealed  this  activity  by  creating  fictitious  records  and  entries  on  internal 
systems.  
 
From  the  outset  of  this  enquiry,  the  Senior  Investigating  Officer  identified  that 
managing the scale and complexity of the case would be essential to achieving a successful 
outcome. Initial enquiries revealed that ADOBOLI’s offending went back as far as 2008 and 
the material held within the bank relating to the trades was ‘voluminous’, with trading data 
for the loss making period alone totalling millions of trades.  
 
The critical decision was taken, not to go into the bank and image computers or seize 
evidence relating to the trades.  Instead, demands were made on the bank to  identify and 
produce specific  items of evidence and retain all material as the third party. This approach 
ensured that the  investigation was fully focussed on evidence gathering and not swamped 
by the management of material. 
 
Following  a  not  guilty  plea,  the  disclosure  requests  from  the  defence  team 
commenced with an initial request for 33 items, almost exclusively relating to material held 
by  the bank as a  third party.  Forensic examinations  from  the bank, breaking down  these 
requests revealed that these 33 items related to 1.2 million documents, many of which had 
hundreds of pages.  
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A robust approach to the disclosure exercise followed and the case was brought to 
trial  exactly  one  year  after  ADOBOLI’s  arrest.  After  a  10 week  trial  at  Southwark  Crown 
Court, ADOBOLI was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment for Fraud by Abuse of Position.  
 
The  disclosure  strategy  adopted  by  the  SIO  in  this  case  ensured  the  investigation 
remained focussed on the evidence alone and laid the platform for the timely progression of 
the prosecution and the successful outcome in the case.    
 
 
Case Study: Operation Trufflehunter  
This  case  relates  to  an  investigation  conducted  by  the  Dedicated  Cheque  and 
Plastic Crime Unit (DCPCU)  into the criminal activities of Thomas BEECKMANN, a German 
electronics engineer, who at the time of this investigation lived in Singapore.  
 
Over a long period the DCPCU had been receiving intelligence that a London based 
Organised  Crime Group, was  active  in  the  theft  of  PIN  Entry Devices  (PED’s)  from  the 
Benelux region of Europe. These PED’s were being brought into the UK and held pending a 
visit to the country by BEECKMANN. BEECKMANN was paid by the OCG to compromise the 
PED’s  by  introducing  circuitry  which,  when  the  PED’s  were  re‐introduced  into  a  retail 
outlet, would  record all card details,  store  them and download  them on  request by  the 
fraudsters via a Bluetooth Network. 
 
A  large scale  intelligence phase was coordinated by the DCPCU which resulted  in 
gaining  knowledge  of  BEECKMAN’s  global  movements.  This  resulted  in  his  arrest  at 
Victoria Coach Station whilst in possession of eighteen circuit boards of the type used for 
PED compromise along with a heavily encrypted  laptop computer. With the assistance of 
Dutch Authorities evidence was gathered to link the circuit boards seized from BEECKMAN 
to similar compromises throughout Europe. 
 
Section 49 RIPA powers were  invoked  in  relation  to  the  laptop with BEECKMAN 
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refusing to disclose the encryption key. BEECKMAN pleaded guilty at court to offences of 
Possessions  of Articles  for Use  in  Fraud  and  RIPA  offences  and  received  a  sentence  of 
three  years.  This  operation  resulted  in  a  significant  drop  in  the  number  of  PED 
compromises throughout Europe and a better understanding throughout the  industry of 
such technological compromises. 
 
 
Assets:      
 Can relevant assets be traced? 
 Where are the assets located? 
 In what form are the assets? 
 Will Jurisdictional processes allow for their seizure and repatriation? 
 Who else is looking at the recovery of the assets? 
 Are any of the assets already subject to any criminal or civil recovery process?  
 Are the assets at risk? 
 Should a parallel financial investigation be commenced? 
 Are there any additional risks associated with a financial investigation? 
People:    
 Who are they?  
 Where are they?  
 How many are there? 
 Do they have any special needs or requirements? 
 What is their geographic spread? 
 Are they willing to cooperate with an investigation? 
 Can good evidence be obtained from them? 
 Are we in a legal position to detain suspects?  
 
3.1.14: Victim Management 
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The  investigation  of  crime  and  the  bringing  to  justice  of  an  offender(s)  is  a  core 
function of the Police Service; as is the care of our victims, not just in the physical sense of 
the word, such as tending to the wounds of the victim of an assault, but also to the mental 
and  social wounds  of  those  affected  by  fraud.  This  harm  is  not  quite  as  obvious  as  that 
sustained  in  a  serious  assault, but nevertheless,  the  intrinsic damage  caused  to both  the 
immediate victim and to the wider victims, such as family members, can be detrimental to 
them continuing to lead a secure way of life. 
In  the  investigation  of  fraud  it  is  essential  that,  amongst  the  intricacies  of  the 
investigation, the needs of victims are not forgotten and that the correct balance between 
engaging and getting the right result for them is achieved. 
Within  fraud  it  is  important  to  recognise not only  the primary victim but also any 
potential secondary victims. Although the  initial crime may be aimed at an  individual or a 
corporate  victim  (primary  victim),  fraud  will  ultimately  impact  on  other  individuals 
(secondary  victims);  for  example,  family  members  or  in  the  case  of  a  corporate,  those 
employed by the primary victim, or who may lose their jobs as a result. There may be other 
businesses  also  that  rely  on  the  primary  victim’s  existence  and  ability  to  function  at  full 
strength  and  so  the  domino  effect  takes  place.  Each  of  these  businesses  and  the  staff 
employed by  them are  secondary victims, each with  individual needs, who will  suffer  the 
effects at different levels. 
Although  the  secondary  victims  may  not  feature  as  an  integral  element  of  the 
investigation,  their  recognition  is  essential  for  the  accurate  measurement  of  the  harm 
caused and can be invaluable when presenting a case to a court. 
With some large scale frauds there can be a large number of victims, in some cases 
these can  reach  into  the hundreds and be spread across  the country or overseas.  It  is  for 
these reasons that within fraud investigations victims are considered a key strategic theme 
under sub activities, which, unless managed effectively, can become all encompassing and 
overwhelming to an investigator. 
In providing  support  to  victims of  fraud,  it  is  important  to  recognise  the needs of 
different  individuals  or  groups  and  how  best  to  communicate  with  them;  a  form  of 
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electronic  communication  sent  to an  IT aware  individual may not be  suitable  for another 
victim who is less IT aware.  
To assist in the prioritisation of vulnerable and intimidated victims see Guide to Risk 
Assessment  
When  developing  your  victim  management  strategy  consider  the  use  of  the 
following: 
 use of mail‐merge for sending bulk messages without disclosing recipients 
 website victims page secure/unsecure 
 web forum 
 automated telephone calls (call out) 
 pre‐recorded telephone mail box (call in) 
 Social Media 
 ‘victim’ APP (smart technology) 
 localised victim workshops. 
For further information on Victims and Witnesses see Victims & Witnesses  
 
3.1.15: Enforcement Options 
This  phase  of  the  investigative  process  is  the  opportunity  for  the  OIC  and/or 
supervisor  to  stand  back  and  assess  if  the  original  investigation  plan  and  supporting 
strategies are still appropriate prior to entering the Suspect Management phase. 
The  investigation plan would have been based on  the  information available during 
the original Investigative/desktop evaluation, which may be different to what is known now 
following  the  initial  phase  of  the  investigation. Drawing  on  the  outcomes  of  the  original 
evaluation and the initial investigation phase all of the material available should be assessed 
and scrutinised with view to following considerations: 
Appropriateness of the ‘End Game’? 
 Is it still proportionate to the crime? 
 Would an alternative outcome be more suitable? 
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Appropriateness of the ‘Investigative Parameters’? 
 Is the scope still applicable to the desired outcome? 
 Can  the  parameters  /  scope  be  streamlined  for  a  more  effective 
investigation?  
Multi‐track and Multi‐Agency working? 
 Does  the OIC/Investigation  team have  the  right  skills/expertise  to pursue a 
multi‐track investigation? 
 Have the correct agencies/organisations been engaged to enable appropriate 
multi‐track outcomes and sanctions? 
Is a formal investigation still appropriate? 
 Are  there  any  cross‐border  or  jurisdictional  risks  that  could  hinder  or 
undermine the investigation? 
 Would a formal investigation be in the public interest? 
 Are there any Social, Political or Community influences on the investigation? 
Could disruption be a more suitable outcome? 
 
3.1.16: Suspect Management  
The  identification  of  suspects  and  the  use  of  the  trace/interview/eliminate  (TIE) 
strategy are common to most criminal  investigations. For further  information see Working 
with Suspects  
In terms of a fraud investigation it may be appropriate to consider what category of 
fraudster you are dealing with prior to implementing a suspect or arrest strategy. In general 
terms those who commit fraud can fall in one of the below categories, however, this should 
not be seen as exhaustive or exclusive: 
1. Occasional: These are generally good people who have either strayed or been 
corrupted through need or necessity.  
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2. Opportunist: Career criminals who will turn their hand to any activity that will 
generate an income stream, often motivated by greed; although fraud is high 
yield and low risk, it is generally the preserve of the thinking criminal. 
3. Organised:  Fraud  is  a  crime  of  choice  for  many  organised  crime  groups 
because of remote nature by which it can be committed, the high returns and 
low risk of detection and prosecution. 
4. Operational:   Committed by  individuals as part of  their employment, often 
senior  in  position  with  considerable  power  and  influence  within  the 
organisation. 
A person suspected of committing fraud may fit neatly  into one of these or may sit 
across  two more  categories, whether  they  fit  neatly  into  one  category  is  not  important, 
what’s  important  is  the  recognition  of  those  involved  and  how  different  suspect  /  arrest 
strategies may yield greater results  if planned correctly; the strategy used for a member of 
an organised  crime group may not be applicable or as effective  if used  for a CEO of high 
standing from a major investment company 
The strategy for suspect management must also take into account the lifespan of the 
typical  fraud enquiry which, more often than not, can  last many months,  if not years; this 
impacts on how best to achieve best evidence from any interviews with suspects. 
A  common  response within  fraud  is  to undertake  an early  suspect  “First  account” 
interview  where,  rather  than  being  questioned,  they  are  just  given  the  opportunity  to 
provide their perspective of the allegations under investigation. The rationale behind this is 
based on the R v Howell case and the Judge’s direction that: 
 “Would any  innocent man not give an early explanation  in  the  face of a grounded 
allegation”? 
Therefore  when  conducted  correctly,  the  interview  could  help  in  countering  any 
defence bought up later. The downside is that, as their use is becoming more common, the 
defence are looking for ways to counter them.  
In relation to fraud, the defence tend to rely on the complexity of the allegation or 
the  inability  to  have  information  to  hand  as  reasons  for  silence.  Consideration  should 
therefore be given  in  individual circumstances as to what could reasonably be disclosed at 
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the early stage to support the “grounded allegation” if the information to hand at that time 
is just the allegation the value of the interview will be minimal. 
The traditional approach is still for searches and arrests to go hand in hand. Whilst it 
is accepted  that  in certain  instances  it  is necessary as part of a  long‐term enquiry,  its use 
legally  is now debatable.  In  some  instances  it  can be  counter‐productive due  to  the  vast 
amount  of  documentation  that  can  result  from  the  search,  especially  with  a  fraud 
investigation.  
To arrest or interview voluntarily, an individual after a search will mean that you will 
be interviewing with only a fraction of the evidence available and, if enough thought is given 
to  the  process,  it will  almost  certainly  lead  to  ‘no  comment’  interviews  and  can  provide 
more information to the suspect than is being gained.  
Strategically, searches and arrests should be considered separately as two important 
parts of the investigative process from day one of the enquiry. 
In  the  majority  of  serious  and  complex  fraud  investigations,  the  case  will  be 
document  heavy  which  will  make  its  defence  attractive  (financially)  to  solicitors  and 
barristers  who  specialise  in  the  subject  of  fraud.  By  the  very  nature  of  how  fraud  is 
committed  and  the  material  generated  during  the  investigation,  solicitors  will  try  and 
negotiate maximum disclosure to their benefit and that of their client by using their position 
to, in effect, disempower the investigator.  
It  should  be  noted  that  monies  belonging  to  the  suspect  which  are  subject  to 
restraint cannot be used to pay for legal advice and services. 
The primary tactic used by defence teams is to focus on the complexity of the case, 
so  an  objective  for  the  interviewer  is  to  simplify  the  offences  and  processes  in  order  to 
reduce the opportunities for the defence to claim lack of understanding.  
 
3.1.17: Further Investigation 
Within fraud investigation if an investigation has reached the ‘Suspect Management 
phase’  then  it  is  vital  that  a  clear  plan  is  in  place,  with  an  established  end  game  and 
preferred  outcomes.    However,  during  the  investigation,  further  information  will  almost 
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always  come  to  light  that  in  any  other  investigation  may  justify  a  revision  to  the 
investigative parameters, offences under  consideration or  inclusion of new  suspects.  It  is 
often as a result of this additional  information that  ‘mission creep’ sets  in and the original 
investigation can  lose  focus, grow unnecessarily complex and more often than not extend 
the length of the investigation.   
The  investigator must decide  if  the new  information has a material  impact on  the 
case in hand and decide if it is ‘in scope’ or ‘out of scope’. If it is out of scope that does not 
necessarily mean that it will not be investigated, it just means that it will not be investigated 
as part of  this particular case, maintaining  investigative  integrity without allowing mission 
creep to set in. 
An example of such a situation would be where a suspect  is under  investigation for 
targeting elderly and vulnerable victims with a fraudulent investment scheme. The focus of 
the  investigation  is Fraud by False Representation with a parallel  financial  investigation  to 
recover  the  proceeds  of  crime. During  the  investigation  information  comes  to  light  that 
suggests  the suspect obtained  lists of potential suspects and  their contact details  from an 
individual engaged in care for the elderly. 
The investigator has two main options: 
1. Extend the scope of the investigation to include the new line of enquiry. 
2. Park the new information and set aside for a separate investigation. 
Considerations to be taken into would include: 
Option 1 – 
 How does the new information relate to preferred end game? 
 Would  the  case  against  the  suspect be  strengthened  if  this  line of enquiry 
was pursued? 
 If  the  line  of  enquiry  was  pursued,  but  not  proven,  would  it  damage  the 
current investigation? 
 If the line of enquiry is not pursued, would there be any repercussions for the 
investigation? 
 What would be the resource requirements of pursuing this line of enquiry? 
 How is it likely to impact on the timeframe for the investigation? 
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 Is  there  an  obligation  under  CPIA  to  pursue  this  as  a  reasonable  line  of 
enquiry that could assist the defence or undermine the prosecution case? 
Option 2 – 
 Is  the new  information  relevant and necessary  to  the  investigation  in hand 
and the preferred end game? 
 If the new information is parked, would it justify a separate investigation? 
 If a separate investigation was pursued would it be an abuse of process, or a 
legitimate investigative strategy? 
 Would a separate or subsequent investigation be hindered or jeopardised by 
the current investigation? 
 Should a separate investigation be conducted independently but in parallel? 
There  is no definitive  answer, every  case  and  all new  information will have  to be 
assessed on its own merits, in the above example let’s now consider: 
The  person  providing  the  contact  list  to  the  suspect  works  for  a  governmental 
agency, they were not a party to the subsequent criminal activity but did receive a benefit 
for the supply of the data, which was a breach of the agency’s policies and procedures, as 
well  a potential breach of  various  criminal  statutes. Although, on  the  surface,  this would 
appear to be a simple Fraud by Abuse of Position which could be viewed as the enabler for 
the  above  case,  its  investigation  could  add  considerable  complexity  to  the  original 
investigation, consider: 
 What other offences could the conduct constitute? 
o Bribery Act offences – paying and receiving an advantage? 
o Misconduct in Public Office? 
o Conspiracy to Defraud? 
 Have there been any other data breaches to this or to any other persons? 
 Is the suspect a sole agent or are there others within the same organisation 
involved? 
 What are the implications for the existing financial investigation? 
 Does the agency in question have an investigative capability and what are the 
implications of a joint investigation? 
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These  are  just  a  few  of  the  considerations  but  it  is  clear  that, without  giving  full 
consideration to new information and the potential this may have on the investigation, the 
resulting actions could be detrimental to the achievement of the agreed end game.  
For routine Further Investigation considerations see: Further Investigation  
  
3.1.18: Evidential Evaluation 
Even when  the process of  investigating  fraud has been  simplified,  the  length of  a 
typical investigation can be considerably longer than the average criminal investigation; so it 
is  imperative  that progress of  the  investigation  and  the material  gathered  are  subject  to 
regular review and evaluation. This will allow the investigator and the supervisor to ensure 
that the investigation is still on track and that mission creep hasn’t caused a loss of focus or 
expansion to the  investigative parameters, which  is easily done  in prolonged and complex 
fraud investigations.  
When  conducting  the  evidential  evaluation,  the  investigator  should  revisit  the  4 
prevention questions as,  the more an  investigation progresses,  the more  information  that 
may  be  available  to  inform  further  preventative  activities.  In  addition,  the  investigative 
evaluation  is also an opportunity to revisit the original decisions on disruption, alternative 
sanctions and  joint working.  In addition to the formal  investigative & evidential evaluation 
objectives, the evaluation of fraud cases should also identify: 
 confirmation and alignment to the investigative hypothesis 
 conformity with the agreed investigative parameters 
 suitability of preferred end game/sanctions 
 new learning or intelligence 
 reassessment of the public interest considerations 
 delivery of value for money (appropriate to the crime under investigation) 
 ongoing resource implications and considerations 
 alternative outcomes or discontinuance of the formal investigation. 
For  further  information  on  evidential  evaluations  see:  Investigative  /  Evidential 
Evaluation  
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3.1.19: Result / Conclusion 
Unlike  the  traditional  investigative model where  the ultimate  goal was  arrest  and 
charge in anticipation of criminal conviction, with the Fraud Investigation Model the priority 
is  the  effective  and  timely  removal  of  the  threat  and  protection  of  victims  from  further 
harm.  To  achieve  this,  investigators  look  to  implement  the  most  effective  solution,  or 
sanction,  without  being  constricted  to  purely  criminal  processes  and  procedures.  It  is 
therefore  important  that  organisations  recognise  alternative  outcomes  as  a  successful 
conclusion and cases are closed appropriately. 
Some  refer  to  this  as  ‘the  Al  Capone  strategy’  whereby  the  notorious  organised 
crime  boss,  whom  the  authorities  struggled  to  build  a  case  around  his  organised  crime 
activities, secured a prosecution for evasion of tax.  
 
3.1.20: Operational and Organisational Learning 
There are  relatively  few  ‘new’  frauds; most  fraud  is  theft employing  some  form of 
deception  or  false  representation  and  is  increasingly  facilitated  using  new  methods  and 
technologies. Because of the rate at which  fraudsters diversify and change their  ‘MO’,  it  is 
imperative that a system  for capturing and disseminating operational  learning through the 
use  of  structured  debriefs  is  embedded within  the  investigative  process.  As  a minimum, 
structured debriefs should be conducted: 
 at the conclusion of all contested trials 
 on any other investigations where significant learning could be obtained 
 where  input  from  other  appropriate  partner  agencies  may  provide  an 
alternative insight or learning opportunity. 
The  process  of  structured  debriefs  focuses  on  the  following  aspects  of  the 
investigation: 
 What went well? 
 What didn’t go so well? 
 What would you do again next time? 
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 What advice would you give someone else investigating a similar fraud? 
The process  is relatively straightforward and quick to complete for routine cases,  in 
more complex cases it may be necessary to separate out areas or stages of the investigation 
and conduct separate debriefs for each. These could be: 
 pre Investigation & intelligence phase 
 warrants, search & seizure  
 arrests & interviews 
 international working / enquiries 
 inter‐agency working 
 case building and disclosure 
 post charge / court. 
At the conclusion of the structured debrief, the facilitator of the session compiles a 
structured de‐brief report, using a standardised template in order to maintain consistency in 
the presentation of outcomes, learning and recommendations. 
For an example of structured report see: Debrief Report 
 
Case Study: Operation Learning Operation Rye 
 
The  defendant  in  this  investigation,  Kweku  Adoboli,  was  charged  on  the  16th 
September  2011  with  offences  of  false  accounting  and  fraud  by  abuse  of  a  position  in 
relation to his activities as a trader while employed by a leading bank. His arrest followed an 
internal  investigation  in  which  the  defendant  made  voluntary  admissions  that  he  had 
conducted trading in breach of limits set by his managers and had, also, falsified records in 
an  attempt  to  conceal  the  bank’s  true  trading  position.  The  defendant’s  unauthorized 
trading resulted in a loss to the bank in the region of USD2.3 billion. 
 
Although  this  case was  successfully  investigated  and prosecuted  a  year  and  a day 
after  the  offending,  it  was  felt  that,  due  to  the  sheer  scale  and  complexity  of  the 
investigation,  a  structured  debrief  be  carried  out  in  order  to  identify  key  areas  of 
operational learning. 
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The structured debrief was carried out by using a recognized method and was held 
on the 9th January 2013; key personnel  involved  in both the  investigation and prosecution 
were in attendance (including representatives from the Crown Prosecution Service).  
 
The debrief concentrated on various stages of  the  investigation and, also,  included 
difficulties  experienced  during  the  actual  prosecution.  A  summary  of  the  identified  key 
learning points were as follows:  
 
1. A  list  of  independent  experts  should  be  kept  and  maintained  to  assist  in  future 
investigations of similar complexity.  
2. Consideration should be given to identifying if a major fraud should be deemed to be 
a ‘critical incident’, particularly if the investigation is likely to affect the reputation of 
the force or significantly impact on resources. 
3. Consideration should be given to the training of non‐fraud officers who might well 
provide  the  initial  response  to an allegation of  fraud.  (It was suggested  that a crib 
sheet  be  written  to  ensure  maximum  use  of  golden  hour  opportunities  were 
understood and acted upon). 
4. The media office should be contacted as soon as possible with a clear strategy put in 
place  to  manage  media  enquiries,  particularly  with  a  significant  fraud  attracting 
widespread media coverage (this strategy must also ensure that there are sufficient 
press officers at court during the trial to prevent distraction to the officer in the case 
and harassment of the witnesses and victims when arriving and leaving court. 
5. A  third  party  single  point  of  contact  should  be  identified  within  the  victim 
organization  in order  to  assist with disclosure.  It was only when  a  single point of 
contact  had  been  identified,  that  communication  between  the  investigator  and 
victim  organization  became  less  strained  (due  to  the  rationale  and  relevance  for 
material requested being properly explained). 
6. That,  where  possible,  there  is  continuity  in  the  personnel  involved  in  the 
investigation and prosecution.  
 
The findings of the debrief have been widely disseminated through those attending 
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the  specialist  fraud  investigation  training;  additionally,  many  of  the  significant  learning 
points have been incorporated into case studies used to train investigators. The findings of 
the  report have also been  shared with  the College of Policing  to ensure  that  the  learning 
opportunities can be captured in national learning descriptors for fraud investigation as well 
as  assisting  in  identifying  future  national  occupational  standards  for  the  investigation  of 
fraud.  
 
There is a current investigation into a similar fraud involving a ‘rogue trader’ and the 
learning obtained through Operation Rye is currently heavily influencing the strategy. 
 
 
3.2: Multi‐Track Investigations 
A multi‐track  investigation  is one where  the  investigator develops an  investigative 
strategy  that  combines  the  requirements  of  the  investigative  and  sanctions  processes 
consistently to ensure: 
 the most effective and appropriate investigation is conducted, and 
 the most effective and appropriate sanction(s) is/are applied. 
The  advantage of  a multi‐track  investigation  is  in  its  flexibility  and  the message  it 
sends out in deterring others from committing similar offences.  
This approach encourages working with partner organisations on joint investigations 
where the potential sanction or end game sits with a partner agency, such as an offence of 
‘cheating the public revenue’ which sits within the specialism of Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs or where a solicitor, who has facilitated frauds against clients could be disbarred, a 
sanction available to the Solicitors Regulation Authority. 
Below  is  an outline of  the different processes  that  could be  followed  and  a  short 
overview  of  some  of  different  sanctions  that  could  be  utilised  within  multi‐track 
investigations: 
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Criminal Prosecution  
The advantages of a criminal prosecution extend beyond the prosecution itself as the 
threat of a criminal prosecution can, at times, secure the cooperation of the fraudster and 
the publicity of criminal investigation can have a general deterrent effect. 
The Crown brings most cases but there is a provision for individuals or organisations 
to instigate a private prosecution under Section 6 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.   
There are a number of organisations that regularly use private prosecution including 
the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the League against Cruel Sports, 
and the Federation Against Copyright Theft. 
 
Civil Processes 
There  are  a  variety  of  civil  torts  which  can  be  used  in  fraud  cases  to  pursue 
fraudsters for losses and damages. Usually the desired outcome is to freeze the defendant's 
assets with a view to bringing them to the table to negotiate a settlement out of court.  
Within law enforcement there is sometimes a reluctance to use civil processes as the 
cases  and  sanctions  do  not  lead  to  the  fraudster  receiving  a  criminal  record  and  the 
perception by the public is sometimes that, without a criminal prosecution, the police have 
not fulfilled their duty. 
Although  previously  rare  within  policing  and  law  enforcement,  this  approach  is 
common  to  a  large  number  of  organisations,  either  as  the  main  sanction  or  alongside 
criminal  prosecutions.  Their  end  game  is  to  secure  damages  and  restitution  from  the 
perpetrator.  
 
Regulatory sanctions 
Where a  fraudster holds a  form of accreditation or  licence and  they are  found  to 
have  committed  an  offence  of  fraud,  an  option  may  be  to  get  them  disciplined  by  the 
regulatory body. 
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Some of most high profile cases utilising this approach have been achieved by NHS 
Protect which, on a number of occasions, have secured additional sanctions against medical 
practitioners,  with  the  ultimate  sanction  being  suspension  or  erasure  (barred  from 
practicing).  
The  police  service  are  favouring  this  process  as  a means  to  effectively work with 
partner agencies  from  the regulatory sector  in dealing with professional enablers, such as 
financial advisors, solicitors, accountants and surveyors.  
 
Staff disciplinary 
Sanctions against fraudsters who work for the ‘victim’ organisation can be as simple 
as staff disciplinary action. This can range from warnings, suspension, and demotion to the 
ultimate sanction of dismissal.  
 
Parallel Sanctions 
Once  an  investigation has been planned  and  a  suitable  ‘end  game’  identified,  the 
result  or  outcome  does  not  need  be  limited  to  one  process,  there  are  a  number  of 
opportunities to pursue parallel sanctions such as: 
 staff disciplinary process and civil litigation 
 staff disciplinary process and a criminal prosecution 
 staff disciplinary process, civil litigation and a criminal prosecution 
 civil litigation and a criminal prosecution 
 civil litigation and regulatory sanctions. 
    However  there  must  be  careful  consideration  of  how  these  processes  are 
coordinated,  both  chronologically  and  operationally.  (I.e.  criminal  cases  take  precedence 
over civil remedies etc). 
 
Joint Investigations & Alternative Sanctions available to the Fraud Investigator 
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UK Borders & Immigration (UKBA) 
In cases where there is a joint investigation with the Police and UKBA, the police will 
normally  lead  the  investigation and  the CPS will be  the prosecuting body. Meetings at an 
early stage of the investigation or case preparation are recommended to outline steps that 
should  be  taken  to  agree  case  progression. Working  in  partnership with UK Borders  and 
Immigration can enable access to the following outcomes and sanctions: 
 Obtaining Leave to remain in the UK by Deception ‐ Immigration Act 1971  
 Remaining  beyond  Time  Limited  by  Leave  (overstaying)  ‐  Immigration  Act 
1971  
 Possession  of  Immigration  Stamps  or  replica  Immigration  Stamps  ‐ 
Immigration Act 1971  
 Employment of Illegal Immigrants ‐ Asylum and Immigration Act 1996  
 Forgery and Counterfeiting and Offences, Forgery & Counterfeiting Act 1981 
 Identity Document Offences, Identity Documents Act 2010 
Full details and guidance on each of these offences is available at: CPS & Immigration 
 
HMRC 
Following the merger of the CPS with the Revenue and Customs Prosecutions Office 
a more robust and consistent fraud prosecution capability has been developed to tackle the 
increasing levels of fraud and tax evasion committed against the HMRC. 
The  CPS,  in  conjunction  with  HMRC,  has  taken  a  public  stance  to  increase  the 
number of tax fraud and evasion cases prosecuted.  
Working with the HMRC and the CPS it is possible to successfully prosecute, not only 
individuals,  groups  and organised  criminals who evade  tax or excise duty, but  also  those 
who set up sophisticated but dishonest tax avoidance schemes. 
The  concept  of  joint  working  with  the  HMRC  will  be  more  common  to  fraud 
investigators  as  the majority  of  fraudsters  are  reluctant  to  declare  proceeds  of  crime  as 
income for revenue and tax purposes.  
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Revenue  or  tax  related  fraud  (including  VAT)  as  it  is  commonly  referred  is 
investigated  by  Her  Majesty's  Customs  and  Revenue  (HMRC)  or  by  the  National  Crime 
Agency. 
The main tax related fraud offences are: 
 fraudulent evasion of income tax 
 fraudulent evasion of VAT 
 cheating the public revenue 
 providing false documents or information to HMRC 
 fraudulent evasion of excise duty on imported goods or smuggling goods. 
The majority of tax related fraud offences are created by statute, with the exception 
of the cheating the public revenue, which is a common law offence, preserved by the Theft 
Act 1968. 
Most  offences  are  triable  either‐way  with  the  exception  of  cheating  the  public 
revenue, which is indictable only. 
 
Fraudulent evasion of income tax  
The Taxes Management Act 1970 (TMA 1970)  imposes criminal  liability on a person 
who  is  'knowingly concerned  '  in  the  fraudulent evasion of  income  tax by him or another 
person. A person will be 'knowingly concerned' if he had both knowledge (rather than mere 
suspicion) and actual involvement in the fraud.  
 
Fraudulent evasion of VAT  
The Value Added Tax Act 1994 (VATA 1994) creates specific offences relating to the 
deliberate non‐payment of VAT.  
Criminal liability will arise under the VATA 1994 if a person: 
 is  '  knowingly  concerned'  in  'fraudulent evasion'  (e.g.  knows  that money  is 
owed but deliberately fails to submit tax returns or creates false accounts) or 
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if he purposefully takes steps to evade  liability  (e.g.  fails to register  for VAT 
and to keep proper accounts), or 
 acquires possession of  goods or deals with  goods or  accepts  the  supply of 
services, having reason to believe that VAT has been or will be evaded, or 
 furnishes  information  that  is  false,  with  intent  to  deceive  or  makes  a 
statement  that he knows  to be  false or  recklessly makes a  false  statement 
(e.g. suppresses sales or inflates purchases). 
 
Cheating the public revenue  
The  common‐law  offence  of  cheating  the  public  revenue  includes  any  form  of 
fraudulent conduct which results in depriving the HMRC of money to which it is entitled.  
There  is  an  overlap  between  the  offence  of  cheating  the  public  revenue  and  the 
statutory  tax  related  offences.  Cheating  the  public  revenue  is  a  'conduct  offence'  and 
therefore the prosecution does not need to prove that the defendant caused actual loss.  
The offence carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment (or an unlimited fine). 
 
Providing false documents and information to HMRC  
The Customs and Excise Management Act 1979  (CEMA 1979) creates  two offences 
specifically  relating  to  false  declarations  to  HMRC.  Both  offences  require  proof  that  a 
declaration was false in a 'material particular'.  
The  difference  between  the  two  offences  lies  in  the mens  rea  required  for  each 
offence. One offence is a strict liability offence, and therefore requires no proof of intention 
whilst the other offence can only be committed 'knowingly or recklessly'. 
 
Fraudulent evasion of duty  
The CEMA 1970 creates two offences relating to the evasion of duty (tax) payable on 
goods.  
Both offences involve the deliberate non‐payment of tax such as: 
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 customs duty on the importation of certain goods from outside the European 
Union (EU) 
 excise duty payable on alcohol products and tobacco, and 
 VAT on goods imported to the UK from outside the EU. 
The provisions are drafted  so  that  the offences  can be  committed  in a number of 
ways  and  will  often  include  activities  such  as  the  possession,  concealment,  disposal  or 
removal of goods. The statute refers to  'any fraudulent evasion' or  'attempt at evasion' so 
the reach of provisions is therefore very wide. 
More information on the prosecution of tax related fraud can be found at: CPS & Tax 
Evasion 
 
Single Fraud Investigation Service (SFIS) 
The  CPS  are  now  the  prosecuting  body  for  Benefit  and  Tax  Credit  fraud  and  the 
following guidelines set  out  the  factors  that  prosecutors  should  take  into  account  when 
considering these cases and whether to send cases to the Crown Court, these may also act 
as  the aggravating  factors  that prosecutors will draw  to  the  sentencing  court's attention. 
These include: 
 whether the fraud was professionally planned 
 whether the fraud was carried out over a significant period of time 
 whether multiple frauds occurred  
 use of a false or stolen identity 
 relevant  previous  convictions/cautions/previous  out  of  court  disposals  for 
benefit fraud 
 an attempt to conceal or dispose of evidence 
 abuse of a position of trust 
 substantial consequential loss to public funds. 
The most common frauds occur as a result of:  
 
Failure to declare true financial circumstances 
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E.g.  employment  (paid  or  unpaid,  employed  or  self‐employed  work),  household 
income  of  any  kind,  capital  (including  savings,  properties  owned,  investments,  student 
status  (including  loans  or  grants),  outgoings  over  declared  (including  rent  or  childcare), 
nursery care. 
 
Failure to declare true social, personal or family circumstances  
E.g. living with a partner as husband and wife, children leaving, dependants dying 
 
Disability related fraud  
E.g. unreported  improvement  in mobility or diminished care needs (Disability Living 
Allowance  cases),  unreported  improved  capacity  to  work  (Incapacity  Benefit  and 
Employment and Support Allowance cases) 
 
Identity or organised fraud  
E.g. applying  for national  insurance numbers, benefits, payments or other  financial 
advantage,  using  a  false  or  hijacked  identity  and/or  false  identity  documents  in  support; 
forgery and counterfeiting, or an organised attack or manipulation of the welfare payment 
system such as a cyber attack, internal or contract fraud.  
The majority  of  prosecutions  for  Benefit  and  Tax  Credit  frauds  are  under  section 
111A of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 (SSAA) or the Fraud Act 2006.  
Where the defendant has provided  false  information or made  false declarations or 
representations in the claim for benefit, it is likely that the majority of prosecutions will be 
brought under: 
 Section 111A(1)(a) SSAA 1992 ‐ dishonestly making a  false representation to 
obtain benefit 
 Section  111A(1)(b) SSAA  1992 ‐  dishonestly  producing  or  furnishing  false 
information or documents to obtain benefit  
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 Section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006  ‐ dishonestly making a  false representation 
with intent to gain or cause loss 
Where the defendant has made an initial legitimate claim for benefit but then fails to 
report a change which affects entitlement, the majority of prosecutions will most  likely be 
brought under: 
 Section  111A  (1A)  SSAA  1992  ‐  dishonestly  failing  to  notify  a  change  in 
circumstances affecting entitlement to benefit; or 
 Section 3 of the Fraud Act 2006 ‐ fraud by failing to disclose information 
Where tax credit fraud is alleged, these will most likely be brought under: 
 Section 35 of  the Tax Credit Act 2002  ‐  knowingly  concerned  in  fraudulent 
activity undertaken with a view to obtaining payments of tax credits; or 
 Section 2 or section 3 of the Fraud Act 2006 
More information on the prosecution of Befit and Tax Credit Fraud can be found at: 
CPS & Benefit / Tax Credit Prosecutions 
 
Intellectual Property Office (IPO) 
The IPO are the official government body responsible for Intellectual Property (IP) 
rights in the United Kingdom. These rights include: 
 patents 
 designs 
 trademarks 
 copyright. 
The  IPO has a dedicated enforcement arm and  their  Intelligence hub holds a wide 
range of national and international intelligence on all areas of Intellectual Property. The IPO 
works closely with Trading Standards, HM Revenue & Customs, the National Crime Agency 
and the newly formed Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit.  
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If you own an intellectual property (IP) right such as a copyright, design, patent or 
trademark, then others cannot manufacture, use, sell or import it without prior permission. 
Unauthorised use of someone's IP can be classed as IP crime and may lead to prosecution. 
Trademark infringement generally relates to counterfeiting whilst a breach of 
copyright can be piracy. 
Examples of counterfeiting could include fake: 
 clothing  
 footwear 
 handbags 
 pharmaceuticals. 
Examples of piracy could be DVDs, CDs or CD ROMs of unauthorised copies of: 
 music 
 software 
 films 
 games. 
Key offences applicable to Intellectual property offences are: 
Trade Marks Act 1994, (Penalty of up to 10years on indictment) 
 S92 ‐ Unauthorised use of a trademark 
Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988, (Penalty of up to 10years on indictment) 
 S107 ‐ Criminal liability for making or dealing with infringing article 
 S198 Criminal liability for making, dealing with or using illicit recordings 
 296ZB Devices and services designed to circumvent technological measures 
 297 Offence of fraudulently receiving programmes 
 297A Unauthorised decoders 
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For more information see IPO  
Alternative Sanctions available to the Fraud Investigator (General) 
 
Restraint Order (POCA) 
A Restraint Order  is the equivalent to a civil freezing order, but  is used for criminal 
investigations under the Proceeds of Crime  legislation. As with the civil freezing order,  it  is 
designed  to stop  the suspected  fraudster hiding or spending  the assets. A Restraint Order 
can be obtained before conviction where confiscation will be pursued. 
 
Serious Crime Prevention Orders (SCPO) 
SCPOs  were  established  under  the  Serious  Crime  Act  2007  and  enable  the  DPP, 
Director of Serious  Fraud Office and DPP Northern  Ireland  to make an application  to  the 
High Court  (non‐convicted) or Crown Court  (for a convicted person). These are  for serious 
crimes, which include fraud, counterfeiting etc. 
A SCPO can contain prohibitions, restrictions, requirements and other  terms which 
are  considered  appropriate  to  protecting  the public  and  preventing  or  disrupting  serious 
crime. The CPS guidance on SCPO identifies a wide range of potential restrictions relating to: 
 financial, property or business dealings; 
 working arrangements; 
 with whom a person associates or communicates and the means used to do 
so; 
 the premises he/she is allowed to use and for what purpose; 
 the use of any item and 
 travel both within UK and abroad. 
A SCPO can  last  for up  to 5 years and a breach of a SCPO, on summary conviction 
carries up to 12 months  imprisonment or 5 years on  indictment. They can also be applied 
against  bodies  corporate,  a  partnership  and  unincorporated  association. Breach  by  these 
can lead to a winding up order.  
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Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOCPA) Agreements 
Sections 71  to 75 of  The  Serious Organised Crime  and Police Act 2005  ('the 2005 
Act') came  into  force on 7th April 2005 and established a statutory  framework  to  replace 
earlier arrangements  for regulating agreements made with offenders who have offered to 
assist the investigation or prosecution of offences committed by others. 
Full  Immunity  ‐ Section 71 of  the 2005 Act provides  that  if a  'specified prosecutor' 
thinks  that  for  the  purposes  of  the  investigation  or  prosecution  of  any  offence  it  is 
appropriate  to offer  any person  immunity  from prosecution, he may  give  that person  an 
immunity notice. 
Restricted use undertakings  ‐ Section 72 provides that  if a  'specified prosecutor' thinks 
that for the purposes of the investigation or prosecution of any offence it is appropriate to 
offer any person an undertaking that information of any description will not be used in any 
criminal or confiscation proceedings or civil recovery under Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002  (civil  recovery of  the proceeds of unlawful  conduct) he may  give  that person  a 
restricted use undertaking. Any such undertaking must be given in writing 
As with section 71, section 72 has been amended by section 113 of  the Coroners and 
Justice Act  2009  to  provide  that while  a  person who  assists  the  authorities  under  those 
powers can be offered  immunity  in respect of any offence they may have committed, the 
assistance  must  be  in  relation  to  the  investigation  or  prosecution  of  an  offence  that  is 
capable of being tried in the Crown Court 
Section 73 agreements relate to those co‐operating defendants who have not benefited 
from  an  immunity  from  prosecution  or  a  restricted  use  undertaking  but  who  have, 
nonetheless,  assisted or offered  to  assist  in  the  investigation or prosecution of others. A 
defendant who pursuant to a written agreement with a specified prosecutor has provided 
or  who  has  offered  to  provide  assistance  to  an  investigator  or  prosecutor  is  eligible  to 
receive a reduction in sentence provided he has entered a guilty plea. 
Section 74 allows a specified prosecutor to refer a sentence back to the sentencing court 
(i.e.  the  Crown  Court)  for  review  if  certain  conditions  are met  and  the  defendant  is  still 
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serving  the  sentence.    The  review  itself  is  not  an  appeal  against  sentence.  It  is  a  fresh 
process which takes place because new circumstances have arisen, such as: 
a. the defendant received a reduced sentence on the basis of a written agreement to 
assist, but then knowingly failed to any extent to give assistance in accordance with 
the agreement); 
b. the defendant received a reduced sentence on the basis of a written agreement to 
assist, and then in pursuance of a separate agreement gives or agrees to give further 
assistance; 
c. the defendant did not receive a discounted sentence but  in pursuance of a written 
agreement  subsequently  gives  or  offers  to  give  assistance  in  connection  with 
investigating or prosecuting an offence. 
 
In sentence review cases under section 74, applications can be made under section 
75 of SOCPA to exclude people from court, impose reporting restrictions or for the court to 
sit in camera. 
 
Financial Reporting Orders (FRO) 
FROs  were  established  under  the  Serious  Organised  Crime  Prevention  Act  2005. 
Upon  conviction  of  a  listed  offence,  which  includes  Fraud,  the  court  may  make  an 
application for a FRO when  it  is believed there  is further risk of such a  listed offence been 
committed. 
These can last for up to 5 years in a magistrate’s court and 15 years in a crown court. 
In  essence  they  require  the  individual  to make  regular  reports  concerning  their  financial 
situation. 
 
Disqualification from Acting as a Company Director 
Under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, where a person is convicted 
of an  indictable offence which  is  linked  to a company, or the management of a company, 
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they  can be disqualified  from being  a  company director  for up  to  5  years  in magistrates 
court and 15 years in crown court. 
 
Disqualification from Driving 
A person can be disqualified from driving for any period the court sees fit.  Although 
this  is not a typical sanction associated with fraud, powers contained within the Powers of 
Criminal Courts  (Sentencing) Act 2000, allow  the court to disqualify a person  from driving 
when a vehicle has been used for the purpose of criminal activity. 
 
Compensation Order, Restitution Order, Deprivation Order and Confiscation Order 
There are a number of orders which can be made by the courts on conviction.  
Compensation  Orders  are  covered  by  sections  130  ‐  133  Powers  of  Criminal  Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000 which are orders for the offender to pay compensation to the victim. 
From  3  December  2012,  section  63  of  the  Legal  Aid,  Sentencing  and  Punishment  of 
Offenders  Act  2012  inserts  section  130(2A)  providing:  "A  court  must  consider  making  a 
compensation  order  in  any  case  where  this  section  empowers  it  to  do  so".  This  new 
requirement  is  in  addition  to  the  long‐standing  requirement  in  section  130(3)  to  "give 
reasons...if it does not make a compensation order..." 
Restitution  orders  are  covered  by  sections  148‐149  Power  of  Criminal  Court 
(Sentencing)  Act  2000  and  are  similar  to  compensation  orders  but  instead  return  the 
property  to  the  victim or  assets  seized  from  the offender  to  the  value  to be paid  to  the 
victim. 
Deprivation  Orders  are  covered  by  Section  143  Powers  of  Criminal  Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000 governs the powers of the courts to deprive an offender of property, 
used, or  intended  to be used  to  commit or  facilitate  the  commission of any offence  (not 
necessarily  the  offence  of  which  the  offender  has  been  convicted);  facilitation  includes 
taking steps to dispose of the property or avoid conviction. 
A Confiscation Order can be made where the offender is deemed to have benefited 
financially from their offending  in accordance with the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Assets 
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and  monies  seized  from  this  order,  however,  go  to  the  Treasury  and  law  enforcement 
agencies (only when there is no Compensation Order against those assets). 
 
Freezing Orders 
Freezing orders are not technically a sanction, but by freezing an  individual’s assets 
they end up becoming a limited sanction. They must form part of a civil suit and their aim is 
to  restrain  the  assets  of  the  defendant  so  they  cannot  spend  or  hide  them  during  any 
parallel process. Freezing Orders are often used with the aim of bringing the defendant to 
the table to negotiate a settlement. 
 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPA) 
DPAs were  introduced  in  Schedule  17  of  the  Crime  and  Courts Act  2013  and  are 
applicable to cases of fraud, bribery and other economic crime. They apply to organisations, 
not individuals.  
Under  a  DPA  a  prosecutor  charges  a  company  with  a  criminal  offence  but 
proceedings are automatically suspended. The company agrees to a number of conditions, 
such  as  paying  a  financial  penalty,  paying  compensation  and  co‐operating  with  future 
prosecutions of individuals. If the company does not honour the conditions, the prosecution 
may resume. 
DPAs are designed to avoid  lengthy and expensive prosecutions with the prolonged 
uncertainty they bring  for the victims, blameless employees and others dependent on the 
fortunes of the company. At present, when a company is convicted of a criminal offence, a 
court can impose a fine or put it out of business by winding it up. Both these outcomes can 
cause collateral damage to employees and shareholders who may be blameless. 
DPAs avoid that and provide a welcome addition to the prosecutor's tool kit for use 
in appropriate circumstances.  A DPA could be appropriate where the public interest is not 
best served by mounting a prosecution.  
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In February 2014 the SFO published a Joint Code of Practice with the CPS on the use 
of DPAs following a consultation.  The most important features of the DPA regime outlined 
in the code are judicial oversight, and unequivocal (full and genuine) cooperation from the 
corporate. 
 
3.3: International Investigations 
With  the  increased  use  of  technology,  criminals  have  evolved  and  learnt  how  to 
commit  traditional  crimes  in new  and  innovative ways, often  remotely, with  the  criminal 
enterprise located outside of the country in which the victims’ live. This has resulted in the 
need  for  investigators  involved  in  serious  and  complex  fraud  operations  to  consider 
international  and  cross‐border  enquiries  in  excess  of  what  is  achievable  through  the 
traditional  process  of  the  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  Treaty  (MLAT)  and  the  use  of 
International Letters of Request.  
For more  information on  traditional models of Cross‐border working see European 
Investigations  
It  is  becoming more  common within  serious  and  complex  fraud  investigations  to 
instigate  joint  investigations with the countries where the criminal enterprise  is operating.  
Although great use can be made of the MLAT and Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) sometimes 
a  more  effective  and  sustainable  solution  can  be  achieved  through  the  agreement  of 
international working and intelligence sharing protocols, often achieved through the use of 
a MOU and facilitated by the NCA. 
 
Case Study: Op Wardour 
In Jan 2014 representatives of UK law enforcement visited China to attend a number 
of  formal meetings with Chinese  law enforcement which had been  arranged by  the NCA 
Attaché at British Embassy Beijing.    
The purpose of the visit was to commence an exchange programme between both 
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countries with the aim of; 
 Identifying and exploring future routes of communication between UK and China 
LEA’s regarding cross jurisdictional IP Crime issues 
 Agree protocols concerning the sharing of intelligence between UK and China  
 Share  information &  intelligence of UK & Chinese OCG’s with Ministry of Public 
Security (MPS) via relevant competent authorities 
 For both countries to  formally receive requests  for assistance  , via the relevant 
competent authorities , to dismantle/disrupt OCG’s concerned in IP Crime  
UK  law  enforcement  made  a  request  of  the  Public  Security  Bureau  (PSB)  for 
assistance with an investigation concerning UK national arrested 2013 in Shanghai linked to 
existing UK based OCG. (Op Wardour)  
In  March  2014  search  warrants  were  executed  and  arrests  made  based  on 
intelligence supplied by the Chinese. This intelligence proved to be accurate and helped lead 
to  the disruption of an existing UK based OCG  involved  in  the  importation of  counterfeit 
goods into the UK.  
 
 In addition  to  intelligence  sharing  initiatives cross border partnership working can 
focus  on  medium  to  long  term  arrangements  where  there  is  a  need  for  a  sustained 
collaborative approach.  
 
Case Study Project Sandpiper 
Project Sandpiper  is a European Commission funded project  in which the Dedicated 
Cheque and plastic Crime Unit  (DCPCU) has partnered with  the Romanian National Police 
(RNP)  to  tackle  Romanian  organised  crime  groups  that  are  impacting  on  the  payments 
industry in the UK and Romania.  
 
The two year project has seen significant operational successes and to date twenty 
officers from both the DCPCU and RNP have benefitted from international secondments and 
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the  legacy  of  the  project will  be  the  establishing  of  a  strong  and  effective  collaboration 
between UK and Romanian law enforcement.  
 
Operation Sandhaven  is one such case which has been developed from this project 
and relates to a Romanian Organised Crime Group engaged in significant ATM crime in and 
around London.  
 
Through intelligence developed under Project Sandpiper, DCPCU officers executed a 
number of search warrants and made multiple arrests. Computer equipment seized, when 
examined revealed 36,688 unique compromised UK card numbers and this activity alone has 
resulted  in estimated  savings  to  industry  totalling £15m. The  four principle  suspects have 
been charged with serious fraud offences and trial listed for August 2014. 
The process known as  ‘Joint  Investigation Team’  (JIT) and  is  facilitated by Eurojust 
whose  mission  is  to  stimulate  and  improve  the  coordination  of  investigations  and 
prosecutions between  the competent authorities  in  the Member States and  improves  the 
cooperation  between  the  competent  authorities  of  the Member  States,  in  particular,  by 
facilitating the execution of international mutual legal assistance and the implementation of 
extradition requests.  
Eurojust may ask the competent authorities of the Member States concerned: 
 to investigate or prosecute specific acts; 
 to coordinate with one another;  
 to accept that one country is better placed to prosecute than another;  
 to set up a Joint Investigation Team; or 
 to provide Eurojust with information necessary to carry out its tasks.  
Furthermore, Eurojust: 
 shall ensure that the competent authorities  inform each other of  investigations 
and prosecutions of which they have been informed; 
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 shall assist the competent authorities in ensuring the best possible coordination 
of investigations and prosecutions; 
 shall  give  assistance  to  improve  cooperation  between  the  competent  national 
authorities, in particular based on Europol's analyses; 
 shall cooperate and consult with the European Judicial Network (EJN), and make 
use of and contribute to the improvement of its documentary database; 
 may,  in  accordance  with  its  objectives,  try  to  improve  cooperation  and 
coordination  between  the  competent  authorities,  and  forward  requests  for 
judicial  assistance  when  they:  (i)  are  made  by  the  competent  authority  of  a 
Member  State,  (ii)  concern  an  investigation  or  prosecution  conducted  by  that 
authority  in a  specific  case, and  (iii) necessitate  its  intervention with a view  to 
coordinated action; 
 may assist Europol, particularly with opinions based on analyses carried out by 
Europol; and 
 may  supply  logistical  support,  e.g.  assistance  in  translation,  interpretation  and 
the organisation of coordination meetings.  
What is a JIT?  
A JIT  is an  investigation team set up on the basis of an agreement between two or 
more Member States and/or other parties, for a specific purpose and limited duration.  
 
Advantages of using a JIT:  
In general the benefits of a JIT compared to that of traditional forms of international 
co‐operation,  such  as  “mirror"  or  "parallel"  investigations  and  International  Letters  of 
Request, are briefly  summarised below. This  list  is not exhaustive as  there may be many 
advantages to a JIT that are specific to the circumstances of each individual case. 
 
 Ability  to  share  information  directly  between  JIT  members  without  the  need  for 
formal requests.  
 Ability  to  request  investigative  measures  between  team  members  directly, 
dispensing with  the need  for  International  Letters of Request. This applies also  to 
requests for coercive measures.  
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 Ability  for  members  to  be  present  at  house  searches,  interviews,  etc.  in  all 
jurisdictions covered, helping to overcome language barriers in interviews, etc.  
 Ability  to co‐ordinate efforts on  the spot, and  for  informal exchange of specialised 
knowledge.  
 Ability  to  build  and  promote  mutual  trust  between  practitioners  from  different 
jurisdictions and work environments.  
 A  JIT  provides  the  best  platform  to  determine  the  optimal  investigation  and 
prosecution strategies.  
 Ability for Europol and Eurojust to be involved with direct support and assistance  
 Ability to apply for available EU, Eurojust or Europol funding.  
 Participation  in a JIT raises awareness of the management and improves delivery of 
international investigations.  
The  concept  of  JITs  arose  from  the  belief  that  existing  methods  of  international 
police and judicial co‐operation were, by themselves, insufficient to deal with serious cross‐
border organised crime. It was felt that a team of investigators and judicial authorities from 
two  or more  States, working  together with  clear  legal  authority  and  certainty  about  the 
rights, duties and obligations of the participants, would improve the fight against organised 
crime. 
 
JITs set up between EU Member States and third States  
JITs can be set up with and between countries outside of the European Union, provided that 
a legal basis for the creation of such JITs exists. The legal basis can take the form of:  
 an international legal instrument,  
 a bilateral Agreement,  
 a multilateral Agreement,  
 national legislation (e.g. Article(s) of the Code of Criminal Procedure).  
 
Requirements for a JIT  
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The approach for establishing a JIT is not dependent on the seriousness of a crime 
but rather from the crime‘s international and cross‐border dimension.  JITs may, in 
particular, be set up where: 
 a Member State's investigations into criminal offences require difficult and 
demanding investigations having links with other Member States, or  
 a number of Member States are conducting investigations into criminal offences in 
which the nature of the case necessitates co‐ordinated and concerted action in the 
Member States involved.  
JITs will usually be considered when investigating more serious forms of criminality. 
However, when considering setting up a JIT, national  legislation and operational guidelines 
should be checked  to determine whether  the creation of a  JIT  is  subject  to a  seriousness 
threshold or any other qualifying criteria. 
Whether  a  JIT  is  suitable  in  a  particular  case  depends  on  the  individual 
circumstances, but JITs can be considered in smaller as well as bigger cases.  
 involve Eurojust and Europol at earliest opportunity to discuss possible benefit of the 
creation of a JIT and concrete steps in formation  
 JITs  can  serve  as  basis  for  future  co‐operation  by  facilitation  of mutual  trust  and 
contacts  
 creation  of  a  JIT  can  be  suggested  by  a  Member  State,  as  well  as  Eurojust  and 
Europol  
 a JIT is a flexible investigative tool to be used for the benefit of the investigator.  
 
For more information on Eurojust and JITs see Eurojust  
 
Case Study: Op Soundwave 
Op Soundwave was a European wide investigation into ‘boiler room fraud’ which at 
its apex was  receiving millions of pounds  from UK based victims who believed  they were 
buying legitimate shares in upcoming bio‐fuel and mineral companies. By the conclusion of 
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the investigation police had identified 138 victims who had combined losses in excess of £11 
million.  
From the outset of the investigation it was apparent that the strategy would have to 
be innovative and expeditious due to the level of ongoing damage the OCG were causing to 
UK victims. The strategy that was undertaken used all facets of covert proactive policing in 
order to generate, identify and evidence the criminal role of each subject.  
 
Due  to  the  level of cooperation  that was needed  from  the Swedish authorities, an 
application was made to Eurojust, Hague for a ‘Joint Investigation Team’ to be undertaken 
between  the  UK  and  Sweden.  This  initiative  allowed  the  exchange  of  information  and 
performance  of  actions without  the  need  for  official  IMLAT  requests,  this  action  greatly 
increased  the  efficiency  and  speed  of  the  investigation.  In  addition  one  witness  from 
Sweden was kept under police protection throughout the prosecution phase due to threats 
and acts of violence he received from associates of the OCG.  
 
The preparation of this case was an incredibly complicated matter with the final case 
bundle  totalling  in  excess  50,000  pages,  all  of which was  served  electronically  to  reduce 
costs  for  the police and  the  judicial system.  In addition  to  this  the disclosure process was 
exceptionally complicated due to the amount of material seized during the operation. The 
case  involved  the  recovery of exhibits  from both Sweden, where witnesses were  located, 
and Spain, where their ‘boiler room’ premises were eventually located. 
 
 
3.4: Prosecuting Fraud 
The Crown Prosecution Service 
The Crown Prosecution Service has a dedicated, specialist,  fraud prosecution  team 
based  in London, Leeds, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool and Cardiff.    In addition each 
CPS Area has a Complex Casework Unit.  Fraud cases not appropriate for either of these two 
units are prosecuted by the CPS in the normal way alongside other mainstream crime. 
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The  majority  of  fraud  prosecutions  are  investigated  by  the  police  force  in  the 
geographical area in which the fraud is alleged to have taken place. The case is then usually 
referred to and dealt with by the CPS area geographically aligned to the investigating police 
force.   Either  the police  force or  the CPS Area  is entitled  to  refer a case  to  the Specialist 
Fraud  Division  for  consideration,  and  equally  the  Division  is  willing  to  give  advice  and 
support to police and local CPS prosecutors. 
The Specialist Fraud Division provides a dedicated fraud expertise to advise, from an 
early stage, on the most serious, complex and difficult  fraud and corruption  investigations 
being conducted by all police forces across England and Wales, with a view to bringing the 
resulting prosecutions.  
The  Division  also  prosecutes  all  criminal  tax,  excise  and  strategic  export  cases 
investigated  by  HMRC,  all  benefit  fraud  cases  investigated  by  DWP  and  criminal 
investigations  conducted  by  a  number  of  other  agencies  including  the  Medicines  and 
Healthcare Products Regulatory Authority and the Gangmasters Licensing Authority.       
Bringing this combination of specialisms within one Division  in the CPS reflects the 
fact that economic criminality can take many forms and enables the Division’s prosecutors 
to deploy a range of expertise to give effective advice to investigative bodies. The diversity 
of expertise also supports partnership working across different law enforcement bodies. 
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Ardoyne
Steve Strickland and Mike Betts suitably attired 
on Nigeria’s National Dress Day with Nigeria 
Police Commissioner Ayotunde Ogunsakin
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and most professional work he had ever seen.” 
The 21 ofﬁcers from the City who were work-
ing in Belfast in July also had to cope with some 
of the hottest temperatures recorded in North-
ern Ireland for several years. 
Insp Philp said: “It was incredibly hot, even 
through the night. We were in ballistic vests and 
stuck inside armoured Land Rover security ve-
hicles with no air conditioning. The heat was in-
tense with your full public order kit on.” 
The G8 Summit and Marching Season polic-
ing is the ﬁrst time mainland forces have been 
called in to support the PSNI. All City ofﬁcers re-
turned from both stints safe and well. 
Great Job: Read more about our role policing 
the G8 – at home and away – on pages 4 & 5
Insp Andy Philp, of B Group Operations, said: 
“We were right in the thick of it.  We were de-
ployed up by the Ardoyne shops area which 
is traditionally a ﬂashpoint between Loyalists 
and Nationalists.  
“We dealt with a barricade that was set 
alight and a chase through a housing estate. 
The entire serial was deployed in defence of 
the ofﬁcers who were chasing. We made one 
arrest of a female who was involved in the dis-
order and stopped a well known activist.
 “We were then deployed in another Loyal-
ist area, Mount Vernon, which had been the 
scene of street rioting. While we were up there 
we were able to prevent any further repeti-
tions of serious disorder. 
“We had a fantastic comment from one of 
the PSNI ofﬁcers, a veteran with 25 years ser-
vice. He said our deployment on the housing 
estate in the Ardoyne was probably the best 
PUBLIC ORDER ofﬁcers from City of London 
Police have returned from two tours of duty in 
Northern Ireland with praise for their profession-
alism ringing in their ears.
Ofﬁcers underwent specialist training in North-
ern Ireland policing tactics ahead of being de-
ployed in June at the heart of the G8 Summit when 
world leaders came to Northern Ireland in the 
tightest security operation seen in the UK since 
the London Olympics. 
The City of London Serial were hand-picked 
to work within the high security, inner perime-
ter of the G8 Summit where world leaders such as 
David Cameron and US President Barack Obama 
were staying. 
Less than a month later City of London Police of-
ﬁcers were called back to the Province to support-
the  Police Service Northern Ireland  (PSNI) as part 
of mutual aid to maintain order after a series of 
street riots during the Belfast Marching Season. 
City serial ‘in thick’ of Belfast action
A GROUND-BREAKING overseas mission to 
Nigeria has enabled the force’s Fraud Acad-
emy to establish an all important stronghold 
in West Africa, as well as raising the City of 
London Police’s proﬁle as a world leader in 
combating economic crime. 
The key objective of the visit was to show-
case the Fraud Academy’s courses and to 
discuss future opportunities for the City of 
London Police. 
The intense week-long trip, made by A/DCI 
Steve Strickland, DS Mike Betts and DS Mar-
tin Baldwin, was spent working alongside the 
Nigerian Police’s Special Fraud Unit (SFU) de-
livering a series of workshops to 150 delegates 
from both law enforcement and private sec-
tor agencies across Nigeria. 
Steve Strickland, ECD’s Head of Training 
and Educational Services, said: “The success 
of this trip has been breathtaking. The SFU, 
backed by almost every local speaker, are 
keen to ensure that this event becomes a reg-
ular occurrence.
“We have been taken aback by the huge in-
terest this event has generated; we made na-
tional TV as well as regular reporting in the 
daily newspaper. There has been much posi-
tive discussion for the Fraud Academy to pro-
vide future training to a wide range of agencies, 
banks and others from the ﬁnancial services 
sector. We are now very busy actively following 
up these many leads and enquiries.” 
The delegates attending the Fraud Acade-
my showcase learned about the City of Lon-
don Police’s history and the uniqueness of 
what we can do to help others around the 
world to combat economic crime and fraud. 
Det. Supt Paul Barnard said: “The trip to Ni-
geria has broken new ground for the Fraud 
Academy. We have plans to run more Fraud 
Academy showcase events in the United Arab 
Emirates and Malaysia. 
“This is a good news story, not simply for 
ECD, but for everyone in the force. It demon-
strates the potential of the Fraud Academy 
to generate signiﬁcant new revenue and that 
will be money re-invested in all types of polic-
ing here in the City.” 
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Academy In focus
A n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F o r c e  a g a i n s t  
E c o n o m i c  C r i m e  
Our status as the NaƟonal Lead Force for Economic Crime reaches much further than the 
UK; the Academy is conƟnually approached by Private and Public Sector organisaƟons 
from around the globe to provide world class economic crime educaƟon.  
 
From Nigeria to Dubai, we are proud to have delivered bespoke tuiƟon packages to a 
host of internaƟonal delegates, earning an unparalleled reputaƟon for creaƟng  pracƟcal  
training soluƟons to aid the global fight against economic crime. 
A message from Steve Strickland, Head of InternaƟonal Development  
 
Welcome to the Academy In Focus InternaƟonal  NewsleƩer.  
 
In this, the first issue of ‘In Focus’, we have reflected on the international highlights of the last year, you 
will see the wide variety of programmes that we have been working tirelessly to design and deliver to 
meet the needs of international investigators, counter fraud professionals and anti‐corruption specialists,  
providing them with the vital skills to combat economic crime in an ever changing and fast moving world. 
In future issues we will bring you details of forthcoming events, new programmes and the latest in  
organisational learning and best practice from the City of London Police and our specialist Fraud,  
Anti‐Corruption, Insurance, Intellectual Property and Cheque & Plastic Card Crime teams. 
 ISSUE ONE 
Helping Global Law Enforcement & Corporate Enterprises 
Tackle the Threat of Economic Crime 
As the NaƟonal Lead Force for Economic 
Crime the City of London Police is  
responsibility for sharing  knowledge,  
operaƟonal learning and best pracƟce to 
those commiƩed to combaƫng economic 
crime.  
 
We are constantly striving for  new and 
innovaƟve ways to enhance law  
enforcement capability and protect the  
corporate enterprises who engage in  
commercial business in the City of London 
and the financial centres of the world 
against the threat of economic crime.   
 
Under the umbrella of the City of London 
Police Economic Crime Directorate, a 
number of pracƟcal iniƟaƟves exist to 
prepare, prevent and protect against 
fraudulent aƩacks on the public and  
private sectors, culminaƟng in the pursuit 
of organised crime through intensive  
invesƟgaƟons reaching far across the 
globe.  
By using such unique live case studies, 
informaƟon based training with the  
Academy can provide the skills, tools and 
knowledge to breach vulnerable areas 
within corporate operaƟons. In addiƟon 
to our standard courses, our flexible  
training approach enables the Academy to 
tailor elements of fraud tuiƟon to meet 
the needs of internaƟonal law  
enforcement, government agencies and 
individual corporate enterprises. 
Working with the British High 
Commission in Botswana to  
increase operational  
capability of the DCEC 
Specialist investigative training for elite team 
dedicated to countering international corruption 
A recent pilot training  
programme delivered in  
Botswana by detecƟves from 
the Academy will shortly lead 
into a conƟnent wide  
anƟ‐bribery educaƟon  
iniƟaƟve to combat  
corrupƟon across Africa. 
 
The event delivered in March 
2014 at the Public Services 
College in the capital  
Gaborone was hosted by the 
Botswana Directorate on 
CorrupƟon and Economic   
Crime (DCEC). The DCEC is an  
autonomous law enforcement 
body formed in 1994 to  
invesƟgate, prevent and  
educate the public and  
private sector in counter fraud 
iniƟaƟves.   
 
The Academy team spent six 
days in Botswana, training 
thirty delegates from the 
DCEC and the Director of  
Public ProsecuƟons oﬃce.  
 
Whilst in Gaborone the team 
met representaƟves from the  
Commonwealth African AnƟ‐
CorrupƟon Centre (CAACC), a 
department co‐located within 
the DCEC which promotes anƟ
‐bribery and corrupƟon  
iniƟaƟves across Africa’s 
member states.  
 
As a result of this highly      
successful pilot, a schedule of 
future training events for 2014 
is currently being planned by 
the Academy.  One of the new 
iniƟaƟves for 2014 is a ‘Train 
the Trainer’ programme to 
provide developing countries 
with a sustainable and cost 
eﬀecƟve soluƟon for building 
naƟonal and internaƟonal 
capability.  
DCEC: 
International 
Anti-
Corruption  
Investigators 
Course 
Steve Strickland and David 
Aldous from the Academy 
deliver a bespoke 3 day 
course at the Public Services 
College, Gaborone, Botswana 
which was tailored for the 
specialist and highly complex 
work of the DCEC 
Joint enterprise with the British 
Foreign & Commonwealth  
Office for the Dubai Police 
 
The financial crisis has, 
popped the construcƟon  
bubble, and several high‐
profile corrupƟon cases have 
come to light, demonstraƟng 
a need for stricter controls in 
both the public and private 
sectors.  
 
The government has aimed to 
minimise the threat from 
corrupƟon through several 
iniƟaƟves and eﬀorts, one 
being the provision of  
specialist bribery intelligence 
and invesƟgaƟon training 
delivered by the Academy.  
 
This bespoke training  
programme was designed to 
reflect the local legal system 
and the operaƟonal pracƟces 
of the Dubai Police, taking 
account of the impact of the 
financial crisis and rise of  
corrupƟon invesƟgaƟons 
within the Emirates.  
 
The training programme  
incorporated the latest  
operaƟonal learning from the 
City of London’s Overseas 
AnƟ‐CorrupƟon Unit,  
incorporaƟng high profile 
case studies from  
invesƟgaƟons that have 
spanned the globe. 
Intensive investigators’ programme for specialist 
intelligence operatives in the Dubai Police 
The United Arab Emirates' (UAE) 
economic growth is largely 
based on a business‐friendly 
environment which has  
historically aƩracted substanƟal 
foreign investment.  
 
TradiƟonally, corrupƟon has not 
been a widespread  
phenomenon, and occurrences 
of peƩy corrupƟon were  
reportedly uncommon.  
Dඝඊඉඑ  
P඗ඔඑඋඍ: 
International 
Bribery &  
Corruption 
Programme 
Martin Baldwin and David 
Aldous deliver a  
specialist course designed for 
the Dubai Police and  
Intelligence Services 
International partnership to  
deliver Anti‐Bribery  
Management  Training  
Understanding Bribery and Effective Due Diligence  
City of London Police  
Commissioner, Adrian Leppard 
QPM, said: “Bribery is the most  
insidious form of corrupƟon. It 
permeates and destabilises the 
social fabric of developing  
socieƟes and denies  
communiƟes their righƞul 
aid.  Good business must be 
seen to idenƟfy and deter  
bribery, suﬀocaƟng its  
opportunity to manipulate and 
debase transacƟons. Business 
needs systems to achieve this 
and the BS 10500 AnƟ‐Bribery 
Management System Standard 
sets a benchmark for good busi‐
ness pracƟce both domesƟcally 
and internaƟonally.” 
The City of London Police, in 
partnership with the BriƟsh 
Standards InsƟtute (BSI) have 
designed a series of training 
programmes to combat the 
increasing prevalence of  
bribery and corrupƟon.  
 
The on‐going threat of  
corrupƟon in high‐risk  
countries poses a real danger 
to internaƟonal growth, trade 
and compeƟƟon.   
 
This programme, delivered at 
the Hong Kong oﬃces of BSI 
was the first internaƟonal 
oﬀering of the new 10500 AnƟ
‐Bribery Management  
training. Delegates aƩended 
from Indonesia, Korea,  
Taiwan, Vietnam, Hong Kong, 
China, Malaysia and India. 
 
The training programmes 
have been designed to give 
businesses peace of mind 
about their anƟ‐bribery  
strategies.  
 
The training delivered to the 
delegates will enable  
businesses to implement an 
eﬀecƟve anƟ‐bribery  
management system and  
conduct internal  
invesƟgaƟons of bribery.   
BSI  
H඗ඖඏ 
K඗ඖඏ: 
Anti-Bribery 
Management 
System 
Mike Betts, one of the  
Academy’s Anti-Corruption 
experts and project lead for 
the design of the BSI Anti-
Bribery Management System 
Training travels to Hong Kong 
to deliver the first international 
programme. 
Educational partnership  
between the Academy &  
Nigerian Special Fraud Unit (SFU) 
The intense week‐long trip, 
made by the Academy team, 
was spent working alongside 
the Nigerian Police’s SFU 
delivering a series of  
workshops to 150 delegates 
from both law enforcement 
and private sector agencies 
across Nigeria. 
 
Steve Strickland said: “The 
success of this trip has been 
breath taking. The SFU, 
backed by almost every local 
speaker, are keen to ensure 
that this event becomes a 
regular occurrence.” 
“We have been taken aback 
by the huge interest this 
event has generated; it has 
made naƟonal  TV as well as 
regular reporƟng in the daily 
newspaper. There has been 
much posiƟve discussion for 
the Academy to provide  
future training to a wide 
range of agencies, banks and 
others from the financial 
services sector.”  
 
The delegates aƩending the 
Academy’s showcase event 
learned about the City of 
London Police’s history and 
the uniqueness of what we 
can do to help others around 
the world to combat  
economic crime and fraud.  
A showcase event on Insider Abuse in Financial  
Institutions & The Implications on a Developing Economy 
A ground breaking overseas 
mission to Nigeria has  
enabled the Academy to  
establish an all important 
stronghold in West Africa, as 
well as raising the City of 
London Police’s profile as a 
world leader in combaƟng 
economic crime. 
 
The key objecƟve of the visit 
was to showcase the  
Academy’s courses and to 
discuss future opportuniƟes 
for the City of London Police. 
Nඑඏඍකඑඉ 
SFU: 
Corporate 
Fraud 
5 Day  
Workshop 
Steve Strickland, Mike Betts and 
Martin Baldwin celebrate the 
success of the 5 day workshop 
delivered to delegates from  
law enforcement, regulators and  
financial institutions 
Joint programme delivered in partnership with 
Euromed Police III 
International Fight Against Corruption 
In the framework of Euromed 
Police III Project, the sixth 
training seminar was delivered 
in partnership with the City of 
London Police Economic Crime 
& Fraud Training Academy on 
“Fight Against InternaƟonal 
CorrupƟon.” 
 
23 delegates from 7 South 
Mediterranean countries, 
namely Algeria, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco 
and PalesƟnian Authority 
aƩended this seminar, all  
being professionally  
concerned by the topic.  
Delegates studied the harm 
and impact of corrupƟon,  
analyzing the various levels 
and aspects of corrupƟon in 
the world, looking at the  
damage caused to society, 
reducing public confidence in 
government and public  
insƟtuƟons, increasing  
poverty, poor quality of  
products, inequality and civil 
unrest.  
 
Case studies were presented 
on the diﬀerent ways of  
detecƟng, invesƟgaƟng and 
prosecuƟng corrupƟon  
including a study of the  
various internaƟonal legal 
systems and the benefits from  
employing a mulƟdisciplinary 
approach, drawing on the  
experƟse of civil and criminal 
pracƟƟoners as well as  
developers of the most  
advanced technological  
soluƟons.  
 
The seminar concluded with a 
focus on the need for  
internaƟonal co‐operaƟon 
which is an absolute  
requirement for the eﬀecƟve 
and eﬃcient invesƟgaƟon of 
corrupƟon. 
Eඝක඗ඕඍඌ: 
International 
Fight Against 
Corruption 
Steve Strickland, Mike Betts 
and Chris Felton deliver the 
Academy’s first international 
corruption programme with 
specialist speakers from  
Italian Guarda di Finanze, 
Israeli National Fraud  
Investigations Unit, French 
Gendarmerie and  
Jordanian National Police  
About the Academy  
Launched in 2011, the extraordinary demand for training from 
the NaƟonal Lead Force for Economic Crime has driven rapid 
development within The Academy with a diverse variety of 
both naƟonal and global Public and Private Sector  
organisaƟons and individuals benefiƫng from the unparalleled  
experience of learning priceless counter fraud and anƟ‐
corrupƟon techniques from an unprecedented training team  
of serving City of London police oﬃcers.  
 
With a focus on pracƟce over theory, The Academy curriculum 
draws upon the Economic Crime Directorate of the City of  
London Police, recognised as one of the world’s greatest  
resources of economic crime intelligence, developing real Ɵme 
training content sourced from current high profile economic 
crime invesƟgaƟons.  
 
2014 heralds a new exciƟng phase of teaching at the Academy 
to include e‐learning, corporate partnerships and theatre 
workshops. Our mission to educate as wide an audience as 
possible in the detecƟon and prevenƟon of  economic crime 
conƟnues, underpinned by the Ɵreless economic crime         
invesƟgaƟve work of The City of London Police. 
Is 2014 going to be your year to 
benefit from the Academy’s 
specialist training services? 
 
We recognise that quality training should deliver organisaƟonal 
and operaƟonal improvements that are tangible and measurable.  
 
We want to help you realise these improvements – which is why 
we oﬀer a comprehensive pre and post course customer support 
service. We can help you idenƟfy training needs, develop a  
bespoke course or programme and oﬀer a range of post course 
services from mentoring to work‐based assessment and analysis 
of benefits. 
 
We look forward to welcoming you to one of our City of London 
based training venue or one of our remote sites provided by our 
partners in the UK and overseas. AlternaƟvely, if you have a  
suitable training venue of your own and would like us to come  
to you, then please let us know. 
 +44 20 7601 6798 
 AÃùΜ®ãùÊ¥½ÊÄÊÄ.ÖÊ½®.ç» 
 HƩp://bit.ly/fraudtrainingacademy  
